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ART. I.—UNSECTARIANISM AND SCIENTIFIC
SECULARISM.

First Principles. By HERBERT SPENCER. London. 1862.

Lay Sermons. By T. H. HUXLEY, LL.D., F.R.S. London. 1870.

Fragments of Science for Unscientific People. By JOHN TYNDALL, LL.D., F.R.S. London. 1871.

Essays on the Use and Limit of the Imagination in Science. By JOHN TYNDALL, LL.D., F.R.S. London. 1871.

ALTHOUGH the portentous catastrophes which at intervals befall nations, as well as their gradual disintegration and decay are always predominantly, as well as ultimately, due to moral evil, it is none the less certain that intellectual defects often exercise a powerful influence in intensifying the former and in accelerating the latter. This is especially the case when such defects occasion a wide-spread popular misapprehension of terms and epithets, parts of the meanings of which strongly appeal to most powerful social instincts.

The results of such misapprehension (fatal miscarriages of philanthropic effort) form some of the most depressing and disappointing phenomena which mark critical epochs in the evolution of the political and social condition of the civilized world.

In spite of the gross immorality and the profound irreligion which dominated that movement of the North German mind, misnamed the Reformation, it cannot be doubted but that ignorant well-intentioned zeal contributed to its advance. Ignorance of the essentially Papal character of the Christian Church, and want of appreciation of the deadly nature of Erastianism, were necessary precursors of that miserable Lutheran heresy, the moral consequences of which its wretched author was one of the first to deplore, while politically it resulted in that thirty years of war the devastating and disintegrating effects of

which, on Germany, only ended through the sharp cautery of the Napoleonic invasions, if even through that.

The most notable example which the world has ever produced of social and political disappointment of the kind above referred to, is, perhaps, that great political and social transformation—the French Revolution.

In spite of wide-spread moral corruption, and the ravages of Voltairean unbelief, never perhaps was a people more moved by aspirations after social regeneration or philanthropic action, more eager and energetic, than in the France of that period.

The privileged classes, on the memorable 4th of August, 1789, divested themselves of their time-honoured distinctions with an eagerness of which it is impossible not to admire the generosity, while lamenting the precipitancy and imprudence. From the unhappy king downwards, a strong desire prevailed that henceforth the nation, having secured freedom for all, should march forward in peaceful "progression," guided by the light of an "emancipated reason." Yet the result of all these well-meaning efforts was that unprecedented series of horrors, the faint reproduction of part of which appalled us in the past year. In the name of "liberty" the first conditions of freedom were made impossible for at least three generations—as the event has shown.

The deeply-seated causes of political crises generally escape detection by contemporaries. In the latter part of the 18th century the promoters of the movement as little dreamed of the true nature of their labour, as did the democratic tyrants of its culmination imagine that they were not destroying, but rather intensifying, the evils of the *ancien régime* itself. With passionate invocations of liberty the last feeble barriers against utter despotism were levelled to the ground, and the germinating seeds of freedom still left in the provincial assemblies were torn up in the interest of a bureaucracy yet more centralized than that which existed under the Bourbon kings.

For a calm and judicial investigation of the causes of such a miscarriage of effort, society is (as now is generally admitted) pre-eminently indebted to the labours of Alexis de Tocqueville. In his work on the *ancien régime* he has most conclusively demonstrated how fatal to real reform, and to the social amelioration so much desired, were the destruction of the nobility and the confiscation of all ecclesiastical landed property; to say nothing of that violent warfare against all religion, resulting in a moral degeneracy, the fatal effects of which France is even now reaping; and but too probably has still to reap.

"Du dix-huitième siècle et de la Révolution, comme d'une source commune, étaient sortis deux fleuves; le premier con-

duisait les hommes aux institutions libres, tandis que le second les menait au pouvoir absolu." At its close: "Les Français se trouvèrent plus loin de la liberté qu'ils ne l'avaient été à aucune époque de l'histoire." *

These memorable results were in no slight degree due to widespread misapprehensions as to the true meaning of the phrases adopted as the favourite Shibboleths of the period. In this way the unlimited despotism of the dominant party came to be taken as synonymous with "freedom," the degradation of all superiority as "equality before the law," the brutalities of a profane mob as "religious liberty." Freedom, legal equity, and the liberty of religion—worthy objects of aspiration indeed—thus, through confusion of thought and expression, lent their powerful aid (as stimuli to generous emotion) to the perpetration of acts directly opposed to the real objects which those emotions favoured.

Had it been possible to make the leaders of the movement, or the mass of the nation, apprehend clearly the true signification of their favourite watchwords, the results would probably have been widely different. Unhappily that great nation—claiming to be yet at the head of the world's civilization—still suffers from the poison of that fatal period; and its further decay and corruption are certain, unless it possesses sufficient recuperative energy (sufficient moral force and religious faith) to expel at last the virus.

Hardly anything can be more important to a nation, in a period pregnant with social or political changes, than that it should clearly apprehend the real objects aimed at; for misapprehension may so pervert the action of generous emotions as to cause it to miscarry, and produce results the very opposite to those originally intended.

After a long period of comparative tranquillity, or of changes which have been almost exclusively political, signs are not wanting to warn us that we ourselves are entering upon an epoch of active social transformation.

In England, at the present moment, we find ardent aspirations and efforts in favour of the elevation and improvement of the lower classes, a wider distribution of comfort and happiness, and an equitable adjustment of public burthens. Social changes may easily produce consequences greater than any resulting from merely political transformations. The latter modify, indeed, the structure of the political fabric, but the former may

* Speech of M. de Tocqueville in the Chamber of Deputies, 28th May, 1840.

directly affect the source of energy itself, or even the very coherence of its particles.

Warned then by the past and instructed by the example of France, it becomes not only desirable, but necessary, carefully to avoid fatal misunderstandings, so that no verbal ambiguities may induce destruction where the real aim was to edify.

The estimable aspirations of our philanthropists have chiefly manifested themselves in two sets of actions. One of these has consisted of endeavours to promote the greater welfare of the masses by exhortations and publications, and by material means, such as the erection of baths and washhouses, model lodging-houses, &c. The other set (which, of late, may be said to have become *the movement* of the day) has been made up of measures and proceedings intended to diffuse and improve popular education. In a word, the objects aimed at by the present movement are (in the ideas and intentions of very many) nothing less high than the promotion of "truth" and "godliness" as included and implied in the "amelioration of the conditions of life."

It becomes, then, supremely important for the influential masses of our fellow-countrymen to ascertain accurately what is and what should be meant by "amelioration," and what *is* and should be meant by "education."

The prevailing direction of intellectual effort at any one period cannot but modify its various aims and modes of action. The external manifestation of sanctity by a S. Bernard at the epoch of the Crusades, and that exhibited by a S. Francis of Sales at the period of the *renaissance*, are as diverse as might be expected from the intellectual contrast between the two centuries.

Moreover, if the results of such efforts are both dazzling as to their success, and unquestionable as to their utility, the influence must be greatly intensified. No wonder then that at the present day, conceptions as to "amelioration" and "education" are deeply coloured by the influence of the physical sciences, the wonderful progress of which during the last two centuries is the commonplace of our popular literature. We might expect *à priori* that *physical* welfare and *physical* truth would enter largely—often almost exclusively—into contemporary conceptions of those objects, deemed the most worthy of pursuit, as tending directly to promote "truth" and "well-being."

Side by side with this physical aspect of contemporary teaching we yet find in England that there is now an increasing tendency to idealism in philosophy, which, if it only continues and augments, will (in spite of its errors and dangers), to a cer-

tain extent, modify the one-sided effects of physical predominance, and will so far do good, as it forces upon general recognition the fact that there *is* science which is *not* physical, and that, to say the least, it is to this *non*-physical science that precedence must be yielded even by the professors of physical science themselves. This is largely exemplified by the more recent teaching of Professor Huxley, as also by that of Mr. Herbert Spencer, Professor Tyndall, and Dr. Bence Jones.

Nevertheless, this idealism is as yet far from popular and widespread, and, in view of the rapid march of events, no time should be lost in forcing on the attention of the middle class in this country the great importance of forming a correct estimate of what share physical science can justly claim in social amelioration and education, lest by its hypertrophy a corresponding atrophy of other knowledge and of other yet more important well-being than the merely physical, should ensue.

Now it is undeniable that we not seldom meet with certain ambiguous popular phrases which are intended to express such aspirations as have been spoken of above, after "goodness" and "truth."

Thus there is a strong desire that education should be more "scientific," and as much as possible "unsectarian." The amelioration of the masses is to be accomplished by increasing their "welfare," aided by the promotion of "morality" not based on "theological dogmas," while, above all, those persons and those measures are to be encouraged which are found ticketed with the euphemistic title "liberal."

On the other hand, it is not expressly denied that a nation is in some sense an organic whole—not a mere herd of individuals. It is not denied that the merely animal wants of men are unfitted to be the highest object of desire for each, nor that the lowest mental processes are not the most deserving of cultivation. Again, it is not expressly denied that to act under a strong sense of God's supervision, and in accordance with what is believed to be His will, is the supreme duty, and, moreover, calculated to serve the highest interest of each citizen and of the entire nation.

Nevertheless we are convinced, and think we can make it plain, that the logical result of much popular teaching and the utterances of more than one popular leader of high standing and deserved eminence in certain fields, tend inevitably to reduce the nation to a herd, or rather chaos, of self-seeking units; tend to discourage self-denial, and to make willing subordination seem a Quixotic imbecility; tend to deprive moral aspiration at one and the same time of its highest aim and its highest sanction; tend to make men regard the gratification of their animal

wants as the "summum bonum"; while as to their reasoning faculties, they tend to dwarf the highest power of the intellect by the undue stimulation of its lower powers and activities.

We are also convinced, and also think we can make it plain, that these results are mainly, or in great part, owing to the misapprehension of the full meaning of terms, the generous instincts in the meantime urging on vigorous and immediate action, which cannot but more or less entirely fail of its aim, and produce dire mischief, in spite of the best intentions, owing to those very misapprehensions.

The modes of intellectual action at present employed to promote the good ends aimed at, are mainly three:—1. Magazine and newspaper articles; 2. Popular lectures to adults, and especially to working men; and, 3. The direct teaching given to children.

Neglecting for the present the teaching of the young, let us note certain utterances of popular teachers of high standing which appear to have met with a very wide acceptance.

Professor Tyndall, in his treatise on "The Constitution of Nature" (reprinted in his collected essays), to the question, "Was space furnished at once, by the fiat of Omnipotence, with these burning orbs?" replies:—

To this question the man of science, if he confine himself within his own limits, will give no answer, though it must be remarked, that in the formation of an opinion he has *better materials to guide him than anybody else.* ("Fragments of Science," p. 6.)

In his address to the students of University College, he tells them that the poet of the future

Ought to be the interpreter of that power which, as "Jehovah, Jove, or Lord," has *hitherto filled and strengthened the human heart.* (Ibid., p. 106.)

Again, in his paper on "Vitality," he remarks:—

The most advanced philosophers of the present day declare that they ultimately arrive at a single source of power, from which all vital energy is derived; and the *disquieting circumstance* is that this source is *not the direct fiat of a supernatural agent*, but a reservoir of what, if we do not accept the creed of Zoroaster, must be regarded as inorganic force. (Ibid., p. 436.)

Moreover, all this shallow dogmatism is unaccompanied by one word of explanation as to the absence of any real, necessary conflict between the action of evolution itself and the conception of its results being absolutely and primarily due to the "fiat of a supernatural agent."

Once more, in his little work on the "Use and Limit of the Imagination in Science," he expresses himself thus:—

Whence come we; whither go we? The question dies without an answer

—without even an echo—upon the infinite shores of the Unknown.* Let us follow matter to its utmost bounds; let us claim it in all its forms to experiment with and to speculate upon. Casting the term, "vital force" from our vocabulary, let us reduce, if we can, the visible phenomena of life to mechanical attractions and repulsions. Having thus exhausted physics and reached its very rim, the real mystery still looms beyond us. We have, in fact, made no step towards its solution. And thus it will ever loom—ever beyond the bourne of knowledge—compelling the philosophers of successive ages to confess that

"We are such stuff

As dreams are made of, and our little life

Is rounded with a sleep."

Finally, this popular physicist says of the theory of evolution :—

Many who hold it would probably assent to the position that at the present moment all our philosophy, all our poetry, all our science, and all our art—Plato, Shakespeare, Newton, and Raphael—are potential in the fires of the sun. We long to learn something of our origin. If the evolution hypothesis be correct, even this unsatisfied yearning must have come to us across the ages which separate the unconscious primeval mist from the consciousness of to-day. ("Fragments of Science," p. 163.)

What then is the creed, what are the lessons likely to be learned by young or inquiring minds amongst non-Catholics from this scientific catechism? What will be gathered from such passages as those referred to (which are not elsewhere retracted or explained away by their author), from that which they inevitably imply, as well as from that which they actually express? For while religious belief retains its social power in any country, those who attack it will mostly, more or less (like the infamous Voltaire), veil their hostility, and seek by implication, insinuation, or studied silence, to produce an effect far exceeding that openly aimed at by their express words.

As far as can be gathered from Professor Tyndall's words—and we are anxious to state his views with the utmost fairness, his authoritative teaching may be thus formulated :—

I. The professors of physical science, who are to be the supreme pontiffs† of the future, are better qualified "than any-

* It may not unreasonably be asked, how, if they are *unknown*, those shores can be *known* to be infinite.

† Professor Tyndall has the honour of having the irrepressible M. Gambetta (M. Thiers' *fou furieux*) for a colleague in this promulgation. That eminently "liberal" politician exclaimed : "Faisons appel aux savants ; qu'ils prennent l'initiative ; ce sont eux qui peuvent hâter *le plus puissamment* notre restauration morale et nationale." (Speech delivered at Bordeaux on the 26th June, 1871.)

body else" to judge the highest questions of philosophy and religion, though the actual interpreters of the unknowable are to be the poets.

II. The duly instructed can no longer have their "hearts strengthened" by the conception of the First Cause as "Jehovah," or even as "Lord."

III. The Patres Conscripti, or rather the Pontifices Maximi, have dogmatically defined and decreed that there is one "single source of power, from which all vital energy is derived"—an "inorganic force."

IV. The inquiry as to the origin and the end of human life is fruitless, and therefore the effort to discover our proper aim is an endeavour to solve what is hopelessly insoluble.

V. Nevertheless we do come from a fire such as that of the sun, and love that charity which "thinketh no evil"; humility, piety, and holiness are essentially derived from heat, and are merely different "modes of motion."

Let us now turn to the teaching of him who is styled by Mr. Darwin "our great philosopher," namely, Mr. Herbert Spencer.*

In his "First Principles," this writer distinctly tells us that Theism is not only incredible but inconceivable (p. 43), and that "every form of religion" is not "even thinkable" (p. 46). In the place of God we are presented with "the unknowable"!

To the very natural objection that thus an emotionless and "unthinkable abstraction" (p. 114) is offered to us, "instead

* The various estimates of Mr. Herbert Spencer commonly met with, whether on the part of admirers and disciples, or whether on the parts of opponents, seem to us exceedingly exaggerated.

We have no wish to detract from the admiration due to one who has thought out for himself so much as Mr. Spencer has; but, at the same time, it must not be forgotten that he might have spared himself great labour, and have arrived at far more philosophical views, had he made himself acquainted with the labours of his predecessors. Mr. Spencer gives forth to the world as novelties errors both promulgated and refuted centuries ago. To Catholics it would be simply amusing, did not charity make it also painful, to see how he solemnly enunciates, as wonderful discoveries, partial truths, perfectly familiar to Catholic theologians, but which, being divorced from other truths complementary to them, become the most pernicious errors. In spite, however, of much mischief effected by this writer, he is none the less indirectly an instrument for good and for the promotion of the Catholic faith. He is this, inasmuch as, with but a slight modification, his system might be made to harmonize with theology, while, even in its unmodified state, it is a powerful solvent of those crude and illogical forms of belief on which so many repose in a false security. It is much to be regretted that Mr. Spencer remains profoundly ignorant of Catholic theology, which contains all the philosophical truths he advances, together with the others necessary for their completion.

of a Power which we can regard as having some sympathy with us," we are quietly and coolly told, "this kind of protest of necessity accompanies every change from a lower creed to a higher."

"No mental revolution can be accomplished without more or less of laceration." The same writer, in an article in the "Fortnightly Review" for April, 1871, makes clear his belief that our highest aspirations after holiness, and our love of eternal goodness and beauty, are nothing but modified brutal instincts of the lowest kind, developed by experience and utility. Altogether the teaching of "our great philosopher" comprises the following dogmas:—

I. Theism is false and absurd.

II. Rewards and punishments in a future life are the delusions of superstition.

III. Prayer is an absurdity, as there is no God having any personal sympathy with us.

IV. There is no difference of kind, but only of degree, between the intellect of a sage or the emotions of a saint, and the psychological faculties of a mud-fish.

V. There is no such thing as free will, no man having any more real option, as to his thoughts and intentions, than has a leaf to resist the action of the wind.

If Mr. Spencer is more or less extensively esteemed as a teacher, a far more general acceptance is enjoyed by that eminently popular naturalist Professor Huxley, who has of late wandered beyond his special subjects of exposition into the wider fields of ethics, politics, and metaphysics. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of a teaching followed and accepted with so much avidity by a large section of the middle and lower classes, and it will be well to consider carefully the dicta put forth by so popular an authority,—an authority, moreover, by no means relying upon the power of persuasion or the force of truth, but ready, as soon as practicable, to call in the aid of the "secular arm" to give effect to the anathemas of a "scientific syllabus."

In Professor Huxley's Lay Sermons the following passages occur:—

I say that natural knowledge, seeking to satisfy natural wants, has found the ideas which can alone still spiritual cravings. (p. 14.)

The Gospel enunciated by the Professor, is, after all, anything but "good tidings." He tells us:

In this *sadness*, this consciousness of the limitation of man, this *sense* of an open secret which he cannot penetrate, lies the *essence* of all religion. (p. 15.)

The familiar phrase "serious views" is very inadequate to

express the deep depression of the creed proposed to us, in place of that which tells us "Rejoice always, and again I say unto you rejoice." Mr. Spencer's expression for the First Cause is fully accepted, since we are told, as to the unknowable, that we

Know (!), to our cost, that he never overlooks a mistake, or makes the smallest allowance for ignorance. (p. 36.)

Again we read :

Were mankind deserving of the title "rational," which they arrogate to themselves, there can be no question that they would consider, as *the most necessary* of all branches of instruction for themselves and for their children, that which professes to acquaint them with the conditions of the existence they prize so highly, which teaches them how to avoid disease, and to cherish health in themselves and those who are dear to them. (p. 98.) It becomes clear that all living powers are cognate, and that all living forms are fundamentally of one character. (p. 142.)

Even those manifestations of intellect, of feeling, and of will, which we rightly name the higher faculties, are . . . "to every one but the subject of them, known only as transitory changes in the relative positions of parts of the body." (p. 135.)

In the first place, we should be glad to know on what principle Professor Huxley considers one human mental manifestation "higher" than another ; but letting this pass, surely "known *by means of* changes of position," would be the more correct form of expression. Yet sometimes the Professor does not scruple to go beyond the facts of phenomena, into the region of abstractions and occult causes, as freely as his neighbours. Thus he tells us : "We do not hesitate to believe that, in some way or another," the properties of water "result from the properties of the component elements of water." (p. 150.)

It is difficult to understand this bold assertion on Professor Huxley's own principles. At other times he does not scruple to ignore and practically deny what is evident to the reason, though hidden from the sense, as when he tells us that :

A nucleated mass of protoplasm turns out to be what may be termed the structural unit of the human body. As a matter of fact, the body, in its earliest state, is a mere multiple of such units ; and, in its present condition, it is a multiple of such units, variously modified. (p. 140.)

Yet who can doubt that in the living body there is a latent, active principle wanting in the recent corpse, though composed of the same identical masses of nucleated protoplasm ?

The Professor has of late become the expositor of the idealist philosophy, according to which mental phenomena are to each individual most unquestionably *the* primary objects of know-

ledge, and yet he tells us "it is obvious that our knowledge of what we call the material world, is, to begin with, at least as certain and definite as that of the spiritual world." (p. 155.) And more recently,* he has said, as to "psychoses" and "neuroses," "The right view is that they are connected together in the relation of cause and effect, psychoses being *secondary*, and following on neuroses!"

Finally we meet with the following passage:—

If a man asks me what the politics of the inhabitants of the moon are, and I reply that I do not know; that neither I, nor any one else, have any means of knowing; and that, under these circumstances, I decline to trouble myself about the subject at all.....in replying thus, I conceive that I am simply honest and truthful, and show a proper regard for the economy of time. So Hume's strong and subtle intellect takes up a great many problems about which we are naturally curious, and *shows us* that they are essentially questions of lunar politics, in their essence incapable of being answered, and therefore not worth the attention of men who have work to do in the world.

He then quotes Hume saying:

"If we take in hand any volume of divinity, or school metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, *Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?* No. *Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?*—No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."

Professor Huxley adds,

Permit me to enforce this *most wise* advice. Why trouble ourselves about matters of which, however important they may be, we do know nothing, and *can know nothing?* (p. 159.)

The expression "*can know nothing*" is sufficiently dogmatic, especially on the part of one who tells us that "of the existence of self" we have not, nor "can we by any possibility have," the highest degree of certainty. (p. 359.)

In his address to the members of the Midland Institute he remarks:

I take it that the good of mankind means the attainment, by every man, of all the happiness which he can enjoy, without diminishing the happiness of his fellow-men.

And,

If we inquire what kinds of happiness come under this definition, we find those derived from the sense of security or peace; from wealth, or com-

* In his last lecture at the Finsbury Institution, given in the past winter.

modity, obtained by commerce ; from art ; from knowledge, or science ; and, finally, from sympathy or friendship.

And here we must remark, in spite of his contact with many working men, how utter must be the Professor's lack of acquaintance with the real life of the poor, thus completely to exclude from the catalogue of human happiness all considerations of religion, its hopes, its stimulus, its consolations. Had he but practised that profession which counts him amongst its members, he could hardly have failed to encounter amongst the sick and suffering some poor souls whose one stay and consolation, amidst a crushing accumulation of earthly woe, has been a trustful belief in a heavenly Father's love, and the prospect of a supernatural union with Him in the life beyond the grave.

As before, we may lay down the following propositions as the summary of Professor Huxley's moral and religious teaching:—

I. Physical science is the one only fountain at which spiritual thirst can be quenched.

II. Sadness is of the essence of religion.

III. The First Cause is inexorable and pitiless.

IV. He looks with favour on the learned Dives, not on the poor and ignorant Lazarus.

V. Physical welfare and happiness are the summum bonum.

VI. Security, wealth, culture, and sympathy are the only rational objects of pursuit.

VII. All aspirations or efforts after divine things—the love of God or beatitude in a future life—are simple waste of time, if not worse, and are fit only for lunatics.

VIII. Knowledge of all such subjects is impossible to us.

If we were to pursue the inquiry from the pontiffs down to the acolyths and ostiarii of the physically-scientific hierarchy, far more exaggerated expressions could easily be produced, tending to drive further home the principles insinuated by their leaders. Thus Mr. Barratt, in his *Physical Ethics*, tells us nakedly that “no pleasure is bad, except when it means pain,” and that “the good is pleasure.” Mr. Winwood Reade, a friend and ardent disciple of Mr. Darwin, very pithily states the ultimate conclusions of his recent work, which deals with so wide a field, and is entitled the “*Martyrdom of Man*.” He therein tells us: “God-worship is idolatry ; prayer is useless ; the soul is not immortal ; there are no rewards, and there are no punishments in a future state.” Of course Mr. Reade fully adopts Mr. Darwin's views as to the essential brutality of our nature ; and indeed almost, though quite involuntarily, caricatures the teaching of his master regarding the ape-origin of man.

Such crude views, "*le rationalisme grossier*," and its grotesque pretensions to intellectual eminence, have been well characterized by Mr. James Stirling:*

"There was a time," says Hegel, "when a man who did not believe in ghosts or the devil was named a philosopher!" But an "advanced thinker," to these distinctions negative of the unseen, adds—what is positive of the seen—an enlightened pride in his father the monkey! He may enjoy, perhaps, a well-informed satisfaction in contemplating *mere material phenomena that vary with conditions*, as the all of this universe, or he may even experience an elevation into the moral sublime when he points to his future in the rock, in the form of those bones and other remains of a *Pithecius intelligens*, which, in all probability (he reflects) no subsequent intelligence will ever handle—but monkey is the pass-word! Sink your pedigree as man, and adopt for family tree a procession of the skeletons of monkeys—then superior enlightenment radiates from your very person, and your place is fixed—a place of honour in the acclamant brotherhood that names itself "advanced"! So it is in England at present; this is the acknowledged pinnacle of English thought and English science now. Just point in these days to the picture of some huge baboon, and, suddenly—before such enlightenment—superstition is disarmed, priests confess their imposture, and the Church sinks—beneath the hippocampus of a gorilla. ("The Secret of Hegel," Preface, p. xxxi.)

These words express truly enough a state of opinion still but too widely prevalent in England. We are not without hope, however, that ere long a more general diffusion of a truer philosophy will cause the essential difference between the psychical natures of man and of brutes, to be more clearly apprehended. Then a belief in the monkey-ancestry of man will very soon pass away into the limbo of discarded physical superstitions.

It would indeed be well if some of those who so recklessly advocate popular teaching, such as that we have called attention to, would ponder over the utterances of continental infidels, in order that they might see the logical outcome of those same popular teachings; for it is continental writers who most fearlessly develop their principles to their full results.

Guillaume Marr, a journalist of Lausanne, in a general report addressed to the *Conseil d'Etat* some years ago, dared to assert as follows:

Faith in a personal and living God is the origin and the fundamental cause of our miserable social condition. . . . The true road to liberty, to equality, and to happiness, is atheism. No safety on earth, so long as man holds on by a thread to Heaven. Let nothing henceforward

* See "Fortnightly Review" for November, 1871, p. 539.

shackle the spontaneity of the human kind. Let us teach man that there is no other God than *himself*; that *he* is the Alpha and the Omega of all things, the superior being and the most real reality.

Again, Caro observes :

Science conducts God with honour to its frontiers, thanking him for his provisional services. ("L'Idée de Dieu," p. 47.)

Feuerbach tells us plainly :

Les antichrétiens, les athées, les *humanistes* (qui ne reconnaissent d'autre Dieu que l'humanité) aujourd'hui sont bien maltraités ; mais ayons bon courage ; l'athéisme humanitaire n'est plus dans les camarillas des grands seigneurs riches et fainéants, comme au xviii^e siècle, il est descendu dans le cœur des travailleurs qui sont pauvres, *des travailleurs d'esprit* comme des travailleurs de bras ; *il aura sous peu le gouvernement du globe.*" ("Qu'est-ce que la Religion," p. 586.)

Another writer of the same school remarks :

Les feuilletonistes français, qui prétendent attaquer les moines, ne voient pas qu'ils font cause commune avec eux, puisqu'ils admettent, comme eux l'article fondamental, *la notion de conscience morale et la distinction du bien et du mal*. Le plus célèbre d'entre eux n'est lui-même qu'un poète jésuitique. Les seuls opposant véritable à l'imposture religieuse, c'est nous et nos doctrines purement et radicalement négatives. (Gratry, "Une Étude sur la Sophistique contemporaine," p. 153.)

Returning to our English physical expositors before quoted, we will now sum up the teaching in which they appear to concur, or at least the teaching which is the ultimate and logical outcome of their expositions—the dogmas which can hardly fail to impress themselves upon the minds of their disciples who follow them with so simple and unhesitating a trust. They may be drawn up as follows :

- I. Temporal happiness is the one rational aim of life.
- II. A positive belief in God and a future life is an unwarrantable superstition.
- III. Virtue and pleasure are synonymous, for in root and origin they are identical.
- IV. Men are essentially but brutes, no differences of kind dividing them.
- V. The cause of all things has not personality, and consequently neither feeling, nor intelligence, nor will.
- VI. All who pretend to teach religion are impostors or dupes.
- VII. Our physical science teachers are the supreme exponents of all truth, and the ultimate arbiters of all actions.
- VIII. There is no such thing as real merit or demerit, as all

our actions are absolutely determined for us, and freewill is the most baseless of delusions.

Frightful and desolating as are the errors thus authoritatively taught to unsuspecting people, such as are the majority of those who run after the declamations of our popular teachers of physical science, those errors acquire an additional importance from another characteristic of the anti-religious school, which is rapidly becoming more manifest,—prudential disguise being discarded, as no longer necessary.

The Church, the pillar and ground of truth, is even better able to contend with and overcome our Sophists of to-day than she was to refute their far more acute and able predecessors of bygone centuries. Even the mutilated, illogical, and nebulous forms of Christianity popular in this country might have had comparatively little immediately to fear from attacks based upon physical science only, but for the characteristic to which we refer,—which is the more and more avowed appeal to persecution and physical force.

A short time ago it might have been contended that these speculations, however calculated to damage individuals, were not of immediate political importance.

The unsuspecting might have contended that these physical dogmatists were all “liberals,” and that therefore no hindrance to free inquiry, or the untrammelled propagation of truth, need ever be apprehended at *their hands*, and that with a fair field and no favour truth must prevail.

Indeed, Mr. Herbert Spencer* speaks of “That spirit of toleration which is so marked a characteristic of modern times, and is daily growing more conspicuous,” and says :

Our toleration should be the widest possible ; or rather, we should aim at something beyond toleration, as commonly understood. In dealing with alien beliefs our endeavour must be, not simply to refrain from injustice of word or deed, but also to do justice by an open recognition of positive worth. We must qualify our disagreement with as much as may be of sympathy. (*Ibid.*, p. 122.)

These are sentiments which, were they universal, would make such considerations as we are attempting to bring forward in this article less imperative. It is greatly to be feared, however, that this benevolent prediction as to the increase of toleration has as little foundation in truth as had the philanthropic anticipations that war was at an end when the first International Exhibition of 1851 was opened. The acts of the Commune do not certainly breathe a very tolerant spirit, to say nothing of “sym-

* “First Principles,” p. 120.

pathy with opposite opinions"; and sentiments kindred to those of the French Communists are now being sown broadcast not only over the continent of Europe, but even in our own country also. Apart, however, from political convulsions and popular passions, the writings of recent or existing physical teachers contain enough to warn the Christian world to prepare in time for the advent of an atheistic persecution. Thus Comte, in his "*Philosophie Positive*," gives utterance to principles of persecution sufficiently unmistakable. He tells us:—

Il n'y a point de liberté de conscience en astronomie, en physique, en chimie, en physiologie même, en ce sens que chacun trouverait absurde de ne pas croire de confiance aux principes établis dans les sciences par les hommes compétents.

Professor Huxley, who quotes these words, speaks of the organized spiritual power which, according to Comte, was to have supreme control over education in each nation, as most "completely sacerdotal" and "entirely anti-scientific," and adds* that "the logical, practical result of this part of his doctrine would be the establishment of something corresponding with that eminently Catholic, but admittedly anti-scientific, institution—the Holy Office."—("Lay Sermons," p. 190.)

Another utterance comes from France with a warning in the same direction, and from one whose orthodoxy cannot be suspected of having sharpened his apprehensions as to the future. M. Ernest Renan † speculates as to whether "l'avenir ne ramènera pas quelque chose d'analogue à la discipline ecclésiastique que le libéralisme moderne a si jalousement supprimée."

The Duke of Argyll, ‡ commenting on Mr. Lewes's dictum that "whatever is inaccessible to reason should be strictly interdicted by reason," himself observes: "Here we have the true ring of the old sacerdotal interdicts. Who is to define beforehand what is, or what is not, 'inaccessible to reason'?"

But the most portentous phenomenon of this kind is the open avowal of intolerance, and the direct advocacy of persecution of religious opinions by no less a "liberal" than Professor Huxley, whose reprobation of the very same views as expressed by Comte we have just quoted. Indeed, he has repu-

* Professor Huxley adds the singular remark that "the great teaching of science—the great use of it as an instrument of mental discipline—is its constant inculcation of the maxim, that *the sole ground on which any statement has a right to be believed is the impossibility of refuting it*!" According to this, we have ground for believing that a green dragon inhabits the sun, since such a proposition it is quite impossible to refute.

† "S. Paul," p. 392.

‡ "Primeval Man," pp. 21-23.

diated that reprobation and distinctly contradicted his previously expressed views, in his address to the Midland Institute, wherein he has quoted both Comte and Plato approvingly, and speaks with scorn of that "pet doctrine of modern Liberalism," that "toleration" is "a good thing in itself, and ought to be reckoned among the cardinal virtues." * He has added the remarkable words: "I do not see how *any limit whatever* can be laid down as to the extent to which, under some circumstances, the action of Government may be rightfully carried"; and has asked the question: "Are we not bound to admit, with Locke, that it [i.e. the State] may have right to interfere with 'Popery and Atheism,' if it be really true that the practical consequences of such beliefs can be proved to be injurious to civil society"? †

In principle this carries equally with it the right of the State to persecute *Theists*. Nor does he leave us much opportunity of doubting that such persecution would speedily be called into play did he possess as much power as will in that direction. Of this his conduct at the London School Board is sufficient evidence, and we Catholics owe him a debt of gratitude for the candour with which he manifested his hatred and fear of our holy religion.

Yet while admitting to the full whatever credit may be due to him for this candour, we must not fail to call attention to the fact that he has not hesitated to persecute those of whose tenets he has since manifested his profound ignorance.

Like many another man, Professor Huxley seems to have stumbled at the difficulties presented to his intellect by the illogical creed in which he was brought up, and then taken for granted that Catholicism but added other difficulties and incredibilities to those which had offended him in his natal creed.

The first elements of justice, however, require that we should take some pains to acquire a tolerably accurate knowledge of any system before we call in State aid for its suppression, and for the persecution of its supporters.

We have seen that, according to the teaching Professor Huxley favours, all religious speculation and action is but waste of thought and effort. It cannot be for the advantage of the State that time and endeavour should be thrown away in a manner worthy only of lunatics; consequently all who would promote such loss should be discouraged and put down. "The logical, practical result" (to quote Professor Huxley's words respecting Auguste Comte) "of this part of the doctrine would be" what he in-

* See "Fortnightly Review" for November, 1871, p. 532.

Ibid, p. 538.

vidiously calls, "the establishment of something corresponding with the Holy Office"—in fact, a Star-chamber of physically scientific inquisitors sitting in judgment on, and condemning, parents who had dared in private secretly to teach their children to worship God.

Of course such "advanced" measures are not yet to be looked for, but their logical basis is prepared by the enforcement of "unsectarian education."

The naked avowal of the principle of thorough-going persecution by so prominent a "liberal" has surprised many; but in truth, we think the Professor has here shown himself to be both logical and rational. Except upon a basis of intuitive morality and the relation of the conscience to God, there is and can be no solid basis on which the rights of minorities can securely repose. The logical and necessary alliance between atheism and the most extreme and hardest form of despotism—a despotism like that of the Pagan empire, ignoring conscience altogether—was empirically manifested in France in 1793 and 1870, and it is a characteristic circumstance that Professor Huxley refers to and quotes the congenial authority of Hobbes, who "with a true instinct, would have laid deep the foundations of atheism and despotism together, resolving all right into might, and not merely robbing men, if he could, of the power, but denying to them the duty, of obeying God rather than man."* Christianity and Judaism, by preferring martyrdom to apostasy, first taught men the rights of conscience, and seem destined to repeat the lesson a second time in opposition to a revived paganism, and as a result, of a new persecution by it of the Christian Church.

We have ourselves recently called attention (in the number of this Review for October last) to the fearful oppression under which the Catholic inhabitants of "liberal Switzerland" now groan.

There we have a practical example before our eyes of the amount of religious freedom to be expected from secularists. It is not persecution carried out under the excitement of a revolution crisis, as recently in Paris, but is cool, determined, cold-blooded, and brutal.

Not only, as we before said, is the freedom of public worship denied, but "heavy fines are inflicted on men and women for the sole offence of practising the devotion, or singing hymns to our Blessed Lady *in their own houses*"!

In Germany we have at this moment before our eyes an instance of deliberate religious persecution, and the naked

* Archbishop Trench—"The Study of Words," p. 171.

assertion on the part of a Protestant minister of the right to determine who shall and who shall not be admitted to partake of Catholic sacraments, as well as to define and decree what is and what is not Catholic dogma—an avowed appeal to brute force and irreligious passions against the sacred rights of conscience and religion.

The destructive dogmas which we have extracted and catalogued, can happily, as yet, only find favour in this country with an insignificant numerical fraction of the community. Nevertheless, that fraction contains men who are eminent in almost every branch of intellectual activity, and many deservedly popular, not merely on account of their acquirements, but through their hearty sympathy with increased knowledge and more wide-spread social comfort. Many disguise their views, so that their negative sympathies can only be guessed by their more or less studious avoidance of direct and unequivocal theistic utterances.

The danger of the wide diffusion of these desolating misbeliefs arises mainly from confusion of thought. The narrow end of the wedge having been once introduced, it is sure to be afterwards driven home by "pitiless logic." As an example of this unhappy ambiguity, we will select the widely-popular phrase, "unsectarian education."

Of course, to Catholics, these considerations are so familiar as to need no repetition, but we address ourselves to all our fellow-countrymen, and rejoice to know that our words penetrate amongst the English-speaking races far beyond the sphere of exclusively Catholic readers.

In the first place, then, what is "sectarianism"? There are people who seem to imagine that an opinion may be an "opinion in general." But, in fact, each opinion must have a *definite* existence, just as no man-in-general exists, but only definite individual men. Every man, as certainly as he has eyes of a definite colour, and a nose of a definite form, must have definite opinions on the subjects which occupy his thoughts, even though it be the sceptical one that certainty has not been, and cannot be attained. Thus with regard to philosophy and religion, to bring up men without attempting to give them definite teaching on such subjects, is the same thing as directly teaching them that philosophy and religion are unimportant matters, possessing no certainty whatever. This view is just as definite, just as sectarian as any other, and those who hold it will tend to sympathize with and aid each other, just as will the holders of any other philosophical or religious opinion. Nor because such a body does not possess an external visible organization, like that of the Church, is it the less a united

body with definite views and aims. A man must either believe that God exists or that He does not exist, or that His existence is unknowable, or possibly knowable, but to him unknown; and each one of these beliefs constitutes a dogma, and one pregnant with the most momentous consequences. Similarly, as regards a future life, a man must hold either that he has, or that he has not, grounds sufficient for acting in this life with a direct view to the next. One of these two beliefs is just as dogmatic as the other, both will be fruitful in effects; while to bring up children in silence as regards a future life, is equivalent to teaching them that the second belief is the true one. It is in this way that the cry for "unsectarian education" really means education of all and at the expense of all, in the tenets and dogmas of one inconsiderable body—viz. the Secularist sect. The many amongst our non-Catholic fellow-countrymen accept this cuckoo-cry from really good motives—viz., zeal for instruction, for social amelioration, and the diminution of vice and crime; but they fail to consider the true meaning of the phrase, which, if apprehended with accuracy, would deter multitudes from advocating it, as they would see how really fatal it is to the benevolent ends they have in view.

But in truth it is to be feared that too many members of the Secularist sect are as *dishonest* as they are narrow and bigoted. A large amount of instruction might, no doubt, well be given in a colourless way as regards religion by conscientious men who felt bound to abstain from proselytism, and so the evil, though considerable, would yet be negative. But, in fact, this scrupulous abstinence would be rare indeed. A conspicuous example and warning has been lately exhibited to us by one who in a public address at a noted College, in London, presumed to go out of his way to insult, we hope, the great majority of his hearers by the utterly uncalled for assertion that the word "soul" ought to be banished from the English language!

This negatively dogmatic spirit would surely show itself on the part of those narrow sectarians, the Secularists. They can be fair indeed in dealing with the question of rival Christian creeds, which they can afford to treat with perfect equality, since they contemplate them with the same indifference and ignorant contempt. But once let it be a question between irreligion and faith, and their partisanship and bigotry are plainly revealed. That in speaking thus we are not stating exclusively the views of Catholics, but merely drawing out what on examination must be evident to all unprejudiced minds, is well shown by some of the recent utterances of our periodical

literature. Thus Mr. Henry Holbeach, in the number of the "Contemporary Review" for last April, well observes:—

The great majority of scientific men at the present time pursue a purely Positive method, and the primary *assumptions* of that method are fatal to all theological conceptions. It should not need much argument to show that they are, at lowest, fatal to any theological conceptions such as those upon which Christianity as a system is necessarily engrafted. Now a professor might preach an orthodox sermon every Sunday, subscribe Sir Roundell Palmer's pledge *ex animo*, and have Christian prayers before and after class, and yet, if he taught science after the manner of Büchner, he would be opposing not only Christianity, but Theism, with the whole stress of his mind, and his pupils would, at the best, turn out sceptics. . . . Those, if any, who imagine that these characteristic features cannot and would not of necessity be introduced into the "secular" teaching of the young under State sanction—who think that an anti-theological *animus* cannot be made effective in the instruction given to children—are very much mistaken. . . . But besides all this, it is certain that the scientific teaching all over the world is so. . . . Vain is it to reply, these are not *questions brûlantes*. They are not, and they are ; and if they are decided in favour of state-applied education on the secular basis, they simply introduce the thin edge of the wedge ; and after the whips will come the scorpions ; after the deeds in the green tree the deeds in the dry. And we should have, already, this state of things :—Paid for in part by the religious classes, compulsory secular teaching, that is necessarily pervaded by a spirit which they regard as anti-religious.

These considerations naturally bring us to the second term of our phrase, which term is but too generally imperfectly apprehended even by us Catholics ; but, of course, comprehended much more vaguely by most of those who are unhappily outside the Church.

It is therefore to our non-Catholic fellow-countrymen that we especially address the following remarks, though we confess to a hearty wish that we could feel more assurance than in fact we do feel, that it is superfluous to place such reflections before the eyes of Catholics.

The term we refer to is "Education." An ambiguity clings to it similar to that which we have seen to attend the adjective part of the popular phrase "unsectarian education," to the substantive part of which we now address ourselves.

Education means the cultivation of the whole man, body and soul, and the latter in its entirety—emotion and will as well as sense and intellect. No one can deny that religious dogmas have often a powerful effect for good or ill in stimulating the emotions and the will. No one therefore can deny that education without religious dogmas is necessarily defective and im-

perfect though each may have his view as to what those dogmas should be.

As regards the intellect itself, no education can be regarded as truly effective which does not tend to stimulate its highest powers. But education mainly carried on by physical science, tends to an undue preponderance of the senses, that is to say, of the lowest faculties of the soul. The highest intellectual activity, philosophical science, cannot, of course, be *directly* taught in poor-schools. Nevertheless it is difficult to see why the highest *results* of philosophical science should not be imparted as well as the results of other sciences, e.g. astronomy.

No one would deprecate the imparting to poor children rational conceptions of the starry heavens on the ground that they cannot be taught to examine and calculate for themselves, so as to have an independent knowledge of astronomical laws and phenomena.

Now religion brings down to the popular apprehension and embodies the highest results of philosophy. Those, therefore, who would exclude it from our schools, would deprive the masses of such share as is open to them of the highest truth. A parallel folly would be to insist on each man working out for himself his own astronomy. As religion, however, has infinitely more to do with practical life than has astronomy, it is plain that to exclude it is an infinitely more momentous matter.

Thus the movement in favour of education, however excellently intended in the abstract, tends in the concrete to be perverted, with calamitous effect, through misapprehension of the true meaning of the word; and in this way aspirations worthy of all praise, and a zeal which cannot be too much commended, run the risk of producing effects the very opposite to those really aimed at by the great body of those so interested in the cause we are discussing.

All who have at heart the welfare of their country must desire the wide diffusion of a spirit of self-control and rational subordination, and the depression of the more selfish and brutal instincts of our nature.

Men are moved to action by a variety of motives; such as,—
1. Their admiration of what is virtuous. 2. Their admiration for what is beautiful. 3. Their admiration for what is true. 4. Their sympathy for some or all of their fellow-men 5. The desire of their own greatest good. 6. The hope of reward. 7. The fear of punishment, and 8. The gratification of their instincts and passions.

This being so, let us see what is likely to be the effect of a wide-spread belief that an absolutely perfect omnipresent, omnipotent and all holy God will distribute to every one, in a future

life, rewards and punishments exactly proportionate to every deed, word, and thought for which in this life their will is responsible—that will having the power of self-determination.

1. The admiration of virtue, goodness, and truth is intensified and rationalized as of the essence of the ALL-PERFECT—a reasonable object for our utmost love.

2. Sympathy for our fellows acquires a basis which else it lacks, and this belief can never be the reason of that sympathy resulting in an unjust action, as, under the governance of an all Holy God, we cannot really benefit a friend by any evil, though, in a sense, kindly-intentioned act.

3. The natural desire for our own greatest good is thus seen to coincide absolutely with the law of "right."

4. The hope of reward and fear of punishment are intensified and again directed to a coincidence with the same law of "right."

5. The gratification of our instincts and passions, in contravention of the law of right, is opposed by a consensus of motives, which are at once the highest and the most powerful.

On the other hand, if we are so unhappy as to disbelieve in God and a future life, we then have but a subjective support for our intuitions of truth, goodness, and beauty, and no certainty that we cannot benefit those we love by evil actions, if such appear desirable to us; moreover, we then have no motive for loving our neighbour, or forgiving our enemy, beyond what our spontaneous disposition prompts us to love or to forgive. In the same way, such disbelief deprives us of any certainty that "the right" is "necessarily our greatest happiness," rewards and punishments become confined to this world, and merely such as we may hope to obtain without real merit, or to evade. In the same way, again, we cease to have any motive to restrain our instincts and passions beyond the degree to which selfish considerations prompt us to restrain them.

Place two men, in all things equal, save that one accepts, and the other rejects the belief referred to. Let them be exposed to temptations. It is as certain as any mathematical truth that such beliefs will operate in promoting virtue, and in repressing vice in the one who accepts them.

What then must be the effect of education in which these supreme truths are ignored? What must be the effect of an "amelioration" of the condition of the masses which should, at first, give them increased physical comfort indeed, but which should tend to make such considerations as temporal welfare the all-important or primary one?

The objects aimed at by the present movement, "goodness" and "truth," would indeed fail to be attained; for "the increased

welfare of the masses" cannot be promoted by anything which weakens their few remaining religious convictions; nor can truth be served by the removal of the only effectual barriers against lying. God is the one great keystone by which are upheld the multitude of complex arches which constitute the vast fabric of human life. That keystone removed, the abutting ends of the severed arcs may stand for a time in perilous and unstable equilibrium, but the oscillations of secular change will soon prostrate them in utter and irreparable ruin.

Physical philosophers who oppose Theism, often speak of the supreme importance of truth. It would be interesting to know on what ground they could support their conviction that truth is *necessarily* a good, without the belief that the great Cause of all things is at the same time the God of truth. Experience may show that truth has been generally beneficial, but it can never make its beneficence axiomatic, or render it impossible that in certain cases ignorance may not be bliss, and deceitfulness true wisdom.

Certainly, if the views of Mr. Herbert Spencer concerning freewill were true, the only hope of humanity would be that it should "believe a lie." For, as human moral progress has been effected under the belief in moral responsibility, it is unquestionable that were men universally convinced and able fully to realize that such responsibility is a delusion, and that their every thought is absolutely predetermined, a general paralysis of moral effort must necessarily ensue.

As to the consequences of the wide acceptance of his own views, that writer admits:

Few, *if any*, are as yet fitted wholly to dispense with such [religious] conceptions as are current. The highest abstractions take so great a mental power to realize with any vividness, and are so inoperative upon conduct unless they are vividly realized, that their regulative effects must for a long period to come be appreciable on but a small minority. . . . Those who relinquish the faith in which they have been brought up, for this most abstract faith in which science and religion unite, may not uncommonly fail to act up to their convictions. Left to their organic morality, enforced only by general reasonings imperfectly wrought out and difficult to keep before the mind, their defects of nature will often come out more strongly than they would have done under their previous creed. ("First Principles," p. 117.)

These *à priori* teachings as to the necessary tendencies of religious convictions are supported by many *à posteriori* considerations. It is a widely-spread notion that ignorance and crime go hand in hand; but the most notorious and conspicuous criminals of late years have been far from uneducated men,—Rush, Palmer, Pritchard, Traupman, occur to the mind at

once, and it is unquestionable that the educated classes in this country and France furnish a fair percentage of the criminal population. If we take cases in which crime is connected with political passions, France, from 1789 to the present day, proclaims loudly how little guarantee intellectual culture offers against the most lamentable and criminal aberrations.

A rational self-control, due subordination, and a proper repression of selfish passions often enough fail to be exercised, even with the aid of religious training; but it is inevitable that such training should *tend* to such repression, while that the absence of religion *tends* to occasion effects of an opposite character, is not only plain to the reason *à priori*, but is made manifest by conspicuous examples.

These truths have lately strongly impressed themselves on the minds of some of our impulsive neighbours on the other side of the Channel. We might have expected a more important reformatory action in France than there yet appears to be any evidence of; but the mischief has been too deeply ingrained by the calamity of a century of vile and corrupting influences. It is consoling, however, that here and there we find evidences of a clear perception of the fundamental and most important truth which we are now endeavouring to inculcate.

M. Le Play, in a recent pamphlet*, recalls his fellow-countrymen to the practice of obeying the Ten Commandments as the only safe and sure road to national prosperity,—and he laments how

La nation se persuade, depuis longtemps, qu'elle s'est assuré l'admiration et le succès par les révolutions qui n'ont fait qu'aggraver les maux de la monarchie absolue, qui n'ont produit au dedans que la décadence, et qui n'ont suscité au dehors que le mépris.

These are wholesome words, and we must earnestly pray that the intimate connexion between religion and social stability and welfare, will soon be generally and effectively, as well as clearly, seen by a nation so logical as the French, and one so rich in recent apostles and martyrs of our holy religion.

It is that religion which has ever the honour of being the first object of attack, as well of the bitterest and most malignant hatred on the part of the enemies of all order; and if such hostility is ever the rule of those who would uproot the first principles of society, and replunge us into barbarism far worse than that existing in any known race of savages, it must surely begin to be evident to all sincere non-Catholic Christians

* "La Paix Sociale." Paris, 1871.

that those who defend the Church defend not only her, but the very basis of society itself.

The eloquent Bishop of Orleans said but the plainest truth the other day, when he urged on his fellow-countrymen, with regard to positivists and materialists:

It is not so much *my* Church which they would destroy, as *your* home! and I defend it; for all those things which are the supreme objects of your desire,—reason, philosophy, society, the basis of your institutions, the principle of your laws, the foundation of your doctrines, the subject of your books, the sanctity of your hearths, the morals of your children—these are the things which I defend, and which you throw away in crowning those who would destroy them.

Unhappily, it is but too plain that similar warnings are called for in England also. In defending religious faith we shall surely, ere long, be seen by all to be, at one and the same time, defending the foundations both of the family and of the State, which are gravely threatened by the propagation of a worship of mere material wellbeing, which calls itself "philanthropy," and a retrograde scepticism which names itself "enlightenment."

It is almost superfluous to say that we, nevertheless, yield to none of those we oppose, in our desire for the temporal well-being of the poor. We are, however, convinced that in this matter, as in some others, the apparently roundabout road is really the most direct. It is generally admitted that those who aim directly at pleasure attain it less surely, even considering this world only, than do those whose aim is duty. So also temporal prosperity will more certainly attend the intelligent efforts of a community, the aims of which extend beyond this life, than of one from which such aspirations are excluded. It is far indeed from our wish to discourage or repress philanthropic efforts, but we desire that the objects sought should be classified according to their real worth and dignity, and that—clear and distinct conceptions being formed as to what is really to be aimed at—there should be no waste of generous emotion in stimulating misleading and disappointing efforts.

We emphatically proclaim that it is always good to know a "truth," even of the humblest kind. But all truths are not of equal consequence, and it would be a great calamity if the higher and more important became neglected for the sake of others of a lower order.

The truths of physical science, and all that concerns our material well-being, are of great value considered in and by themselves. When, however, they are contrasted with the truths of religion, all who are not atheists must admit that they

are exceedingly subordinate. Though good in their own station, they become even direfully pernicious when used to discredit those higher truths, and when promoted to a precedence for which they are unfitted.

Catholic philosophers are far indeed from having any dread or jealousy of the physical sciences, and nothing would be more ludicrous in their eyes, were it not pitiable, than the wide-spread delusion on that subject, current in England.

We must here emphatically protest against this delusion, and, on the contrary, assert that it is Catholic philosophers *only* who can afford fearlessly to welcome truth, of whatever rank or order, and from whatsoever quarter. It is they *only* who are prepared to push their investigations into every accessible region, instead of shrinking with timidity or awkward simulations of contempt from unwelcome and hostile phenomena. On the other hand, we see men of physical science, whose blatant boast is that they seek truth only, and that they are ready to welcome all truth,—refusing inquiry, meeting asserted demonstrations with mendacious abuse and the grossest misrepresentations—dealing, in fact, with phenomena, which, if true, destroy the very foundations of their whole system, with a helpless imbecility which would excite pity, did not the pretentious arrogance which accompanies it produce disgust.

We see men who give themselves out as *the* teachers of their race confronted by abundant testimony as to the existence of facts, which, if true, cut the ground from under them, and prove that what they have proclaimed as truth is the most baseless and pernicious of all delusions. Under these circumstances, instead of, as is their most plain duty, putting everything else aside until by investigations (no matter how persevering or prolonged) they have succeeded in verifying or in disproving the alleged facts, they take refuge in dogmatism, and such puny persecution as is at their command. Certainly few of the minor intellectual phenomena of the latter half of the nineteenth century will hereafter appear more contemptible than the conduct of these unhappy physical dogmatists.

Free inquiry in its legitimate field (like freedom of action in its appropriate spheres, and freedom of conscience against the despotism of the State) finds then its uncompromising advocates in Catholic philosophers only. They endeavour to investigate and appreciate at their just value *all* phenomena, whether natural, preternatural, or supernatural. In psychology they ignore* no aspect of man's sensitive and intellectual

* We have a notable example of an opposite method in the psychology of Mr. Herbert Spencer, who very easily accounts for all our intuitions by "experience," through the very simple process of quietly *ignoring* all the highest acts of the human mind.

being, but seek to assign to each power the rank which experience and intuition combine to prove that it possesses.

Asserting the dignity of man's nature and the trustworthiness of his faculties, they maintain the rights and the validity of human reason against its detractors,—the experiential Sophists who now rule over a crowd of credulous believers in the rationality of protoplasm, the emotional sensibility of heat, and the divinity of motion.

The sooner these facts come to be widely appreciated the better for our beloved country. Physical dogmatism, such as that we have endeavoured to expose, can have but one sad result. "The proper study of mankind is man," and it is the study of his nobler nature, and not merely that of the material universe of which he forms a part, which can alone aid us in our highest needs, or rationally direct our endeavours towards individual, social, and national well-being.

ART. II.—S. MARY MAGDALENE IN THE GOSPELS.

A Homely Discourse. Mary Magdalene. London: Washbourne.

Articles "Lazarus" and "Mary Magdalene" in "Smith's Dictionary of the Bible." By Professor PLUMPTRE.

Commentary on the Gospel of S. John. By E. W. HENGSTENBERG, D.D.
Translated from the German. Dissertation on John xi. 1. Edinburgh: Clark.

CATHOLICS of the present day commonly take for granted, that S. Mary Magdalene was the sister of Martha, and identical also with the "peccatrix" of Luke vii. 37. The author c. g. of the pleasing discourse, which we name at the head of our article, has evidently never dreamed of doubting the fact; and indeed the Church's whole office for July 22nd is based throughout on the assumption. On the other hand those who are more prominent among Protestants at this moment for the pious spirit, the diligence, the accuracy, with which they study Scripture, are more and more tending to unanimity in the opinion, that Mary Magdalene, Mary of Bethany, and the peccatrix were three distinct and separate persons. Nor will it be doubted by any one who candidly examines the arguments

adduced for this conclusion, that they carry with them at the first blush much appearance of cogency. The question—not to mention its importance in other respects—is so keenly interesting in a devotional and ascetical point of view, as to be well worthy of consideration.

Our readers will naturally inquire in the first instance, whether, apart from the statements of Scripture itself, there is any historical proof of the received Catholic view: but we are not aware of any Catholic, who even *alleges* the existence of any such proof. There is a *second* preliminary question, however, to which the answer is not so simple. It may be asked whether the concurrent judgment of so many holy men in every age, and the sanction more or less explicitly given by the Church to that judgment, should not by itself suffice to secure the assent of loyal Catholics. On this second question we shall say a few words at the close of our article; but our main purpose is to pursue the inquiry on the exclusive ground of Scripture. Even this limited task we are as far as possible from professing to perform exhaustively: on the contrary we shall but suggest two or three hints, in the hope that more competent critics may carry them out, or modify and correct them, as the case may be. We will at once express our own firm conviction, that the text of Scripture, considered by itself and in its own light, establishes, not indeed a certainty, but an enormous preponderance of probability, in favour of the received Catholic view.

It will be more convenient to our readers, if we indicate at starting the chief relevant passages of Scripture. We begin them with the peccatrix of S. Luke.

But a certain one of the Pharisees [named Simon] asked Him to eat with him; and entering into the Pharisee's house he reclined [at table]. And behold a woman, who was a sinner in the city, hearing that He reclined [at table] in the Pharisee's house, brought an alabaster box of ointment, and stood weeping behind at His feet, and began to moisten His feet with her tears, and wiped them with the hair of her head, and kissed His feet and anointed them with ointment, &c. (Luke vii. 36—38.)

Immediately after this narrative S. Luke thus proceeds:—

And it came to pass thereafter that He travelled through the cities and villages, preaching and evangelizing the Kingdom of God; and with Him the twelve; and [also] certain women who had been healed from evil spirits and from infirmities, Mary called Magdalene from whom seven devils had gone out, and Joanna, &c. (Luke viii. 1, 2.)

At a later period of S. Luke's Gospel we hear:—

But it came to pass as they went that He entered a certain village; and a certain woman, Martha by name, received Him into her house. And she had

a sister named Mary, who sat also at the Lord's feet, and hearkened to His word, &c. (x. 38-9.)

We now come to S. John:—

But there was a certain sick man, Lazarus, of Bethany, from the village of Mary and her sister Martha. It was Mary who anointed the Lord with ointment and wiped His feet with her hair, whose brother Lazarus was sick, &c. (xi. 1, 2.)

Then, after Lazarus's resuscitation,—

They prepared for Him there a supper, and Martha ministered.....Mary therefore took a pound of precious ointment, and anointed the feet of Jesus, and wiped His feet with her hair; and the house was filled with the odour of the ointment, &c. (xii. 2, 3.)

We do not insert the parallel passages to this last from S. Matthew and S. Mark; because it cannot be denied, without manifest eccentricity, that they *are* parallel and describe the same event. We further assume, as a position which cannot be denied without manifest eccentricity, that the Mary and Martha of Luke x. are identical with the Mary and Martha of S. John.

From these and other notices of Scripture we think that the two following conclusions, which are Maldonatus's, may be inferred, with the very highest degree of probability which is short of absolute certainty. Firstly the anointing of Luke vii. is an entirely distinct act from that of John xii.; but secondly, the agent on both occasions was the same, being no other than S. Mary Magdalene. The *latter* of these conclusions has long been almost universal among Catholics. The *former*, we fancy, is advocated by various distinguished Catholic writers besides Maldonatus. He himself cites in its favour S. Ambrose, S. Augustine, and S. Bede. We can appeal on its behalf to the authority, singularly high on such a subject, of F. Coleridge. (See "*Vita Vitæ*," p. 67.) F. Newman, in his fourth Discourse to Mixed Congregations, takes it for granted. F. Dalgairns, in a passage which we shall quote before we conclude, implies the same opinion. Professor Plumptre (if we rightly understand him) ascribes it also to the Bollandist writer on July 22nd.

In behalf of this our first conclusion, we need say very little: for we are throughout mainly contending against Protestants; and on this particular point we are in accordance with their almost unanimous opinion: though one of them, Hengstenberg, whom we name at the head of our article, warmly dissents. We refer our readers then to the reasoning of Maldonatus (in Matt. xxvi. 6 and John xi. 2), and only add three remarks of our own. (1) The testimony of S. John (xi. 2) seems to us almost decisive on the matter, as we shall presently point out

in a different connection. (2) To our mind, every attempt at harmonizing Luke vii. with John xii. does but place in clearer light the utter hopelessness of such a task; and we were never before so firmly convinced that the two scenes are distinct, as when we read Hengstenberg's laborious effort to prove them identical. (3) There is a distinction between the two anointings, which should by no means escape notice. In S. Luke the peccatrix moistens His feet with her *tears*: a circumstance most natural in the first transports of conversion, but which very significantly is absent from all three accounts of the anointing at Bethany. It may further be added that, as appears from S. Matthew and S. Mark, at Bethany Mary anointed, not His feet only but also His head. This is hardly reconcilable with the wording of Luke vii.; while at the same time, as Mr. Isaac Williams points out,* the change of action is most touchingly significative of her changed situation at the later period, and of her increased confidence in her Saviour's love. Indeed if we look at the two narratives with all their attendant circumstances, we may say that the earlier act is the more excited, the later the more solemn and (as one may say) more *ritual*.

The main stress however of our argument must evidently turn on the *second* of our two conclusions. In behalf of this conclusion, we shall lay down three successive theses. And our first shall be, that—putting aside all the texts which mention Magdalene—Mary of Bethany is pointed out in Scripture as identical with the peccatrix of Luke vii. Protestant commentators in general are especially earnest against this particular thesis. "Many persons" says Mr. Williams "would be inclined to allow that Magdalene may be Mary sister of Martha; and many would be disposed to take for granted that Magdalene was 'the sinner.' But *most persons would be very loth to suppose* that the good sister of Martha should be 'the sinner.'"† "There is not the slightest trace" says Professor Plumptre (p. 257) "of the life of Mary of Bethany ever having been one of open and flagrant impurity." Such a supposition, Protestants often add, is considered additionally improbable, from the *position* held by her family. "All the circumstances of John xi. and xii.—the feast for so many guests, the number of friends who came from Jerusalem, the alabaster box, the ointment of spikenard very costly, the funeral vault of their own, point to wealth and social position

* "On the Passion," p. 412.

† We should explain that Mr. Williams himself *does* incline to accept this view.

above the average." (Plumptre, p. 78.) Then again, as Protestants are especially fond of insisting, if this identity be supposed, "Mary, whom we have been accustomed to regard as a silent soul involved in meditation, who has opened her pure heart to the Redeemer as the tender flowers silently unfold themselves to the sun, becomes a wild and tameless woman, who first found in Christ stillness for her passions, and convulsively clings to Him still, lest the calmness of the waters of her soul should be exchanged again for tempest."*

We reserve to a later part of the article our inquiry, whether the character of Mary, Martha's sister, is in any respect different from what we might expect to find in the converted peccatrix: here we content ourselves with earnestly repudiating any such notion. As to the rest, we readily admit that a certain presumption arises against us, from the circumstances recounted in the objection. Still this presumption should go for very little indeed, considering that S. John testifies to our thesis almost in so many words. "It was Mary" he says (xi. 2) "who had anointed the Lord with oil, . . . whose brother Lazarus was sick." As Maldonatus urges,—the Greek word is in the aorist after an imperfect, and necessarily refers to some act *which had already taken place*. "*Ἦν δὲ Μαρία ἡ ἀλείψασα,*" &c. &c. No one, unless he were quite recklessly defending a theory, would look this text deliberately in the face,† and dream of maintaining that it can be understood, without most grievous distortion, as referring to a future act. On the other hand be it remembered, that S. John wrote for the very purpose of supplementing the earlier Evangelists; and especially of supplementing S. Luke. It was pointed out in our number for October 1864 (p. 427) by a writer, whom we may now without impropriety mention to have been F. Coleridge, that "almost the whole of S. John might be inserted in large sections between various breaks in the third Gospel, and a continuous history be thus made up of the two." There really then cannot be a fair doubt, that S. John in this verse distinctly declares the identity of Lazarus's sister with her, of whom S. Luke had narrated that she anointed the Lord with ointment and wiped His feet with her hair.‡

* This is Hengstenberg's account (p. 3) of an objection very common among Protestants, which he is to answer.

† We mean to imply by this language, that the many Catholic writers, who identify the anointing of Luke vii. with that of Bethany, have not for the most part duly pondered this verse in the Greek, and deliberately given it an anticipatory sense. From the *Latin* alone, the argument is far less strong.

‡ It is a small matter, but worthy of mention, that all three of the Evan-

There can really be no fair doubt of this interpretation: still, since some (most strangely) *have* doubted it, we will add a corroboration, which on other grounds also is of some importance. It is evident that S. John was thinking of S. Luke in this part of his Gospel, because he refers to him in the preceding verse. "Lazarus was of Bethany, from the village of Mary and Martha;" i.e. he was an *inhabitant* of Bethany, but came *originally* from a certain other village. Greswell insists with much force on this distinction between "*ἀπὸ*" and "*ἐκ*" (Dissertations, vol. ii. p. 482); and is supported, not only by Professor Plumptre (p. 78, note), but also (as that writer mentions) by the illustrious scholar Hermann. Thus our Blessed Lord is always said to be "*ἀπὸ Ναζαρέτ*," and never once "*ἐκ*." And as Professor Plumptre justly observes, even though by degrees both words might come to be used *apart* with hardly any shade of difference, their use *in close juxtaposition* might still be antithetical: nay, we would even say, *must* be antithetical in the verse before us, because otherwise the change of prepositions in the same sentence would be senseless. Even apart from this particular linguistic question, there are strong grounds for our statement. It is surely a most forced hypothesis, that a place so important in Scripture as Bethany, and so frequently named, should be called by the title of "Mary and Martha's village." Still more unaccountable is it, that Bethany should be called "the village of Mary and Martha," rather than "of Lazarus" whom S. John is directly mentioning. Hardly less strange would it be if S. Luke, who so often mentions Bethany by name, had in one place (x. 38) called it vaguely "a certain village," and had moreover inserted what there took place, in the midst of Galilean events. On the other hand, S. John's expression would be most natural if he intended reference to a Galilean unnamed "village," mentioned by S. Luke as containing Martha's house, and as the scene of our Lord's temporary abode with her and Mary.* In both verses then S. John is connecting his narrative with S. Luke; and as verse 1 refers to Luke x., so (returning to our imme-

gelists state the ointment used at *Bethany* to have been "very precious." In Luke vii. there is no mention of this; *neither is there in John xi. 2.*

* The only explanation we can find suggested on the other view is, that S. John called Bethany "the village of Mary and Martha," in order to distinguish it from the other Bethany which was beyond Jordan. But the expression would *not* so distinguish it; because he had said nothing whatever previously, as to *which* was the Bethany where Mary and Martha dwelt. If it be said that his readers knew this fact *aliunde*, it is certain that they must have equally known *aliunde* where *Lazarus* dwelt; and consequently the verse could give no one any information whatever.

diate purpose) verse 2 refers to Luke vii. In his first verse he identifies his own Mary of Bethany, with S. Luke's Mary, sister of Martha; and in his second he identifies her with S. Luke's peccatrix.

At last however, we would not account the argument which we derive from John vi. 2, as absolutely final and peremptory, in such sense that no imaginable amount of argument on the other side could justify a different rendering; for we would not deny that there may be some few Scriptural texts, of which the true sense is a very unobvious one. But our whole argument here is concerned with *probabilities*. And (speaking greatly within bounds) we say it is immeasurably more improbable that S. John's words refer to an event which had not yet happened,—than that Mary's history should have been very exceptional in its character, and that the Evangelists should be silent on certain previous events of her life.

A further argument may possibly be adduced against our thesis, though we are not aware that any Protestant has so adduced it. "Many of the Jews," says S. John (xi. 19), "had come to Martha and Mary to console them for their brother." On this Professor Plumptre remarks very reasonably (p. 78), that "the particular sense which attaches to *S. John's* use of the phrase 'the Jews,'—as equivalent to Scribes, Elders, and Pharisees,—suggests the inference that these visitors or friends belonged to that class." It may be objected then that—considering the well-known character of Pharisaism—such a circumstance disproves the supposition of Mary having been so recently an abandoned sinner. The reply however is obvious. It is seen from Luke x. 38, that Mary and Martha were in Galilee down to a period later than that which we ascribe to Mary's conversion. Her earlier course is not one of those facts which families love to blazon about; and it must not be supposed that private gossip would then circulate from Galilee to Jerusalem, as it might now from Scotland to London. However certain it were that Mary is the peccatrix, we see no fragment of reason for supposing that the Scribes and Pharisees, who came to know her in Bethany, were cognizant of the fact.

We ground our thesis then mainly on the circumstance that, unless we suppose the ordinary use of language revolutionized, John xi. 2 refers to a past fact; and that no such fact is dreamed of by any one, except that recorded in Luke vii. But secondly, even could it be admitted that the verse is anticipatory in its sense,—even on this most violent and paradoxical supposition, our thesis would still hold its ground. On such an hypothesis, S. John intended to declare: "this Mary was the woman, so well known throughout the Church as having anointed the Lord and wiped

His feet with her hair.”* But he would not thus have spoken, if there had been *two* women famous for this fact. The form of speech implies, that this one particular devotional act was characteristic of this one particular disciple. Maldonatus urges this, on Matt. xxvi. 6.

And this brings us to another corroborative argument. It was a common enough practice to honour some distinguished guest by anointing his head (see e. g. Luke vii. 46); but that a woman should anoint the *feet* and wipe them with her hair—this is a very special and peculiar act of devotion, and one not likely to enter the mind of two different persons. As Mr. Isaac Williams observes (p. 412), “it was an action that could not have been done by a second person from imitation, and would scarce have spontaneously occurred to two different persons. But when we consider both the anointings to have been by one and the same individual,” there is an exquisite propriety about their variety of attendant circumstances, on which we have already remarked.

Our first thesis then has been, that—putting aside altogether the texts which mention Magdalene—Mary of Bethany is pointed out in Scripture as identical with the peccatrix. Our second shall be, that—putting aside altogether the texts which mention Mary of Bethany—the peccatrix is pointed out in Scripture as identical with Magdalene. We will commence our argument for this thesis, by pointing out the position expressly allotted to Magdalene in the Gospels.

Immediately after the scene of the peccatrix described in Luke vii.—with no interval whatever, even the slightest—occurs the first distinct mention of Magdalene. There appears on the scene a personage, new in name,—of whose antecedents nothing whatever is recorded in any part of Scripture, except the statement, twice repeated, that out of her seven devils had gone forth,†—but who assumes in some respects the most prominent place of all the disciples. Whether as regards grace, we say, or whether as regards privilege, Magdalene is in more than one important particular placed higher, than any other whosoever of our Lord’s followers. In saying this, we do not of course include His Holy Mother, who belongs (as we may say) to a different sphere from all other human beings; but we do include all the Apostles. Look e. g. at the most eventful and critical part of Gospel history. All the Apostles forsook our Lord and fled,

* So paraphrases Godet, one of our ablest opponents: “Cette Marie dont je parle ici est la femme qui est connue comme ayant oint, &c.” (On John xi. 2.)

† Luke viii. 2; Mark xvi. 9. As to the indubitable genuineness of the end of S. Mark’s Gospel, see Mr. Burgon’s volume, noticed by us in April, pp. 477–483.

though S. John soon took heart again. The body of holy women stood afar off, gazing from a distance at the Crucified (Matt. xxvii. 56; Mark xv. 40, 41); but Magdalene and one other kept company with His Mother at the Cross's very foot, exposed to all the insults and outrages of His raging enemies. With that other holy woman she remained publicly sitting before the sepulchre, when their companions had withdrawn (Matt. xxvii. 61). She was the first, if not the only one, of the holy women, who summoned Peter and John to the sepulchre (John xxi. 2). She was the first to see our Lord when risen; and this fact was accounted of so much importance, that (over and above S. John's detailed description) S. Mark calls special attention to it.* She not only saw Him, but was favoured with a solitary and somewhat lengthened interview. It was she who first "went and told it to them who had been with Him, as they mourned and wept." (S. Mark xvi. 10.) Hengstenberg truly adds (pp. 18, 19) that "as Peter regularly stands at the head in the list of the Apostles, so does Magdalene when women are mentioned. *The place of honour is given her in all the four Evangelists.* Thus it is in the enumeration of the women who followed Jesus in Galilee, Luke viii. 2; in the narrative of the Crucifixion, Matt. xxvii. 56, Mark xv. 40, 47; of the Entombment, Matt. xxvii. 61, Mark xv. 47; of the Resurrection, Matt. xxviii. 1, Mark xvi. 1, Luke xxiv. 10. The only exception is John xix. 25, where the other Mary is mentioned before Magdalene. But this was evidently done to avoid sundering the former from the Mother of Jesus previously mentioned;" and in no way therefore detracts from the significance of the fact, to which Hengstenberg draws attention.

The devout student of Scripture, when he observes these singular privileges, will as a matter of course look back for the early history of one thus singularly graced and honoured. To find merely that "seven spirits had gone out of her," is no satisfaction whatever of his holy curiosity. But if he does but look at the passage *immediately preceding* the first mention of Magdalene, he will find the very phenomenon of which he is in quest. As Magdalene exceeded all the other disciples whomsoever in certain important particulars of grace and privilege, so the peccatrix exceeded all the other recorded disciples whomsoever in the exercise of those virtues which are characteristically Christian.† Jesus Christ came on earth, that He might draw

* Mark xvi. 9, "apparuit primò Mariæ Magdalenzæ." In our number for April 1867 (p. 443, note) we have urged, that this statement implies no denial of the indubitable fact, that His Mother saw Him risen before any other human being saw Him.

† We prescind entirely of course, as before, from the most Holy Virgin.

sinners to repentance; and the special means on their part whereby He was to draw them, was to be their faith, hope and love towards Himself. Now no other disciple is recorded as having equalled the peccatrix, in these virtues of repentance, faith, hope and charity. She was changed in a moment, from the lowest depths of moral abasement, to meriting the solemn declaration "thy sins are forgiven thee" (ver. 48). And by what means on her side was this conversion wrought? Our Lord tells her that it is her faith which has saved her (ver. 50); and declares also by most manifest implication (ver. 47), that the fervour of her present love is proportioned to the grievousness of her past offences.* When did any *Apostle*—when did S.

We prescind also from the case of the penitent thief; on which we speak presently in the text, and which rather confirms our argument than otherwise.

* Alford (in locum) admits it to be certain, that the Vulgate text "*quæ erat in civitate peccatrix*" is correct; and beyond all question the obvious sense of this is, in Alford's words, that "she was known in the place by public repute, as carrying on a sinful occupation in the city."

The following remarks of Archbishop Trench, in his admirable volume on our Lord's Parables, deserve to be quoted:—"That a woman, and one of a character such as is here represented, should have pressed into the guest-chamber, and this uninvited, either by the Lord, or by the master of the house, and that she should have there been permitted to offer to the Saviour the form of homage which she did, may at first sight appear strange; yet after all does not require the supposition of something untold for its explanation, as that she was a relation of Simon's, or lived in the same house,—suppositions which are altogether strange, not to say contradictory, to the narrative. A little acquaintance with the manners of the East, where meals are so often almost public, where ranks are not separated with such iron barriers as with us, makes us feel with what ease such an occurrence might have taken place. Or if this seems not altogether to explain the circumstance, one has only to think how easily such obstacles as might have been raised up against her, and would have seemed insuperable to others, or to herself in another state of mind, would have been put aside, or broken through by an earnestness such as now possessed her. Even as it is, the very nature of such religious earnestness is to break through and despise these barriers, nor ever to pause and ask itself whether according to the world's judgment it be 'in season' or 'out of season.'"

In a note he subjoins the following excellently chosen citations:—"Beautifully Augustine (*Enarr. in Ps. cxl. 4*): *Illa impudica, quondam frontosa ad fornicationem, frontosior ad salutem, irruit in domum alienam; and again (Serm. xcix. c. 1)*: *Vidistis mulierem famosam . . . non invitata irruisse convivio, ubi suus medicus recumbebat, et quesisse piâ impudentiâ sanitatem: irruens quasi importuna convivio, opportuna beneficio: and Gregory (Hom. 33 in Evang.)*: *Quia turpitudinis suæ maculas aspexit, lavanda ad fontem misericordiæ cucurrit, convivantes non erubuit: Nam quia semetipsam graviter erubescere intus, nihil esse credidit, quod verecundaretur foris: and another (BERN. *Opp.*, v. ii. p. 601)*: *Gratias tibi, ô beatissima peccatrix; ostendisti mundo tutum satis peccatoribus locum, pedes scilicet Jesu, qui neminem spernunt, neminem rejiciunt, neminem repellunt: suscipiunt omnes, omnes admittunt. Ibi certè Æthiopissa mutat pellem suam;*

Peter or S. John—exhibit such external marks of love for Jesus, as were displayed in this most memorable scene? The whole circumstance is so beautifully set forth by F. Dalgairns, that we are sure our readers will thank us for the length of our quotation. We need hardly say we are not intending to *assume* here, that the peccatrix was Magdalene and Martha's sister.

There is one wicked and notorious sinner who has come to hear Him, not out of a wish to be better, but because her sister Martha has talked her into it. She goes along the streets in the pomp and insolence of her beauty, the jewels glittering in her hair, throwing shameless glances around her, with sin in every look and every gesture. She is going to hear the Nazarene preach, and to defy His power. She comes within His influence, her looks are bent upon Him, and the sweet sound of His words reaches her ear. Oh ! what a change comes over her ; her eyes are riveted upon Him, and her colour comes and goes. The tones of that voice have gone down to depths in her soul, of which she herself knew nothing. A moment ago she gloried in the triumph of her fascination, and exulted in her sinful power. Rich, noble, and young as she was, she could, especially in that ancient pagan world, set public opinion at defiance. Numbers as depraved as she had shared the counsels and the friendship of the world's heroes and statesmen. But all at once there rises up before her a new thought for her, the degradation of sin. And then, with a crushing force, comes the view of God's dread justice, of death, and of eternity. She would have sunk to the earth had there not mingled with it, in the very depth of her horror and astonishment, the gentle hope of the mercy of God. Scared and frightened by these unwonted tumults, she rushes back to her home. Who could be the preacher that so strangely moved her ? Who was the man that knew her soul so well ? At the very sound of His voice light had flashed upon her mind, her trembling will had owned some mighty sway, and her proud heart had been crushed within her. Who could it be but God ? She had heard of old of "God with us," of the mighty God who was to be born of a virgin, and, enlightened by divine grace, she felt that this must be He. She had seen her God, and yet, strange to say, guilty as she was, she felt no dismay ; an unutterable love had taken possession of her soul, and she must see that heavenly countenance again. He could banish her for ever, and well He might, considering what she was ; but she must look upon the face of her God once more, if it were for the last time. She knew that He was to be at a banquet ; her presence would be felt as a leprosy by all, but she cared not. What was the world to her now ? So she cast off her silken robes and put on her worst attire ; and she took the jewels from her hair and trampled them under foot. With dishevelled locks flowing down her shoulders, and an alabaster vase of precious ointment in her hands, she walks rapidly through the streets to the house of the Pharisee. The guests stare

ibi pardus mutat varietatem suam ; ibi solus Phariseus non expumat superbiam suam."

wildly on her, as in this apparition, with pallid face and streaming hair, they recognize the Magdalene. But she sees no one but Jesus. All eyes are fixed on Him with greater wonder as she takes her station on her knees behind Him, as He lay reclining on the couch, according to the Roman custom. All think that He will shrink from her; but see, she grows bolder still, her lips approach His feet. Now surely He will rise and spurn her from Him. But, no, He bears the touch of her polluted lips, and the poor lost creature breaks her vase and pours her ointment on His feet, while her bursting tears flow unrebuked upon them, and her long hair wipes off the moisture. Well may the Pharisee say in his scornful heart, This is no prophet, or He would have spurned her from Him. It is no prophet, but the omniscient God, He who had created and "called her by her name," who had "allured her and spoken to her heart." And now He turns His eyes upon her, and, amidst the breathless silence of the spectators, the gentle tones of His voice bid them look upon that "woman," and proclaim aloud that because she loves Him she is forgiven. ("Devotion to the Heart of Jesus," pp. 137-140.)

It is difficult, after such burning words, to resume our dry and methodical reasoning: but each man must serve God according to his gift, and the present writer has no eloquence at his command. Our argument then is this: On one side there stands a holy woman, whose earlier life is nowhere mentioned, but who is pre-eminent above all the other disciples in various most important particulars of grace and privilege. On the other side there stands a holy woman, whose *later* life is nowhere mentioned, but who is pre-eminent over all the other disciples in the exercise of characteristically Christian virtues. Moreover, the first mention of the former occurs *immediately* after the sole mention of the latter; attention being expressly drawn by S. Luke to the consecutiveness of time.* These two facts precisely fit into each other, like the wards of a key into its lock; and an extreme probability results, that the two holy women are identical.

A page or two back we said in a note, that in our remarks on the peccatrix we prescind from all reference to the penitent thief. Our reason was of course, because it may well be doubted, whether he did not exhibit in an *equal* degree the virtues of repentance, faith, hope and charity. And so the Church unites the two together: "Qui Mariam absolvisti, et latronem exaudisti." We need hardly say that his case rather strengthens our argument than otherwise. If his Christian graces were publicly manifested, so also was the *reward* of those graces. He was straightway confirmed in grace; his future salvation publicly announced; and he has been made in every

* "Ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ καθεξῆς, &c." (Luke viii. 1). "Ἐν τῷ καθεξῆς" = "paullo post." (Schleusner.)

age of the Church the patron and model of death-bed conversion.

The objection, far more commonly than any other raised against our thesis by Protestants, is this: Magdalene had been possessed by *devils*; and our thesis understands this statement as expressing, that she had led a life of sin. But no one, say these Protestants, is described in Scripture as *possessed* by devils, who is freely yielding his will to their solicitation; but one only who is in such sense their slave, as to be irresponsible for the actions done under their influence. Now we are not aware that any Protestants have attempted to *prove* this allegation; and we are confident that if they did, they would find proof impossible. Nor, indeed, are Protestants quite unanimous on the matter. Thus Mr. Burgon, who is honourably distinguished for his singularly careful study of the Gospels, gives very strong testimony on our side. He is so far from maintaining confidently the identity of Magdalene with the peccatrix, that on the contrary he will only call such a "conjecture *possibly* correct;" and yet, when he speaks of Magdalene, he says that by Luke viii. 2, "it is *probably* meant that she had been a person of *most unholy life*, in whom many evil spirits had once taken up their habitation."* In like manner Lange and Olshausen, to be presently cited. All these three writers refer to the parable of our Lord, which we shall immediately mention. Hengstenberg, who is also of course on the same side, draws attention to this parable, which is simply decisive. He says it is the only Scriptural instance, besides that of Magdalene, in which a *sevenfold* demoniacal possession is narrated. It is that recorded in Matt. xii. 43-45 and Luke xi. 24-26, concerning the man, who is cleansed from one evil spirit, but afterwards possessed by seven others; and under the name of demoniacal possession, it throughout undeniably includes *habits of sin freely acquired*.

For instance, Alford is one of those who raise against our present thesis the objection which we are here considering.† Let us observe then his commentary on this *other* sevenfold demoniacal possession. "The direct meaning of the parable," he says (in Matt. xii. 43), describes, under the figure of this sevenfold (or rather eightfold) possession, "the desperate infatuation of the Jews after our Lord's Ascension, their bitter hostility to the Church.....their joining in the impieties of Julian." "Another important fulfilment of the prophetic

* "Plain Commentary on the Gospels," in locum.

† "What is stated" in Luke viii. 2, he says, "makes the notion *exceedingly improbable*" that Magdalene was the peccatrix (in locum).

parable," he presently adds, is found when "the religious lives of men shroud themselves.....in formality and hypocrisy, till utter emptiness of faith and spirituality has prepared them for *that second fearful invasion of the Evil One*, which is indeed worse than the first." He considers then this eightfold demoniacal possession to exist,—not specially where men have lost all liberty of will,—but on the contrary where, yielding to the temptation of devils, they perform a series of acts free and most detestable. Lange again is by no means confident that the peccatrix is Magdalene. Still he thinks ("Life of Christ," English translation, vol. ii. p. 133) that Luke viii. 2 probably describes Magdalene as having been "rescued from the heavy curse of sin"; and in his commentary on Matt. xii. 43 he says that the fuller demoniacal possession signifies "a voluntary and damnable self-surrender to Satan by a wicked life." Olshausen too (on Luke vii. 36) thinks it "improbable" that the peccatrix was Magdalene; and yet (on Luke viii. 2) considers that Magdalene's "powers and capacities seem to have been surrendered to the ministrations of darkness."

In truth, if the received Catholic view be accepted in its integrity, no words could more aptly apply to the peccatrix, than those of Luke viii. 2. Mary of Bethany had apparently been brought up in innocence and virtue; and at all events, from her circumstances, was entirely exempt from those temptations to sin, which are presented by poverty and distress. Yet she came to lead publicly in some city the life of an abandoned woman. Nothing is more easily credible, than that a course so singularly depraved was occasioned by the agency of evil spirits; who inhabited her, who solicited her from within to acts of sin, and to whose prompting she freely surrendered her will. He Whom she was led by grace so tenderly to love, not only declared her forgiven, but expelled the evil spirits and delivered her from their solicitations.*

A second objection has been urged against us,—which forcibly illustrates how impossible it is to travel long in company with the most pious Protestants, without coming across some display of unintentional profaneness, which shocks and revolts one. The objection is thus expressed by Professor Plumptre: "It is *unlikely* that such an one as the 'sinner' would at once have been received as the chosen companion of Joanna and Salome,

* It may be added in this place, for the want of a more convenient one, that by identifying both the peccatrix and Magdalene with Mary of Bethany, we answer readily *another* question asked by some Protestants. "How," they inquire, "could the peccatrix have been in circumstances, which fitted her for ministering to Christ from her substance?" (Luke viii. 3.) Very easily, if she belonged to the comparatively wealthy family of Martha and Lazarus.

and have gone from town to town with them and the disciples" (p. 257). Good God! Certain holy women were travelling in company with our Lord, as He preached the Gospel from city to city, seeking everywhere the most abandoned sinners, and inviting them to repentance, faith and love. Yet a sinner thus converted, and that with a display of evangelical virtues hitherto unparalleled,—who had been commended by the Omniscient for her signal faith and love—is not good enough forsooth to consort with these singular missionaries. Were they Pharisees then and not Christians at all? We will venture to affirm, that Joanna and the rest would have had far more misgivings whether they were fit company for *her*, than whether she was fit company for *them*.

Another consideration must not be omitted from our argument. The peccatrix, from the very nature of the case, was now to shape out for herself a totally new plan of life. Would she, who had thus forced herself into the presence of her Beloved, willingly lose sight of Him? Would she willingly endure the darkness of His absence, if she could sun herself in the light of His presence? There were holy women already travelling with Him; and it is quite incredible that she should not have joined herself to their company. Moreover S. Luke must have seen his reader's inevitable perception of that probability, when he immediately proceeds to recount that Mary Magdalene, "from whom seven devils had gone out," did that very thing, which the converted peccatrix almost certainly *would* have done.

Our first thesis was, that—putting aside those texts which mention Magdalene—the peccatrix is pointed out in Scripture as identical with Mary of Bethany. Our second has been that—putting aside those texts which mention Mary of Bethany—the peccatrix is pointed out in Scripture as identical with Magdalene. Our third shall be the supplemental one, that—putting aside that passage which mentions the peccatrix—Mary of Bethany is pointed out in Scripture as identical with Mary Magdalene. We admit that the grounds for that thesis are less irresistible, than for the other two; and we will begin therefore by mentioning, that the assertion to which it points has already been shown to be in the highest degree probable. If Mary of Bethany is identical with the peccatrix, and *she* with Mary Magdalene, Mary of Bethany is of course identical with Mary Magdalene. Our present thesis further states, that there are *direct* grounds in Scripture for holding this identity, apart altogether from the middle term of the peccatrix.

"The village of Bethany and its neighbourhood were, at all events at a later period of our Lord's ministry, a frequent retreat to Him from the controversies and tumults of Jeru-

salem. See John xviii. 2; Luke xxi. 37; xxii. 39." (Plumptre, p. 79.) In that village dwelt one family especially dear to Him (John xi. 5). One of them especially, Mary, had already been signalized (Luke x. 42) as "having chosen that best part which shall not be taken from her:" who, while Martha was engaged in serving, sat at His feet listening to His word, or lavished costly ointment in His honour. It is incredible that she, who so hung on His every word, with whose family He was so intimately bound up, whose own brother He had so recently raised from the dead, should have stayed behind at Bethany, when Jerusalem, the scene of His Passion, was so close at hand. And it is hardly less incredible that she should have remained, throughout her Lord's suffering, at a distance (Matt. xxvii. 56; Mark xv. 40, 41), when others stood close to the Cross (John xix. 25). Moreover, as Hengstenberg points out (p. 18), "she had already presymbolized our Lord's burial" (Matt. xxvi. 12; Mark xiv. 8; John xii. 7); and all the three Evangelists, who mention her anointing Him at Bethany at all, dwell on this particular *aspect* of her action. Was she likely then to give up His actual entombment to the hands of others? to those other two sitting opposite the sepulchre (Matt. xxvii. 61) while she went away? Yet this she did, unless she were Magdalene.

Then again the fact of her brother's resurrection must have brought her into special sympathy with her Lord's Resurrection. Yet there is no trace, in any one of the Gospels, of any place whatever being assigned to her in reference to that mystery, unless she were Magdalene. Nor of course should we omit the corroborative fact, that at all events her name, like Magdalene's, was "Mary." Moreover, in this case the probability is entirely on one side. We are not aware of any single consideration which has been even *alleged*, as tending to render *improbable* the identity of these two Maries: all which Protestants have attempted, is to show that there is no *sufficient evidence* of the fact.

As to our three theses, taken independently of each other, our own appreciation of the ground on which they respectively rest would be as follows. We should say that the third is very decidedly more probable than its contradictory; that the second reaches so high a degree of probability, as to render its contradictory quite improbable; and that our first thesis is almost certain, so paradoxical is the notion that John xi. 2 can refer to a future action. But it would of course be most unfair to treat the theses as though they were *in fact* mutually independent; for (as we have just pointed out) each one of them is distinctly and importantly corroborated by the union of the other two.

Then there is further to be taken into account what we may call the *negative* evidence of Scripture. Consider the holy woman there designated as the converted peccatrix ; consider the holy woman there designated as Mary Magdalene ; consider the holy woman there designated as Mary of Bethany. In no one catalogue of the holy women throughout the Gospels do two or more persons appear together on the scene, bearing any of these designations. Yet had there really been three corresponding persons,—all three would possess characters so pronounced and elevated, that one would think they must have received prominent mention.

This leads us to a further consideration, which must not be omitted, although it will weigh differently with different people. Is not the *interior character* ascribed to the three so similar as to indicate identity ? Mr. Isaac Williams draws this out very forcibly, as regards Magdalene and Mary of Bethany ; though in his second edition he speaks less decidedly than in his first. We italicise one or two clauses.

When we have formed, unconsciously, a picture of Mary Magdalene in our minds, we find that it extremely resembles that which we have unconsciously been forming, at the same time, of the sister of Lazarus. If any one, judging from the circumstances recorded in the Gospels, were to give an accurate description of what he supposed to be the character of either of these, it would be, in great measure, a character of the other also ; with this difference, perhaps, that with Mary Magdalene we connect something more of penitential sorrow ; with the other, that calmness of piety which belongs to one that had always “chosen that good part which shall not be taken away from her.” And yet perhaps it may be shown, that there is not sufficient reason for even this supposed discrepancy, either in their histories or their characters.

The few circumstances recorded of St. Mary Magdalene are such as to excite in us an exceeding interest ; we behold her standing among the nearest to our Saviour's Cross, sitting the last at His grave at night, and coming the first there in the early morning ; and, more than all, the circumstances of our Lord's interview with her rivet our strongest attention and emotions. So eminent among those holy women for her devoted service ; and eminent even among those holy women, in the favour and acceptance of her Lord. Now, in the previous history, we have circumstances recorded of an equal and similar interest in Mary, the sister of Lazarus. The same attachment to our Lord ; the same favour expressed towards her. And the occasions on which they are mentioned bring out the same points of disposition in both. In *both the same calm, yet intense devotedness of character ; in both a disposition retiring and contemplative ; and yet in both, at the same time, earnest and unshrinking.* We have here Mary Magdalene sitting by the sepulchre, and withdrawing from the busier company of her friends, the Galilean women, who had gone to prepare spices to do honour to their Lord. We have, on another occasion, Mary, the sister of Martha, sitting at Christ's feet to hear

His instructions, and, in so doing, separated from her more active sister, who was busied in preparations to do honour to our Lord, by receiving Him worthily. We have Mary Magdalene sitting in grief at His grave. We have the sister of Martha sitting in grief in the house, mourning for her brother Lazarus.....In both a depth of feeling, which would be considered contemplative; and yet, in both, it was combined with a most active energy. Under circumstances of the same kind, they both come forward to our notice by a development of a similar character; and yet the conduct of each of them, under those circumstances, is different from that of others on the same occasions. Thus, at the death of Lazarus, we read of Mary, his sister, "but Mary sat still in the house," in the position and character of a mourner; but on our Lord's coming, it is said, "as soon as she heard that, she arose quickly." The earnest activity which marks this movement, displays also, incidentally, the deep and strong devotedness of her disposition; for the Jews, who knew her, concluded she had gone to sit at the grave, as an action naturally expected of her character and affections, *supposing that she was going to act as we find Mary Magdalene now doing.* The Jews, therefore, which were with her in the house, and comforted her, when they saw Mary, that she rose up hastily, and went out, followed her, saying, "She goeth unto the grave to weep there." Now, let this account be compared with that of Mary Magdalene on our Lord's death: the one, as we observed, sat still in the house, mourning; the other now sits still at the grave, mourning. But from that posture the former arose hastily on hearing of our Lord. And Mary Magdalene is the first, on Sunday morning, before the break of day, to hasten to embalm our Lord; and, again, there is the same active intensity shown, when on perceiving in the twilight that the stone was removed, she hastened to inform the disciples, anticipating even her companions, who waited after her at the place, and saw the Angel. Again, when they come into the presence of our Lord Himself, *there is something very similar in the character displayed by both of them; and yet not similar to anything mentioned of any other of our Lord's followers.* ("On the Passion," pp. 404-6.)

As to the peccatrix, since only one circumstance is recorded concerning her, there is not of course the same means of studying her character; but we may say that such a character as that of Magdalene is the result which might have been expected to ensue, from such a circumstance as that of Luke vii. What are the characteristics to be observed, whether in Magdalene or Mary of Bethany? Such as these: comparative indifference to surrounding events; a brooding on her own thoughts; on the other hand extraordinary keenness in listening to her Lord's voice, and extraordinary promptitude in obeying it. Is not this what might have been expected, in one who had been led by the accents of that voice to break suddenly with all which had given her interest and excitement, and who would look therefore mainly to Him for supplying the place of all she had left? And so F. Newman represents the exhibition of

Magdalene in the Gospels as specially setting forth the character of a penitent. "Love to her," as to other penitents, was "as a wound in the soul, so full of desire as to become anguish. She would not live out of the presence of Him in whom her joy lay: her spirit languished after Him when she saw Him not, and waited on Him silently, reverently, wistfully, when she was in His blissful presence."—(Fourth Discourse to Mixed Congregations.) Indeed we may add, that the character of penitent Saints has ever been contemplative: witness S. Mary of Egypt, S. Pelagia, S. Margaret of Cortona.

Before closing the exclusively Scriptural part of our argument, something must be said as to *harmonizing* the various New Testament notices of the great Saint whom we are considering. In attempting however such a harmony, we by no means advocate it as certain or even probable, but only as possible. Some Protestants seem to think that the various accounts *cannot* be mutually reconciled on the Catholic theory: but if one way of reconciling them is shown to be possible, a hundred others may be possible also. We would suggest then the following.

Martha, Mary and Lazarus (to name them in their probable order of seniority), having lost both parents, lived together in Martha's house in some Galilean village. Some time before the commencement of our Lord's ministry, a great grief fell on this household; for Mary fell into the power of seven devils, and, consenting to their solicitations, led publicly an abandoned life in some city of Galilee. Martha and Lazarus, by their sorrow, would be more easily weaned from earthly prejudices and interests, and they became beloved disciples of our Lord. Meanwhile Martha of course used every means in her power to reclaim Mary; and when Jesus was to preach in the very city where the latter pursued her infamous calling, Martha persuaded her at least to hear Him.* To avoid further importunity she promised this, little thinking what the issue would be. Her conversion followed, and she joined the other holy women in accompanying her Deliverer through the cities and villages of Galilee. In due course she arrived at her native village,† where Martha (who may easily have travelled so far in the holy company) received them into her house.‡ When Mary departed

* Our readers will remember that this is F. Dalgairns's suggestion.

† Nothing can possibly be more vague than the note of *time* in Luke x. 38; nor are we aware of any difficulty in supposing, that the event there recorded followed very soon after that of Luke vii. 36. In case however there is any difficulty, unknown to us, against such a supposition, we could most easily give a different turn to this particular part of our conjectural harmony.

‡ It may be worth while to point out that S. Luke does not call it "the village in which Martha and Mary dwelt," or use any other phrase implying that the latter had latterly been a resident there.

with the other holy women, Martha and Lazarus had the strongest reasons for abandoning that part of the country altogether. So long as Mary was a sinner, it was important that they should be close at hand to take advantage of every opportunity for reclaiming her. But now they would yearn to leave a place crowded with such miserable associations, where their sister's shame was so widely known, and which she was unlikely again to visit. Nor would they have much difficulty in deciding, that they should go into the neighbourhood of Jerusalem: for they well knew that our Lord's ministry was to issue in certain mysterious events there to take place; they earnestly desire to witness those events; and there also they would enjoy more of their sister's society. Then they are naturally drawn to Bethany in particular, because in that village dwelt Simon,—once a leper, and perhaps cured by our Lord,—who was connected with them by such intimate family ties, that Martha could with propriety minister in his house at an entertainment as though it were her own, and Mary could take on herself what was the special duty of a hostess to an honoured guest. (Compare Matt. xxvi. 6, and Mark xiv. 3, with John xii. 2, 3.) When they are settled in their new abode, our Lord enjoins Mary to abide with them for some brief time, both as a joy to them, and in many ways a salutary discipline to herself. During this period Lazarus dies, and is raised to life; and the rest follows, as recorded by S. John.

The greatest part of all this—we need hardly say—is purest conjecture. Our only purpose is to show, that the Catholic opinion presents no *difficulty* in the way of harmonizing the various Scriptural notices; and a thousand harmonies may be possible, though only one can be true. One thing is to us very plain: viz. that the earlier Evangelists, for whatever reason, preserve an *intentional* silence on the household of Mary, Martha, and Lazarus. We will not here consider what reason may be given for this intentional silence; a question on which Professor Plumptre has some excellent remarks (pp. 81–2). We will only point out, that this fact explains the omission, in the earlier Gospels, of all reference to Lazarus's resurrection; an omission on which great stress is laid by the opponents of Christianity.

So much then on the testimony of Scripture, considered by its own light. We are next to consider how far the authority of *holy men* should weigh with Catholics—apart from direct Scriptural proof altogether—in favour of the generally received Catholic opinion. So far as the opinion of some holy man has been merely based on his own personal examination and juxtaposition of texts, we do not see how his holiness adds to it any special weight; and it must certainly be admitted that the

application to Scripture of what may be called historical criticism, is far better understood in these than it was in earlier days. Yet there are other constituent elements of the question, on which the judgment of holy men possesses, as such, very high authority. For instance, the most devout Catholics of every age have wonderfully agreed in discerning a deep identity of character, in the acts which Scripture respectively ascribes to Magdalene, to Mary of Bethany, and to the peccatrix: and this agreement should weigh greatly with every pious believer. Then again it is curious how few Protestant commentators—*none* so far as we happen to know—have discerned the singularly high and extraordinary evangelical virtues displayed in the history of Luke vii. This is a fact on which holy Catholics have laid pre-eminent stress; and their judgment on the matter (we think) should carry extremely great weight with any Catholic (if there *be* any) whose own private examination would not have led him to discern this.

Lastly, we must inquire how far the Church's authority legitimately bears on the question. On this point we would speak with great diffidence; but our own notion is this. The Church, we need hardly say, is the one authorized interpreter of Scripture, in all which relates to faith and morals. Now the most approved writers of every age, with the Church's full sanction, have constantly based highly important lessons, in the matter of faith and morals, on the identity of S. Mary Magdalene with the peccatrix; on a comparison between such repentance, faith, love, on the one hand as are described in Luke vii., and such privileges on the other hand as were enjoyed by the Saint. We cannot think that a Catholic would act piously, or even safely, who, on the strength of his own critical investigations, should permit himself to doubt on the Scriptural *foundation* of those lessons. On the other hand, as regards identifying *Mary of Bethany* with the peccatrix—however irrefragable to our mind is the *Scriptural* argument for such identity—we do not see that the Church's authority need be taken into account.

Reverting now to our Scriptural argument, we would make one final remark. Those elaborate and carefully-reasoned attacks on the inspired history of our Lord, which have proceeded from such writers as Strauss, Renan, and the Tübingen school, have been by no means an unmixed evil. Doubtless they have inflicted on mankind most serious injury; for (to mention nothing else) they have afforded to antitheists of every class a pretext, for eluding that refutation of their theories which is furnished by the Christian evidences. But on the other hand we have of course fullest confidence in the final result, when the battle is fairly fought out. And already these attacks have led

the defenders of revealed religion to discover in the Gospels a thousand minute harmonies and coincidences, before latent, which singularly assist the believer in definitely grasping the sacred narrative.

It is to be regretted, however, that the work of defence has been so predominantly left in the hands of Protestants. Of course the controversy is to them far more a matter of life and death than it is to Catholics, who have the Church's authority to fall back upon. Still we wish that a larger number of Catholics were devoting themselves to Scripture criticism, than (so far as we know) is in fact the case. One undesirable consequence resulting from the present state of things has been, that specially Catholic interests have in some sense gone to the wall; and that concessions have been made to unbelievers, which every Catholic would repudiate. This particular case of S. Mary Magdalene is one among a hundred such. Now every Catholic is convinced that the tide of unbelief, now so strongly and rapidly running in, cannot be successfully resisted except by the Rock of S. Peter; and he will earnestly desire therefore—were it only for that reason—that all who wish to defend Christianity should rest on that Rock. But this important end is powerfully promoted by every fresh instance in which it is shown, that there is a real and deep harmony, between characteristically Catholic doctrines or opinions on one side, and the results of legitimate Scriptural criticism on the other. One purpose of our present article has been to do something in this direction.

ART. III.—THE CARTE PAPERS.

The Carte Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. A Report presented to the Right Hon. Lord Romilly, Master of the Rolls, by C. W. RUSSELL, D.D., and G. P. PRENDERGAST, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, Commissioners for selecting Official Papers for Transcription from the Carte Manuscripts. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

THE letters, memoirs and entries, written for the most part at least two centuries ago, which are here given to the eye of day,—having been exhumed from among the collection of the indefatigable Thomas Carte, in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, and connected together in this work by a lucidly plain and impartial explanatory narrative,—are specially interesting

and useful as tending to unravel one of the most perplexing knots into which the history of any period has ever contrived to coil itself. Old papers, by throwing a light into the dark corners of the past, draw them as it were into the region of the present. Moreover, those now before us further reveal the thoughts and dealings of one of the most remarkable, most defeated, and yet most calmly successful personages of all whom books and archives, like a mirage, bring near out of the distance and offer to our gaze.

Among the puffed sleeves and perfumed periwigs, the fair, haggard faces, and the swaggering, rosetted feet which swarm in the unlovely court of Charles II., we see an old man, in rolling white wig, moving at a stately pace through the chambers and ante-chambers, often talking affably to groups of two or three elderly gentlemen, now and then favoured with a few courteously unmeaning words by his Most Religious and Gracious Majesty, and anon turning his eyes with a somewhat cynical smile on the brilliant crowd around him, as though he belonged not to them. And does he belong to them? Is not his aspect somewhat weatherbeaten as compared with the powdery gaiety of these flatterers, like that which a last year's butterfly, faded by autumnal showers and winter frosts, wears among the newly-painted creatures of the young year?

This old man is not contemptible or inane. He has done more in the world than any one of these frail new insects whether what he did was bad or good, politic or the reverse. Nay, he is active still, and will continue to be so up to the end. He takes an interest not only in his studs of horses, his hounds, and his hawks, but also in the petitioners, Innocents and Tories—the original and most unhappy Tories—of the Sister Isle; though not always, it is to be feared, in the landless and destitute heirs of some of His Majesty's departed servants. He cannot be charged with the species of cowardice which bears the name of courtliness, so rife in those days; for he does not fear to assert himself at times even to the king, when he thinks the boy whose father as well as himself he has so assiduously served, treats him unbecomingly. One day an armed man dragged him out of his coach with the intention of hanging him at Tyburn—Colonel Blood to wit, who tried to steal the Crown jewels; which objectionable person met with more than leniency at the hands of that Charles II., in whose reign the scaffolds seldom had time to dry. And when the King sent a messenger to the Duke of Ormond with apologies, and the messenger began his task by remarking that it was the King's pleasure to be clement, the Duke suppressed further excuses with the observation that as the King's pleasure was the only

reason which could be assigned, enough had been said already. Perhaps Ormond hardly liked that Court of the Restoration, where decorum was sent to the lumber-room, and where a fiery cavalier, himself one on the long list of Irish Viceroy's, challenged the veteran Lord Lieutenant to a duel before breakfast in his old age.

"Is it your Majesty's pleasure that I should go out of my way at this time of day to fight duels with Dick Talbot?" said the Duke to Charles, thinking, no doubt, how hot and fatiguing that day had been of which his now aged shoulders bore the weight. They had always borne it rather prosperously, to be sure.

He could tell a "*fabula, sed vera*" which besides being more wholesome, would far outdo in interest the concoctions of the dramatists and novelists of his time, if he would be candid and tell the truth, the very truth, about all the transactions in which he bore a part. Indeed, he is not averse to telling some of it. In this golden evening of his stormy life he has actually resolved to recall the events of the morning and the noon, chiefly for the purpose of refuting certain accusations which resemble the last remains of bygone cloud and tempest, streaking the horizon of his now tranquil sky. The "*Account of the Carte Collection of Historical Papers*," among many other circumstances in the Duke's wonderful life which it illumines with lucid impartiality, lifts the veil on his distress at these ordinary troubles, his last as it would appear, and shows him writing scraps of memoirs, and employing Sir Robert Southwell, whose "care for him and care of his interest," to Sir Robert's credit be it quoted, "appeared to be more warm when others thought him under a cloud and quitted him, than when the sun shone more conspicuously upon him," to expound his career with a faithful and willing pen in refutation of several vulgar charges. There is something laughable, taking them altogether, about these calumnies upon the Duke; partly because it is impossible not to wish that some of them were true, as for example that which whispered that he had been a favourer of the Irish; partly because of the mocking, shameless, ludicrous unfairness of others, such as the Earl of Anglesey's assertions about the Irish rebellion of '41 having been hatched at Whitehall; and partly because some were only calumnies in the Duke's own opinion, as for example the accusations commonly brought against him of being an Irishman. However, he resolved to give his own account of that past of which the noise was dying away in his ears, and which he could now contemplate calmly, if from his own point of view. An interesting spectacle is the veteran who has lived prosperously

into a new era, and has begun to look upon himself as historical.

The Duke can gaze back down a long vista of events that are done with, and of faces that are passed away. He holds in his hands a few worn cards, relics of the game of life,—the long, anxious game which he has played out chiefly on the other side of St. George's Channel. Not that he has even yet finally deserted the scene of his former trials of skill. No one doubts his ability, and he is about for the fourth time to seek that land which is after all his own land, and where it is thought that he will be useful yet; for, in the words of the "Naval Allegory,"

Quoth the King, "I'd rather make James go
A fourth trip to Ireland." "Let it be so,"
Cried one and all.

But though "Ormond never old" is sent back once more to the Irish helm of state, his day is declining, as all days must, and calmly, as all do not. He has long outlived the great game of eight years with which above all his name is associated, and most of those partners and antagonists who succeeded each other so quickly and changed places so confusedly that it is a wonder how well he made his brains serve him throughout. He gave it up at a moment when, through the loss of his ablest partners and other awkward circumstances of the same kind, he found himself left alone with Oliver Cromwell, a mighty player, at the awful green table of fate. Ormond's hand was still not altogether a bad one; but he was hampered by a perplexed young king, he was opposed by the invincible Brewer, he had lost his best ally, and had somehow, in one way or another, made himself suspicious to some of those who should have succoured him. So it happened that before long he rose and marched off with dignity, trailing the robes of a marquis after him. And Cromwell smoothed out the rumped cloth with his red-hot iron, piled all the cards in a heap, and remained sole master of the situation.

There are few episodes of history so little understood or so wilfully misrepresented as the Irish Civil War of 1641-53. Probably many people who talk jocularly about Kilkenny cats little think that the phrase and the ridiculous legend from which it springs have their origin in the unhappy dissensions of the Confederation of Kilkenny, so noble in its object, but ruined by enmity within, kindled at enmity without. Englishmen, it is acknowledged, do not care for Irish history. They legislate for Ireland, discuss Ireland, often abuse Ireland, and yet, as they never think of reading her history, they can hardly

be competent to judge of Irish affairs. But the fire, and humour, and pathos which throw a charm round modern Ireland (except where Fenians are concerned), run like golden threads through the dark woof of her history, and alone reward the student who regards amusement as a necessary sauce to knowledge. It is true that good Irish histories are difficult to obtain, but the difficulty springs from want of demand; and it is a curious fact that the most violent misrepresentations and reckless assertions on the unscrupulous historic page, relating to the past of the sister isle, are readily believed and quoted. In these days of "justice to Ireland" this surely ought not to be the case.

For example, to a large proportion of Englishmen and women Sir Phelim O'Neill seems to be the only prominent figure, sometimes the only figure at all, in the foreground of what is often called the Great Popish Rebellion of '41. Occasionally the Duke of Ormond is allowed a niche in the background, but usually Sir Phelim is depicted as the sole important actor in the whole affair, holding aloft a blood-stained brand, and standing, a warning to posterity, on a heap of forty thousand immolated victims. The number, however, is avowedly uncertain, since it rises in proportion to the fervour of his accusers, and has occasionally reached the enormous sum of one hundred thousand, if not more.

Surely this is unjust, not only to other leaders who played a much more conspicuous and much more noble part in the Civil War, but also to the redoubtable Sir Phelim himself. It is true that he was not altogether a prepossessing character: untimely quarrels with his cousins, petty spite and jealousy, and sundry other misdemeanours may be laid to his charge, nor will any one care to conceal them; but it is equally true that if certain murders took place in the beginning of the insurrection, perpetrated by exasperated men and women, whose wrongs had driven them to crime and madness, the inexorable arithmetic of eyes which do not see through scarlet spectacles, reduces the number to a fourth of the usual sum at the most. Some bring down the 40,000 to a 0; yet the grand old system of giving a good round number and chroniclers' love for a supper of horrors, have imposed even on foreign writers, such as Lamartine; and throughout the ages Sir Phelim continues to be the bugbear of old ladies, and an everlasting stock argument on the platform. The strangest thing is that his contemporaries seem never to have heard of all these evil doings. Neither Ormond, nor the Confederate Assembly, nor the Puritans themselves were aware of them. This fact is remarked upon by Dr. Russell and Mr. Prendergast, in page 121 of their

"Report," *à propos* to Sir Phelim's amicable correspondence with Ormond in 1649, which shows that the Lord Lieutenant, as well as the Anglo-Irish Assembly, regarded him with respect. It is to be remarked also that he was tried "by the Roundheads afterwards for high treason; and for the high treason committed by rebellion, and not for murder, he was sentenced and hanged." There was a charge against him for one murder, that of Lord Caulfield, but, as the learned Commissioners further observe, "that charge is now known to be false." If the accused are allowed the benefit of a doubt, surely O'Neill may be allowed the benefit of the certainty which these testimonies establish.

It is undeniable that in some parts of Ireland murders were committed, and every one is willing to be shocked that such was the case. The best protectors of the Protestants were undeniably the Catholic priesthood, to whom many were indebted for the safety of their lives and goods. But the most enthusiastic lover of Ireland never claimed for her the peculiar distinction of being a nation of angels, and no people of a character less exalted were likely to bear, without retaliation, all that the Irish had to endure at the time of the breaking out of the war. Their oppressors were to be found in the city and in the country. Out among the glens and "on the fair hills of holy Ireland," flourished such gentle creatures as Sir Frederick Hamilton, who kept a gallows on which he made a point of sacrificing a victim a day, in the person of whatsoever, man, woman, or child, came first to hand. On one occasion, to celebrate St. Patrick's Day, as it appears, instead of a living body he hung up a stuffed figure of the Guy Fawkes description, expressly for the pleasure of seeing the unhappy spectators pray of their charity for a fellow-creature's soul. In the city there was the torture-chamber, where Anglo-Irishman and Celt alike paid the penalty of their religion; and throughout Ireland the Sacraments were administered by stealth. Strafford had ground down the country with all the force of his iron hand; a pair of so-called justices, named Parsons and Borlase, now held sway in Dublin Castle; and the people being scourged into madness, their chieftains began to look around for a wholesome channel into which that madness might be turned. They found it in the Confederation of Kilkenny and the Civil War of '41.

When all these things are called to mind it is difficult to understand Ormond's assurance, given us in one of the Memoirs which he left in his "Red Box," to the effect that Ireland "was in a flourishing and improving condition when the rebellion broke out," at least if the happiness of the people be necessary

to such a state of prosperity; difficult, too, to imagine how he could think it strange that the insurrection should have taken place.

Together with the chivalrous Roderick O'More, and other northern chiefs, Sir Phelim O'Neill inaugurated this the greatest and best disciplined of all Irish outbreaks, from the first Geraldine war down to the abortive attempts which ended at Ballingarry and Tallaght. The Catholic gentry of the Pale, headed by Lord Gormanstown, coalesced with the native Irish, and glorious and unwonted was the spectacle when Gormanstown and O'More, on the hill of Crofty, swore to bury old differences for the sake of their common faith. The originators, however, drop out of their conspicuous positions as the affair goes on. O'More is last seen, a princely figure, on the lost battle-field of Kilrush, and is supposed to have died soon afterwards at Kilkenny, leaving a stainless name. And Sir Phelim takes his place as a secondary star after the appearance on the political firmament of a first-rate luminary, his far more talented and distinguished kinsman, Eugene or Eoghan O'Neill. Nothing can be more absurd than to confound these two together. Sir Phelim, finding that he was making small progress, and thereby somewhat discouraged, went to meet Eoghan and yielded up to him the chief command in Ulster. Yet in spite of this cousinly welcome, not only did they soon quarrel, but they were essentially different from each other in many important respects. Sir Phelim seems as a general rule to have disliked his cousin heartily, until they were set at one again by the efforts of the Papal Nuncio, who is himself as much misrepresented as the actors in Irish history nearly always are. Later, pitiable to say, the girlish enmity sprang up again, and appears with a waspish sting in Sir Phelim's letters to Ormond written in 1649, and preserved to posterity, with all its little spiteful traits, in the Carte Collection.

Eoghan O'Neill possessed in a far greater degree than Phelim, the inexplicable combination of characteristics which ensures influence over the Gaelic race. It would be as difficult to specify these characteristics as to define the peculiar charm which certain natures exercise on refractory horses. The *clannishness* of the Gael is doubtless the clue to the matter, and their favourite leaders in olden times have without exception sprung from some princely race, usually, too, from the "old Irish." Like Sir Phelim, Eoghan was himself a Gael, belonging to the royal house which Ulstermen especially held in reverence; and indeed, the past year has shown that the Irish in general hold it in reverence still. He was a splendid soldier and officer; his recklessness as to his own safety appears to have verged on

folly, but no doubt even this military fault increased the admiration of his followers for their daring leader. Moreover, he was a devout Catholic—a circumstance which deeply and favourably impressed the religious minds of his countrymen. He had proved his devotion by his deeds, since he had given up brilliant worldly prospects in order to fight for the Church where well-trained soldiers were most sorely needed; and he possessed a letter from Pope Urban VIII., expressing the Holy Father's pleasure in the generosity of the sacrifice.

O'Neill's training on the arid soil and beneath the dry fierce sky of Spain had not erased the remembrance of his native honeysweet and somewhat guttural tongue; neither had his military education under the solemnly disciplinarian brother of Philip IV., driven the original genius out of that fertile mind, often as such treatment is the ruin of inborn talent. It is, for example, a well-known if unacknowledged fact that the great destroyers of original musicians and painters, are music and drawing masters. No doubt it is a useful exercise to draw legs of chairs, and play a hundred scales a day, and well to be told that "that fatal facility" must be curbed; yet unless the facility be very inveterate indeed it is likely to die of education. The Cardinal's school for soldiers seems to have been somewhat of the martinet description, and the young ideas ran some risk of fading away instead of shooting up under his repressive training. His tactics perhaps were rather of a sixteenth century stamp, and took after those of the great Duke of Parma, who was his first cousin once removed. Yet genius did push up under his eye, and bloom and flourish, and had it not been transplanted out of continental fields of fame would have done him the honour which Michael Angelo brought to the master whom he has rendered famous.

The Cardinal could distinguish the rare talent of O'Neill, and helped him, with a rapidity remarkable in an Infant of Spain, up the golden ladder of fame. Richelieu, too, recognized the calibre of the Irish defender of Arras, who with good-humoured valour inscribed above the gates the announcement that—

*"Quand les Français prendront Arras,
Les souris mangeront les chats."*

a natural phenomenon which is not recorded by history as having taken place, though after a brilliant defence the city was at last forced to yield to the "men in nations" whom Richelieu sent against it. A prospect of grandeur equalling that of Wallenstein or Piccolomini shone refulgent in the not very remote heavens, when O'Neill received tidings of the movement begun by Roderick O'More the chivalrous and

stainless, and by the cousin Phelim, whose name has descended all too much blackened to horrified posterity. Eugenio Rufo, as the Spaniards called him, saw what was at stake. He could not perhaps fully realize the condition of Irish Catholics in their own land, being accustomed to hear Mass without a consciousness that the life of the celebrant, together with his own and that of everyone present, was in imminent danger, and having no fear of star-chambers and Dublin Castle before his eyes. Yet there was the plain fact that Ireland was taking up arms for the sake of the Faith; it was equally plain that they lacked among them, if not military talent, yet that shaping and pruning which all talent needs, and which it should rather receive in the barrack-yard school than not at all. So the choice seemed to lie between remaining on the Continent to be as famous as Wallenstein and Piccolomini, and going to a fresh field where, even if he succeeded, his fame would never be European; between wealthy, comfortable distinction in opulent countries, and an uncertain struggle in the wilds of Erin. It is to the credit of O'Neill that he chose the latter.

Self-devotion naturally does not bring worldly ease in its train; and from the moment when the frigate which bore O'Neill up the German Ocean and past the Orkneyan Skerries, hove anchor at Dunkerque, to that when his hard-worn life ebbed out on the misty island in Lough Oughter, he passed but few hours undarkened by trouble and anxiety. Even Dugald Dalgetty found comfort to a large extent among the Spanish soldados, though good pay and good Rhenish went a long way towards contenting him; to a rising, talented, and ambitious soldier of rank, fully appreciated by his commander-in-chief, the Spanish must have been a pleasant service enough, as well as one promising wealth and splendour. Different, indeed, was a high military post under the supreme Council of Kilkenny.

The marble city wore a brilliant appearance when first O'Neill reached Ireland; such a one as, in all probability, it will never wear again, even in that halcyon period when the President of the Irish Republic holds his court, with democratic simplicity (how well suited to the "clannish" Gael!), in some White House in Dublin, scorning the historical, infamous, and deputy-monarchical Castle. From Spain and Germany came the apprentices of the Thirty Years' War, in rich velvet dresses, and collars marvellously created at Brussels, Mechlin, and Valenciennes. From Rome came priests and friars rejoicing in the new era of freedom, and bronzed with such a sun as never rises in the dewy skies of Erin; from Ulster and Munster the Gaelic costume, which set at nought the celebrated Statutes,

was there to meet the Saxon garb of fashionable Palesmen. And the Council began its work well, in due parliamentary form, and having its own mint not devoid of something to coin.

The Irish are accused of bulls, the English of blunders, which are bulls in action. But the Council of Kilkenny, perhaps because both English and Irish elements were mingled therein, was victimized not only by the bull, but by the blunder in its most active form. It was in military matters that the presence of this presiding genius was first strikingly manifested. The Council forgot the wholesome, if inelegant, adage that "Too many cooks spoil the broth," and divided the command of their army among four generals, none being supreme; which course of action, to remove from the kitchen to the higher sphere of the laboratory, was like throwing four opposing elements into one jar, and produced something the same results. Had O'Neill commanded in chief, that opportunity would probably have occurred at once which occurred seven years later, and was there rendered useless by his death.

The Earl of Ormond makes his first appearance on the scene as the general sent to suppress the Irish rebels, who were taking up arms for liberty of conscience. The king did not trouble himself to be civil to the Confederates, though they had one and all sworn allegiance to their sovereign Lord King Charles in solemn terms. Ormond himself left in his "Red Box" an account of Charles's reasons for his rough treatment of the Confederate Catholics. "Nor was it safe for him to offer at reducing his Irish rebels by treaty, because his disaffected subjects of his two other kingdoms made his pretended favour of Popery to be the principal ground of their dissatisfaction; and the credit that calumny gained was the only means by which it was possible for the rebellious Parliament to raise forces able to resist the king's; so that, if his Majesty had gone about by treaty, or if he had not concurred with the Parliament in all the ways they could propose for suppressing it by force of arms, his least scruple or delay would have given continuance to the aforesaid calumny, and it is probable he never would have been able to have disputed his just rights as long as he did." This calumny certainly was rife among the Puritans, they who had themselves forced the king to reduce his army in Ireland; and, moreover, they have got a Hume, slanderer both of the king and of the Irish, partially to credit the accusation. It was afterwards revived, as before observed, by the Earl of Anglesey, which caused Sir Robert Southwell to refute it by dividing the guilt fairly "between the king's different enemies." Charles certainly resembled a child, who in climbing about a cliff has thrust himself into a position whence he can go neither back-

wards nor forwards. Half measures—a step first in one direction and then in another—were hardly a likely means of escape. It does seem as if it would have been a rash proceeding, at that early stage of his disasters to throw himself boldly into the arms of those Catholics, loyal at heart, with whom the Roundheads were pleased to confound and mix him up. Yet would it not have been better than the course he adopted? He knew that he could not consistently curry favour with the Parliamentarians, and he was obliged to be inconsistent afterwards even so far as to make peace with his Irish “rebels.” And it certainly must be admitted, though with a reference to the advantage we are under of seeing the events in full which were then in embryo, that whatever he had done, he could not have offended the Puritans more than he actually did, seeing that they finally cut off his head.

However, as he had determined for the moment to crush the Confederates, he ordered the transportation of English and Scotch forces to Ireland. But it was necessary to pay their wages; and the Duke reveals Charles's arrangements for doing so. “He gave the royal assent to an Act of Parliament to invite and secure adventurers out of the confiscations of the Irish rebels.” And yet they did but want liberty of conscience, and then they would have died for him. Did he find it as easy to content the Parliamentarians? But Charles was only one among several demented monarchs who, out of different courses, have chosen the one which leads most surely to destruction.

Ormond, though he afterwards shrank from measuring swords with Oliver Cromwell, was not altogether devoid of military talent; and the Confederates received an unheeded warning in Preston's defeat at Rathconnel. Yet they held firmly to their purpose, though they still went on quartering the command, so that the whole affair was as stable as any affair can be where there is no central authority.

It has been truly observed that had Parsons and Borlase, the two Puritan justices who then governed Ireland, continued to wield the delegated sceptre, and apply the rack in Dublin Castle, the Confederation would have prospered. It was so necessary to present an united front against such open and unmistakable foes as these, that discord could not raise its head; their aim appeared to be extermination, and no one likes to be exterminated; not a Palesman who would not join hands with a Celt to defeat such an intention. It was an evil day for the allies when in 1644 the now Marquis of Ormond supplanted Parsons and Borlase, for he was less violent, yet more dangerous; his arguments were softer than the rack, yet more demoralizing. And this view of the case is fully corroborated

in the "Account of the Carte Collection." Ormond, like the king, never thought of giving up all reference to the feelings of Charles's scrupulous English subjects, and all hope of conciliating them; though he was "not imbued with the same hatred to the Irish of the Pale as the Lords Justices and the Parliamentary leaders in England; nor was he unwilling, so far as was possible . . . to consider the admitted grievances of their northern allies" (p. 115); yet he opposed their demands, and took the method which, of all the devices of diplomatic engineering, is the surest to undermine a hitherto strong edifice, and reduce it to ruins. He set them at variance among themselves. "It was Ormond's manifest policy to discourage the growth of their demands, and to throw every obstacle in the way of the consolidation of that formidable unanimity in asserting them. . . which had resulted in the Confederation of Kilkenny. And thus the correspondence is full, not alone of angry denunciations of the 'exaggerated' claims of the clergy, and especially of the party of the Nuncio Rinuccini, but of suggestions and appeals to every element of disunion by which the two parties might be divided" (p. 116). Here was a far more dangerous enemy than the brutally upright justices; one who could whisper sweetly in Confederates' ears, and only resort to force when necessary.

Ormond's own position was a most peculiar one. He, too, was an Irishman, though not quite so much so as Preston and Muskerry, and far less so than O'Neill on the one hand and Murrough of the Burnings on the other. He himself was much distressed at the name, and did his best to disown the nation which, though it has not often produced so great an adept in diplomacy as the Duke of Ormond, has certainly borne a rich harvest of saints, sages, and heroes.

It is true that Ormond's mother was a Poyntz, and that he was born in England; but his father had been a Butler of the Kilcash branch. He was a Protestant but not a Puritan; and the only Protestant of his family, having been instructed in the Church of England in his tender years by Abbot, Archbishop of Canterbury. His whole career, as is natural, smacks somewhat of his early training; and he declares that "he has been strangely mistaken these forty years and upwards, if he is not by birth, education, religion"—he does not perceive the inherent weakness of the phrase—"and affection, a perfect Englishman." He was nearly connected with several families of the Pale, a circumstance which further involved his complicated position. However, of all his many accomplishments, diplomacy was his forte, even though it seems that it succeeded rather in harming his

enemies than in serving his friends. Still it must be remembered that he had the misfortune to be the minister of a man who was always changing his mind, and allowances must be made accordingly. Finally, Lord Ormond presented a dignified appearance in his wig and grand plumed hat, and his address was full of fascination.

It was the age of fascination, yet the charm was an unavailing one. Charles was fascinating, yet he lost his head; so was Montrose, and he met with the same fate; O'Neill was fascinating, and adored by more than two-thirds of a nation, yet he died before his time of wearing anxiety. Ormond too was fascinating; but in the period at least of which we are speaking, he attained his bad ends only and never the good, so far as concerns his public life.

In 1643, Ormond, always more merciful towards them than the Lords Justices, had been commissioned to treat with the Confederates, for Charles began to recognize the fact that he was doing his cause no good but rather harm by quarrelling with his Irish subjects. There was joy in the Supreme Council, who did not see at the time that this negotiation was their death-blow. It came early in their career, yet it was the germ of that cankerworm which sapped their life. If liberty of conscience was their aim, they should not at that moment have negotiated with Charles and Ormond except on a certainty of obtaining their demands; for success was smiling on their arms, and Preston possessed Leinster, and O'Neill the North. They who had taken the oath must needs own no other king than Charles; but they were equally bound to win the free exercise of their religion. The Gaelic confederates were clear-sighted enough to oppose the year's cessation of arms which was agreed upon with Ormond, for he would not engage to help them in their struggle with the invading Covenanters, who overran Ulster, plundering field and town. Scarampi, Urban VIII.'s envoy, was of one mind with the Gael, and argued that now was the time for winning those rights for which they had taken up arms. They could, of course, help the king afterwards if they liked. But no one listened to Scarampi, nor to the old Irish, who reaped nothing but harm from the truce. And after it came Ormond's lord-lieutenancy, the ruin of the Confederation.

The king was, of course, worried by the ultra-Protestants on account of the cessation, but he began by behaving well, owing partly, it is said, to the influence of Henrietta Maria, partly to his hope that the Confederates would send him the help of 10,000 men. And presently the Earl of Glamorgan was deputed

to make a final peace with the Irish Catholics, remove their disabilities, and to levy men for the king's service, till, to quiet the angry growls of the Parliament, Ormond and Charles, with one of their alarmingly sudden pirouettes, threw Glamorgan into prison on his return to Dublin. Such occurrences as these were vexatious; they naturally made the Confederates believe that the king was playing them false—as indeed he was likely to do in his efforts to conciliate first one party, then the other; and they declared that not a soldier should leave the country on his behalf till Glamorgan should be released, and released he accordingly was. But far from resenting his imprisonment, he coolly observed that Ormond had acted well. No wonder that the old Irish eyed the negotiations suspiciously.

Meanwhile a new and most important actor in the intricate Kilkenny drama had appeared on the stage, no less a personage than the celebrated Gianbattista Rinuccini, the Nuncio sent by Innocent X. to the Irish Confederates, and on whose tomb may yet be read the pregnant words—

“Ad fœderatos Catholicos Hiberniæ pontificio legatione functo.”

He was a remarkable man occupying a remarkable position; deeply studious, severely virtuous, inflexible in principle, having, as it seems, a power to bow the stronger will when the weaker was left uninfluenced. He had seen the queen in Paris, who, long suspected by her enemies of sympathy with the Confederates, had become really favourable towards them since the battle of Naseby; he had narrowly escaped being taken prisoner by a Parliamentary cruiser; he had made a triumphal entry into Kilkenny, amid gorgeous banners, and peals of bells, and a Latin oration from a young student who has some claims to pity when it is called to mind that all this pomp took place in torrents of rain, which must have shown the Tuscan Nuncio what sort of weather he had to expect in Ireland. Yet in spite of the rain it was a grand day for the Confederates.

Rinuccini loved the Irish, especially the ‘mere Irish.’ He knew that their hearts were bound up in the freedom of their religion. And the keen Italian saw at a glance that whoever negotiated with Charles and Ormond must bind them fast. He was not averse to the relief of Chester; but he would have the Confederates claim as its price, that which was the object of their confederation. A good part of them agreed with him; but the other part would leave the king to decide, after they had helped him, what he should give them in return for their help. Division was among them; it was the beginning of the end.

The treaty was one to excite the wonder of all who are not well acquainted with the general character of the "Lords of the Pale," for they are responsible for such a treaty having been signed at all, as it finally was. The first article stipulates that Catholics should not be bound to take the oath of supremacy; the twenty-first that the "Graces" which Charles in the fourth year of his reign had promised them, should be asked for again from the ensuing parliament. And not another condition relative to religion is mentioned. The Confederates at once made ready the troops who were to embark for England, but the treaty had been too long delayed; Chester had fallen, and the embarkation was no longer necessary.

That this peace was not the wish or deed of the nation, who had taken up arms for liberty of conscience, nor of the clergy, who opposed it steadily and consistently, cannot be too strongly insisted on; because Ormond has brought against them accusations of treachery, so angrily couched, that they are quite alarming, as coming from the self-possession grandee. The Lords of the Pale, always distinguished since the first for a half-hearted policy, and forming the large majority of the Supreme Council, are answerable for the peace of 1646.

Poor Henrietta Maria, it appears, had discussed with the Pontiff by letter a treaty much more favourable to the Irish, and including the English Catholics, who looked anxiously for help to the friendly Confederates. The Nuncio's wish was all for this treaty; but either from delay, which was the disease of the time, or from the queen's powerlessness to act, it fell through, and is heard of no more. To the far more favourable terms which Glamorgan had proposed, Henrietta had evidently been a party; for Lord FitzWilliam wrote to the Supreme Council at her command expressing a far greater regard for the Confederates than for Ormond, together with an opinion, which reads like keen satire, that they were now all united among themselves!

All this time and long before, the Scots originally introduced by Hamilton had been in Ulster, curbed only by the genius of Eoghan O'Neill. Neither was it an easy matter to curb them, seeing that it took three years to get together and discipline an army, with all his talent for the organization of troops; seeing also that the Scots were commanded by so experienced a soldier as Munro, himself an old officer of Gustavus Adolphus. There is the dry comicality of his race about Munro: not so much the voluntary humour of a light and witty spirit, as the involuntary humour of misplaced solemnity. Probably he little thought, when fighting under the Lion of the North, that he should be disastrously defeated in the distant wilds of Ulster, by a rising, but as yet unheard-of, pupil of the "Rother Hut,"—yet so it

was. We have it on the authority of one of his foes, the real author of what goes by the name of "Eoghan O'Neill's Journal," that Munro spoke broad Scotch, indeed the very broadest; but even without that authority it is impossible to read the smallest effort of his grave pen without being certain of the fact. His pen sometimes did make efforts, as in the "Munro, his Expedition," &c. (for none but the author himself could write out the title in full), wherein among other spicy records he relates how a soldier was deemed much disgraced in the eyes of all brave men because he neglected to challenge a minister who had reproved him for misconduct. As to Munro's despatches, they rather tickle the fancy of the profane than excite the admiration of the lover of veracity. Withal he was strong in battle; made indefatigable attempts to induce O'Neill to fight while as yet unprepared, and on one occasion took advantage of his personal imprudence to try and make him prisoner in a lane. But Fortune did not smile on the soldier of Gustavus as brightly as his education and his energy deserved; and she had ready for him the downfall which follows self-conceit, in the famous battle of Benburb.

These Scots were now in league with the Parliamentarians, and were often supplied from England with arms and money; indeed Munro had only just taken leave of their commissioners when he met O'Neill at Benburb on a splendid June morning, when the sun for once shone cloudless. The summer dawn, the heathy slopes, the devotions with which the Irish army began the battle, the advance of the Scots along the river bank, the hot and gorgeous afternoon, the hopeless rout, the flight of Munro without cloak or wig, the prostrate thousands strewn on the battle-field in the light warm night of June, form an *ensemble* common in all history, but ever to be dwelt on fondly by two-thirds of the nation. Only two-thirds, or perhaps a little more; it were not judicious to fall into the mistake of the young lady who, with great simplicity, complimented an Irish friend of strong Protestant principles on the battle of Benburb, but was soon made aware of her mistake by the offended party assuring her that "The Boyne is our great battle."

It is sad to reflect that when the day of Benburb was over, every one conducted himself as he should not have done. Munro wrote straight off from Carrickfergus, first to the English commissioners, observing that it behoved him to taste of bitterness; and secondly, to the Parliament, computing the troops and field-pieces with which he had begun the battle at a cipher which shows subtraction to have been his forte. His statements do not seem to have been entirely credited, for the posters which informed the wrathful Londoners of his defeat

give his losses at a pretty round number. But Munro never ought to have been in Carrickfergus at all; for now was the time when he could and should have been driven not only from that stronghold, named after Charles I.'s ancestor, but out of Ireland altogether. The thirteenth fairy, however, seems to have worn a black cap at O'Neill's christening; and when all her sisters were showering their gifts on the royal child, she decreed with a wave of her broomstick that he should never reap their fruits.

It was at this time that the peace negotiation was going forward in its crotchety, quarrelsome way; and it was natural that the Nuncio, after his procession and solemn mass of thanksgiving for the great victory of Benburb, of which he sent the tattered banners to Rome, should look with horror on the readiness of the Confederates, in their strength and glory, to place themselves so meekly in the power of Charles's whims. The king, at that moment, seems to have had some thoughts of coming to Ireland, if a letter he wrote to Glamorgan can be trusted. Unfortunately he gave Ormond at the very same time to understand that he would not have the peace at all; though Ormond must have known that he did not mean what he said, since that faithful and sorely-tried Lord-Lieutenant persistently brought the negotiation to a conclusion, and ever afterwards declared that he did so at the king's command. The peace certainly was not one which need greatly have roused the jealousy of the Puritans. The indignant Nuncio called for help to his Celtic favourite, who had just beaten Munro; and O'Neill came in haste at his bidding, and marched towards Kilkenny. To understand historical characters and their actions, the critic should make himself their contemporary, and place himself in their position; and doubtless the impulse to go southward was potent with O'Neill. For the Nuncio exercised upon him all the influence which that upright prelate knew how to wield over certain natures; the austere, enthusiastic, inflexible, and keen Italian had won a heart which was clear and limpid but vehement as Ulidian mountain torrents. Besides, the victorious chieftain had given up all for his religion, and here was a peace which made no provision for its exercise, and left the king to decide how much or how little he would concede. O'Neill left the Scots in Ulster; and if the author of "Munro his Expedition, &c." did not chuckle, it must have been only because he thought chuckling below the dignity of one who had taken the Covenant.

Not only would the clerics and the people have none of the peace; O'Neill and Preston, in a rare fit of unanimity against Ormond, agreed in condemning the imperfect treaty; and

Ormond himself, who was in Munster, very nearly became their prisoner, only escaping them by running away in a manner unbecoming to a marquis and a viceroy, and by the complaisance of an officer who allowed him to cross Leighlin bridge. Perhaps the memory of this hurried flight edged the bitterness of Ormond's words, when he afterwards recalled the breach of the Peace of '46. To the "Red Box" he consigned his assertion that it was an "infamous breach," and due to the Nuncio and Irish clergy; and he speaks rancorously of the conduct of O'Neill and Preston at this juncture. O'Neill had always been the indignant enemy of the treaty; rightly so, since his oath bound him to "defend, uphold, and maintain the free exercise of the Roman Catholic faith and religion throughout this land;" a clause which the Council would seem to have forgotten when they placed this darling object in the king's power to give or withhold as he pleased. Preston, it is true, had at at first celebrated the arrangement with rejoicings; but he announced a change of mind when he found that nearly everybody was against the peace. As to the bishops, in spite of Clarendon's assertion to the contrary as far as the Nuncio is concerned, they signed a protest condemning any treaty which failed to provide, not only for liberty of conscience, but for the restoration of plundered church property, and the appointment of a Catholic Viceroy. And Rinuccini and his party triumphed. None of those who were not responsible for the peace observed it. If the Nuncio ever saw the sun shine while in Ireland, it must have been at this hopeful period.

His rôle in the Kilkenny drama is that of the open and clear-headed if at times imprudent character, who found himself thwarted by events, which events went wrong because the people round about him were so troublesome as not to attend to his advice when he counselled them aright. The puzzled student has cause to thank him at least for being consistent.

As to the Marquis of Ormond, the part which he played is all the more difficult to analyze, because it has been extolled as glorious by his admirers, and denounced as hateful by his detractors. His own pen has made sundry efforts to explain the mystery of his doings in Ireland, and was greatly occupied as it seems, with excusing any leniency he may have shown towards either side. He paints himself somewhat as a perplexed Colossus of Rhodes; and perplexed he doubtless was. What with sympathy for the Lords of the Pale, and fear of the old Irish and the Puritans, and regard for the King, and dislike to the Catholic claims, he must have had a hard time of it. It should be borne in mind that Ormond was Charles's servant, and unlike those servants of modern days, who oppose them-

selves even to carrying out their master's good intentions, he followed Charles for good and bad as nearly as might be, considering the contradictory orders which he sometimes received. With one party, and that the clearer-headed party, Ormond incurred great odium, probably because he obeyed too closely the wishes of the hard-pressed, unhappy, vacillating King. "He would rather," says a vehemently "Old Irish" writer, "have seen the crescent flying from Dublin Castle than the colours of the Confederates." It appears that he preferred those of the Parliamentarians to either. Possibly a Charles and an Ormond might associate the triumph of the Confederation with the complete political separation of the two countries, which was in nowise a part of its programme, nor a necessary sequence of events. Be that as it may, Ormond very narrowly escaped seeing the hated colours flying from those dismal towers. He is discovered awaiting in terror the report of that first gun that never was fired, when the Confederates have made up their mind to march once for all upon Dublin, because it is believed, not without reason, that Ormond will give it to the Puritans rather than see an Irish soldier within its walls. He begins to feel as if he had escaped across Leighlin bridge in vain, while his lady carries baskets of earth to the ramparts, and the "Dublin cits" tremble in expectation of the terrible "creaghts" bursting in all the glory of their black glibs and saffron shirts into the streets and warehouses. The Confederates lie encamped along the banks of the Liffey. Their fires light up the wintry nights; Ormond can count them, and plentiful they are.

Why did not the living waves fling themselves against the weak defences of the capital? It was the old story, the new story, the perpetual story, acted out everywhere to some extent, but more especially in Ireland, the chosen abode of the Kilkenny species of cat. That army had two leaders, and they quarrelled—beneath the very walls of the city they quarrelled. Not that they broke openly, insulted each other face to face and named a friend; but they had for some time past been in a chronic state of dissension, in spite of their unanimity about the peace. Nothing could set the tetchy son of the house of Gormanstown at one with the gallant and brilliant Celtic prince who possessed the hearts of the "mere Irish." The Nuncio could not do it, though he had settled the quarrel of the two O'Neills. Gael and Gael might meet, but Gael and Palesman never, though the angles of their Gaelism and Paleism had been rubbed against half the nationalities of Europe. It would have been worth while even to be friends when the Puritans were ahead; but Thomas Preston could not bring his mind thereto. He kept Rinuccini con-

tinually on the march, through the bleak November weather, from "Your Grace knows that General Preston is not to be trusted, and as likely as not is setting a trap for me," to "If your Grace knew what the Old Irish and their ferocity are, you would see that they mean to annihilate me." Probably what his Grace knew best was that the Italian sun was glowing warmly on his peaceful archiepiscopal palace far away at Fermo. How polite was the Palesman, how deferential the Milesian, and yet how impossible it was to make them see clearly that Ormond was laughing at them over the feeble ramparts which the Marchioness had strengthened with baskets of earth. It is a story such as this which raises a doubt whether Irish existence, with all its glow of generosity, and purity, and domestic love, can be sustained without feud and discord. Yet how can she be a firm edifice and bulwark of civilization unless she cease to be a "heap of uncementing sand"?

"What rare fun we'll have fighting among ourselves when we do get the land," was the reflection of a member of the Riband Vehm-gericht. The grimly humorous Vehm-gerichter knew his countrymen's tendencies—felt them, no doubt, rampant within himself. Would not his shillelagh be down in a trice on the heads of the twenty or thirty who should dispute his acre with him? And is not the same feeling manifested by the Fenian beyond the Atlantic, by the Ribandman in his barn, the Orangeman in his lodge, and the improvised herald who would have every low-born spalpeen from the other side of the bay, river, or lake, to know that the O'Mores, O'Sullivans, or O'Tooles have the best blood in them?

Less tangible, but more fatal than the ordinary instrument of Hibernian wrath, were the shillelaghs which crossed each other in airy combat beneath the walls of Dublin. Preston, it appears, was chiefly to blame, though the fault of the brave and pure-hearted O'Neill seems to have been a touch of fiery temper, not to be excused by the common reflection that it ran in the blood. He had some reason to distrust his colleague; and had he alone commanded, no doubt Dublin would have fallen.

They had been twelve days before the city without firing a shot. Fifteen days, according to O'Neill, would have sufficed to reduce it even afterwards, when occupied by Puritan troops. The weather was bitterly cold, though it had no power to cool the tempers which burned beneath those inclement skies. At last a false report, that the Parliamentarians had landed and were within the capital caused the Confederates to break up their camps and depart, and the golden opportunity was gone, never to return.

Here is a dark stain on the blotted page of the memorial which History's muse was sadly and untidily keeping! Yet both the generals who did not take Dublin were brave and good soldiers, and neither was a cruel conqueror. O'Neill had shown a trait of peculiar generosity when, though cut to the heart at the hazy-headed Castlehaven being preferred before him in the earlier part of the war, he had yet gone to pay him a congratulatory visit: and Preston, though sweetness of that kind was out of his sphere, yet showed on more than one occasion a bright example of humanity to the Parliamentarians and such-like foes, which it is a pity, on the whole, that they did not follow.

When the dreaded columns had withdrawn from the chill banks of the Liffey, Ormond began to fear the Puritans, and, half relenting, wished to admit some of Preston's troops; but even Preston, though possessed with a great regard for the lord-lieutenant, was obliged to reject his terms. The Marquis's Protestantism forbade him to make concessions, and as no one had any intention of giving troops away Ormond and Dublin were left to subside until the Puritans should come.

They did come, and soon, and were received by the Marquis himself; and before May three thousand of them were in his garrisons. This is, perhaps, the most extraordinary passage in Ormond's public life. His own explanation of it forms another of those MS. memoirs in which he recalls and seeks to justify the policy of the past. After recalling the peril and unprofitableness of his post, he observes that he held his footing "above a year after his late Majesty put himself into the hands of the Scotch at Newcastle. . . . Notwithstanding that he was soon after in their power, they obtained his Majesty's command to me for the delivery of all the places I held for him to the House of Parliament, then sitting at Westminster." They were surrendered then at the king's command, but, according to Ormond's own account, it was a command extorted from him by his own ungenerous and doubtfully loyal Scottish subjects. The Lord-lieutenant may possibly have thought that an alliance with the Confederate Irish would have been fraught with great danger to the king, though the British rebels were certainly at that time not yet ripe for the terrible crime which ultimately crowned their rebellion; and only a year later, when he was in far greater peril, his representatives were forced to make that very alliance after all. Ormond becomes perplexing when he goes on to state what are apparently the king's own free reasons for ordering him to take the astounding course he did; because there is a doubt raised as to how far it was the king's wish, and how far the wish of the Scotch. Ormond first observes that he himself was reduced to great straits by

so many enemies on different sides, as he undoubtedly was; and then relates how he "surrendered Dublin and all the other garrisons to Mr. Arthur Annesley and others, commissioned by the Parliament to receive them, and his Majesty judging it to be more agreeable to his interest and profession for the maintenance of the Protestant religion, to put those places into the hands of the English rather than the Irish rebels." Poor monarch! he had few besides rebels now; and no wonder, since, with so unwonted a consistency, he constantly mistook his own interests. Ormond gives the sentiments just quoted as the king's own, so that it would appear as if he at least in some measure agreed with his Protestant subjects on this matter, besides relying more fully on their clemency and fidelity than on those of the Irish. Subsequent events formed a striking comment on the decision of him who had escaped as Mr. Ashburnham's servant into the Scottish lines, confident in the loyalty of his Northern kingdom! "Judging, likewise," Ormond goes on to say, "that though both had broken their faith and natural allegiance by raising a rebellion, yet the English, who would have no peace with him but upon intolerable conditions, and so could not break it, were preferable, for that and many other reasons, to the Irish, who had made so solemn a peace as it is possible to stipulate, and yet perfidiously broke it by uniting their whole force against his lieutenancy." He could have added that it was possible the Irish might have some remembrance of the king's own behaviour in the matter of the "Graces," promised almost at the beginning of his reign; but there seems to have been a general impression that the Irish alone were bound by obligations, even obligations which they had always protested against taking on themselves. In spite of Charles's tolerably persistent enmity towards them, "*Pro Rege*," was a significant part of the Confederates' motto, and they would all along have been in earnest for the king, had the king been for them. Had he at the beginning, or even now, thrown himself upon their loyalty, the vacillating head of Charles I. might, such as it was, have remained upon his shoulders. Had he fled to the Irish instead of to the Scots, with what an outburst of affection would the royal fugitive have been hailed by a people monarchical in disposition, sympathetic with distress, and given to shelter those who are in hiding! Even now the Confederates were far from being ill-disposed towards him. Preston was always hankering after the friendship of the Lord-lieutenant, and O'Neill wished to make the king's welfare only second to the freedom and triumph of religion. This may sound strangely as said of him who has so often been represented as aiming at that which is known as complete separa-

tion; but as the Commissioners observe in p. 121, "it is very evident from his letters in the Carte collection that the popular notion that he was contending absolutely for the independence of Ireland is erroneous. He was a Royalist in the strict sense." When, in 1643, Sir Robert Stewart, the Governor of Culmore Fort, addressed him as being in rebellion, he replied with the promptitude which usually distinguished his epistolary, and sometimes his military efforts: "Sir, in that particular we imagine we are in no rebellion ourselves, but do really fight for our prince, in defence of his royal crown and prerogative, wherein we shall continue, and die to the last man." So again, six years later, when he was himself dying, he declared most solemnly in his last letter to Ormond, that throughout the war his "intention . . . tended to no particular ambic'on or privat interest of myne owne (notwithstanding what was or may be thought to the contrary)"—as though he foresaw the accusations which would be brought against him by posterity, nay, by Ormond himself—"but truly and sincerely to the preservac'on of my religion, the advancement of his Maties service and just liberties of this nac'on;" a declaration in perfect harmony with the Oath of Association. It was a pity that the king did not look for help to such allies as these. For the unhappy monarch might well have been aided from either of his minor kingdoms; from Scotland, but the canny Scot, as Charles might have suspected thinking perhaps, that so uncertain a possession was best off his hands at a good bargain, sold him for one famous groat; from Ireland, had he and his deputy chosen to coalesce with his friends rather than with his enemies. On the other hand, the English rebels had already proved themselves implacable; for had the king's former severity with the Irish stopped the mouths of the Puritans, or prevented them from warring against him? and did the intolerable conditions on which they insisted hinder them from carrying their enmity to the last mortal extremity? All went wrong for Charles.

Lord Ormond, then, surrendered to the Parliamentarians who hated both his king and his country. He turned to Murrough of the Burnings, who was held to have forfeited the name of O'Brien, and who looms forth through the smoke of church and roof-tree, a perpetual and terrible specimen of a Gaelic Puritan. Lord Ormond turned to Jones, to Cromwell, to any rather than the Confederates. Preston was shocked, as well he might be; he saw perhaps too late that he had better have taken Dublin before it was irrevocably given up to the common enemy.

There was one old man in Dublin whose fidelity to the king shines out brightly amid the surrounding gloom. This old

man was Smith, the mayor, who refused to surrender the keys of the capital to his sovereign's foes. He could not believe that he was expected to do so by that very sovereign, until Ormond read him a letter from Charles, which convinced the poor old mayor that the Viceroy was disloyal only by the King's desire, and he gave way. Ormond's enemies have based terrible accusations on this letter; nevertheless, it seems as if he was acting as honestly as he could, though in this case fidelity would rather have consisted in disobedience. Had the Lord-lieutenant made up his mind to be bold, gracious, and decisive, had he in the king's name granted the demands of the Confederates, appealed to their honour and loyalty, and landed in England with an army of twenty thousand men to release the king, the thirtieth of January would probably have never been so doleful a day, and the Marquis of Ormond would have won undying laurels. However, he did not take that generous and daring course; on the contrary, he admitted the Puritans into Dublin, Drogheda, and Dundalk, after which episode he departed for a while from the scene; and as he looked back from the deck across the matchless bay of Dublin, he prophesied that he should one day return there gloriously.

The only advantage of this retirement of Ormond is to the student of history, as it takes one element of discord from among the many which perplex him when he reads the complicated chronicles of the civil war. Thenceforward the struggle was between the Confederates and the Puritans. Yet there were still Ormondists, though there was no Ormond; and to their half-measures the Nuncio resolutely opposed himself, sustained by Nicholas French, a learned and energetic man, whose fancy it was every now and then to propose that Preston should be arrested. Colonel Jones commanded the Puritan forces, and one day, having marched out of Dublin, he administered to Preston a crushing defeat on Dungan Hill. Yet the conqueror of Preston dared not meet O'Neill, in itself a proof of what the victor of Benburb might have done had he been invested with the supreme command, being quick, steady, and careful of his men. He was more beloved by the Irish than ever, and more out of favour with the Pale party, though without any fault of his own. A clever writer living abroad had penned in a book the cool proposal that Charles's grey and already pretty well discrowned head should be relieved altogether of the crown of Ireland, which, it was argued, would better fit a more Milesian brow. The Irish need not look far for a new sovereign who would well wield both sword and sceptre; at least so thought the Ormondists, fiercely positive that O'Neill was intended, as no doubt he was. Yet there can be no question that he would in

any case have refused the crown—he of whose honour “when once he engaged himself,” even Ormond had a high opinion, —who, in truth, preserved it stainless, and who, even setting aside his letters professing perfect loyalty, had taken the oath, “That I will, during my life, bear true faith and allegiance to Charles my sovereign lord.” It is interesting, nevertheless, to surmise what would have happened had it been possible honestly to accomplish such a design; to think of the wild enthusiasm of the Irish; the antique style of the coronation; the advantage gained at least of a supreme authority; the Ormondists placed in mild imprisonment; the cessation of talk and parley; the Montgomeries, Hamiltons, Chichesters, and all who had profited by the Sham Plot of 1607, sent off *de part le roi*, and *guerre à l’outrance* against the Puritans. But none of these alarming events took place; only the Ormondists grew even more obstinate, and declared the clever writer guilty of high treason; then they made treaties with Burning Murrogh, and were fierce against O'Neill, though he had saved Kilkenny and the Council from Jones and his Ironsides. Meanwhile, he was a prey to grief and mortification, remembering, it may be, that summer's day when his frigate left the port of Dunkerque, with hope and fair winds attending her on her way.

As to the philo-Celtic Nuncio, he took leave of the misty western isle, of troublesome Palesmen, of warm-hearted “mere Irish,” and of their valiant chieftain whom he loved, and returned to the land of myrtle and olive, where the Head of the Church greeted him with the words, “*Temerarie te gessisti.*” If he acted rashly, at least he always acted in good faith. No temporizing, no trimming, no vacillation, no departure from principle, can be laid at the door of that true but unhappy man.

Perhaps the heart which ached least of all was that of the Marquis of Ormond. He reappears upon the scene, not as the glorious conqueror of his own prophecy, but as the struggling opponent of the Puritans, whom he had himself admitted into the country. Strange to say, everything which now happened, and everything which he was obliged to do, combined to contradict and throw ridicule on his former policy. He had spent the better part of his short exile in Paris, where he saw the Queen and the Prince of Wales. They bade him return upon his footsteps, and do exactly what he should have done a year before; in the concise words of Dr. Russell and Mr. Prendergast—“They enjoined him to return to Ireland, to concede the principal demands of the Irish, to conclude a peace with them, and thus to effect a union between the Protestant, Presbyterian, and Catholic Royalists, in other words, the English, Scotch, and Irish of that country, in an endeavour

to save the King from the fate which the Queen and Prince now feared for him" (p. 118). They had come to see at last that alienating the Irish did not conciliate the English; so the Marquis returned in a different character to the island, but not to the city, where, on three other occasions, he had represented Royalty. It was not too late to save the country; rather, the time had come for the final contest; but it was too late to save the King. Not long afterwards the tragedy was enacted which even now is matter for indignation; the dark 30th of January dawned, which saw the hapless Charles I. lose head and crowns together; and meanwhile internal feud had burnt so fiercely in Ireland that O'Neill and Preston had positively made war upon each other at last, and Preston naturally suffered a severe defeat. Ormond, whose feelings must surely have been of the saddest and most uncomfortable description, shows to advantage in the gloomy year which began with that gloomy January, though in it he sustained a defeat for ever linked with his name. But now the demon of discord is suddenly laid, and the blessed spectacle of union begins to dawn upon the sight. It seems like the justice of history that, "from Ormond's return to Ireland in 1648 to his flight in 1651 he held his authority in some sense in common with the body which, under the title of Commissioners of Trust, represented the Confederate Catholics." As to the old Confederation, headed by the Supreme Council, it is no more—dead of loyalty to Charles and regard for Ormond; but there is a joining of hands which promises well.

One of the first "Old Irish" notables won by Ormond in his new character was the redoubtable and much-maligned Sir Phelim O'Neill. After Sir Phelim had been reconciled by the Nuncio to his kinsman Eoghan, he preserved his friendship with him sufficiently intact to fight under his banner; and at Benburb Sir Phelim commanded a division, which, contrary to the custom of his general, he forbade to give quarter to the Scots, who gave none themselves. Somehow there always seems to have existed in Sir Phelim's heart a smouldering opposition to the world in general, and more particularly to his illustrious cousin; and on Ormond's return to Ireland he hastened to meet him at Kilkenny, and was recommended to him by the Assembly as "worthy of his Highness's especial favour"; and Ormond thereupon gave him a regiment of foot and the governorship of Charlemont Fort. All this was without the consent of Eoghan O'Neill, who "held off, unable to pardon Ormonde" his rendition of the garrisons, and "believing also that, according to his own declaration at Athlone, there could be no true union between the English and Irish." Never-

theless fire and water, in the shapes of O'Neill and Ormond, were destined to coalesce.

There was good need for union, for Cromwell, the regicide, the mighty captain, was on his way to Ireland, where he thought to add fresh lustre to his glory. He left London in state, with a coach and six, his Ironsides trooping after him, and humming surly hymns in their joy at being about to crush the sister isle and her pagan inhabitants, and all the pious city, wishing him well, and advising him to bind their kings in chains, and their nobles in links of iron. Cromwell was very willing to follow such congenial advice, only he had reason to doubt whether it would be so easy a matter as these well-wishers supposed. He was not fondly confident of his own success, and often anticipated some interruption to its rapid course. He knew that the Israelites had sometimes been permitted to flee before their enemies, and all the beefsteaks and ale with which he fortified himself could not put certain hope into his heart. There were Amalekites who were strong in battle, and who might fulfil the prediction of the Quaker woman when she broke the trencher in Cromwell's presence, saying that "so shall he be broken in pieces."

Still, Cromwell would never let failure be his own fault. He had become generalissimo of the army in Ireland on purpose to acquire fresh laurels, and he began well at Drogheda, by putting all the Amalekites therein—men, women, and children—to the sword, on the 12th of September, 1649, his fortunate month and year. A short time before, while Cromwell was yet in England, Ormond's fame had been severely diminished—except to those who considered Ormond's fame as incapable of diminution—by his defeat at Rathmines, in the neighbourhood of Dublin. He could not plead that he had been beaten by the invincible brewer, for it was Colonel Jones who routed him with slaughter, and took his arms and baggage. Jones was doubtless a man of talent: it was he who crushed Preston at Dungan Hill; and though he dared not set foot beyond the walls of Dublin, because O'Neill lay waiting for him, this is rather a proof of the Irish hero's prowess than of the Puritan's deficiency. But still it is impossible not to feel more dissatisfied with Ormond for having been vanquished by Jones, than if he had fled before the man whose privilege it was to walk through iron walls. He soon, however, recovered from the blow, for which proceeding he had a fortunate aptitude, and set about making arrangements for the defence of Drogheda. One trait in Ormond's character is particularly pleasing and graceful; namely, his chivalrous care for the safety of women. In p. 132 of the "Account of the Carte Collection," is given his

letter to the Earl of Derby on behalf of Lady Tichborne, wife of a former governor of the town. She was "particularly threatened with ruin," because she was considered to be "Irish," although her husband had held Drogheda against Sir Phelim O'Neill in '41. Even with the intriguing Lady Willmot Ormond dealt gently, on account of her age and former good conduct, in spite of the inclination of her grandson, the governor, to "make pouter of her." To this terrible fate he himself fell a victim. He had a wooden leg; and during the massacre the Puritans, who believed that he kept his gold in this artificial limb, took it off and searched it; but finding nothing therein they knocked out Sir Arthur's brains with it, and hewed him to pieces. More fortunate was he who flashes into history, sometimes rather luridly, as "Dick Talbot"; imitating certain insects he lay as if dead, and thus escaped with his life, destined forty years later to play a chequered part in another Irish war as Duke of Tyrconnell.

Though Ormond was beaten at Rathmines, and Preston at Dungan Hill, by the same formidable Jones, there was one Irishman yet who could rival even Cromwell himself. The victor of Benburb might well measure swords with the victor of Naseby and Marston Moor, and the hopes of the country turned towards Eoghan O'Neill. The two generals seemed to be well matched—that pair in every respect so dissimilar, except in their supreme military genius. Both possessed the unlimited confidence of their soldiers, though different indeed was the cold and resolute reliance which the Ironsides placed on their commander, to the warm and enthusiastic devotion of the Irish to their chief. O'Neill had been well-trained, and taught the art of war in his boyhood; Cromwell was near fifty before he began to fight at all; but he had already shown that the energy of talent and fanaticism supplied in his case the want of that education which all the other great soldiers of his day had received in the school of the Thirty Years' War.

And now all Irishmen wished—and Ormond, whether an Irishman or not, wished too—for deliverance from Cromwell, and looked for that deliverance to the hand which wielded worthily the sword of Hugh O'Neill, lately restored to the collateral descendant of the great Earl; and even the Scotch Covenanters of Ulster, who had now gone over to the service of the King, were at last destined to be in alliance with the Irish general who had "rubbed shame" upon their faces at Benburb.

It was on the 10th of August, 1649, that O'Neill had made a truce with Monk, the dubious Parliamentarian who afterwards brought back Charles II., and was made a duke for his

pains. This truce, and the arrangements which accompanied it, furnish an amusing episode, such as is sure occasionally to enliven chronicles in which Irishmen and Puritans conjointly had a part. O'Neill was not superstitious, and saw no harm in concluding a truce with Monk when a truce with Monk was the best means of serving the cause for the time being; but it was different with Hugh Peters, the great Puritan preacher. The news of Monk's negotiation reached London; Peters mounted the pulpit at Westminster Abbey, and made the sacred arches ring to his denunciations of the backslider and his unholy alliance with the powers of darkness, until all who heard showed the entire whites of their eyes in pious horror. General Monk's idea of what the powers of darkness were, evidently differed from that of Hugh Peters, but he dared not offend that worthy and all whom he and his sermon influenced, so he broke the unholy alliance, and resolved to put off backsliding to a more convenient period.

This rupture with Monk opened the way to a better treaty for O'Neill, and now at last that occurred which promised the most for victory over the Parliamentarians,—a coalition between the old Irish and Ormond. It took place at last; O'Neill saw the inestimable advantages of it, and thought the time had come for forgetting Dublin, Dundalk, and Drogheda; and the Marquis had learned that, for his own safety's sake, he must turn towards the object of his former dread, from whom he had fled in so great alarm across Leighlin bridge, whose lands he was supposed to have settled hopelessly on the Hamiltons, and who had formerly been the chief object of his dread. Ormond was not disposed to be Quixotic; and as to the uncomfortable circumstance of asking for help from a quarter whence he had always assumed that evil only could come, he knew that he must doff for the moment that dignity which had already received more than one severe blow. In fact, he saw that the help of the Ulidians was necessary to him and to his cause; and that help was not denied him. Indeed, he found O'Neill equally eager for an alliance, and quite ready to give him the support of those terrible long-haired creaghts whom the Gaelic prince held in his leash, and whom Ormond had been wont to fear as he might a Tartar horde or an army of bloodhounds. So astonishingly great and sudden was the confidence in Ormond which O'Neill now manifested, that before the treaty between them was signed he told off three thousand of his well-trained troops, and sent them southward under Colonel O'Farrell on or about the 12th of October. In one whose principle it had been for some years that Ormond was not to be trusted, this piece of confidence appears so great that it

would seem to be the effect of a fevered state of the brain, though it is a fact not less strange than true that Ormond possessed the power of getting every one to believe in him when he chose, even by letter, to make himself agreeable; and his correspondence with O'Neill in '49 was very agreeable indeed. However, he kept faith as to these three thousand men: they were victims, not to his treachery, but to his incapacity.

The days were now closing in fast, and the autumn drew on apace. The real crisis had arrived. There had not as yet been a combination of events which could be called the crisis; but now, with an united Ireland opposed to a Puritan invasion, two great captains, evenly matched, and such an earnestness on both sides as can never be produced by a war not underlaid by some vital principle, the situation was unequalled. Ormond, waxing ever more anxious as Cromwell loomed up before him, awaited at Waterford with hot impatience the approach of his new ally, with whom he was to go forth and meet the regicide. O'Neill neither would nor could desert him, and on the power of O'Neill's sword all depended. Now it was to be seen whether or no Cromwell was invincible; now the fate of hearths, altars, country, must be decided once for all. But one day, while Ormond waited, there rode into his camp a horseman in military mourning. What did he want there? He had come to tell the Marquis of Ormond that O'Neill was dead. Though he had passed all his life under fire, he had not lost it on the battlefield or in the deadly breach; he drooped on the march southward, and expired quietly in the castle of Oughter, or Uacder, the seat of his faithful "slasher" Miles O'Reilly and now that of his own brother-in-law Philip. He died of poison, as a part of the world was pleased to call the low fever which carried him off. It is true that when at Derry he dined with the Parliamentary Coote, but a dose received there could hardly prove fatal at the end of twenty-four days or more. And as if to obviate this difficulty, a whisper was raised which laid the guilt on a pair of russet boots. Indeed Plunket, who sent the suspected boots, afterwards bragged loudly that he it was who had destroyed Sisera; and yet his anxiety to take upon himself the glorious responsibility hardly does away with doubt on the subject, especially as the very possibility of his assertion may be questioned. The loss of O'Neill may be more easily accounted for otherwise. Dr. Russell and Mr. Prendergast, it is true, say that he fell mortally sick at Cavan, and of course in proportion as his death was sudden, it leaves more room for suspicion of poisoning, though Coote must still be exonerated; but the story sometimes goes that his health began to fail at Derry, and that he died some

three weeks afterwards, the natural course of typhoid fever, which is always common in Ireland, and was sure to be particularly so at that time. The tainted air, the damp and dreary autumn, haste, anxiety, and the wear-and-tear of many past troubles, account for the dire calamity, and take away the necessity of laying this crime also at the door of the Sassenach.

However it happened, the beloved chief of the Gaelic Irish died, and was buried at Cavan Abbey, wearing the Dominican habit. His place of burial was concealed, for the lonely dignity of death inspired no respect in the Ironsides, as is proved by many a broken tombstone in the churches and churchyards of England. It is impossible, even without the exquisitely tuneful though somewhat too romantic summons of the poet to "weep the Victor of Benburb," not to regret the chivalrous, constant, and self-devoted hero of the Civil War; for there is no other actor in that drama who can compare with Eoghan O'Neill, taking the leaders all in all. He was a fine specimen of his race; and the adoring love with which his countrymen regarded him shows their appreciation of so high a type. He is, too, a proof of the genius which pure Celtic blood can produce; nor does the enmity with which many regarded him prove anything more than that the green-eyed passion of envy reared its snaky form against him, as against so many other distinguished men. His talent surpassed that of all his colleagues and allies put together; but the gifted spirit fled just when the whole country relied most fully upon its aid.

His death entailed not only the loss of his genius, but the extinction for many precious months of every particle of the hopeful energy which had lately burned so brightly in the Irish heart. The grief was wild, the keen was piercing, and it was the keen of his cause as well as of the chieftain himself; for the Irish could muster neither skill nor vigour in the thick darkness which followed the setting of their guiding star. "The rudder of our ship was he," says the modern bard,—an assertion which clashes somewhat strangely and awkwardly with the similes of the "Naval Allegory," wherein Ormond is represented as commanding the "Good Shipp Ireland," with eventual success, though the author confesses that the "Great Pilot"

..... "spoon'd away before
The wind and sea until the storm was o'er."

There seems to be among poets both tragic and comic a general disposition to describe Ireland as a ship, perhaps on account of the natural instability of a nation treated as she has been. Certainly her conduct after the death of O'Neill much resembled that of a helmless vessel, for she drifted with wind

and tide, and drove before the tempest; and if she was wrecked, what wonder?

Cromwell found more ease and less glory than he had expected. One iron wall had fallen before him, though not by his blows; and all the others, built up timidly behind its shelter, were walked through with ease. At first no one seemed disposed to be heroic; treachery, too, had already been at work, though it was none of Ormond's, but simply that of the Protestant and English Royalists who garrisoned Cork, Youghal, and other strong places in the south. They were under the command of Inchiquin, otherwise Burning Murrough, who was now fighting for the king; and as they had before fought for the Parliament, they demanded their arrears of pay, and those who had been active in the surrender of the forts were rewarded in Irish land; after which it is not surprising to find the Irish soldiers expressing their distrust of the remainder of these English allies, and that Ormond dismissed them from the royal service. The Marquis himself did not attempt to give battle to the regicide, whose chance of being broken to pieces seemed already to be fairly gone; the hope, the peace, the union, were shattered; and when the bereaved Royalists awoke from their lethargy, they instinctively began to quarrel again while Cromwell's army of locusts covered the land. Nevertheless, though no battle was offered him, Cromwell did not gather in his laurels without spilling noble blood. Ormond had garrisoned several southern towns with the troops sent him by O'Neill—splendid regiments, which would have formed the heart and life of his army had he taken the field against the Ironsides; and the behaviour of these men certainly contrasts strongly enough with that of the defenders of Cork, Kinsale, and Youghal. The town of Clonmel made a resistance which has earned it an eternal fame, though, like other besieged cities, its fate was sealed when first the enemy appeared before its walls. Cromwell had already taken Kilkenny, the city of the Confederation: he had been manfully opposed, but the town succumbed to its inevitable fate, and Cromwell slaughtered the inhabitants, knocked down the beautiful cross which had been erected in the fourteenth century, and broke the famous window in the cathedral; he did not, however, destroy St. Canice's itself, which survived to be whitewashed. At Clonmel, and afterwards at Limerick, an O'Neill conducted the defence, a relative of the lost prince who was to have conquered the unconquerable, and Black Hugh behaved like a true hero; so gallantly, indeed, that even the stern Puritans took pity on the noble youth when at last he fell into their power, and spared his life. Limerick was a costly prize to the Puritans. The defence

was bold and obstinate, though the plague was raging in the city, which, perhaps from its situation, was long particularly subject to epidemics. The garrison was reduced more by its invisible than by its visible foe, and the contagion spread to the camp likewise, where it did not spare the self-styled saints. At last Limerick fell, destined forty years afterwards to sustain a siege which should be more memorable still. And now occurred the grand and awful scene of the trial of Terence Albert O'Brien, bishop of Emly, who summoned his unlawful judge, the ruthless Ireton, to meet him at the bar of Heaven; a month after which summons Ireton was seized with a violent fever, doubtless the plague, and died, accusing every one else of his own crime.

Matters in Ireland grew worse and worse, and Ormond was blamed for having made some appointments infringing on the conditions of the peace of '48. Indeed, though Ormond was above all things anxious to serve the cause to which he had devoted himself, his behaviour was unsatisfactory in that time of terror and confusion, and perhaps deserved the suggestions of the new council, that he should seek to make himself useful nearer the person of Charles II. That hopeful, moreover, being now victimized by his Scottish custodians, and undergoing a course of sermons which should have insured the virtue of his after-life, had been induced or forced to repudiate the peace of '48; and though Ormond declared that the intelligence was false, the council believed it, and declared that they in return repudiated Charles II. Nevertheless the Irish soldiers carried on a "hopeless warfare" at the King's desire, or probably at Ormond's desire on the King's behalf, in order to prevent the Parliamentary army of Ireland from uniting with that in England to defeat Charles's invasion of his own kingdom. However, Cromwell proved that he could do without the aid of the Ironsides whom he had left to pacify Ireland, and crushed the hopes of Charles II. at Worcester on another fortunate September day. And at last Ormond, who, after all, never came to any harm amidst all these manœuvres and difficulties, finding himself in a terrible position among the Irish, the King, and the invaders who would not have suffered his stately head long to burden his shoulders had he fallen into their power, and knowing that he had for ever lost the opportunity of driving back the Puritans, made his dignified escape, and sailed from Galway for the Continent. Everything which Ormond did was in its way dignified, and contributed in its degree to give him the name of the "Great Duke."

It is not recorded whether or no he indulged in prophecy on this occasion. He might have foretold that he should one day

return to a Lord Lieutenancy more comfortable than either of the two former ones, to renew the policy of '45 and '46, and to restore the country, according to his own idea, to some amount of prosperity; though, as has been before observed, it is difficult to see how a country the bulk of whose people are unhappy, which those certainly were who had lost their lands, and were hunted down for making raids on their own cattle, can be entitled to be called prosperous. These things were, however, as yet unrevealed to Ormond when he saw the coast of Galway fade from his eyes, as he had seen that of Dublin fade three years before.

The helmless vessel rolled on to her destruction. There were heroes on board her yet, doomed to perish when she finally went down with all hands. Bishop French was a hero, and he would gladly have transformed Clanricarde into another; but that was a character which did not suit the Earl, who was nominal successor to the Lord Lieutenancy. Meanwhile the valiant ones of the Civil War were falling like trees before a tempest; and it is remarkable that the mere Irish, who throughout the struggle had borne a courageous and tolerably consistent part, showed far greater fortitude than did the Ormondists when called upon to pay the penalty of the great rebellion.

One of these, General Purcell, had fainted on hearing his death sentence pronounced. Sir Phelim O'Neill, guilty or not guilty, but doubtless unconscious, as were his judges themselves, of how bad a name his would become when it should be seized upon unanimously to be blackened, ended his course heroically on the glorious scaffold. He was offered his life in exchange for a crimination of Charles I., and an oath to the effect that that king had instigated the rebellion of '41; but the "wretch O'Neill," as he is often called, refused to buy safety with that falsehood, and left the umquhile Lady Abercorn to bewail her second widowhood. The Bishop of Clogher, too, who had been taken prisoner by Sir Phelim on that gentleman's second breach with his kinsman in '48-9, the Bishop being the dear friend of Eoghan O'Neill, crowned a virtuous life with a patriot's death. He was a martial prelate, and had done well enough in his soldierly capacity while his friend lived to command him, and to give him military in return for spiritual advice; but now, bereaved and despairing, his tactics were those of a will without an intellect to guide it, and after losing nearly four thousand veterans at Letterkenny, he fell into the hands of his enemies and was executed by the inhuman Coote at Enniskillen.

Nicholas French went as ambassador to Brussels to sue for help. He was well qualified for the mission, being upright,

talented, and dignified ; but it is easy to see, on looking back, that the fatal reef was close ahead, and that Cromwell was pacifying Ireland much too quickly for help so tardy to be of use. The Duke of Lorraine expressed a readiness to protect her, but he higgled and delayed, and was confused and thwarted by Ormond and Charles II., who behaved henceforward much as Ormond and Charles I. had done. It was at this time that French wrote a highly uncomplimentary work on Ormond, as the "Unkind Deserter of Loyal Men and True Friends," wherein he demonstrated that the ex-vice-roy's exchequer had become somewhat plethoric during the civil war, and especially after the cession of Dublin to the Puritans, although he had maintained his post "three years upon his own credit and fortune," as one of his Red Box memoirs assures posterity. These accusations of the Bishop seem to be contradicted by certain incidents of the love tale which we find in p. 181 of the "Account of the Carte Collection." Lord Ossory, while at the Hague, fell in love with a Dutch beauty, whose fortune only reached the cipher of £10,000 ; and though Ormond himself stood the friend of the youthful pair, his wife raised many prudential and motherly objections on the ground that the dowry ought to be £20,000, for she intended not only to disengage a mortgaged estate with it, but also to transfer the remainder to her daughter Elizabeth, as a marriage portion for that young lady. She did ultimately consent to the match ; but it is amusing to read that even when Ossory's union with his Dutch bride proved to be a happy one, "the Duchess generally speaks of her in a tone of complaint, as if she still retained her regrets at the marriage." The difficulties to which Page, the messenger sent by Ormond to soften the heart of the Duchess, who still resided in Ireland, towards the youthful lovers, likewise seems to indicate that the ducal exchequer was not at that time very full, for he had to sell a stray gold ring to pay the postage of a letter to his master ; which fact is a strange one, when we read that the commissioners for Ireland had left the Duchess in possession of Dunmore Park, and of lands to the value of £2,000 a year. But it seems unlikely that the suspicions of French could be well founded ; Ormond appears to have always acted honestly towards the Royal family and the Royal cause, though so much cannot be said for his conduct to the Catholics of Ireland, to whom his deference had been so great when they were necessary to him, and whom after the Restoration he treated according to his old policy of dividing them among themselves, and, moreover, failed in many cases to restore the lands which the Cromwellians had wrenched from their rightful owners. Bishop French even complains that

Ormond helped to prevent the comprehension of the Irish Catholics in the Act of Oblivion ; so that those who had rebelled against the crown and spilt the blood of Charles I., were pardoned, and those who retained their allegiance while taking up arms against their fellow subjects in self-defence, saw their estates and houses conferred on their own and the King's enemies. Thus was treated the son of Sir Phelim O'Neill, whose " affectionate friend " Ormond, according to his own handwriting, had once been, and who had died refusing to buy his life at the expense of a crimination of Charles I. And many a humbler victim could sigh forth, as did the literary Irishman, that though the king had been restored to his realms, he himself had not been restored to the kingdom of his cottage. And never, after his terrible straits in 1649, did Ormond show sympathy for the Catholics again ; while as for French, he expiated his crime against the Duke in perpetual exile.

Whilst Ormond was at Brussels and at the Hague, Cromwell accomplished his task ;—he pacified Ireland. Having hanged and beheaded men, and tossed women in blankets, the new powers allowed forty thousand of the Irish to emigrate, though those who had wolf-dogs were not to take them away, because wolves were growing numerous ; transplanted sundry lords of the Pale from their fertile lands and comfortable homes into the wilds of Connaught ; reduced many noble families to penury, and injured all the churches to the best of their powers. Fleetwood, the second husband of Mistress Ireton, and Henry Cromwell, were not, personally, savage rulers, though subject to the commands of the Lord Protector ; but that was enough. The vessel had gone down. And the only head which bobs up to the surface again, bewigged and serene, and having picked up a ducal coronet among the ooze in the ocean of confiscation and exile, is that of our old friend the great Duke of Ormond—great, no doubt, for that very reason, because he rises with a rebound when others fall to lie for ever. At the Restoration, he appears in London, always in his glory, and having for ever finished, except as a painful retrospect called, up by petitioners, Remonstrances, and Courts of Claims, with the great game which has been played out, the mighty drama in which he made his *début*. His name will, however, be for ever associated with that drama, more than with his after-years of prosperity and his parks and palaces at Dublin, never more to be besieged. The other distinguished actors in the scenes of the Civil War are mostly dead, or doomed to die in exile. At Fermo, at Cavan, at Ghent, they are the dust of many countries. But Ormond lives and flourishes, prosperous and wealthy, to be restored to the vice-regal throne of a ruined land.

ART. IV.—REPLY TO MR. RENOUF BY F. BOTTALLA.

No. II.

ORTHODOXY OF POPE HONORIUS I.

THE well-known case of Pope Honorius has been so thoroughly ventilated of late, that to believe that it can still create an insurmountable difficulty against the doctrine of Papal Infallibility would betray an unusual amount of simplicity. But, even if it were difficult to find an explanation satisfactory either as a whole or in detail, the solemn definition of Papal Infallibility pronounced by the Vatican Council is sufficient to dispel from the minds of Catholics even the slightest misgiving on the subject. This, however, should not prevent us from answering objections brought against the facts already explained, as thereby new light is shed on the truth and its demonstrative evidence. With this view we undertake to discuss in this second article the objections urged by Mr. Renouf in his pamphlet "The Case of Pope Honorius Reconsidered." My answer on the general subject is not much needed after the excellent reply given to the author by Dr. Ward.* I will therefore avoid, as much as possible, repeating what Dr. Ward has so ably urged against Mr. Renouf's pamphlet, and will limit myself mainly to what concerns my book on Pope Honorius, though I shall be obliged to touch on the general drift of Mr. Renouf's thesis as stated in his new pamphlet.

That gentleman's first thesis is, that "Pope Honorius in his letters to Sergius really gave his sanction to the Monothelite heresy." His arguments may be summed up as follows:—The letter of Sergius to Pope Honorius is thoroughly Monothelite; but the Pope accepted his doctrine: therefore he gave his sanction to the Monothelite heresy. Further on he lays great stress on the assertion that Pope Honorius maintained in his letters one will in Christ, and that he inferred it, as the other Monothelites, from His unity of person: he corroborates this assertion by the particle *unde*, or *ὧθεν*, used by Honorius, which implies, as he says, that the confession of one will in Christ is a corollary deduced from the doctrine of "com-

* "DUBLIN REVIEW," April, 1870, pp. 372--402.

municatio idiomatum.”* Consequently he compares Pope Honorius’s doctrine with that of the Patriarch Paul, and concludes that it is identical.† Moreover, since the *Ecthesis* of the Emperor Heraclius was taken verbatim from the letter of Sergius to Honorius, and was condemned by the Lateran Council, Pope Honorius’s letter, as he argues, which admits the same doctrine, was implicitly condemned along with it.‡ Finally, Mr. Renouf rejects the excuse which might be alleged in favour of Honorius on the ground of his having been ignorant of the true meaning of Sergius’s letter. Let us pause here.

In all this Mr. Renouf repeats over and over again dogmatically what he had already said in his first pamphlet, and what has already been more than once answered by Dr. Ward, by others, and by myself. He makes no account of his adversaries’ replies, nor does he trouble himself to give any proof of his trenchant assertions; but he tries to impose on the simplicity of his readers by the dogmatic tone of his language. Next, Mr. Renouf asserts that Pope Honorius accepted the Monothelite doctrine of Sergius’s letter. But how does he prove it? “Because,” says he, “throughout his entire reply there is not the slightest hint of suspicion as to the orthodoxy of any proposition of Sergius.”§ Granted: does it follow therefrom that he accepted the Monothelite doctrine of Sergius’s letter? Honorius did not reproach, nor condemn Sergius for error expressed in his letter. Well; that may have been caused by fear, by a false prudence, by ignorance of the nature of Sergius’s letter: it may have been a fault in the discharge of his Pontifical office. But how does it follow that he accepted the Monothelite doctrine, when there is not the slightest hint of

* “The Case of Pope Honorius Reconsidered,” pp. 14—19. The words of Pope Honorius’s letter are as follow: “Unde et unam voluntatem fatemur, Domini nostri Jesu Christi,” etc.

† “The Case of Pope Honorius Reconsidered,” pp. 20—21.

‡ Mr. Renouf, in a foot-note at p. 26, makes a great protest because I attributed to him the assertion that a part of the *Ecthesis* had been copied from the letter of Honorius. And he remarks that I “spent more than a page in attempting to refute this calumny.” It is true that I attributed to him that assertion, mistaking, from notes hastily written, the particle *to* for the other *of*. But it is quite false that I spent more than a page in exposing that calumny. The truth is that I spent not even a line in its refutation; but I showed only the absurdity of Mr. Renouf’s assertion that “Pope Honorius’s positive confession of faith was identical . . . with those of the Monothelite confessions of the *Ecthesis* and *Type*” (p. 14 of “Condemnation of Pope Honorius”). Mr. Renouf, who so bitterly complains of my having read in my notes *of* instead of *to*, evidently misunderstood not a mere particle, but more than a page of my pamphlet. What excuse can be pleaded for his blunder?

§ “The Case of Pope Honorius,” p. 17.

this in his reply? How can this be true when the doctrine set forth in his letters is thoroughly Catholic? We had already fully demonstrated in our pamphlet in no less than thirty-five pages the orthodoxy of Honorius's letters.* Dr. Ward had done likewise in the articles we have already referred to. But, as usual, Mr. Renouf took no notice of our arguments, nor did he trouble himself to meet them with new and more stringent reasons in favour of his view. He only repeated what he had already asserted *ex tripode* in his first pamphlet, which had been refuted hundreds of times. The *plan de guerre* of that gentleman in his new pamphlet is to pass over in perfect silence all the arguments brought against him by his adversaries; to pick up here and there some incidental remarks which were somewhat wanting in exactness, at least in the opinion of Mr. Renouf; to represent them as the main points on which all Honorius's apologies hinged; to attack them more or less violently; and to proclaim a full victory on the whole.

He asserted in his first pamphlet that Honorius had professed the doctrine of one will in Christ, and he deemed the explanation given by his apologists to be subterfuges which could not bear examination.† But we think we proved to demonstration from the very context of Honorius's letter that no Monothelite doctrine was implied in the words of the Pope. Mr. Renouf was then bound to show that our explanations were mere subterfuges which could not bear examination. But he preferred to say nothing on that head, and repeated over and over again in a categorical tone his former assertion, which had been fully refuted in our book. With only this difference, that in his second pamphlet he most impudently accused Pope Honorius of having deduced the doctrine of one will in Christ from that of the unity of His person; and he alleged in proof thereof his having employed the particle *unde* (ὅθεν) before his sentence concerning one will in Christ, as if it were a corollary of the unity of His person. But since we have already exploded this grammatical remark in our work on Papal Infallibility,‡ we need not now repeat the observation. Rather may we here plainly assert that Mr. Renouf has utterly misunderstood the whole drift of Honorius's letter. Had he compared the sentence in question with the following one, wherein the Pope gives a clear explanation of his own assertion, he would have easily perceived its real meaning. We pointed it out in our pamphlet; but Mr. Renouf

* "Pope Honorius before the Tribunal of Reason and History," pp. 45—80.

† "The Condemnation of Pope Honorius," p. 14.

‡ Sect. xi. pp. 272, seq.

having nothing to oppose to our reasoning, has again thought it prudent to say nothing in the matter. He may perhaps be excused for having acted in this manner; but what excuse can be offered for his admirers of the "Union Review," of the "Saturday Review," and Co., who declared his pamphlet *unanswerable*, because they knew nothing of the controversy, which yet they pretended to judge?

But, before quitting this subject, I wish to make a further remark on what Mr. Renouf pointed out at page 25 of his pamphlet, concerning the Monothelite principles contained in Sergius's letter. "His (Sergius's) language is most distinct and clear. Two operations, he says (Sergius), imply two wills, and these imply opposition to each other, as if God the Word had willed the Passion and the humanity had resisted; and he goes on to say, ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ὑποκειμένῳ δύο ἄμα καὶ κατὰ ταυτὸν ὑφεστάναι θελήματα. The δύο ταναγτία θελοντες of whom he speaks are not two human wills, but God the Word and the humanity. This is the impious doctrine which the Pope denounces, and against which he asserts one will in Christ." Of the words of Sergius's letter quoted in the original text Mr. Renouf says that they are indubitably Monothelitic; and he remarks that I did not say a word about them in my analysis of it.* Now we can by no means accept this statement of our critic. He says that the Greek words quoted from Sergius's letter are indubitably Monothelitic. We reply that, according to their literal meaning, they cannot be branded as Monothelitic, for the good reason that Sergius did not simply and absolutely assert that it is impossible for two wills to co-exist in one and the same person, but two contrary wills, two wills opposed to each other on one and the same subject. This being the bearing of Sergius's assertion in the passage in question, it could not be qualified by me in the analysis of his letter as the "most indubitably Monothelitic part of the whole letter": this task was to devolve only on Mr. Renouf. As to Pope Honorius, he did not denounce as impious the assertion of two wills in Christ, but that of two *contrary* wills in Him, as stated in Sergius's letter. Pope Honorius clearly professed that "lex alia in membris, aut voluntas diversa non fuit, vel contraria Salvatori."† Now in this sentence the Pontiff pointedly asserts, first, that in Christ there was not what the theologians call *fomes peccati*, or what S. Paul termed "a law in his members in conflict with the law of his mind, and bringing him into captivity to

* "The Case of Pope Honorius Reconsidered," p. 25, note.

† In Act XII. Conc. VI. (Labbe, t. vii. p. 963.)

the law of sin."* It follows, secondly, that there was not in Christ a will contrary to His Divine will. It is clear to any one who considers these words without prejudice, that the Pope did not deny the human will of Christ so far forth as it is a faculty; but in as much as it is different from or contrary to the will of God. Mr. Renouf maintains that the *Σέλημα διάφορον* does not mean the will at variance, but "numerically different."† And in order to prove his assertion he observes that among the titles of the works of S. Maximus there is one in which the word *διάφορος* is used in this sense. But how can he prove that the word in question has no other meaning when the contrary is distinctly stated in every Greek Lexicon? Besides this, Mr. Renouf implies in his assertion what he ought to have proved, to wit, that Honorius had denied the human will in Christ, which he assumes as already demonstrated. For had he for a moment supposed that Honorius had not denied it, the word *διάφορος* in the passage already quoted would have shown its natural meaning of disagreeing or being at variance. In fact, if I say that in the state of perfect and innocent nature Adam had no will *διάφορον* from that of his Creator, doubtless I would not mean thereby that Adam had no will numerically distinct from that of God, but only that his will was in perfect accord with that of his Creator. In this case the word *διάφορος* would naturally yield meaning as it is taken for granted that Adam's will was numerically distinct from that of God. Then the contrary supposition must have led Mr. Renouf to insist on the primary meaning of the word in question. But that this was not the meaning intended by Honorius is evident both from his own words and from the context of his letter. The Pope repeatedly asserted that "a Divinitate assumpta est nostra natura non culpa, illa profecto quæ ante peccatum creata est, non quæ post prævaricationem vitia." He again inculcates the same truth: "Non est assumpta, sicut præfati sumus, a Salvatore vitia natura." And he immediately gives the reason why the humanity taken up by Christ was not corrupted. "Nam lex alia in membris aut voluntas diversa non fuit vel contraria Salvatori." Now let us suppose with Mr. Renouf that the *Σέλημα διάφορον* should be rendered "a will numerically distinct," it would follow that two *numerically distinct* wills in our nature are the consequence of original sin, the effect of our corrupt nature, as it was not the case before the fall of our first parents. Who does not see the absurdity of this

* Rom. vii. 23.

† "The Case of Pope Honorius Reconsidered," p. 21, note.

assumption? On the contrary, original sin did not change our nature or its powers, it only debased and perverted their original tendencies; it caused the *voluntas sensualitatis* to be a source of sin; it caused the *voluntas rationis* to be at variance with and even in opposition to the will of its Creator. This is what is meant by the corruption of our nature; and this, and this only, is meant when we say that the nature taken by Christ had nothing of that defilement which is the consequence and the punishment of sin.

Pope Honorius therefore in the passage under consideration does not deny in Christ any of His natural faculties, whether of the lower or higher grade: he only denies the corruption entailed upon them from original sin. On this account, though he admits that Christ had in His assumed humanity the natural lusts of the senses, he still denies that any law existed in His members "*quæ repugnaret legi mentis ejus.*" In the same manner, whilst acknowledging in Him the will as a part of human nature, he still denies that His will could be either at variance with or contrary to the will of His Divinity. In other words, Pope Honorius acknowledges in Christ's humanity the natural faculties in the same state in which they existed in man's nature, while yet innocent and perfect; because, as he says, Christ did not take Adam's fault, but his nature. Moreover in Adam's nature, while yet in the state of innocence, there was only one will, the natural will; because the will of his senses was in a perfect subordination to the former; nor did it act, save in accordance with the direction of the superior will. This is why Pope Honorius professed in his letter "*Unam voluntatem Domini nostri Jesu Christi, quia profecto a Divinitate assumpta est nostra natura non culpa,*" etc. Let us suppose for a moment that the "one will" in Christ acknowledged by Honorius were the Divine will; then this passage would only yield this absurd meaning: viz., Christ did not take our will, because He did not take our sin, as if our will were the legitimate offspring of sin. How does Mr. Renouf clear these inextricable difficulties? He passes them by, as usual, being satisfied with astounding his readers by his extraordinary and unconnected remarks, which by no means alter the bearing of our arguments. The authority of Combefis and some others, to which he appeals, does not move us in the least. Combefis, like Mr. Renouf, did not understand the drift of Honorius's letter: the latter nevertheless is more guilty than the former, since he should have well pondered the learned remarks of many theologians subsequent to Combefis, who so clearly demonstrated the orthodoxy of Honorius's letter, that very few

had again ventured, before De la Luzerne, to question it. And the correctness of this view has already been established by the judgment of the two most learned men of the Gallican school, De Marca and Baluze.

We are by no means concerned to explain in this place the rest of the letter of Pope Honorius, regarding the objections which this Pope proposes to himself from Scripture against the agreement of the two wills in Christ, or his replies thereto. We have already fully set forth, in our pamphlet on Honorius, this important part of his letter, and have proved thereby that the Pope evidently admitted the human will in Christ. But Mr. Renouf passed by those pages of our book with his eyes shut. So that he did not even attempt to assail our reasoning. Wherefore we are in no wise bound to treat anew the same subject. We will only observe that this part of Honorius's letter is a fresh proof that the Pope intended in his answer to Sergius only to show the absurdity of the inference, that if we acknowledge two operations in Christ, we are by consequence compelled to admit two divergent wills. The Pope, having started with the proposition that in Christ's humanity no other will existed save the *voluntas rationis*, and having proved it from the doctrine of the supernatural conception of Christ, proceeds to answer the difficulties which might be brought against this doctrine from Scripture, as the Scripture seems to imply a conflict between the two wills of the Saviour. But this subject is also fully treated both in our pamphlet on Pope Honorius, and in our work on Papal Infallibility. To those works therefore we refer our readers. From all that has been said here, our readers may easily perceive how far Mr. Renouf and his allies are mistaken in their assertion, that Pope Honorius maintained in his letters the existence in Christ of only one will, and that divine. The very context of the letter and the connection and distribution of its parts are wholly incompatible with this assertion, and the charge of heterodoxy brought against that Pope. Now Mr. Renouf remarks that the Ecthesis condemned by the Lateran Council is in great part made up of the letter of Sergius to Honorius. As to the Ecthesis, no wonder that it is taken in great part from the letter of Sergius to Honorius, since its author was the same. But, as we observed in our pamphlet, it is in perfect contradiction to the doctrine expressed by Honorius in his letters to Sergius. The argument, by which we proved that the doctrine of Pope Honorius's letters was orthodox, evinces at the same time that it was in contradiction to the doctrine stated in the Ecthesis: and this much the more, as that heretical document is admitted to

have been drawn up in a great part from Sergius's letter, whose Monothelite principles are not at all implied in Honorius's reply. Doubtless, Sergius in his letter to Honorius proceeded more cautiously than in the *Ecthesis*; and thus his heretical doctrines were not so evident in the latter as in the other document. But the more distinctly the Monothelite dogma appears in the *Ecthesis*, the more it is in contradiction to the doctrine taught by Pope Honorius in his letters to Sergius. Consequently the condemnation pronounced by the Lateran Council against the *Ecthesis* does not at all impeach the orthodoxy of this Pontiff's letters; despite the gratuitous assertions to the contrary of writers of Gallican views.

Mr. Renouf seems not to understand how it is that Pope Honorius "in his second letter objects as strongly as ever to the expressions of 'one' or 'two operations,' not on account, as he says, of any economy of silence, but because they are utterly unauthorized."* But that gentleman, as we proved in the preceding article, has conceived a wrong idea of the Monothelite dogma; and he consequently believes that this error lurks where it really does not exist. Now the Catholic doctrine, which the new faction opposed, implies, that since in Christ there are two complete and distinct natures, there must needs exist a twofold class of operations, as either nature acts by its own innate energy. The Monothelites maintained on the contrary, that the principle of action in both orders was the *Logos*: consequently Christ's humanity had in their system only the functions of an instrument, by which the Divine virtue of the Word was made manifest; it did not operate by its own inborn powers, but only as moved by the former. They thus destroyed in reality the two orders of operations in Christ. Moreover the Church had expressly taught by the organ of Pope Leo I. that both natures constantly co-operated in any single act of our Redeemer; since both are substantially united in the unity of one person. The Monothelites on the contrary, according to their fundamental principle that the eternal *Logos* acts in the two natures, did not admit such co-operation; nor did they see in a single act of Christ aught but an action of the same *Logos*. The Lateran Council with the Sixth Synod condemned their doctrine as here stated: their Fathers therefore defined that in Christ there exist "*duas naturales operationes*" (*δύο φυσικὰς ἐνέργειας*); since, according to S. Leo's teaching, "*Agit utraque forma cum alterius communione quod proprium est.*" Had Mr. Renouf read attentively the definition of the Sixth Council,

* "The Case of Pope Honorius Reconsidered," p. 28.

he would not have misunderstood and misrepresented the Monothelite dogma. The Monothelites expressly denied the two orders of operations in Christ, which they attributed to the one and the same power of the Divine Word. But they did not consider the question, whether in a single act of Christ, as for instance, that of restoring to life the son of the widow of Nain, it was necessary to count one or two operations. The definition of the Synod did not properly regard this point of the controversy, although it implicitly taught that in any act of this description both the natures co-operate. But this was not the case with Pope Honorius. He considered the controversy under both aspects; and, moreover, in his letters, as we have already remarked in our pamphlet, he often used the word "operation" (*ἐνέργειαν*) in the sense of *ἐνέργημα* an external act. Sophronius and the ambassadors whom he sent to the Pope, represented the question in the sense which was afterwards defined by the general Synod; and the dogmatical letter of Sophronius is an evident proof of this. Now Pope Honorius fully admitted the doctrine, understood within these limits. We have fully demonstrated it in our pamphlet; and further, it is quite evident* and admitted even by our adversaries. But the Pontiff passed over those limits, and he also regarded the question from the other stand-point; nay, not being well acquainted with the state of the controversy, he thought that this was the very point which was debated by the two opposite parties. This is an important remark, to which the learned F. Colombier has just called the attention of theologians in some of his articles inserted in the "*Études*," as well as in a very clever letter he has addressed to Bishop Hefele on the case of Pope Honorius.† And indeed his view seems to me to be quite correct. From this it follows that the qualifications given by the Pope of "not being an authorized doctrine" of "its being a useless question," &c., are to be referred to the second, not to the first, dogmatic aspect of the controversy. Pope Honorius acknowledged that in each single action of our Saviour, both His Divine and His human nature operated; but he would not decide, nor did he think useful to do it, whether the acts, by which each of them in the hypostatic union co-operated, should be called one or two operations. No wonder then if, after the embassy from Sophronius, he adhered to the same principles; and profes-

* "Pope Honorius before the Tribunal," &c., p. 51, seq.

† "*Études*," Février, 1870, p. 272; Mars, p. 390. "Le Pope Honorius et Dr. Hefele," par le Père Colombier, S.J., p. 6, seq.

sing the Catholic dogma, as it was afterwards defined by the Lateran and the third Council of Constantinople, he allowed the other side of the controversy to remain an open question.

It is time now to say a few words on the authority and bearing of the contemporary witnesses alleged in favour of the orthodoxy of Pope Honorius's letters. Mr. Renouf, in his first pamphlet on Pope Honorius's condemnation, put forth the assertion, that the evidence of the three "*locupletissimi testes*" brought by Garnier in favour of the Pope's orthodoxy "was really that of one man, and that one an interested and mendacious witness."* We have answered this gratuitous assertion by proving first that the evidence was not really that of one man; and secondly, that the Abbot John was not a mendacious witness.† Mr. Renouf in his second pamphlet, seems to withdraw in some measure the first part of his assertion; he strives rather to diminish the value of the testimony of S. Maximus and of Pope John IV.; but he insists on the charge of lying in the case of Abbot John.‡

Whoever compares the two pamphlets of Mr. Renouf may easily guess that the author had not attentively pondered S. Maximus's letter to Marinus, when he wrote his first pamphlet; and now, in order to avoid defeat, he endeavours to pass over its most remarkable passages in defence of the Pontiff's orthodoxy. In fact both S. Maximus, Abbot John, and Pope John IV. had one and the same purpose of showing that Honorius in his letter to Sergius had not intended to deny the natural will in the humanity of Christ; but only the sensual and carnal will. He therefore pointedly insists on this view over again in his letter to Marinus. "*Romanæ Ecclesiæ Papam,*" he says, "*innatas geminas in Christo voluntates haud putem reprobare epistola sua ad Sergium, eo quod unam voluntatem dixerit; sed magis suffragari, easque merito astruere; qui nempe hoc dicat, non ad humanam ac naturalem Salvatoris elidendam voluntatem, etc.*"§ And more to the purpose: "*Quibus ostendit non quod habuerit humanam voluntatem (non enim hoc dixisse apparet), sed quod ut homo, neque secundum corpus ullam per membra innaturalem operationem haberet; neque vero secundum animam contrarium voluntatis motum aut abhorrentem a ratione, uti se res in nobis habet: quod et supra naturæ humanæ em gelnatus est.*|| And further on, after having explained

* "Condemnation of Pope Honorius," p. 15.

† "Pope Honorius before the Tribunal," &c., p. 61, seq.

‡ "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 35.

§ "Epist. ad Marinum," Op. t. ii. p. 238, ed. Migne.

|| "Epist. ad Marinum," p. 242.

the rest of Honorius's letter, where the Pope says: "Non sunt hæc diversæ voluntates," he continues: "Non ergo naturalem, atque humanam, uti dicebam, voluntatem interimit (Honorius), sed vitiosam et innaturalem.* And again, insisting on the Pope's words, "Non sunt hæc diversæ voluntates" he remarks: "Hoc est contrariæ et adversantes; ex quo palam conficitur, esse in Christo duas naturales voluntates. Nam si contrariam ut homo non habuit, naturali præditus fuit. Quod enim contrarium non est, naturale prorsus est."† S. Maximus draws these consequences, after having fully examined Honorius's letter; and he appeals at the end to the evidence of Abbot Anastasius and Abbot John in order to establish this view. Now Mr. Renouf in his second pamphlet, by suppressing the most important passage from S. Maximus's letter, referring to Abbot John's witness in favour of Pope Honorius's orthodoxy, gives his readers to believe that S. Maximus in his conference with Pyrrhus appealed to the testimony of Abbot John, as being the best able to judge of the meaning of Pope Honorius's letter; but that in his letter to Marinus he adopted a totally different explanation.‡ Now in our pamphlet on Pope Honorius we assert that S. Maximus in his letter to Marinus appealed expressly to the authority of Abbot John, not in order to prove his thesis, but in order to confirm it. We have seen what was the thesis of S. Maximus, let us now see whether the view, attributed by him to Abbot John in this very letter, disagrees with his own. The learned Martyr plainly asserts that the view of Abbot John, the secretary of Honorius, was: "nullo modo (Honorium) abolendam seu excludendam censuisse naturalem Salvatoris, qua homo est, voluntatem; sed eam duntaxat, quæ nostra est atque vitii labem habet, penitus eliminasse et sustulisse."§ Now this view of Abbot John referred to by S. Maximus is a plain confirmation of the one he expressed in the foregoing passages. At the same time it is identical with the view which the Abbot expressed in the letter he wrote to the Emperor Constantine in the name of Pope John, and to which S. Maximus alludes in his conference with Pyrrhus.|| "That if the holy

* *Ibid.*, l. c.

† *Ibid.* p. 243. According to these passages, I said in my pamphlet on Pope Honorius that S. Marinus had spoken of one will in Christ's humanity; and it was with reference to the same that I said that Mr. Renouf, with somewhat lax notions of literary honesty, has withheld the evidence from the eyes of his readers.

‡ "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 33.

§ "Epist. ad Marinum," l. c. p. 246.

|| Op. t. ii. p. 330, ed. cit.

doctor in his letter to Marinus preferred to explain the words: 'Unam voluntatem' of Honorius's letter in the sense that no carnal will or lustful thought preceded the conception or birth of Christ," that view of his own did not affect in the least the object of his apology, which was to prove that Pope Honorius in his letter to Sergius did not deny a human will in Christ, but only the carnal sensual will; that therefore he was not a Monothelite. He showed this from the letter itself; and confirmed it by the authority of Abbot John. Consequently S. Maximus did not justify Honorius, as Mr. Renouf asserts,* because he believed himself to be in possession of extrinsic evidence in favour of his orthodoxy. But he appealed to the extrinsic evidence in order to confirm the construction he had put upon the letter of Honorius, which he had proved as orthodox independently of any extrinsic testimony.† As to Pope John IV., one of the witnesses appealed to in favour of Honorius, Mr. Renouf speaks of him with great contempt. He represents his letter to the Emperor Constantine as most extraordinary and ludicrous, if considered as a description of Sergius's letter to Honorius, and moreover objectionable in every part.‡ Now we have seen in our pamphlet that Pope John's *Apologia pro Honorio Papa* may be divided into two parts: the first points out the meaning of the passage of Honorius's letter, which had been misrepresented by Pyrrhus; the latter demonstrates the opposition existing between the doctrine of Honorius and the error of the Monothelites, which is shown to be a disguised Eutychianism.§ Now Mr. Renouf passes over its second part, and represents the first as it were the whole *Apologia*, and a full analysis of Sergius's letter. Pope John wrote that apology when Pyrrhus published an extract from the Pope's letter to Sergius, for the purpose of showing that the Pontiff had taught one will in Christ. He was therefore only bound to prove that Honorius had denied in Christ nothing but the sensual will; and consequently that this doctrine had nothing to do with the dogma of the Monothelites. Pope John's object was neither to analyze Sergius's letter, nor to refute it, nor to discover its heretical bearings. Nor can it be said on that account that he gave a false statement of the controversy or that there is any discrepancy between his *Apologia* and Sergius's letter.

* "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 34.

† *καὶ ἄντα μὲν ἔγωγε τὸν νοῦν ἔχειν ὑπολαμβάνω, πάσης ὄντα καθαρὸν ὑποψίας.* "Epist. ad Marinum," l. c. p. 244.

‡ "The Case of Pope Honorius," &c., pp. 30, 31.

§ "Pope Honorius before the Tribunal," &c., pp. 63, 64.

But I have said all this in my pamphlet.* Nevertheless Mr. Renouf harps on the same string, without taking into the least account what I had replied to his charges against that Pope.

With regard to Abbot John, two accusations are made by Mr. Renouf against him : (1) that he, as secretary of Pope John IV., "gave an utterly false account of the letter of Sergius to Honorius, when writing in the Pope's name to the Emperor Constantine ;† (2) that Abbot John was wanting in veracity when he asserted that Honorius's letter did not speak of one will, but that the Greeks had wrongly interpreted the passage.‡ Now as to the first charge, we have already said that neither Pope John IV. nor his secretary, Abbot John, had the slightest intention to give a full account of the whole drift of Sergius's letter, but only to show what caused Pope Honorius to prove that in Christ there were not two contrary wills. Doubtless Sergius had explicitly asserted that the profession of two operations in Christ had given scandal to many, who thought it would imply the existence in Christ of two conflicting wills. Honorius wrote his letter to the effect of proving the inconsistency of that supposed consequence, and consequently in order to vindicate the doctrine of two operations in Christ from the charge of any error whatever. The secretary of Pope John IV. intended only to explain this point of view in order to justify his master. Nor was he wrong when he gave Abbot Anastasius the foregoing account of the interpretation of Pope Honorius's letter by the Greeks. For, according to the statement made by Anastasius and related by S. Maximus, Abbot John said, "Nullo modo in ea (epistola) per numerum mentionem fecisse (Honorium) unius omnimodæ voluntatis ; licet hoc nunc ab eis confictum sit, qui epistolam Græce reddiderunt.§ Now, I think that if the words of the Abbot be carefully considered and confronted with S. Maximus's letter, in which they are found, they could bear a meaning which is neither false nor a contradiction to what he wrote in Pope John's name to the Emperor Constantine. In fact, the words in question, if taken in their proper

* *Ibid.* p. 64, seq. If Mamachi had taken the true view of Pope John's "Apologia pro Honorio Papa," he would not have grounded any argument on the supposed discrepancy between the letters of Sergius and Pope Honorius. But he, with other writers of his age, having taken the line of discarding all the documents brought against Honorius as falsified, exaggerated everything which would contribute to justify their view.

† "The Case of Pope Honorius," pp. 32, 33.

‡ *Ibid.* l. c.

§ ὡς οὐδαμῶς ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπιμνησιν δι' ἀριζμοῦ πεποιήται ἐνδὸς τὸ παράπαν δελήματος. "Epist. ad Marinum," Op. t. ii. p. 244.

sense, do not deny that in Honorius's letter the word *unam* was wanting, but that it meant only one will in Christ, absolutely and exclusively one will (ἐνός τὸ παράπαν θελήματος). The Greeks, with Pyrrhus, attributed this meaning to it in order to support their error by the authority of the Roman Pontiff. Abbot John in his words regarded the quotation from Honorius's letter as referred to by Pyrrhus, who sent to all the Churches circulars approving of the Ecthesis and quoting in its support the passage in question. No wonder that Pyrrhus in his translation of Honorius's words may have used expressions bearing the meaning of ἐνός τὸ παράπαν θελήματος. At all events, Abbot John did not refer to Honorius's letter, as it appeared later in the Acts of the Sixth Council, but as it was garbled by Pyrrhus. That the Abbot did not deny the existence of the word *unam* in Honorius's letter, is manifest from the whole letter of S. Maximus to Marinus. S. Maximus not only admits the fact of Pope Honorius having written the words "*unam D.N.I.C. voluntatem fatemur*," but he refers to them at least three times in the course of his letter; he explains their meaning, and proves that they by no means exclude the human will in Christ. He afterwards appeals to the authority of Abbot John as to a witness; and he refers, as we said above, to the explanation given by him of Honorius's statement, to wit: "*At neque ullo modo abolendam, seu excludendam censuisse (Honorium) naturalem Salvatoris, qua homo est, voluntatem, sed eam dumtaxat, quæ nostra est, atque vitii labem habet, penitus eliminasse et sustulisse.*" Now, if Abbot John had denied the existence of the word *unam* in the passage quoted from Honorius, how could S. Maximus appeal to the Abbot's authority in order to confirm his explanation? If Abbot John had meant that the words *unam voluntatem* did not exist in the letter, how is it that he, the Abbot, justified them by the explanation to which we have above referred? Such being the meaning of the Abbot's statement, any one may easily understand that it contradicts by no means what he himself wrote in Pope John's name to the Emperor, and which was quoted by S. Maximus in his Dispute with Pyrrhus. Finally, with regard to the same Abbot John, we dare to say that it is very unfair in Mr. Renouf to press again the same charge of unverity and dishonesty against the holy secretary of two Popes. To the authority of S. Maximus, who calls him "*a most holy man*," that gentleman replies that "*this expression was indiscriminately used of all persons in high ecclesiastical office, who had not compromised themselves in any way.*"* But was it also

* "The Case of Pope Honorius," p. 35, note.

usual to say of high ecclesiastical dignitaries, that "he was a man who had illustrated all the West with his virtues and religious doctrines"?* Now S. Maximus spoke of Abbot John exactly in this manner; and he could by no means speak thus of a public forger. Thus the words of the holy martyr are a certain guarantee of Abbot John's veracity.

It remains to examine what Mr. Renouf says concerning the Council of Lateran, for the purpose of showing that the cause of Pope Honorius was held to be no longer defensible at the time of that Synod. His argument, which he had already urged in his first pamphlet, runs as follows:—"The fact that Pope Martin I. and the Lateran Council heard Honorius quoted in a dogmatic letter (of Patriarch Paul, a Monothelite) as an authority for Monothelism, without any contradiction being offered, is a sure sign that his cause was no longer held to be defensible."† In our last pamphlet we examined this argument, which has also been used by Dr. Dollinger and perhaps by others before him.‡ There we opposed no less than four reasons to the assertion of Mr. Renouf. But we tried beforehand to give a retort to his argument for the reason that, besides the name of Honorius, that of some other Fathers of the Church had been mentioned by Patriarch Paul. Mr. Renouf, as usual, passes over my four arguments, and he attacks only the retort, representing it to be the only reason employed in my pamphlet against his charge.

Now we remarked in our pamphlet, first that Pope Martin, being aware of Paul's calumny against Honorius, at the opening of the council, made a solemn declaration in favour of all his predecessors in order to reject beforehand the infamous charge of the Monothelite champion. We added, secondly, that the same Pope Martin, after the opening of the Council, explicitly declared that it was his intention and that of the whole Synod to discover and bring to light all the authors of the Monothelite heresy. And yet he did not say a word which could possibly refer to Pope Honorius. Moreover, thirdly, we called attention to the many *libelli* of Abbots, Bishops, and Synods, which were read in the course of the Council, all concerning the Monothelite controversy. In each of them the four Patriarchs, together with other partisans and promoters of the new heresy, were unanimously denounced, but no direct or indirect allusion was made to Pope Honorius. The doctrine of that Pope was not considered as deserving of such denun-

* "Disp. cum Pyrrho," Op. t. ii. p. 329, ed. Migne.

† "The Condemnation of Pope Honorius," p. 17.

‡ "Pope Honorius before the Tribunal," &c., p. 77, seq.

ciation. Finally we intimated that it was not a kind of regard to the Roman See, which caused the name of Honorius to be suppressed in that denunciation, because in all those *libelli* the See of Rome is represented as the foundation of the faith, as the teacher of truth, as the centre of the Catholic doctrine. Therefore their authors, while speaking of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, could not have the *arrière pensée* that Honorius had been an unorthodox Pope, whose orthodoxy was no longer defensible. No, at the time of the Lateran Council no such idea found a place in the mind of the assembled Fathers: on the contrary, it was considered that no possible ground could be alleged for any charge of heresy against him. And this, and this only, was the reason why no contradiction was offered to the rash assertion of Paul's letter concerning his orthodoxy.

So much the more that one of the members of the Lateran Synod was S. Maximus, that illustrious Abbot and most learned theologian, to whose efforts that assembly is due. S. Maximus had openly and solemnly defended Pope Honorius's orthodoxy in his famous letters to Maximus and to others as well as in his dispute with Pyrrhus. Can we, then, believe that in the age of the Lateran Council the cause of Honorius was held as indefensible, when S. Maximus had defended it so victoriously? Again, can we imagine that, if the case had required it, S. Maximus would have abstained from protesting in the Council in favour of Pope Honorius against the calumny of Patriarch Paul?

But what of our retort? It regarded only the silence and the omission of any protest on the part of the Lateran Fathers against Paul's assertions in his letter to Pope Theodorus. Now it is true that not a word of this kind was uttered by the Fathers in favour of S. Cyril, and the other Doctors mentioned by the Monothelite Patriarch. After the perusal of Paul's letter, Bishop Deusdedit only remarked that Patriarch Paul was proved a heretic by his own words, and he asked for the production of the Typus of which the same Paul had been the author. Which being read, the Synod solemnly declared it to be contrary to the rule of faith, and favourable to the heretical faction. But in order to prove what doctrine had always been transmitted by the Magisterium of the Church, a command was given to read the dogmatical decrees of the five Œcumenical Councils. Then Bishop Maximus, in the name of the whole Synod, stigmatized Cyrus, Sergius, Pyrrhus, and Paul as calumniators and impostors, with their predecessors, who had walked in the path of heresy. And he concluded that the testimonies of all the Fathers which were to be alleged in the following session would evidently prove that the doctrine

held by the assembly was in perfect accord with the definitions of former Synods. Thus, properly speaking, the greater part of the fifth sitting was not taken up with the defence and apology of the three Fathers mentioned by Paul in his letter to Pope Theodorus, but with the defence of the Catholic doctrine, which the Monothelites misrepresented as in disaccord with the traditional teaching of the Fathers.

But another remark is still necessary in order to show the solidity of our retort despite the assertion of our adversary. Not only Patriarch Paul, in his letter to Pope Theodorus, but generally all the Monothelites had appealed to three or four Fathers, whom with Pope Honorius they represented as favourable to their dogma. Such were S. Athanasius, the two SS. Gregory, and S. Cyril of Alexandria. They alleged some passages, in which they seemed to give countenance to the Monothelite doctrine. Pyrrhus, in his dispute with S. Maximus, when pressed by his adversary, appealed to those authorities, and with them to that of Honorius, who had been said to have confessed one will in Christ. S. Maximus took the defence of all and each of them, and, as he explained the misinterpreted words of Pope Honorius, he did the like with regard to all the rest of the passages of the Fathers alleged.* Now Patriarch Paul, in his letter to Pope Honorius, not only mentioned the names of S. Cyril and the others, but he also declared that he could easily produce testimonies from their works. The testimonies alluded to were of course those alleged by Pyrrhus and other Monothelites. Of Honorius he said that he was in perfect harmony with the teaching of the Fathers. Now if the Lateran Council had thought proper to make an apology for Pope Honorius, and to contradict the calumny of Paul, they should have explained, as S. Maximus did in his dispute with Pyrrhus, the misrepresented passages of his letter to Sergius, which had given rise to the imposture. In like manner, if they had intended to defend personally the Fathers mentioned in Paul's letter by name, they should also have explained, as S. Maximus, their testimonies, which had been so much abused by the heretics; especially as the doctrine of Pope Honorius had been represented to be in perfect accordance with that expressed in them. But they did nothing of the sort with reference either to Honorius, or to the other Fathers, as S. Cyril, &c. This is the ground of our retort, which Mr. Renouf qualified as "utterly unfounded."

Before concluding, we wish to add only a further remark.

* "Disp. cum Pyrrho," Op. t. ii. p. 315, seq.

Mr. Renouf often indulges in his last pamphlet in adducing authorities from Catholic theologians in favour of his assertions. We may have occasion elsewhere to see of what value they may be against the cause of Pope Honorius. For the moment we wish only to point out that it is not fair in him to enlist on his side names of theologians who have never dreamed of favouring his views, and never meant what he means. He says that he consoles himself in the company of Natalis Alexander and Christianus Lupus, "who is one of those who plead for the 'pia intentio' of Honorius." He (Chr. Lupus) speaks, continues he, of Honorius's decree as being "*Ectheses ac Typi fundamentum.*" *Omnia enim tria sunt ejusdem tenoris, et tam Typus, quam Ecthesis, decretum illud dumtaxat confirmarunt.*"* Now who would believe that by these words the learned Lupus only proposed to himself an objection which any one might have opposed to him? "*Questio est quare Synodus non damnaverit etiam Honorii Pontificis decretum. Omnia enim,*" &c. And he answers, "*Respondeo, erga tria illa processisse hanc Lateranensem Synodum, quomodo erga Sanctum Basilium ac profanum Nestorium processerunt in suis duodecim Capitulis Sanctus Cyrillus et Sacrosanta Synodus Ephesina. Et Basilius et Nestorius Christum Dominum dixere Hominem Deiferum et tamen hic inter hæreticos est, ille gloriosus manet inter orthodoxos Ecclesiæ Patres.*"† That is to say, according to Christianus Lupus, Honorius's letter was the foundation of Monothelism in the same sense as S. Basil's expression was that of Nestorianism, as S. Augustin's principles on Grace were of Baianism and Jansenism, and so forth. And since the doctrine of S. Basil, of S. Augustine, and of the other Fathers was orthodox, though heretics drew therefrom erroneous views, which they supported by their authority, so the doctrine of Honorius was thoroughly orthodox, though the Monothelites abused it.

It is true that in the Council of Lateran it was deemed a prudent economy not to speak of the conduct of Pope Honorius with regard to the Monothelite heresy; but not because the Papal doctrine was believed to be erroneous, or that it had given the least ground to the dogma of Sergius; but because the Council did not approve his economy of silence, and blamed his negligence in this juncture. That is to say, the Lateran Council by its silence blamed in Pope Honorius what was really blameable, and what had led the Fathers of the

* "The Case of Pope Honorius," &c., p. 39, note.

† "Dissert. de Sexta Synodo Gen. c. v.," Op. t. iii. p. 27, ed. Venetiis.

sixth Synod to pronounce against him a sentence of condemnation. But it never gave the least hint that any error whatever was contained in this Pontiff's doctrine. Thus the remarks of Mr. Renouf and of his predecessors fall to the ground.

ART. V.—THE PRIESTHOOD AT IRISH ELECTIONS.

Judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Keogh at the Court House, Galway, on Monday, 27th May, 1872. Printed by order of the House of Commons.

THE recent Galway election and its consequences forcibly illustrate some of the most conspicuous Irish social and religious phenomena. The time has not yet come for commenting in detail on the facts of the case: since at the time we write Judge Keogh's Judgment has only just been printed, and the evidence taken before that judge has not yet appeared. Moreover, further inquiry into the facts has been demanded by the venerable Archbishop of Tuam and others, whom the Judgment inculcates; and we are only too happy that we shall be thus relieved from the task of expressing any precise opinion on those facts, until the heat and asperity of controversy shall on both sides have somewhat subsided. Here therefore we confine ourselves to the central question of principle; viz. the grounds on which, and the method in which, it is legitimate that the Catholic priesthood should take an active part in Irish elections. And we shall deal no otherwise with Judge Keogh's Judgment, than so far as it expresses *his* view on this question of principle.

Now at the very outset we are met by one broad fact: No one, not even Judge Keogh, professes to doubt, that the great majority of Galway electors considered Captain Nolan a more eligible candidate than Captain Trench. Yet, on the other hand, it is the Judge's opinion, expressed in every variety of shape, that the former gentleman owed his election entirely to the influence of the priesthood. In other words—by the admission of Judge Keogh himself—the effect of sacerdotal interference has been simply the election of that candidate, whom the voters really preferred. Had an *English* election been in question, this consideration would have been decisive on English public opinion; but the number of Englishmen is extremely small, who can bring themselves by any effort to weigh English and Irish affairs in the same balance of principle. Where England is concerned, the whole

liberal party at least profess to regard landlord influence with profound suspicion; but Judge Keogh—a liberal of the first water—has declared that in Ireland “no safer, no steadier, no more legitimate influence than that of the landlord over his tenant could be used” (p. 6). In the same spirit Englishmen are constantly expressing a wish, that the influence of landlords in Ireland may prevail over that of priests; refusing to look in the face the indubitable fact, that these two influences are violently contrasted with each other, in their relation to the first principles of political morality. The landlord (speaking broadly and generally) puts pressure on his tenants (so far as he does so), that they may vote *against* their conviction; but the priest puts pressure on his flock, that they may vote in *accordance* with it. Thus the electional influence of priests is in itself conducive to political morality, with whatever regrettable or even deplorable extrinsic circumstances it may be occasionally mixed up; whereas the influence of landlords (we are speaking exclusively of Catholic Ireland) is in its very essence tyrannical, oppressive, and unjust. This is the point on which we wish to insist in our present article.

We shall be asked—why draw the distinction implied in our last parenthesis? Why do we think differently on the character of landlord influence, in Great Britain and Ireland respectively? It is important for our purpose, that we begin with answering this question in some detail. We will speak then for a few pages on Great Britain alone, and then apply what we shall have said to the special circumstances of Ireland. And we express frankly the bias of our own opinion, that in Great Britain, on the whole, under the circumstances of the moment and in the shape in which it is for the most part practically exercised, landlord influence cannot be truly called oppressive or tyrannical; though neither can we admit that it is, in any high sense of the word, legitimate.

We should start with explaining—we still confine ourselves to Great Britain—that we are very far from admirers of the Constitution in its present state. We have always thought that the whole series of Reform Bills, commencing with 1831, have been built on a fundamentally unsound basis; and that their ultimate issue will probably be nothing less, than the absolute triumph of that movement which Catholic writers call the Revolution. The ground of objection which we take to these Reform Bills, is one which has very often been publicly adduced, and to which we are not aware that any answer has even been attempted. The House of Commons is in fact the one supreme power of the State. It was of extreme moment therefore, that intelligence as such, that property as such, should have its fully sufficient

influence; and that every different interest of the country should be there faithfully represented. The voice of the multitude should doubtless carry with it great weight; but on no principles to us intelligible, ought that weight to be predominant over all other influences put together. Under the old system of close boroughs, there was a real and effective representation of divers interests, though by means of a machinery which could not be defended. What we complain of is, that under the Reform Bills there has been no attempt to secure a similar result by more satisfactory methods; that, instead of the reformers cherishing and promoting every variety of suffrage, they have established a dull and leaden uniformity of franchise; and that they have thus enacted a scheme which, if left to work freely, is one of pure democracy. We say "pure democracy": because (as has continually been pointed out) the lowest class of those who receive the franchise will always outnumber all the rest put together; and the constituency of 1831 was as mere a "demos" as that of 1867.

Now one of the many evils which have resulted from these disastrous measures, has been the political demoralization to which they have in some sense given a sanction. The Russian Government has been called a despotism tempered by the bowstring; and in like manner, since 1832, the British Constitution may well have been called a democracy tempered by bribery and intimidation. That pure democracy in Great Britain is ruinous in tendency, we must take leave to call the obvious conclusion of common sense: and nothing *saves* the British Constitution from being a pure democracy, except bribery and intimidation, direct or indirect, explicit or implicit. It has been difficult for many men to see, that practices, which are so necessary, are at the same time so detestable. And it is to our mind the peculiar ignominy of the Reform Bills, that, under their auspices—so far as Great Britain is concerned—every fresh conquest over bribery and intimidation is one further step on the road to political ruin.

Meanwhile there is just one conservative influence,—necessarily indeed short-lived,—but on which, while it lasts, the mind can repose with less dissatisfaction. Even to this day—though in a rapidly diminishing degree—throughout a large portion of Great Britain, a large proportion of tenant farmers vote for their landlord's candidate with hearty complacency. Nor does this denote such an utter negation of political views as might at first sight appear: because the politics of any given landlord are in general substantially those of his ancestors; and conservative farmers naturally place themselves on a conservative estate, liberals on a liberal. Beyond this broad division however into "conser-

vative" and "liberal," it must be admitted that the great majority of British farmers have few definite political convictions of their own; and they are delighted accordingly to follow their landlord's lead. They vote for his candidate, not at all because they are afraid of any punishment with which he could visit them, but because it is their very notion of political virtue that tenants should so vote. And they have an *esprit de corps*, which makes them delight in the influence of the estate to which they belong.

But it is plain that any individual, who rises above a certain (somewhat low) level of conscientiousness and intelligence, cannot long continue without self-reproach thus blindly to follow the multitude. Suppose I am such a person. I must in due time ask myself the question, *why* it is reasonable and proper that I should vote for my landlord's candidate rather than for any other. And it is very far easier to ask this question, than to answer it. The reply commonly given is, that my landlord is far more highly educated than I am, and that reasonable modesty should induce me to follow his judgment rather than my own. Now doubtless reasonable modesty should show me, how incompetent I am to decide by my own lights the momentous issues before me; but why on earth should I seek my *landlord's* illumination, rather than that of some *other* educated person? I hold a good deal of land from A. B., Esq., and I have always found him a straightforward and honourable man enough; but his neighbour, C. D., Esq., from whom I hold no land at all but with whom circumstances have brought me into contact, impresses me as a person far superior to A. B. in respect both of intelligence and of public spirit. Granting then to the full that reasonable modesty will lead me to seek the advice of one more competent than myself,—surely it is C. D. who should be my chosen adviser, rather than A. B.

A much more plausible reason however than the foregoing may be alleged, for my supporting my landlord's candidate. We have already admitted, that this habit of tenants voting with their landlord is about the least unsatisfactory of the conservative elements in the British Constitution. Should I not therefore injure my country more—so far as any one individual *can* produce either injury or benefit—by discrediting and opposing this habit, than I should do by acquiescing in a candidate, who is not absolutely the best of those who are standing? We incline to think that this consideration has real force. The cases are perhaps not rare in which, by the help of my Mentor C. D. I may fairly arrive at a conclusion, that I should do less harm by opposing C. D.'s favourite candidate, than by weakening the habit which now exists of tenants voting with their land-

lord: a habit which, under present circumstances, neither burdensome nor degrading to the conscience of the former.

But whether this is so or not—and we would by no means speak confidently on the point—at all events such a consideration cannot apply to cases, in which some *momentous issue* is involved. Suppose e.g. my landlord's candidate advocates compulsory secular instruction; whereas I am a Catholic, and (after obtaining the best advice of those more competent persons in whom I have confidence) consider that the enforcement of such instruction would be an overwhelming national calamity. Or suppose that my landlord's candidate advocates a measure of some different kind, which I heartily, and after due deliberation with others, regard as frightfully immoral in tendency. Under such circumstances, it is my duty to do all I possibly can within my little sphere, for the purpose of influencing public opinion. I must nail my colours to the mast. I must lift up my voice against public calamity.

Moreover we believe that, in the existing state of opinion, very few landlords would be found in Great Britain to take offence at this, when they rightly understood it; and still fewer, who would dream of visiting my conduct with any kind of penal retribution. Nay, we believe the large majority of British landlords would concur with ourselves, in denouncing any such act of attempted coercion, as an act which deserves severe condemnation from every honest and straightforward man.

In all the cases hitherto given, it will be seen that the voters act in accordance with their honest conviction; they vote just as they think they *ought* to vote. Here is the obvious and unmistakable line of demarcation, between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" influence. C. D.'s advice was "legitimate" influence; A. B.'s threat of coercion (supposing it) "illegitimate." To vote according to *my own opinion*, does not mean "to vote according to the opinion which I *should* have formed *without* C. D.'s advice"; but "which I have formed *by help* of his advice." On the other hand, under the name of "illegitimate influence" is included every kind of pressure, which seeks to influence the *vote*, without influencing the *opinion*. And certainly we hold, with the Archbishop of Tuam, that the *ballot* is simply irreproachable in *principle*: its tendency is precisely to preserve that influence which is legitimate, and to get rid of that only which is tyrannical and oppressive.

We now cross the Irish Channel; and come at once into the presence of circumstances, which differ (one may say) not less than grotesquely from those of Great Britain. Even on one point which but incidentally affects our argument—the perils of democracy—there is the broadest contrast. The great ma-

jority of the Irish (thank God!) are so faithful to their religion, that they are more accessible than almost any other people to the influence of their priests; and Catholic priests are in all countries the most efficacious, because the most intelligent and large-minded, enemies of the Revolution. So far as the characteristics of that movement have been introduced into Ireland at all, it has not been even by the agency of Irish Protestants, but by the stupid and ignorant intermeddling of Englishmen; of Englishmen, who endeavour to force on Ireland, by measures educational and other, a principle which is utterly uncongenial to Irishmen of every creed. (See our remarks in April, p. 438.) Bribery and intimidation, even in Great Britain, are deplorable and disastrous evils; but in Ireland they are also *unmixed* evils, productive of no incidental benefit whatever.

Here however we must not be misunderstood. Supposing the legislature had thought fit, both in Great Britain and Ireland, to give direct representation to landed property as such,—we should not have a word to say against an arrangement, which (as we have already said) seems to us indefinitely more just and reasonable than that which exists. In what we are going to say, we only assume the obvious and elementary truth, that every one who has received the franchise—be he landowner or be he labourer—should exercise it according to *his own* conscience, and not that of somebody else.

Let this then be borne in mind. Almost every considerable Parliamentary election in Ireland must be regarded by sincere Catholics as a matter of vital importance; as a matter affecting seriously the position of the Church and the interest of souls. *Whichever* the wrong side may be, to vote on the wrong side, nay or to abstain from voting on the right, is nothing less—as every Catholic must feel who chooses to think—than to betray the interests of his God, his Faith, and his Country. That he should do this from fear of his landlord's oppression, or even from mere motives of gratitude to that landlord,—is in itself a base and disgraceful act: however much in individual cases the moral fault may be justly extenuated, by considering the circumstances of violent temptation under which it was perhaps committed.

But how will the Catholic voter know, *on which side* lie the interests of his God, his Faith, and his Country? We have frankly confessed in the earlier part of our article, or rather have heartily maintained, that an uneducated elector of reasonable modesty will look about for persons of superior culture in whom he has confidence, that they may assist him in coming to a conclusion. But an Irish Catholic must really be on the verge of idiocy, who could think that his *Protestant landlord*

will be his competent guide on such a question. Take e.g. what Judge Keogh (p. 17) calls "the great religious question which, we were told, poisoned the whole of this election conflict"; viz., that of denominational education. I am a Catholic of good intentions, but imperfectly instructed. What possible reason can I have for dreaming, that my Protestant landlord's opinion is worth one straw on such a question as this? I know with absolute certainty, that the religion which he professes is false and a corruption of the Gospel: what do I know in his favour, which can counterbalance this adverse presumption? This applies even to the most favourable case: but if I further find him urging me to vote against my conscience, then I have direct proof that his political morality is rotten to the core. On the other hand, the priests—who are not professors only but authorized teachers of the one true Faith—combine with hardly a dissentient voice in one particular doctrine, on this momentous subject of denominational education. There is no politician in the world who is reasonably more certain of any political doctrine whatever, than I am of this. And similar considerations apply in their degree to the other numerous political questions, on which the priests are almost unanimous on one side and the Protestant landlords on the other.

If Englishmen then allege that an Irish Catholic voter acts unreasonably, in supporting his priests by the full and undivided strength of his political action, what is the principle on which they must ground such an opinion? They must hold, in consistency, that a voter is never to be guided by the opinion of any one else, of any "C. D." in whom he reposes confidence; that he is never in fact to vote according to his own opinion; that he is either to vote according to *his landlord's* opinion, or else according to what *would* have been his own opinion if he had had no guide to consult. As applied to England, such a proposition would of course be too preposterous to be gravely expressed; but no proposition is too preposterous, for an Englishman speculating about Ireland.

Judge Keogh's language all through shows, how destitute he is of all sympathy with the very *notion* of Irish electors voting according to their conscience. He calls the recent Galway election (p. 17) "the most astounding attempt at ecclesiastical tyranny which the whole history of priestly intolerance presents." Yet in what *language* has this "tyranny" and "intolerance" found expression? He quotes it with hearty reprobation, and we italicize a word or two.

The clergy of the four dioceses, . . . having determined to support the candidature of Captain Nolan, in conference assembled . . . request the clergymen of the four dioceses to explain to the electors of the several parishes

that the Legislature, in conferring on them the franchise, had intended that it should be used by each elector for the public weal *according to his conscience*. (p. 16.)

The Rev. Father Cannon, that amiable man [the word "amiable" used by Judge Keogh ironically], seconds this resolution :—"That we regard as a recreant and a renegade any Catholic tenant, who allows himself to be *forced* to vote for Captain Trench *against his conscience*." (p. 20.)

Then comes the Rev. Mr. Macdonogh : he said the landlords had no more right to the votes of their tenants than to their souls. (p. 26.)

On this last sentence our own comment would be very simple. Nothing can more emphatically show the gross political immorality of the landlord party, than that it should be necessary even to *express* so rudimentary a political truth. But the Judge quotes it, as among the most violent of sacerdotal utterances. Later on he thus continues :—

Mr. Furlong *admits* that he used the words "the finger of scorn" ; and that he warned them to "*hearken to the voice of conscience*." (p. 42.)

The Judge accounts it then an *imputation* on the Rev. Mr. Furlong, that he warned electors to hearken to the voice of conscience. Then the Judge continues in these very remarkable words :—

That is the theological device : first you persuade a man that his conscience must lead him to vote for a particular person ; and then you menace any man who votes against his "conscience," with all the terrors and deprivations which ecclesiastical influence can supply. (p. 42.)

Words cannot be more express than these in admitting that the influence, to which Judge Keogh objects, is in its substance most *legitimate* influence. Such influence consists exclusively in reaching the *convictions* of the voter ; and does not touch his external conduct, except *through* his convictions. This is the one electional end pursued by Irish priests ; to press electors by every most urgent appeal, into voting in accordance with their genuine convictions. The Judge speaks ironically (p. 31) of the "*never-failing* conscience clause." He condemns himself out of his own mouth.

What shall be said then of a landlord, who has full means of knowing that his tenants regard their vote in the light we have described, and nevertheless aims at diverting their suffrage from its straightforward course ? Though he were to do this exclusively by appeals to their gratitude,—even in this case he would be labouring directly to tamper with their faithfulness to conscientious convictions, and with their political morality. But what if he hints threats of *temporal disadvantage* to follow, from their resisting his wishes ? He is then simply

trying to bribe or intimidate them into doing an act, which they sincerely regard as a betrayal of their God, their Faith, and their Country. Such conduct deserves the detestation of every one who has a heart or a conscience.*

Will some of our readers say, that we deal out unequal measure to landlord and priest? that we use language against the former, on which we should not venture against the latter? They shall see. We say plainly this. Let it be proved in a single instance, that some priest has full means of knowing, that certain Catholics honestly regard Trench's election as more conducive than Nolan's to the highest welfare of Ireland; and let it be proved that under such circumstances he sought to deter them from voting for Trench, by threatening them with spiritual evils. Let this be proved, we say, and the most blatant Protestant will not use severer language than our own. The turpitude of such conduct is much greater than that of landlord intimidation: because (1) any moral offence is *ceteris paribus* far more heinous in a Catholic priest, than in a Protestant layman; and because (2) to oppose virtuous action by spiritual weapons, is indefinitely more abominable than to oppose it by temporal. Let such a priest be visited with con-dignest punishment, and we shall certainly not complain. But we must be allowed entirely to doubt, whether such a priest *exists*. Judge Keogh is diligent in accumulating the worst stories he can find against the clergy; but no one fact of *this* kind can be found in his judgment.

Instead of this, he makes complaints which are so obviously frivolous, that one is amazed he can lay stress on them. Thus (p. 28) he censures the priests, for enforcing on electors the obligation of breaking any promise they might have made for Trench. But all this (as the Judge does not attempt to deny) proceeded on the supposition, that these tenants regarded Trench's election as adverse to God's interests. Now it is a very elementary ethical principle that, if they thought this, their fault lay, not in *breaking* their promise, but in having *made* it. The Judge seems to think, that if I have promised my friend e. g. to tell a lie in his behalf, such a promise binds in conscience; and that if my priest enjoins me to break it, he exemplifies sacerdotal unscrupulousness and tyranny. We call on every lover of morality, be he Catholic, Protestant, or infidel, to protest indignantly against the amazing doctrine here implied.

* We are not for a moment intending to deny, that many of these landlords possess various very estimable qualities. The standard of political morality is so disgracefully low in these islands, that many a man will be guilty in his political capacity of acts, from the parallels to which he would shrink with horror in private life.

In reference to this question, Judge Keogh (p. 23) refers to "Lord Dunsandle's voters": by which choice phrase he characteristically designates those free voters, who happen indeed to be Lord Dunsandle's tenants, but over whose votes—to use a phrase already quoted—that nobleman has no more just authority, than over their souls. We grieve to find (if the fact be so) that one hundred and sixty of these, being Catholics, promised to vote for Trench; whereas it is evident from what follows (even if it could be otherwise doubtful) that they considered his election adverse to the interests of religion. But we are glad to find that they abstained from the still graver moral offence, of *keeping* such a promise.

We now come to what is certainly a more serious matter. A certain priest—according to the Judge, an "insane disgrace to the Roman Catholic religion,"—"said they would use the confessional under the ballot if they required it" (p. 28). We shall not here attempt a theological disquisition; and the less so, because the Dublin clergy have already dwelt on this part of the judgment, in their address to their flock. But we cannot refrain from one remark. We do not see how any one can think himself certain that a case may not arise, in which the interests of religion are so very closely mixed up with some electional issue, that every Catholic who sees clearly its true bearing is bound under mortal sin to take an active part. If such a case should occur, and some given voter commits the offence in question, how can it be avoided that some priest must bring the confessional to bear upon it? Protestants and infidels dislike—some of them abhor—the confessional; but at least, if honest men, they will not think *this* one of its evils, that it enforces a high standard of political morality. At the same time let it be distinctly understood, that we could not attempt any defence whatever of the fact, if it be a fact, which Judge Keogh censures at the top of p. 30.

Indeed throughout we have by no means expressed an opinion, that there are not various priests concerned with the recent election, who may have made very serious practical mistakes; who may, e.g., have used language of very indefensible violence; and who may otherwise have more or less let themselves down from their position as priests of God, towards the level of honest but intemperate political partisans. If this on full examination be found the case, of course we from our hearts deplore it. We would only urge, in extenuation, the heat and excitement of a momentous struggle, the peculiarities of Irish character, and the shamelessness of those principles which certain landlords seem to assume as a matter of course.

But evidence is alleged (with whatever truth) of mobs keeping

voters from the poll, and of priests encouraging those mobs. If such evidence is trustworthy, we do not defend those mobs, and still less those priests. But in all fairness let the state of things be rightly apprehended. For instance (p. 23), "the tenants of Mr. Bodkin," a Catholic, "expressed their desire to go with their generous and kind landlord, but one of them is threatened with a bar of iron over his head." Let us assume for the moment that this is all true. Does any one suppose that these tenants considered Mr. Bodkin a more trustworthy judge of what really conduces to the welfare of Ireland, than the large body of bishops and priests who supported Nolan? The Judge does not even suggest this; his very point is merely, that Mr. Bodkin is a "generous and kind landlord." Indubitably it was wrong to threaten one of his tenants with a bar of iron; but it was no less wrong in those tenants to vote against what they believed to be God's cause, because they had found one opponent of that cause "generous and kind." Let us blame both parties: those who intended to be guilty of a base act, and those whose indignation at such baseness led them into violent courses. To our mind however, the fault of the latter is less than that of the former.

We have said very little about Judge Keogh individually. This has not been because we have failed to form a very definite opinion, as to his display of judicial temper and acumen; nor yet because we forget for a moment those political antecedents of his, from which we might have expected just such a document as is now before us. But we feel that there has already been a great deal too much of personal invective and recrimination; and we are earnestly desirous that the question be considered exclusively on the ground of principle. Let the evidence then by all means be sifted to the very bottom, with the greatest attainable candour and impartiality. We are quite prepared for the possibility, that many facts may be established, which no right-minded Catholic will in his cool moments regard with complacency. But we would stake our reputation on this fundamental issue: is it the priest or the landlord, who really in Ireland presses electors to vote against their genuine and honest convictions? And if the latter alternative be established beyond all possibility of doubt—as will most certainly be the case—then all talk about priestly dictation and ecclesiastical terrorism is the merest moonshine. To express a hope that priests may hereafter exercise less influence in Irish elections, is in fact to express a hope that Irish electors may more largely abstain in future from voting in accordance with their conscience. This is the plain common sense of the whole matter.

ART. VI.—DR. BAIN ON THE RELATIVITY OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

(COMMUNICATED.)

[The contributor of the series on Mr. Mill being obliged, by considerations of health, to suspend his articles for one or two more quarters, we are very glad that we are able meanwhile to place before our readers some comments on another philosophical enemy of the Faith.]

The Senses and the Intellect. By ALEXANDER BAIN, M.A., Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen. Second Edition. Longmans. 1864.

The Emotions and the Will. By ALEXANDER BAIN, M.A. Second Edition. Longmans. 1865.

Logic—Part First, Deduction; Part Second, Induction. By ALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D. Longmans. 1870.

THE Law of Relativity may be briefly summed up by saying that it is impossible to know any one object by itself alone: in every knowledge two or more objects are known together according to their mutual difference and agreement. Thus, I know no single atom of matter singly; I know it as differing from the void which surrounds it, and resembling another atom at some distance off it. Furthermore, I do not know even myself in my own individuality apart from others. Self needs to be set into distinctness as an object of knowledge by some foil of Not Self. The proofs of this law are manifold, clustering round on all sides. So the framers of the law think. They tell us how darkness gives all the glory that appertains to light; the remembrance of sickness is the zest whereby health is made pleasurable; it is the passive victim that brings out the operator's activity and power; it is only in comparison with matter and with space that mind knows mind. In a word, fair and foul, light and darkness, order and disorder, power and weakness, life and death, pleasure and pain, justice and iniquity, good and evil, &c., form so many couples, of which the two members of each are inseparable in any mind, and consequently are wholly inseparable. This assumes that there is no being—or rather, I should say, no relation, if I am to be true to the relativist theory,—there is no relation outside of all knowledge; no object, mental or otherwise, on which mind does not somehow prey. It is an assumption which none

but the grossest materialist—and by implication, utter scorner of metaphysics—has ever, with eyes open, refused to allow.

But the mention of mind, and of the objects on which mind feeds, leads in due course to an inquiry into the nature of the relation between the World of Mind and the World of Matter. And here I will summarize the philosophy of the author whom I am opposing, based as that philosophy is upon the Law of Relativity above stated.

“The worlds of Mind and Matter are better designated the Internal and the External; the External taking in not only Matter but Space. It will be found that the External is embraced, without deficit or surplus, by the category of the Extended; while the Internal, in its negative aspect, is neither more nor less than the Inextended. Everything which is an object at all, and yet has no extension, is Mind; while wherever you find that which you can measure in three dimensions, in two, or in one, there you may safely place the abiding either of Matter or of Space. We yet need to catch a glimpse of the positive aspect of the Internal World. We find it threefold. Mind, the Internal, is Feeling; it is Volition; it is Thought; it is all three together. It is Feeling—every one knows what feeling means. It is also Volition, that is, feeling-prompted muscular action. For we have no knowledge of Mind except in connection with a muscular framework. Lastly, Mind is Thought: that is, it discriminates, it identifies, it retains its impressions. Discrimination, Identification, Retentiveness make up Thinking. Having spoken of the Inextended and Extended, or, as they are frequently called, Subject and Object, separately, it must be inquired whether they can be thought of separately. Am I competent to discuss myself by myself? am I competent to discuss a Not Me wholly independent of myself? It is necessary to give a wide extension to the pronoun *I* in order to meet these inquiries. I may be totally engrossed in the Extended, or, more readily, in the Inextended; I may be in a Subject state or in an Object state; but there can be no Object state, nothing extended, for me, outside of and away from myself. As all my enunciations are measured by the standard of my own faculties, I am justified in saying, that neither matter nor space exists except in relation to me. The prefix *for me* is to be always understood before all my assertions. I am my own measure of truth. What I think true, that I do think true; that is the whole meaning of truth. There is no truth outside of my thinking; no truth, I mean, *for me*; nor can I ever signify anything except *for me*. In that signification—and a grand

“psychological impossibility debars me from putting any other signification upon the words—I am the measure of all things. But, as I said before, I might possibly be in a purely object condition; in that case there would be an extended Object, independent of the inextended Subject, independent therefore of the *Ego*, in the narrower denotation of that pronoun, whereby it is co-extensive with Subject only, and not with Subject and Object both.

“Before advancing to the grand and crowning examination of the widest meaning of the *Ego*, wherein the Extended and the Inextended together are merged, it is requisite to advert to the mode of formation of the duality which composes this universal Me. I consisted originally of states of active movement, nervous currents outwards, and states of passive sensation, nervous currents inwards. I went into conscious movement spontaneously, that is, without any stimulus of sensation, when my nervo-muscular apparatus was fresh from food and repose. I also had sensations without movement. These two diverse kinds of consciousness, contrasting together, formed the duality of the Active and the Passive. This duality of my nature was primitive. From it sprang a second duality under the nurture of experience. I thereby learned to distinguish in me the Ideal from the Actual; the Actual, which varied with my movements, from the Ideal, which was constant in movement as in repose. The sight of a dog chasing a hare is an example of an actual state of consciousness. The idea of that chase is an ideal state. So precarious is the actual, that it may be destroyed by the single movement of the closing eyelids. So strong at home is the ideal, that, carried into darkness or into the bustle of a city, it will yet subsist, where no live hare is visible or durst even appear.

“Rehearsing the series anew and further completing it, I continue :—I was originally a dualism of Muscular Feeling and Passive Sensation. Thence, by experience and association, the custodian of my experiences, I passed into an ulterior dualism of Ideality and Actuality. Out of this dualism was born my third generation, Subject and Object. When I emerge from a consciousness which abides under my movements to a consciousness which changes under them, I become Object, Extended, Not Self: thence repassing to a state of consciousness which endures, notwithstanding my movement, I become Self once more, an Inextended Subject. But Self and Not Self, equally with Ideal and Actual, with Sensation and Movement, are a pair of inseparables. I could not know Sensation, as such, without Movement, nor an Ideal without an Actual, nor could I know myself without the foil that is not me.”

And now, reader, I ween you wonder who I am that am thus marvellously constituted. Mine is a created, human person like your own; and I am not constituted as I have described myself; only Dr. Bain of Aberdeen, writing books on *The Senses and The Intellect* and *The Emotions and The Will*, says that I am. It is with him that I quarrel, in the name of the God that made us all three, made you, and Alexander Bain, and myself. I complain that the man from Aberdeen has set us up each in the place of God; now I will not be so set up, nor will you, nor shall Alexander Bain set up either himself or us, or any created self whatsoever, to enjoy divine supremacy. The following are the arguments with which I go about to pull him down.

Aristotle says that, of two contradictories, one is enough to distinguish both itself and its opposite; *ἑκὰνδν θάτερον μέρος τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ἑαυτό τε κρίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον*.^{*} To bring out the sense of this dictum, let me see how Dr. Bain understands a man to know *yellow*. To know it, he says, in its difference from other juxtaposed colours, as *blue*, *purple*, *green*; and again to know it in its agreement with the same colours in the fact of being a colour. Take the contrast, *yellow-blue*. Am I obliged to know *blue* in order to know *yellow*? Not at all. I may know *pink*, or *violet*, or *lavender*; any shade will do, to set off *yellow* in my cognition. All that Dr. Bain contends for is that, to know *yellow* as a distinct colour, I must know also some other colour from which it is distinguished. Let us call that other colour *y*. *Yellow* we will call *x*; and for not *yellow* we will write $-x$. It does not follow from these data, that $y = -x$, or $x + y = 0$; in concrete language, that were a thing yellow to start with, and we painted it say blue, the thing would by that painting lapse into non-entity. In other words, yellow and blue are not pure logical contradictories. One does not merely exclude the other; it supplants it with something positive. Now I ask Dr. Bain whether it is the exclusive or the supplantative element of his much insisted upon "contrasting notion," that supplies the foil which he desiderates for cognition? When I know a white mare by contrasting her with a chestnut, is it the second mare's being chestnut or her being not white that forms my differentiating circumstance? I opine that it is her being not white. She does not differ in having colour, but in not having that colour which the other has. So through any number of "polar pairs," *white-red*, *white-transparent*, *white-divine*, &c., there is one only contradiction diffused, that of *white not-white*. So long

* "De Anima," i. 5.

as a thing is not white, it does not become either more or less opposed to white by being anything or nothing else besides. This being the case, I go on to affirm with Aristotle, that the negative or non-existent element is known by the positive or existent, and not *vice versâ*. *Not-white* is known through *white*; this order of cognition cannot be reversed. *White* is prior to *not-white* in the mind, not by a priority of time, for the notions are gathered simultaneously, but by a priority of order, in as much as it is through the positive notion that the negative is apprehended. To prove what I say. I experience a contrast of colours, black and white. Wherein does the contrast lie? Not in the white being white, nor in the black being black, but in the black being not white, and the white not black. Beyond this there is no contrast between colour and colour. How then do I perceive a contrast between them? Clearly by knowing *white*, and through that, *not white*, and so knowing *black* in so far as it is *not white*; and again by knowing *black*, and through it, *not black*, and so knowing *white* in so far as it is *not black*. So the knowledge of good and evil may be had from contemplating good alone; for pure evil is pure *not-good*, i.e. nothing; an evil thing is an admixture of evil and good. So *not-self* may be learnt from the mere study of self; it can be learnt by this study only. If we actually had experience of a *not-self*, and had not studied self previously, we should not appreciate what we experienced.

If these conclusions, suggested by Aristotle, are correct, Dr. Bain's Law of Relativity must be erased from the statute-book of philosophy. It is then possible to know an object by itself alone; or if you still postulate a dualism in cognition, you may find it in the object known along with its logical contradictory. You may know x by itself; or, if you will to say so, you know x and $-x$. That is enough; you have no need of knowing y . Granting to the full that there is an obverse and reverse side to every cognition, no less than to every medal; I still find no obverse for x except $-x$. You tell me that y is an obverse. Now if y is not an identity with $-x$, call it equal to $y' - x$. Then, I repeat, it is not the y' but the $-x$, which is the obverse of x . But here is the place for my adversary to put in a grave objection, which I must notice. "You admit," he says, "that it is impossible to know x without also knowing $-x$. But $-x$ cannot be learnt except from $y, z, \&c.$, i.e. $y' - x, z' - x, \&c.$ Therefore, to know x , we must know some other positive reality besides, as y' or z' ." To this objection, my answer stands as might be expected, admitting my own major, and denying the minor which the objicient has appended to it. I deny that $-x$ cannot be apprehended without some second positive term be-

sides x , as y' or z' , being apprehended with it. But my opponent meets my denial with a proof. "Take a man," he says, "and keep him in a medium at 70° without change of temperature, apparel, or health; that man, living in a permanent 'summer heat,' will have no notion of heat, because he has never experienced cold. There then is the heat, the x by itself, which cannot be realized to the mind for want of the y , the cold." There is some truth in my opponent's statement, but he has exaggerated it, and in the exaggeration lies all that serves his purpose of proof. I reply, therefore, that the man so circumstanced has it in his power to form a notion of heat. At the same time I admit that the notion formed will be faint, and would be vastly clarified by an experience of cold. My reason for saying that he might form some notion is this, that if experience of heat (x) taught him nothing of heat, experience of cold ($y, = y' - x$) would teach him nothing of not-heat ($-x$); and so he would remain under any circumstances hopelessly unconscious of heat. But I admit that his notion of heat would be very faint, and that, both on physiological and on psychological grounds. Psychologists, all in their several phraseologies, distinguish between those conscious states which are attended to, and those which are not. All day long, for example, the beating of my heart is an item in the general aggregate of my consciousness. If I will, I can pick that item out and mark it by itself. But what tempts me to single out any given item for special attention? I am tempted either by the pleasurable or the painfulness, or the utility of that particular item. Now revert to our typical man, in his room at 70° F. constant. The animal frame has a tendency to adapt itself to circumstances. Bodily pleasure long felt ceases to please, and bodily pain in like manner abates, owing to the internal adaptation which occasions the pleasure-giving or pain-giving agent outside to produce less impression on the body. This is a physiological principle, holding in other processes besides sensation; it does not touch the cognitive process as such, but only the organic details on which the cognitions of a flesh-imbedded spirit are conditioned. Our man will hardly be delighted or pained with the abiding temperature at which he lives. He will feel no call of attention to it on an emotional score. May he not will to notice it, as a means to some useful purpose? He may, but probably he will not, for an unchanging means, like an inflexible rope, can offer little apparent utility. Consequently the habitual summer heat will rank in the mind with the unchanging weight of the bones, and the regular pulsation of the circulatory organs; it will lie always within the call of attention, but will hardly ever be

attended to. It will be an object of consciousness, but dim and undistinguished, like the foliage in a summer twilight. Now let the thermometer suddenly fall to 45° F. The man starts and shivers, he is probably in pain, certainly excited. The change has been too abrupt for his physical constitution to keep pace with it; so he feels keenly. He is surprised and expectant; his attention is fixed. He remembers vividly his former state, which gives him the full contrast between this temperature and not this temperature. The present then is feelingly discerned in the light of the past. But I have not resigned my first position in conceding thus much; I have rather strengthened it, by squaring it against a very obvious attack. I maintained that a thing could be known by itself alone, without other foil than its bare negative. Opponents pointed out that it is of great advantage for the knowing of one thing, to have its negative involved in a known positive second thing. I admit their observation fully; but I protest that, as a negative can be known only through the corresponding positive, we could not possibly know the first thing by knowing its negative contained in the second, did we not know the first thing, after some fashion, by itself alone.

I have another difficulty for Dr. Bain. He says that we can know only the Relative. I reply, that on his showing, we cannot know even that. He teaches that nothing can be known without its opposite, and that the Relative alone is knowable. What then is the opposite of the Relative? The non-Relative or Absolute. But the Absolute is unknowable; so, therefore, is the Relative likewise; that is, we know nothing, and—worse than the plight of street Arabs—we cannot by any possibility ever be got to know anything at all. Quite a settlement this of the education question.*

* For the above straightforward and telling objection, the author acknowledges the suggestion of a friend. The same friend also pointed out the application of the passage next quoted from Dr. Bain's "Logic." I find that Dr. Bain has anticipated my friend's objection—with what success, shall appear. I quote Bain's "Logic," *Induction*, p. 392. "The doctrine of Relativity is carried to a fallacious pitch, when applied to prove that there must be something absolute, because the Relative must suppose the non-Relative. If there be relation, it is said, there must be something Unrelated, or above all relation. But Relation cannot, in this way, be brought round on itself, except by a verbal juggle." So the author thinks; now for his reason. "Relation means that every conscious state has a correlative state." Precisely; but is the meaning of the word *relation* given by mentioning its derivative *correlative*? "Which brings us at last to a couple (the subject-mind and the object or extended world). This is the final end of all possible cognition. We may view the two facts separately or together; and we may call the conjunct view an Absolute (as Ferrier does); but this adds nothing to our knowledge." In like manner, I contend, we may call the separate view a

Again a difficulty. I read in the author's "Logic"—*Deduction*, p. 53 :—

An important logical exercise for detecting the fallacies nursed under abstract names, is to translate abstract propositions into the equivalent propositions made up of general names, not abstract.

I suspect the doctrine, that we know only relations, of being fallacious. So, acting on its asseverator's advice, I translate it: "We know only related things." Let me seek out what this means. Things are all related,—the Creator to His creatures, and they to Him and to one another. The proposition then seems as indefeasible, and at the same time as common-place, as this other, we know only existent, or possibly existent things. But I should be unjust to Dr. Bain, if I set him to scorn with this semblance of an exposition. "We know only relations," fairly rendered, amounts to, "we know things only in as much as they are related, not in as much as they are things." But what if I rejoin that they are related only in as much as they are things. For what is a thing? It is an *act* and a *term* conspiring into one *existence*. Thus a particle of matter consists of an *act*, that is, in this case, active power to move; of a *term*, that is, capability of being incited to motion, and of *actual being*, the resultant of that *act* and *term*, forming the *complement* of the same. The relations between thing and thing all arise from these essential constituents of everything. For all relations are either of doing or of suffering or of being, categories which answer respectively to the *act*, the *term*, and the *complement* of the related things. In brief, relation is determined by thingness, and cannot be known if thingness is a mystery.

I hold then that knowledge of the relation between two things is knowledge of those things in themselves. But were one thing only existent, would it be knowable? It might be known surely in relation to other things possible. Nor can there be nothing else possible; for were existence dwindled down to a monad, that monad would be God, and He by His very nature is a fountain of possibility. He would in that case—nay He unchangeably does,—in knowing Himself, know the innumerable creatures whom He might create, an endless gradation and multitude of potential images of Him. I cannot

Relative (as Bain does); but this adds nothing to our knowledge. "A self-contradiction is committed by inferring from 'everything is relative,' that something is non-relative." Whose inference is that? The inference that Dr. Bain should have animadverted upon is, "every conscious state has a correlative state, therefore every conscious state of knowing a Relative has a correlative state of knowing an Absolute."

refrain from noticing, that even in the Unity of God there appears relation, the relations between the persons of the Adorable Trinity. And in the unity of every created thing, there is relation likewise between the *act*, *term*, and *complement*. I feel that there is something to be studied here; but the divine mystery dazzles me, and even its reflected light is too mighty for my eyes.

I turn back accordingly to Dr. Bain's darkness. There seems to me to be an equal want of light and of truth in his philosophy. A region of night it is; but, unlike the night, the more you look into it, the more indistinct do its objects grow. I have strained my eyes considerably in looking into it, and all my reward has been a better view of "darkness visible." When the devil wishes to be believed, he changes himself into an angel of light, and he does wisely. Dr. Bain has been less sagacious, or less successful. I could not believe him, if I would; the laws of my mind forbid me. I cannot believe the unmeaning, nor the self-contradictory; and unmeaning and self-contradictory to me, Dr. Bain most unutterably is. True, I understand him in detail; but when I seek to set these details into one, they destroy each other, and a blank is left before my intellectual vision. And yet the author finds readers. Thanks to the patronage of an Examining Body, he does. Thanks too to another fact, that he uses two languages, and while he fulminates an assertion in one, he takes care to couch its contradictory in the other. So he is believed in both, because each assertion remains distinct. His first language is English, the tongue of sense, reality, and fact. His second language is his own; not the words, but the meanings which he gives to them. The words are English as before; but the signification is foreign to the understanding of "a nation not slow and dull, but of a quick, ingenious, and piercing spirit; acute to invent, subtle and sinewy to discourse, not beneath the reach of any point the highest that human capacity can soar to."* But the English nation is, I venture to declare, beneath the reach of the height that Dr. Bain has soared to.

There is a sort of cypher which, leaving the letters and words unchanged, alters their sense. Thus,

She feared no danger, for she knew no sin,
might be construed,

He lost all wisdom, when he lost all faith.

Now, if a writer is consistent in the use of such a cypher,

* Milton, "Areopagitica."

and if the meaning in his mind is consistent likewise, he need only publish a vocabulary that we may learn to understand him. If his cypher is consistently used, but his mental concepts are at variance with themselves, his writings can never be understood as a whole. If, however, while his thoughts are inconsistent, his terms are used now in the vernacular sense and now in the sense of the cypher, he will then be most thoroughly unintelligible, and yet he will delude his readers into fancying that they understand him partially, and hoping that, were his eagle insight theirs, his explanations would be to them as the perfect day. This seems to be the case with Dr. Bain and his admirers. I should much like to see some member of that school draw up a vocabulary of their master's peculiar uses of English, and then remodel his works into as accurate as possible a correspondence with the vocabulary. I should also like to see who would buy, who would read, who could understand the contents of that new edition. A pretty good specimen of it may be got from the concluding pages of "*The Emotions and the Will.*" There the author does not debar himself from a free use of the Queen's English; but, at the same time, the sum of the two volumes at his back constrains him to an extensive employment of his own English. The outcome of it reads like a parody of the chaotic compositions of Comte. Here is a specimen:—

In rebutting the assumption of a world totally separated from mind, in the largest signification that we can give to mind, we must not use language to imply that actuality is the same as ideality; the two experiences are experiences of our own, aspects of self, but so widely distinct as to give a shock of consciousness when we pass between them, and thereby to develop a cognition.

The peculiarities of this sentence would grow, by its being translated as the author has given warrant. The reader may execute the translation for himself, as I shall suggest, afterwards. Meanwhile, I invite any one that has "*The Senses and the Intellect*" with "*The Emotions and the Will*" by him, to turn to the commencement of the former work, and set it side by side with the winding up of the latter. He will behold how it is possible to begin in fact and end in fiction; to start from physiological demonstrations—stray leaves from Bowman and Quain—and culminate in the wildest ravings of Hegel. I advise the author, if ever he undertakes a third volume—he may call it "*The Subject and the Object*"—that he write it, not in English but in German, or at least announce it as having been translated from the German. The speech of this island cannot deal in such monstrosities; it is incredible that a British brain can think them.

I feel that my language is violent; but my reason accords with it. I speak violently, because I have a clear perception of the outrage which Dr. Bain, and the like of him, these many years have been offering—unwittingly, I trust—to the sacred person of Truth. I speak violently, because I cannot tamely endure to see young intelligences blinded and young hearts unanchored into sin. But I am willing to play the logician rather than the preacher. I proceed, therefore, to show cause for my words; and in particular to dissect Dr. Bain's two tongues, and to insist on his henceforth ceasing to say, in the same breath, *yes* with one tongue, *no* with the other.

I take the liberty of calling the two *English* and *Bainite* respectively. There is a word in the English language; it is the pronoun *I*. Every speaking native of this realm understands what that pronoun means. It were vain to explain it to any who did not. The term is found too in the Bainite cypher. Its signification there is set forth as follows:—I presume that *I* and *self* are synonymous, as *egotism* and *selfishness* fundamentally are:

The proper meaning of self can be no more than my corporeal existence, coupled with my sensations, thoughts, emotions, and volitions, supposing the classification exhaustive, and the sum of these in the past, present, and future.*

This definition affords an instance of that felicitous blending of two languages above referred to. An intelligent child might quarrel with its catechism, if to the question "Who is God?" the answer ran "God is the Divine Being." Yet a professor of logic at a Scotch university dares to define that "self is my corporeal existence, coupled with my sensations, &c.;" i.e., "the *Ego* is the *Ego's* corporeal existence, joined to the *Ego's* states of mind." How account for this apparent tautology? This account may be given: *Self*, the word defined, is Bainite, but the *my* of the definition is English. So it is no more an idle utterance to declare that "self is my existence," than to tell a foreigner who knew Latin but no English, "God est Ens Divinum."

But at this juncture a pair of horns—of a dilemma—appear, rushing to gore Dr. Bain. Either the pronoun *I* means in Bainite what it means in English, or it does not. If it does not, I must ask the learned linguist, what, if any, is the meaning of the pronoun of the first person in his native tongue. Surely it is not "a mere name"; and if it does stand for a

* "Emotions and Intellect,"—*The Will*, chap. xi. § 8.

thing, I ask, in the name of the mental philosophy which he professes, for what thing? But if the Bainite *I* is a synonym of the English *I*, then we are presented with the following strange announcement of its meaning: "The proper meaning of self can be no more than my corporeal existence, coupled with my sensations, &c."; i.e., the *Ego* is the corporeal existence and the mental states of corporeal existence, and mental states. The first personal pronoun is thus argued to stand for something impersonal.

The mention of this absurdity prompts me to a full description of the Bainite *Ego*. As already recounted, the pronoun has a broader and a narrower meaning. The broad sense identifies it with Consciousness, taking in Subject and Object, Mind and Matter, everything and—if I may complete for Dr. Bain his Hegelian antinomy—nothing. In that sense, I am the table, I am air, I am space, I am you, and—it is not I that say it—I am God. For proof of this, on Dr. Bain's authority, I cite one passage of his out of many.

The totality of our mental life is made up of two kinds of consciousness—the object consciousness and the subject consciousness. The first is our external world, our *non-ego*; the second is our *ego*, or mind proper. Berkeley confounded these two: he merged the object consciousness, determined by our feelings of expended energy, in the subject consciousness, determined by passive feelings and ideas. It is quite true that the object consciousness, which we call Externality, is still a mode of self in the most comprehensive sense, but not in the usual restricted sense of "self" or "mind," which are names for the subject, to the exclusion of the object.*

This citation incidentally exhibits the larger meaning of "self" or "me," and expressly declares the more limited acceptation of the term. Thus limited, the *Ego* is the Mind, the Inextended, as contra-distinguished from the *non-Ego*, the Extended, which is made up of Matter and Space.

"What," exclaims the reader, "am I, at the narrowest, co-extensive with Mind? Is all that is not me, mere matter or space? Is there no intelligence but mine?" I wish Dr. Bain would respond to these inquiries categorically, and submit to further questioning upon his answer. His language implies that the answer which I desiderate from him would be returned in the negative. From a single page of his "Senses and Intellect" I cull the following phrases:—"all our experience. . . and all the experience of others"; "other persons tell me the same thing"; "to me and to other sentient beings"; "I and all other beings with whom I have had any communication";

* "Senses and Intellect,"—*Intellect*, chap. i. § 38, (2).

"ourselves and all mankind."* Of course Dr. Bain in this page is speaking the truth for himself. The Law of Relativity enacts that his truth shall be *for himself*. It is true then for him that there are other persons besides Alexander Bain. But here a horrid doubt arises. As there are two *Egos*, the lesser within the greater, so there must be for him two Alexander Bains. It is possible then that, always for him, "other sentient beings" may indeed escape from identification with his lesser *Ego*, or subject consciousness, but be caught in his object consciousness, and so Alexander in his full amplitude, *i.e.* in his subject states and object states taken together, will be all the universe of mind, matter, and space, for himself. The horror of such an absorption passes away on remembering that none but extended beings rank as Object, while Mind is essentially in-extended. My mind, therefore, is no part of his object consciousness, albeit that my body is. But is my mind really distinct from the subject consciousness, or mind, of my fellow-man? Dr. Bain declares for himself that his mind is by itself distinct and individual, apart from other minds. Yet his declaration cuts so direct in the teeth of his own philosophy, that I must suppose him again in this instance to be a speaker in two tongues. The phrase "other minds" is of course English, but in Bainite, it, like "existence," must be registered for "a mere name": or perhaps it has a meaning, which will appear presently.

Certainly it does not bear the plain English meaning. That it cannot do, if Dr. Bain's argument against the knowableness of an independent material world is to stand. For if we cannot know matter apart from ourselves, on account of self entering into every act of cognition; on that same account quite sufficiently and on no other, we cannot know mind out of connection with self. We may, to be sure, assert a relation between "my mind knowing" and "the mind known by my mind"; we may call knower and known together, a duality; but the only relation and dualism that can here obtain is that which obtained between subject and object. There Dr. Bain told us, "it is quite true that the object consciousness, which we call Externality, is still a mode of self in the most comprehensive sense"; it is therefore equally true that the subject (?) consciousness, which we call Other Mind, is still a mode of self in the same most comprehensive sense. That there may be no doubt about this parallelism, I shall quote Dr. Bain's argument for the first case, and in parentheses adapt it to the second.

* P. 384, ed. 2.

There is no possible knowledge of the world [whether of matter or of mind,] except in reference to our minds. Knowledge means a state of mind; the notion of material things [and of minds other than our own] is a mental thing [of ours]. We are incapable of discussing the existence of an independent material [or independent mental] world; the very act is a contradiction. We can speak only of a world presented to our own minds. By an illusion of language we fancy that we are capable of contemplating a world which does not enter into our own mental existence; but the attempt belies itself, for this contemplation is an effort of mind.*

I overlook the confusion between the contemplated and the contemplation—in domestic language, between the pudding and the eating—which underlies this argument. I am only anxious that the argument shall carry before all eyes the plenitude of its conclusion; subjecting Independent Mind, as it subjects Independent Matter, to the empire of the universal *I*. Not only then is the territory of the United States an associated aggregate of hypothetical states of consciousness, belonging to Dr. Bain of Aberdeen; the mind of every American citizen is but another aggregate of potentiality having the same North British owner. He is, to himself, America, soil and citizens; he is Europe, Africa, Asia, sun, planets, and fixed stars; he is the sum-total of intelligence linked to the sum-total of matter; he is his own God, not, however, the God of the Christians, nor the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; but the impersonal, indefinite deity of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

I must ask my reader to go in spirit to the most lovely scene that he knows of in nature. I cannot take him thither. It will be a mountain slope, or the side of a river, or the sea-shore, or the mid-ocean, or a home-breathing land of crops and cattle. Let him drink his fill of the delicious prospect, and over the draught let him sing this spell:—"These hills, these waters, these fields, are my recollections of actual experiences of conjoint energies and sensations in the past, and my anticipations of the like in the future, added to my present optical sensation of colour." I know not how this song might be taken by other ears: for myself I have tried the experiment, and my answer is, that if that be philosophy, I will have

* "Senses and Intellect,"—*Intellect*, chap. i. § 38 (1). Further on, in § 38 (6), the author says: "While *sentiens* and *sensum*, or *percipiens* and *perceptum*, may be said to mark the great and vital distinction of subject and object, Mind and the Extended; *cognoscens* and *cognitum* may express a subject and object distinction made within the subject." The Mind is *cognoscens* as knowing, *cognitum* as known by, itself. But does not this *cognoscens* and *cognitum* mark the consistent Bainite distinction between my mind and my neighbour's? See the author's own text; I have altered his punctuation.

none of it. A child, to me, is wiser than such a philosopher. Let the observer now turn away—he need not go to the trouble, let him shut his eyes—the features of nature are at once obliterated. Two tiny muscles contracting have left all that beauty a blank. I know it will be retorted, a blank for him, but not a blank absolutely. I reply that the Bainite tongue owns no difference between “a blank” and “a blank for him.” The two phrases are identical, since the ethical dative “for the subject” is understood wherever it is not expressed. The Englishman distinguishes between “nothing” and “nothing to me”; that distinction is nothing to the Bainite. He has eaten of the tree of knowledge; he has become like unto God; he thinks of a thing, and the thing is; he forgets it, and its being has fled.

Our observer would be better able to convince himself of this, if he stood alone. But let his solitude be broken, broken without his *fiat* being awaited. Let myriads of intelligent invaders, many as those that recently overran France, or that shall tread down pleasant lands elsewhere in ages to come, appear, lining the hills and defiling through the valleys. Instantly the spectator's thought changes; he apprehends what, in vulgar language, he calls other minds than his own, an army seemingly of upstart, independent gods; if we are to take the English sense of *other* with the Bainite rendering of *mind*. Dr. Bain, perhaps, would not object to this hybrid phraseology. I do. I consider it a clumsy contradiction in terms; clumsy, because couched in two languages, and self-contradictory, because Deity is essentially One. I insist on the adjective, *other*, being construed as Bainite, even as its substantive, *minds*, is construed. The awkwardness of expression will thus be removed; about the contradiction we shall see. *Other*, in Bainite, means *a part of the same whole*. Thus Subject is other than Object, both being parts of the same whole *Ego*. Light is other than darkness, and they make up the one cognition, light-darkness. The whole phrase, *other minds*, therefore, signifies, in Alexander Bain's own manufactured tongue, *parts of the same deity*. The language is now homogeneous; is the thought also consistent?

It would seem at first sight that my personality is above all things mine, distinct, peculiar, and unsharable with my neighbours. It would seem, too, that the pronouns *you*, *he*, had their meanings, each representing something that was like me, and yet, for all its likeness, was most irreconcilably not me. I can conceive no greater contradiction than, that *you*, *he*, and *I* should be parts of one whole. Thunder, lightning, and hail would be more conceivably parts of one sunbeam.

Dr. Bain seems to admit the incongruity. How then does he accomplish this fusion of persons into one? Most simply and successfully. He annihilates personality. Let each of us three be no one in particular; then we shall readily be any one. We shall constitute a self that is no self, for the very reason that it is all selves united. *Meum* and *tuum* are superseded by this Great Beast of an Universal Consciousness. The Beast belongs to the order of *Chimæridæ*: its breath is deadly to the soul that believes in it. That Dr. Bain's all-comprehensive *Ego* is impersonal, is manifest from the whole tenor of his writings. They approximate towards being true to themselves, according as we strike out from them the personal and the possessive pronouns. For example, take this sentence above quoted:—

The totality of our mental life is made up of two kinds of consciousness—the object consciousness and the subject consciousness. The first is our external world, our *non-ego*; the second is our *ego*, or mind proper.

The omission of *our* here will obviate an importunate inquiry as to who are the individual *we* that mentally live, and are totally made up of object and subject consciousness. The fact is that the *we* is no individual designation, applicable to these persons and not to those; its meaning is universal, it stands for consciousness in general, for that impersonal cosmos which is the transcendental god—the *locus*, so to call it, of the Hegelian equation, $\infty=0$.*

That this unspeakable totality is at once impersonal and nonsensical, I have Dr. Bain's express declaration in a later work; and first for its impersonality. He says:—

The substance of *Mind* is no other than the aggregate of the three constituent powers, Feeling, Will, Thought. These present, mind is present; these removed, mind is gone. If the three facts named do not exhaust the mind, there must be some fourth fact, which should be produced and established as a distinct mode of our † subjectivity. The substance would then be fourfold. But the supposition of an “ego” or “self,” for the powers to inhere in, is a pure fiction, coined from non-entity, by the illusion of supposing that because attribute applies to something, there must be something that cannot be described as an attribute.‡

A given mind, on this understanding, amounts to feeling,

* Perhaps this is the “Unknowable and Unknown,” which, as Professor Huxley tells us, challenges to itself “worship mostly of the silent sort.” “The idols of the nations” were “silver and gold,” they were “the works of the hands of men”; but at least they were something.

† Capitals mine.

‡ “Logic,”—*Deduction*, p. 262.

will, and thought, and no more. No Bainite should call it *my* feeling, will, and thought; for if that personal pronoun is rightly inserted,

There is an imputation on the sufficiency of the common analysis of the mind. Feeling, Volition, and Intellect, as explained with full detail in the present work, must still leave a region unexplored. A fourth or residual department would need to be constituted—the department of “self,” or Me-ation.*

But if the *Ego*, in the narrower sense of *Subject*, is impersonal, still less will it wear any personal character in that broader sense, wherein it includes the Object equally with the Subject world. It is impersonal; it is nonsensical to boot. This addition is set forth in the clearest terms by the uncompromising professor:—

One portion of Knowledge WE † term the *object* world, the Extended World, and, less correctly, Matter and the External World. The other portion WE † call the *Subject* world, the Unextended Mind, and, less properly, the Internal World. Indeed, when WE † talk of these two departments as dividing between them the universe of existence, WE † are using fictitious and unmeaning language; the ultimate universe, according to the law of Relativity, is a *couple*, the highest *real* grouping of things is this *two-fold* grouping, called Subject and Object, &c. These are the proper *summa genera*. Existence is a mere name.‡

We have seen, then, the *Ego* expanded till it embraced Object—that is, Matter and Space—along with Subject, or Mind. We have seen it merge all other minds into itself, under cover of the antinomy, *Cognoscens* and *Cognitum*. We have seen it stripped of its personal denomination, and reduced from an *I am* to an I-less being. Lastly, we have this very being declared “a mere name.” Witnesses protesting strongly use the form, “as sure as I am of my own existence.” That is an idle form of protest now, since Dr. Bain has ascertained that there is no such thing as I, no such thing as existence. And yet those two words seem to have meaning for him; they figure frequently on his pages. A complete concordance of all that he has written, would exhibit *existence* and its cognate words scores of times, and *I*s in hundreds. This is inconsistent. It is using vulgar language, while condemning the same as sense-

* “Emotions and Will,”—*Will*, chap. xi. § 8.

† Capitals mine. If Dr. Bain does not expunge this troublesome pronoun, he will go nigh to contradict himself. Readers will remember that *we* has no meaning in Bainite, and will wonder at his English use of it.

‡ “Logie,”—*Deduction*, pp. 255-6.

less; it is saying in English, and gainsaying in Bainite. He should write without reference to Person or to Substance, if all that his philosophy lets him know is a phantasmagoria of phases of consciousness. But, poor creature, he cannot even think in that style, though he is pledged to it; small blame to him then for not writing in it. The blame should light on those fantastic speculations, that have put it out of his power to say, "I am" without forfeiting a foregone conclusion.

It is a characteristic of the style of thought which Dr. Bain has espoused, that it holds for nothing the ordinary opinions of men concerning the workings of their own minds, and the things which their minds work upon. It markedly separates "the philosophical" from "the vulgar." In the early communities of Greece, the nobles took on themselves the titles of "the good" and "the brave," the plebeian children of the same mother city being to them, "the bad" and "the cowardly." We are threatened, not with an aristocracy of birth, but with an aristocracy of intellect. We, the *demus*, have learnt reading, but we cannot read our own minds; only our betters, the metaphysicians, can do that; and they have been at the pains to publish translations of their minds in books, that we may read there and marvel at so much wayward egotism and infatuate self-contradiction. Conning over such pages, I cannot think that their authors are the philosophers that are to be kings during the millennium. They seem to me rather like sea-captains—more desperate than the commanders of the Armada—who having resolved that neither wind nor wave shall divert them one point out from their predetermined track, when they find that the conditions under which they sail will not bend to their will, choose rather to unship their rudder and scuttle their craft, than steer as the weather permits them. These speculators proceed doggedly on the maxim, "every man his own pope," and when it appears that there is truth independent of the definition of any man, they forswear their own existences. It had been wiser of them to have abated a little of their own judgments.

There are two courses open to any adventurer that shall essay to walk the outermost verge of human thought in the region of metaphysics. He may either accept the primitive beliefs of his nature, and let his fruit ripen on the twig where his blossom grew; or he may sever the connection between the man and the metaphysician. If the former alternative shall be his choice, he will abide by such axioms as, that he is,—that his self and his being are not mere names,—that there are other selves quite independent of him, or of his knowledge of them,—that matter is, in no sense, a part of his

thought,—that there is a reason for every being, a cause for every event,—that, though he can do as he wills, he ought not always to will as he feels,—that the end of his existence is not before him here. With these convictions, cherished in a heart of virgin innocence, he will readily apprehend cogent natural reasons for the belief in God. He will let out his line, to sound the perfections of his Maker, and will fathom some sure knowledge, along with evidence of deep mystery beyond. Another—and I fear not equally sinless—thinker will no sooner get into his grasp the portion of mental substance that belongs to him as a man, than he will waste it in wanton speculations, cobbling up metaphysical quibbles in face of the certainties of his early youth, and fondly hoping that it is granted to man, in this life of mirror and enigma, to arrive at length to believe in nothing that he does not see in its inmost nature and contents. A mortal can answer some questions, but he can put more. Because the questions are in excess of the answers, some go about to destroy what answers there are. This illogical proceeding gives rise to that distinction, which I have mentioned, between the “vulgar” and the “philosophical,” and to a disparagement of the common thought of mankind. But it is suicidal for the philosopher to draw any such invidious line of demarcation between himself and his fellows. After all, he is only trying to perform systematically and reflectively the same operations which a child ten years old performs without reflection. If the child’s mind works aright, the sage does well to make a study of the process; but if the childish original is a blunder and a flaw, the mature man of system has no subject matter to go to work upon. He has grown into the full command of his faculties, only to find them as millstones without grain.

I know that appeal is made to the hundreds of popular prejudices which science has broken down, and my ears are dinned with talk of the planetary revolutions, and of the laws of motion, of the circulation of the blood, and of the composition of water; but I reply that these were physical discoveries: and physical things, as every astronomer, chemist, and physiologist knows, are removed from obvious experience by the complication of besetting circumstances; whereas the things on which our issue pends are metaphysical and psychological, consisting of the highest generalizations of human thought, and of the every-day operations of the human mind,—things which, by their generality, need little experimental quest, and by their hourly rehearsal, become ready matter of inquiry. Indeed, it has been a reproach upon philosophers from the days of Socrates, that their professional stock-in-trade is so com-

monplace. You cannot view the stars with effect except through eyepieces and object-glasses, or by the reflection of specula; you cannot pry into the nature of inorganic bodies, except you have your test-tubes and acids, and the manifold properties of a laboratory: to be a physiologist, you must sharpen your scalpel, and negotiate for your "subject"; but sit down healthfully in your studio, and, without further apparatus, you shall be a metaphysician, according to the measure of thinking power which God has vouchsafed to accord you. Doubtless, you need something to think about; you may find that in yourself, in the tables and chairs and commonest objects around you: they will lead you by abstraction to higher things, to existences not of this world, to the native region of metaphysics and of all science,—to the eternally true. But when your speculations are ended, if you record them in writing, you will only produce a roll of very commonplace remarks; and the better metaphysician you are, the more commonplace and palpable to the meanest understanding will your metaphysical productions be. This seems a paradox, for the "jargon of metaphysics" is proverbial; it is supposed to be more puzzling than any eastern language. I grant that if you use technical terms, your philosophy will bewilder an inexperienced eye: nor do I object to the use of such terms; they are convenient compendia of expression for academic circles; equal brevity, with ordinary language, could not exhibit the meaning with precision. But I have the strongest repugnance to technical terms which the employer himself does not clearly comprehend. I believe that many works, couched in technicalities, are perplexing from no other reason than this, the author's own perplexity. I would have every technical writer able to paraphrase himself in the vernacular; I would counsel him frequently to come down from his scaffolding, and place himself on the level of a common-sensed, right-minded man. Let him descend, and I will trust him when he soars. Let him walk the earth with me at times, and I will believe his saying in the intervals,

I'm treading air, and looking round the sun.

I should exact no such condescension from a votary of physical science; for I know him to be conversant with phenomena that are veiled by a curtain to my simple eyes.

I may do well to give my reasons at some length for marking off the mental sciences from the physical sciences, and recognizing the voice of the people in psychology, which in chemistry would go for nothing. All my reasons gather to this head, that mental science is the science of the conscious

operations of mankind, while the operations about which natural science is conversant are done unconsciously. Mankind have a right to speak in matters of which they are conscious; they have no such right in matters beyond their consciousness. I care very much to secure the approval of the non-professing psychological public for any account I may have to render of the process of willing; I care not at all that the non-professing dynamical public differs with me as to the constitution of matter. I am not surprised that the once well-nigh universal belief of mankind in the sun's revolution round the earth, has turned out a mistake; I should be surprised if their still more universal belief in their own existence should prove a delusion.

I surmise, however, this objection. "Mankind formerly thought they were conscious of perceiving that the sun moved round the earth; whereas they cannot have been conscious of perceiving what we know not to have been the fact; whence it appears that the thoughts of mankind may be wrong even in matters of their own consciousness." That is the objection. And my answer is this. If the ideas which mankind formerly had of sun, earth, and the laws of motion, truly corresponded to their objects in nature, then they really did perceive that the sun moved round the earth, and their consciousness of such perception was not mistaken. But their ideas of sun, earth, and motion, did not correspond to those natural objects. They did not perceive that the sun moved round the earth, for the simple reason that they did not rightly apprehend the things, motion, earth, and sun. Was it then an illusion that they seemed to themselves to be conscious of that perception? I say boldly that it was not. Consciousness cannot be illusory, in that of which it gives no indication. It is the province of consciousness to indicate the conscious individual's states of mind, not to indicate the correspondence of those states to external objects. The nature of sun and planets is to be found out by examining them, not by examining self. We personally are not suns, nor planets, nor physico-chemical bodies. Therefore I reject the inference drawn from the sciences of external nature to the sciences of mind and being.

But though consciousness does not ascertain the equation between the idea and the object, when the latter is an external thing; yet when the object is internal, consciousness does ascertain the equation. I have an idea of myself; consciousness assures me that, as I conceive myself to be, so am I. Since I am a person, it is of my essence to conceive myself. If that conception is wrong, my personality, my very innermost being, is a lie, and that is an end to argument; a personified lie cannot argue. I say, therefore, as the beginning of all argument,

that I have a just idea of what I am. From that idea of self, which consciousness thus infallibly guarantees, I pass on to ideas of external objects, by a process to be set forth presently. Meanwhile let us utterly discard the doctrine, that psychology, the science of self, and metaphysics, the science of being, are, like the physical sciences, the exclusive property of their professors. No, no. All men have a direct knowledge of psychology and metaphysics; a direct knowledge, though not a reflex one.

It is, therefore, with pain and dissatisfaction that I read the following words penned by a philosopher of a very different stamp from Dr. Bain, the lamented Professor Ferrier. His "Institutes of Metaphysics" (sections 38-41),* have these utterances :—

Philosophy exists only to correct the inadvertencies of man's ordinary thinking. She has no other mission to fulfil. If man naturally thinks aright, he need not be taught to think aright. If he is already in possession of the truth, he does not need to be put in possession of it. The occupation of philosophy is gone; her office is superfluous. Therefore philosophy assumes, and must assume, that man does not naturally think aright, but must be taught to do so; that truth does not come to him spontaneously, but must be brought to him by his own exertions. If man does not naturally think aright, he must think, we shall not say wrongly (for that implies malice prepense), but inadvertently: the native occupant of his mind must be, we shall not say falsehood (for that too implies malice prepense), but error. The original dowry then of universal man is inadvertency and error. This assumption is the ground and only justification of the existence of philosophy.

I consider that the writer of this extract has been misled, by not remarking that it is one thing to think aright, and another thing rightly to describe how we think aright. I contend that man does naturally think aright—he would not be in his senses, if his thoughts were all askew: but he needs philosophy, if he is to describe correctly the process by which he thinks. A ploughman opines the existence of what in scientific language would be called an absolute non-Ego: his opinion is unquestionably well-founded, but he could not justify it before the least of Dr. Bain's disciples. True, he could not: neither would his explanations of what became of his dinner satisfy any inquirer that had read Huxley's "Physiology" at a girl-school. Yet for all that, his eating is healthy, and his thinking, so far as it goes, is right. Both are well, because both are natural. These naturally well-ordered opera-

* Quoted approvingly in the preface to Grote's "Plato."

tions are what physiologists and psychologists describe. But animals vegetate without knowing physiology; and minds understand and will—not on conscious psychological principles. Fancy—what is not to be found in God's creation—a human being for whom nature, with purpose elaborate, had provided an outfit, or rather infit, of indigestive organs, and then had left the poor man to study his "original dowry" of dyspepsia, in order that the health which "does not come to him spontaneously," might "be brought to him by his own exertions." That individual would doubtless be an earnest pathologist; but the science would be bootless, which he used full in the teeth of his nature. So Professor Ferrier's assertion of the cathartic character of philosophy—or of what he understands by philosophy, namely, mental pathology—does put that study in a desirable light—the same desirable light in which the last stimulant is viewed by the dying.

I condemn Dr. Bain, because he contradicts himself. I condemn him because his philosophy, consistently worked out, baffles understanding. I condemn him, on both counts together, because what he says is false, and what he should say, falser. I confess, notwithstanding, that so painstaking an observer of human nature as he is, has not erred in his description of it, without his very error pointing to truth. I am going to offer a specimen, such as I can offer, of how a Christian psychologist may accept what correct indications he has afforded, and assimilate them, and be thankful for them; and still more thankful for the Faith, which makes other men's discoveries greater revelations to him than they were to the discoverers. It will be remembered that man, antecedently to education, is analyzed by Dr. Bain into states of spontaneous active movement, and states of passive sensation. It is evident how this analysis ignores personality. There are states of activity, and states of sensation, but where is the *Ego* that acts and feels? Surely it ought not to be ignored. But to tell what it is, we need a term that hardly occurs in the whole corpus of Dr. Bain's psychological writings; I mean *soul*.

I am not going into a lengthy argument to show that man has a soul. I will only say this much, that if the human body is a substance, or a collection of substances, there must be in the composition of man another substance besides, not corporeal. I know indeed that positivists or phenomenists—the school founded by that hater of metaphysics, Auguste Comte, and for which Mr. J. S. Mill and Dr. Bain have reared up a metaphysical system on the founder's principles, though regardless of the founder's prejudice—I know that phenomenists do not recognize what I call *substance*. By *substance*, I

understand that which has being in itself, and is naturally the principle of its own operations and passive affections; and their comment upon my definition is, that being is a mere name, that things in themselves are unknowable, and that bare "states" are the philosopher's study, not any operative or passive principle. This hostile criticism is not new in my ears. In the preceding pages I have been seeking to show up the perplexed *imbroglio* of nonsense which it involves. I hold then that there exists a something, named material substance, and that it consists of power to set in motion, and capability of being set in motion, together conspiring into the unity of one being. At this rate, the one phenomenon which occurs in the material universe is motion. But feeling and thought are also phenomena of our experience: plainly then, there is another universe, comprising substances of another kind—substances that think and feel—spirits, souls.

The human *Ego* then, I say, is the rational soul quickening the body. Now, before going further, I must draw attention to this fact; that material substances, though they are not actions, are still, so far as in them lies, ever in action. The tip of the pen wherewith I write, is incessantly attracting or repelling other particles round it; the effect of its presence, however infinitesimal, has really been felt from creation, in the uttermost fixed star. Nay, were that steel point the sole matter in existence, it would none the less abidingly perform the agent's part of action; and any second particle, subsequently called into being, would be born into the region of its working. I contend that spiritual substance is an equally sleepless worker. It possesses, furthermore, this advantage, that while matter is inert—moving other matter, but not the mover's own self—the act of spirit is self-reflected or "immanent"; the knower knows his being. But the spirit under our discussion, the human soul, is not, at least in its present state, an angel; it is a spirit in flesh, making up with a material organism one nature of man. Consequently it acts—feeling, thinking, willing, vivifying—subject to material conditions. As a particle can determine no motion unless there be a second particle to be moved; so the soul can do no vital act unless the body be in a state favouring that special vitality.* Yet the particle's self is an ever-energizing motor power; the soul likewise, were it alone, would be a similarly unflagging energizer, and—more favoured than the particle—would exer-

* This comparison must not be pressed, regardless of the difference, that the two particles do not combine in such union as that in which soul and body combine, to form one nature or principle of operation.

cise its immanent energy at its own discretion. Under the extraneous conditions which fetter the souls of us mortals, our spiritual abilities may dwindle to an imperceptible span, as in deep sleep or *coma*; or they may rise high in the exuberance of youth, health, and joy. In all cases they keep pace with the state of the body, and, up to a certain point, with the determination of the will. Accepting, therefore, Dr. Bain's pet phrase, I say that the soul, of its own spiritual nature, is always ready for "spontaneous action"; and that the man gets into "spontaneous action"—action, however, which he can bridle by his will—whenever the good state of his body makes it lightsome for his soul to deal with. All during life there is a certain amount of spontaneity, but it is when the feeling of life is strong, that the spontaneity rises into notice.*

As the source of this unprompted flow of vigour, Dr. Bain alleges the food. That force which, contained in the bread, meat, and vegetables which we eat, is called chemical or organic, is said to be digested by our organs into vital force. The reader recognizes here the doctrine of the "Correlation of Forces." Of the unsoundness and mischievousness of that much reputed doctrine, in its present fashionable form, I entertain the strongest conviction.† My opponent strongly asserts its value and truth. The assertion may appear an inconsistency in him. How can he talk of "animal activity without consciousness,"‡ while the first axiom of his philosophy is, that the universe and everything in it, or connected with it, is a mere panorama of states of consciousness? Or how can the Idealist, between whose "thinking-shop" and Berkeley's the flimsiest of curtains intervenes,§ derive his mind from matter, his thought from the butcher's stall? An exclusive noting of these anomalous expressions about correlation

* See the pertinent passage in St. Augustine, "De Musica," lib. vi. c. 5, and compare "Senses and Intellect,"—*Senses*, chap. iv. § 20, and Appendix B of the same work, *ad fin.*

† My conviction is grounded upon the peculiar view of the composition of matter put forward in the Rev. J. Bayma's "Molecular Mechanics" (Macmillan).

‡ Read "Emotions and Will,"—*Will*, chap. vii. §§ 14, 15, 16.

§ The difference between Dr. Bain and Bishop Berkeley I take to be this. The Bishop says, "Whatever the *Ego* knows, belongs to the *Ego*'s own being." "No," rejoins the Doctor, "that is not true, unless you take the *Ego* in the widest sense of the term ("S. and I."—*Intellect*, chap. i. § 38, (2)); for there is a narrower sense, in which the *Ego* means only the Subject, the region of passivity and ideas." I have ventured to call this distinction flimsy. Either Berkeley is, after all, right, or Dr. Bain's saying, that "the object consciousness is a mode of self," means nothing.

has led some persons to rank Dr. Bain among materialists. But it was no materialist brain that "secreted" "The Emotions and the Will." The writer of that work is too much of a metaphysician to be a materialist.* And yet so unfortunate has the course of his metaphysical speculation been, that it has cast him and the materialist together on the same shore. For what else is the denial of substance but the denial of personality, and how is the denial of personality other than a denial of mind? In that unhappy negation of the *Ego*, idealism and materialism, pantheism and atheism, meet. There they "come together into one," and "speak vain things," "against the Lord and against his Christ." One All-Pervading Force that offers itself now to the dynamist for examination, now to the chemist, now to the biologist, or psychologist, or sociologist, or spiritualist, is the "own nearest relation" of the One Universal Consciousness, that is at once yours and mine, and our mutual friend's—us three, and all men and all things—Mind with Matter in its arms—a Totality of Sameness in Diversity. It is indifferent whether we call this Monster the Absolute or the Idea, or whether we call It God or not, for certainly there is no God—no thing even—besides It, in the confession of its votaries. Now, the mind that isolates any one object in such terms, *ipso dicto* adores that object.

Yes, we speak of "godless philosophies," but the expression, if we consider it strictly, appears to harbour a contradiction. Philosophy cannot be godless. She is the science that beats the bounds of furthest human thought; she, therefore, is most nearly conversant with the mystery beyond man. The astronomer, with his telescope, analyzing nebulae into worlds, is on the track of the Divine Immensity; but unless he carries with him something of metaphysics, he will not recognize anything divine there. The metaphysician, on the contrary, in the contemplation of a grain of dust—such as you have blown in your face in myriads on a windy day—kindles his speculative glance till he is dazzled from the light inaccessible that is the Mind of God. I suppose there is no metaphysical student who does not feel himself thus—not so much perplexed as scared every day that he really studies. But a philosopher may earn from vulgar men the appellation of godless. "From vulgar men," I say, because perhaps more discerning tongues

* "We incur the absurdity of converting mind into a substance to be viewed by another mind, when we speak of our perceiving faculty as an extended thing" ("S. and I."—*Intellect*, chap. i. § 38, (5)). I do not vouch for this *reductio ad absurdum*, but the conclusion which it bears manifests Dr. Bain's opposition to materialism.

would rather pronounce him "no philosopher" than style him at once "philosopher" and "godless." A man may graduate as a "godless philosopher" in two ways. The first way is by philosophizing amiss, and crowning the work, as consistency requires, with a theology of pantheism. In this way the German school have walked, their troops headed by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel: the other way is the way of English, that is, being interpreted, of inconsistent people. They philosophize amiss with the Germans, and then stop short. They have no theology; they do not expressly insult God; they ignore Him with an ominous silence, amounting to a virtual denial. Or they treat Him as His Representative is being treated in these years 1871-2. They hedge Him in a corner, and tender Him their respects, on condition of His keeping to His own side of the fence, to wit, the side which they have appointed for Him. He shall be God of Kirk and Sabbath, of Bible and Prayer-book, and of the World to come; but He shall not be their God. Their stubborn strength will not bow to serve Him; nor will their heart cling, night, morning, and noonday, wherever their steps or their fancies roam, to the thought that He is there. This sequestration under guarantees which the Creator has suffered, involves the loss of His rights in science. It is announced that faith and science are nowhere conferrinous, that no license of speculation can ever amount to infidelity,* so surely is the inviolability of the province of Divine Truth guaranteed by thinkers who ransack heaven and earth without reference to the Maker of them.

Dr. Bain belongs to this inconsistent, halfway school. He does not in set terms deny God; he mentions, occasionally, the Deity, with caution rather than with reverence. Still, I fear not to say it, a personal God enters not into his philosophical system; more than that, a Divine Person is as irreconcilable with his system as with that of Hegel. Only the English relativist wants explicitness. And let not him nor his admirers hope that they will be suffered to halt short of explicit infidelity. Dr. Bain has already in this respect, by a logical development of their common principles, gone further than Mr. Mill; their heirs will still advance along the same path. Educated in Christianity, and thence working its own way to phenomenism, an intellect may manufacture to itself an unstable alloy of these two incompatible creeds. But let that

* "Religious disbelief and philosophical scepticism are not merely not the same, but have no natural connection."—Sir William Hamilton, quoted in Mill's "Examination," p. 139, which see.

intellect well forth its discoveries to younger intellects rising round it, their creed, when they are grown up, will be phenomenonism, sheer and simple. Let them read, for instance, that—

Realism is still exemplified in the doctrine of an Independent External World, and also in the doctrine of a separate existence of Mind or Soul.*

It will be wonderful, after that, if their youthful sense of consistency, undimmed as yet by habits of self-contradiction, does not relegate the immortality of the soul, and the personality of the Creator, to the lumber-room of exploded fictions, where the fragments of the Universal Man strew the floor.† I am convinced that no one can logically profess that the being of creatures is other than divine, who does not admit that the being of matter is other than mental. Dr. Bain, as we have seen, attaches no meaning to the word *being*. "I am who am," or, "I am the Being," as the Septuagint has it, is verbiage to this philosopher. Well, in so far as he pronounces existence a mere name, I cannot accuse him of identifying corporeal with spiritual existence. But this he says—"The notion of material things is a mental thing."‡ This, too, he everywhere implies that "matter" means "my notion of matter"; § this, therefore, is his plighted conclusion, "matter is a thing of my mind." Now apply the theory of perception here expressed to the biblical account of creation. "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." After working at them for six days, "God saw everything that He had made, and behold it was very good." What sense should this narrative convey to Dr. Bain? That God suddenly awoke to consciousness of a new activity of His own? That an hitherto unfelt emotion stole over Him? That the world to Him is his discernment of a sphere of divine action? That created goodness is the Creator's inward complacency in His creation? In short, that the world is God, even as God's knowledge and God's love of the world is most assuredly, in being, God? I am not aware what Dr. Bain thinks of the

* Bain's "Logic,"—*Deduction*, p. 6.

† When shall the All-Pervading Force, and the All-Pervading Ego, and other such pantheist idols, hide their broken godships here?

‡ "Senses and Intellect,"—*Intellect*, chap. i. § 38, (1). Of course every notion is mental, no matter what it is a notion of. But the *notum* and the *notio* are different things.

§ "My apprehension of the possibilities of exerting myself." So I fancy Dr. Bain correcting the text. But the unwelcome conclusion cleaves still to him, like Hercules' poisoned robe. The "apprehension" is a thing of my mind.

Book of Genesis, nor how he would answer these questions; but if he thinks that that book is inspired, and would answer the questions with a *bonâ fide* negative, it remains for him to alter his metaphysical theory of perception. If, when reading his Bible, he is the reverer of a Deity, other than self, let him not be a self-amplifying idealist when sitting in his professorial chair. Again I repeat it, the professor may have two minds, one for philosophy and one for theology; but the pupil will apply one and the same mind to both sciences.

He will be right in the application, if the one mind which he uses is right. It is just that, in the distinction which a student draws between the Creator and Creation, he should not falsify his already acknowledged relation of Subject to Object. Let him be reasonable in the latter case, and he may consistently be orthodox in the former. But how shall I declare the reasonable solution of what Dr. Bain styles "the great metaphysical problem"—wherein does the thinker differ from the thing? Briefly and plainly, with the tongue of my childhood, I declare that the solution is this, that the thinker is one being, and the thing another. The two are not a bare relation, floating loose from substance; they are beings, each in its own right existent, each contingently related to the other. Suppose, instead of *thinker* and *thing*, we say, for concreteness' sake, *rifleman* and *rifle*. Then I say that the rifle exists, whether its bearer thinks of it or no; and the bearer exists, apart from the weapon which he carries. When he thinks of his rifle, there springs up a contingent relation between him and it; by *contingent* I mean a relation which actually holds, but might have never held, and might be broken off. Are there not, however, certain objective relations between the man and the rifle, relations which must hold, so long as the two are in being—relations, for example, of distance or of mutual gravitation according to the Newtonian law? Undoubtedly there are. All beings are related one to the other objectively; but these relations, like the actual existences of the beings themselves, do not depend for their validity on their receiving recognition from a created mind. I shall revert to that question presently.

Dr. Bain may tell me that I freely speak of *being* and *existence*. *Tu quoque*, is my reply to him, despite his profession of having gutted those terms of their meaning. When I endeavoured to take him at his word, into what a kaleidoscope of impersonal, unsubstantial visions was the universe resolved! In despair I have returned to think that existence is a reality, after all; that mankind is right, and not Hegel; and that

waking wits should not go down before "dreams of dreams,"* dreamt in a cloud of tobacco-smoke and beer-fumes.

There is little profit in defining *existence* or *being*. An understanding on which that concept is not charactered, must be a veritable *tabula rasa*. Definition finds there no letters wherewith to spell out a meaning. The person simply has not come to the use of reason. I could only say to him, parodying Wren's epitaph in St. Paul's, "If you seek Being, look around you." Metaphysicians, whom I trust, do indeed give an analysis of this fundamental element of knowledge. They show how, in a being, *act* and *term*—that is, taking the being in its relation to other beings, *principle of activity* and *principle of passivity*—conspire into *oneness*. This they show; but they presuppose a knowledge of *Being* in their pupil; they do not profess to grow a new concept in his mind, but to dissect what is there already. I should consider it a strong proof of idiocy in an English-speaking adult, if Being were to him indeed "a mere name." At the same time, it is worth while to mention that the name is not applied synonymously, or in the same sense, to all the things to which it is applied, but only analogically, or with a proportion. Substance, uncreated and divine, is a Being; created substance, an atom for instance, is a Being; an accident of created substance, as the shape of an atom, is a Being too. But God is *of Himself* and *in Himself*; the atom is *in itself*, but *of another*, that is, of God; the shape is not *in itself*, but in the atom, and, with the atom, it is of God. These denominations, *of itself* and *in itself*, are not mere appendages to Being; they alter its nature entirely. God is not as the atom is, nor even as the angel is; and angel and atom are not as is the atom's shape. A comparison, lame though it be, with the inherent lameness of all comparisons of earth to heaven, may yet serve for some representation of my meaning. The Crowned and Anointed of these realms is their proper Sovereign; the minister, empowered by her, is, in some sort, sovereign; the coin, with her image impressed, is called a sovereign. So *Being*, in its truest sense, is the peculiar title of the Most High—He only is: substances, however, which He has created and sustains, have a being, so named for that it is a shadow and dependency of His; and again the filmy reality of an accident clings round the being of the substance to which it belongs, and borrows the name which denotes its supporter's reality. Suffice it to have re-

* "Dreams of dreams" is what Fichte, Hegel's master, called all human perceptions.

called these scholastic distinctions, lest any ambiguity should lurk in the coils of my argument about Being.

To rehabilitate my chosen example of sensory perception. How does the rifleman know that he and his Martini-Henry are two mutually independent beings? By attending lectures on metaphysics? No, decidedly not; but by the fact that he is a reasonable creature, and has used his reason on the things of his experience; by this native and exercised birthright of a man, is he marked out for a denier of idealism. Neither Dr. Bain nor Dr. Berkeley has ever pretended, so far as I am aware, that they were preaching a popular doctrine. They go about to rectify the opinion of the masses; and that on a point with which the masses are conversant every moment of their mental lives. For myself, in such a case, I would rather err with the multitude than be right with some dozen professors of metaphysics. I would rather founder with a large and well-appointed steamer, than voyage prosperously in the peculiar cutter which my friend B. has built and rigged for himself; for this reason, that if B.'s cutter, or Dr. Bain's philosophy, is to be true to her contriver's word, then sea and mind alike must cast about for other laws than the laws which they have obeyed from creation, as age to age has testified. Metaphysicians are not the prophets now that they were in the olden time. In the world of yore, when primeval tradition was almost lost, and subsequent revelations were confined to the narrow seaboard of Judæa, men turned to intellects like those of Plato and Aristotle, Seneca and Epictetus, for instruction regarding the great questions, spiritual and moral, which the commonest things of earth are ever suggesting to the thoughtful. At that date Philosophy was, what Cicero styles her, "the guide of life, the discoverer of virtue, the chaser away of vice." And very indifferently did she perform those offices, as the first chapter of St. Paul to the Romans bears witness. But she is degraded now. Christ and His Church have supplanted her. She is no longer a beacon of practical conduct, but of speculation merely; the highest of purely human speculations, I allow, but still removed from practice. I speak of Christians born and reared; for to those minds that wander up and down in search of spiritual truth, philosophy is of the highest importance; and for the sake of these, their co-redeemed, perishing brothers, Christians do well to launch their lifeboat on to the sea of metaphysics. There our understandings may wax strong, buffeting with difficulties; and there, what is better than any strengthening of understanding, we may render grateful service to the Heart of Our Saviour. Other-

wise I do not know but what we might afford to leave transcendental subtleties for those eternal years, which, in a short half-century, will have dawned on nearly every one of us that is now of an age to be subtle. Why should we persist in running our heads against the wall when the door will so soon be opened? Why, indeed, were it not that abstruse studies are essential, and are growing more essential, for showing to unbelievers a reason of the faith that is in us. Men pretend to set revelation aside, and peer, with reason's eye alone, into that Upper World, of which every thinker amongst them catches glimpses. They must be disabused; they must be taught by a course of instruction ascending from obvious truths to truths which tower into mystery, that the right direction of reason is towards faith, and the sum of her counsels, "Hear the Church." Heretics and infidels have rejected this lesson of reason; but then what have they done? They have turned round, they or their successors, and finding the elementary facts with which they started inconsistent with the position of denial where they now stand, they brush the facts out of the way, raise the drawbridge between themselves and ordinary mortals, and flaunt the banner of their scepticism for credulous outsiders to admire, and imitate as their ignorance can.

I have a philosophy that shall confirm the existence of an independent Not-Self. But I do not believe that fact on philosophical grounds. I believed it before I was old enough to think consecutively; and if, when the power of argumentation came to me, I had been offered a proof to the contrary from which I saw no escape, I should rather have mistrusted my own capacity for estimating evidence than have caught at the conclusion that the universe and I were one. I embark in my philosophy, resolved that if the philosophy founders, I will not suffer shipwreck. I am conscious of myself, and of the limits about myself, too intimately to fling that consciousness away in the paroxysm of a disappointed metaphysician. Primarily and essentially, I am a man; secondarily and accidentally, I seek to become a philosopher. As a man, I know certain truths; as a philosopher, I would fain tell how I know them. If I cannot tell how, still I know them. At the same time, I trust that I can tell how I know an independent Not-Self. Let me make the attempt.

To prove, one must assume. I assume, then—a simple assumption—that I am. Also, that I know that I am. This cognition is to be analyzed. It regards an *exertion*, an *effect*, and a *resultant state*. The exertion proceeds from my soul, which, itself ever ready to act, moves the body when that is

physically disposed for motion. The effect is in the body, the nerves and muscles of which receive a determination to change. The resultant state is in body and soul together, in the body directly, because that alone has been a recipient, and in the soul by concomitance, since the soul is united with the body in oneness of nature. The soul acts consciously, the animate body consciously suffers, soul and body are in a resultant conscious activo-passive state. That is a clumsy metaphysical statement of the plain truth, *I am*. That I have a soul distinct from my body, is here supposed; proof has been offered for it above. The justice of representing the soul as acting on the body, was shown in discussing Dr. Bain's well-founded doctrine of "spontaneous motion." Lastly, the distinction between an impression received and the state thence resulting, is clear, and, I think, worth remarking. It is evident too, that when two beings are compounded into one nature—that is, one principle of doing and suffering—an altered condition of either being must induce a corresponding alteration in the other; so that the compound, as a whole, will be altered. The compound here is the man, the *Me*. I know me by my action at home. And, knowing that I am, I have entered into the great Idea of Being.

Next comes the difficulty, as to whether I know a Not-*Me*. I must not assume the affirmative; *yes* or *no* upon this question, is the point at issue. But I shall proceed to prove in favour of *yes*. I assume Dr. Bain's second fact of the primitive mental constitution, the fact of "passive sensation," or "nervous currents inwards." In this fact of consciousness are found the second and third elements of the *I am*, while the first element is wanting. For in passive sensation the body is impressed, and body and soul join in a resultant conscious state; but there is no action of the soul giving a stimulus to the body. In Dr. Bain's phraseology, the "diffusive wave of feeling" is not "spontaneous." But the triad of cognition is still made up. Instead of my own soul—my truest innermost *Me**—I mentally place a Not-*Me*, acting upon my body. I know a *Non-Ego*, then, in questions of sensory perception, has this meaning: "some being, not my soul, is acting on my body; the body receives the action; soul and body are in a resultant conscious state." If this theory is rightly framed, it appears how the *Ego* is involved in every apprehension, and yet the *Non-Ego* may be absolutely apprehended. I suffer, mine is the conscious state; but it is not myself that acts upon me.

* "My *Me*," because I revert in thought upon myself.

Adversaries will impugn—it is the only possible point of attack—my right to couple the action of a being outside me with an impression and affection of my mind. I vindicate my right thus. A fundamentally similar impression and affection in time past, went along with action; the present impression and affection, therefore, are associated in my mind with action. Action, impression, and their resultant mental affection, formerly implied Being; so they imply Being now. But the action then proceeded from me; now the action is not from me: the Being, therefore, which I cognized in the foregone case was my own; in this case it is not my own. But is it well to argue from my own being to foreign being? Certainly, if I am to be a man at all; that is, if I am to generalize, and attain to Ideas. In knowing myself, I came upon the Idea of Being; wherever I find this idea exemplified, there I say is some Being. In an external object perceived, the Idea of Being is exemplified as accurately as it can be exemplified without the object coinciding with my own Being. There is just enough of correspondence for me to identify Being, and enough of diversity for me to disown it for mine.

But I not only am, but live; how is it that I learn to strip the attribute of life off the material things that surround me? Where do I find a suture of division between existence and vitality? Well, I find hardly any division at first: children think, and childish men have thought, that stocks and stones are alive. At the same time, the child's notion of life is confused and inadequate. Experience slowly shows him that the laws of motion are not the same for inanimate things as for living things like himself. The longer he consciously lives, the better he identifies life and its indications; and the better he discriminates it from all things else, marking where no sign of it appears.

I seem to have made the knowledge of self the stepping-stone to knowledge of a world beyond self, slighting the common observation, that children and youthful minds generally are taken up with things outside them, and not till mature years do they advert much to themselves. This well-observed fact, however, makes nothing against my theory. Once cognized, the outside view may be more interesting than the view inside; it does not, therefore, follow that it was cognized first. Both are cognized very indistinctly for the first five years of life. I maintain that the infant, during that period, understands little that passes around it, for the reason that it is as yet unfamiliar with the face of its own inner being. The phrase, "coming to the years of discretion," I consider to import the full recognition by the *Ego* of its own existence, and

thence of the existence of beings which the *Ego* is not. From the age of five to fifteen, and onwards, perhaps, to fifty and to death, the *Non-Ego* will still exercise a predominant influence upon the attention; still the *Ego* can, and occasionally does, turn to contemplate itself. That is enough for my argument. Mediately through that self-introspective faculty is the external world perceived.

Metaphysical theories are slippery things. I will state mine again, that the reader may better grasp it. Certain "spontaneous movements" put me in the way of certain "passive sensations." Of the movements, I feel myself the author, or cause, and thereby I apprehend the Idea of Cause; but who shall answer for the sensory impressions? Not mine own mind; for, able as I am to advert to my mental acts, I have been unable to detect my mind in the act of causing these impressions. Yet they must have some cause. Change to me means a caused change; only as a something caused, has the phenomenon of change met my experience. I ascribe those impressions, therefore, to Being other than my mind, Being endowed with independent power to impress my sensibility thus whensoever I may expose it. I recognize the activity of foreign substance, an activity likened amid diversity to that wherewith I myself am active. But I am also passive—susceptible of change. And I find myself able to produce absolute changes on the activities around me. From those changes I gather that the external world too is passive. Knowing its activity and its passivity, I know its substantial being; for "conspiracy of an active and a passive principle into oneness" is the metaphysical expression for the natural state of a created substance.

"There now," my opponents say, "the ghost which Locke had laid, has been conjured up, a new bugbear. Who does not know that substance is but a catalogue of properties, with a form of the mind to hold them together? Away with this realistic necromancy! perish objectified forms of thought!"

Well, my friends, but beware lest the inductive sciences, of which you are so justly proud, perish along with that scouted phantom. Induction rests on the principle that what has happened in the past, will happen, under like conditions, in the future. A principle need be solidly and surely set, that bears such a weight of inference as this bears. How then is it established? what is its security? Mr. Mill steps forward. He will prove the principle. "It has been tried in millions of instances, and never been known to fail; therefore it never will fail." But does not Mr. Mill see that this *therefore* slyly performs the very operation, the justice of which is under dis-

cussion, namely, the leap to the future? What avails it to quote precedents to me, if I entirely repudiate the force of precedent? "But they have always been followed hitherto," you say. "How is that to bar their being departed from henceforth?" Such is the retort. Dr. Bain seems to approve its cogency. Treading as he does, in his logical march, close in the footsteps of his great predecessor, it is curious how, in this particular, he silently eschews Mr. Mill's track.* He acknowledges "We can give no reason or evidence for this uniformity,"—that uniformity of which Mr. Mill had said, "I hold it to be itself an instance of induction." What, then, does Dr. Bain surrender the principle? No. The reason follows in his own words:—

Without the assumption we could not take the smallest steps in practical matters: we could not pursue any object or end in life. Unless the future is to reproduce the past, it is an enigma, a labyrinth. Our natural prompting is to *assume* such identity, to believe it first, and prove it afterwards.

Then the author, who has written so much upon "the primitive corruption of this part of our nature,"† who has said, "Nothing can be affirmed as true except upon the warrant of experience,"‡ and yet that "It [experience] does not prove that anything will always be in the future what it has been in the past;"§ this same author calmly announces his intention to yield to his "intuitive tendency," and believe, and build his knowledge on the belief, that "What has uniformly been in the past, will be in the future."|| And he goes on to say of this postulate, "Our only error is in proposing to give any reason or justification of it, to treat it as otherwise than as *begged* at the very outset."¶

Now I do not quarrel with Dr. Bain simply for making postulates. The lawyer needs laws, and the reasoner needs *data*. But I do grudge his assigning to what he calls "experience," "an exclusive place in our estimation as the canon of credibility;" forgetful that he is assuming throughout the objective

* Compare Mill's "Logic," Book III. chap. iii. § 1, with Bain's "Logic,"—*Deduction*, pp. 273-4.

† See "Emotions and Will,"—*Belief*, §§ 11-14, with the note there; "Logic,"—*Deduction*, pp. 12, 13; "Logic,"—*Induction*, pp. 377-8; and Mill's "Logic," Book III. chap. xxi. § 1, to which Dr. Bain refers. I invite the reader to consider these passages carefully, and view the *à priori* assumption about uniformity in the light of Dr. Bain's own experientialist disclaimers.

‡ *Deduction*, p. 13.

§ *Ibid.* p. 274. || *Ibid.* p. 274.

¶ Attention has already been called to this strange exhibition of Dr. Bain's, in the DUBLIN REVIEW for October, 1871, pp. 311, 312.

worth of an intuition, "which experience will not establish." He is like the swan, appearing to swim by merely looking this way and that, while, beneath the water, there are the proud creature's feet working busily. He has really begged everything in begging this postulate. The essence of every induction, the "leap to the future," is but a doing of what he has asked leave to do. And since it is by induction, according to him and Mr. Mill, that all our knowledge, outside the sphere of present consciousness and memory, is gathered, therefore it is on sufferance only that our every scientific conclusion is drawn.

I think this a very humiliating avowal to be wrung from a philosophy which glories in accepting no facts but those that it can carry home, and examine, and, in Plato's phrase, speaking of the experientialists of his day, "take between its teeth."* Phenomenists clutch truths in their hands—the truths of physical science; but they avow that their eyes are shut, their logic and metaphysics are guess-work, the matter of their bodily frames is a puzzle, their mind a mystery; they find no certainty, and doubt whether there is any truth.† They are not philosophers, but "only players," and their game is blind-man's buff.

Are there any thinkers that have their eyes unbandaged? Yes, those who own to their sure apprehension of such propositions as the following:—"I am," "There is a world of being beyond me," "Substance is an objective reality," "The natural and universal beliefs of mankind, on subjects of psychology, are true," "Truth is independent of any man's belief in it." Such thinkers have their eyes open and uncovered; they know what their minds are about; they do not "go forward in blind faith," and upon the "negative force" of the absence of contradiction, "run the risk of going forward in the same course."‡ There is no risk, no blindness; they see the truth of the first principles whence they start, and all that they postulate or assume is that they do see the truth which they do see; in other words, that man is not a personified lie. Not all of these philosophers will explain external perception as I have explained it; but they will arrive by their several methods at the results at which I have arrived: first, that each intelligence is conscious of its own substantial existence, and so enters into the Idea of Substance as an existent

* Plat. "Theæt." 155 E.

† This doubt is inseparable from the view, that truth is, to each man, "that which he troweth." For "the thoughts of mortal man are unstable."—Wisd. ix. 14.

‡ Bain's "Logic,"—*Deduction*, p. 274.

thing; secondly, that each intelligence also perceives substances outside itself.

I perceive that this ivory, which I hold in my hand, is made up of substance. That is enough. I need no postulate about the future. What purpose of mine the ivory as such serves to-day, it will serve the same so long as it remains ivory. I know that truth of the ivory in the future, when I know the present being and action of the body. For, according to the scholastic axiom, *Quo aliquid est, eo agit*, the ivory, remaining what it is, cannot naturally cease to act as it does. The axiom quoted is bound up in the very notion of *active being*, or *natural substance*. But destroy Substance—as Dr. Bain's Law of Relativity does destroy it—and what pledge of the future does any present relation contain? None whatever. In that case, it is too much to postulate, that what holds now under a certain tenure will hold under the same tenure next moment. To be sure it will; but not on Dr. Bain's principles. Denying Substance, he is "stuck fast in the mire of the deep, where there is no standing-ground;"* he is "come into the depths of the sea, and the storm has overwhelmed" him. He may "labour, crying till he is hoarse," the postulate, basis of induction, cannot be granted to him.

There is left one part of Dr. Bain's doctrine, mentioned by me at the beginning, and not since discussed. I allude to his theory of truth, that whatsoever any mind thinks true, is true for that mind. In his own plain words:—

There neither is, nor can be, any universal standard of truth, or matters which ought to be believed. Every man is in this case a standard to himself.†

I wish that, on this matter, Dr. Bain would re-study the passage in Plato's "Theætetus," 166-71 and 178-9; not blinding himself to the text with the dust of Mr. Grote's comments. There he will find objected the apparent impossibility, on this Protagorean ground, of any man falling into error. I know the ready rejoinder, "None is ever mistaken, in his own conceit, though his neighbours may think him mistaken." I accept the amendment. But what when the man himself admits that he has been in the wrong? Is it that he was right to himself, when he thought himself right, and now he is wrong to himself in that particular wherein he was right to himself before? But if he is wrong now in having held that opinion,

* Ps. 69. *Non est substantia*, Lat. Vulg.,—*οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόστασις*, Sept.

† "Emotions and Will,"—*Emotions*, chap. xv. § 9. Read the whole of §§ 7, 8, 9.

he must have been somehow wrong in holding it then; else why change a right opinion? Because such change is useful, convenient, and recommendable for practical purposes? Well, let him think it not recommendable, then it will lose its recommendations for him; and for himself—that is all the egotist is concerned about—he may remain tranquil and consistent. Then,

Si fractus illabatur orbis,
Impavidum ferient ruinae.

Indeed the ruins will not strike him at all; he need only think that the frame of the universe is standing, and stand it will, for him. This is the farcical scene that we play, when we deck out created ignorance and weakness in the attributes of the Almighty and All-True. For He only is in His thought essentially infallible, who in His volition is irresistible. He is the Standard of truth to every man, who is the Author of whatever any man knows or is. Some such standard there must be, and it can be none other than God.

I argue the existence of such a standard, as well from the absurdities, already alleged, which its negation involves, as from the universal distinction, which all men draw, between "Truth" and "My conviction of truth." It is the old battle of the external world over again. We will not reiterate it; but this I will ask, "Who does not at heart believe that his conviction may fail, but truth abides for ever?"*

There is a third rejoinder bearing upon the free-thinking position, *Whatever a man believes is true for him*. What means the phrase, *true for him*? Does it mean simply, *believed by him*? Then the position is a tautology. Whatever a man believes is certainly believed by him; is that all? Or does *true for him* mean *good for him to believe*? Then the position is a falsehood. Man often believes what is not good for him to believe. The Pope's infallibility, believed by Catholics, furnishes an instance *ad hominem*. We hold firmly to that dogma, bad for us as it is, in Dr. Bain's view. Therefore, if "matters which ought to be believed" are the matters which are good to be believed, it is wrong, not in my view merely, but in Dr. Bain's, to say as he does, "Every man is in this case a standard to himself." Nay, it would not be difficult to prove, by my opponent's principle of the uniformity of nature, that the list of matters which are good to be believed is the same for all men in the same circumstances. Hence it follows,

* *Veritas Domini manet in aeternum*; and that precisely because it is *veritas Domini*, not *veritas hominis*.

defining *truth* as *that which is good for man to believe*, that there is one list of true propositions, one standard, that is, of truth. We call this standard Absolute Truth. The beliefs of individual minds, according with the standard, are relative truths; lacking that accordance, they are errors. There are indeed cases where absolute truth is not that which is good for a certain individual man to believe. For a maniac, deception may be better than truth. Such cases, however, are abnormal, and arise from some disorder in the believer. Absolute Truth is better for men in their normal state to believe than to deny. Else why censure the "pious fraud," which Dr. Bain says the Jesuits "formally avow," that "of preaching doctrines, in themselves false, as being favourable to morals and social order"? *

If there is a truth, to which all intellects must bow, or err, that truth is with God. It cannot be any human opinion, *quâ* human. We say that such a man, or such a society, are authorities on such a question; we do not thereby mean that they decide how the matter shall lie, but they agree with an Authority above them, which agreement gives a representative value to their decision. The common appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober shows that it is not Philip simply who is the ultimate judge of right. If he could take the title of "our own great delegate," his judgment would be righteous at all times.

And this leads me to touch a matter, which no man can handle but very lightly and on the surface; a matter which none should handle without reverence: I mean the origin and derivation of truth from God. There are many forms of proof, confirmatory of the existence of a Being of Beings. Each form will commend itself to its own cast of mind. A great mechanist, or physical philosopher, I suppose, would be impressed with some argument concerning the Prime Mover. For me, my reason is led straightest to Deity when I reflect upon the multitude of affirmations that must be true, now and now and every now, though man is too ignorant, too forgetful, too preoccupied, to affirm them. And do not tell me that they are merely things affirmable, and not affirmations, for were they pure affirmables and no more, the facts which they concern would not actually hold good. Sir Isaac Newton found that one planet attracted another according to the inverse square of the distance between their centres. Where had that truth lain, formularized though hidden, for fifty-six centuries since Adam, and for æons of geological time

* "Logic,"—*Induction*, p. 385.

before Adam yet walked the already old earth? If the Angels knew it, who told it to them? Pythagoras discovered a geometrical theorem, and sacrificed a hecatomb in gratitude. Did he invent the theorem? If it was not invented, but only unveiled by man, in what abyss of wisdom did it lie, deep yet clear, from eternity? How many acts have we ourselves done in secret, and forgotten them? How many passing words have we spoken? How many ideas and desires have we just formed and abandoned? Where is the roll of this history kept? Where is the archive-room? It is not history, they are not facts, if there is no memorial of them. Meditating upon these things, my mind is raised to the inference of an Infinite and Immutable Intelligence; *i.e.* an Infinite and Immutable Being, that understands Himself thoroughly, understands too all other beings, actual or possible, in Himself. Not *in Himself*, as the pantheists teach, for then the vilest of mankind would take precedence of God, since man is still a person, while God would be a medley of things; but *in Himself*, so far forth as His Being is the Archetype on which theirs is modelled; His Understanding, the Glass whereon His Being, and all that is or can resemble Him, finds reflection; His Will, the Mighty Hand, that draws creatures from the Ocean of possibility, and leaves as much behind as it draws.

There is mystery here, I confess, but it is what I may venture to style reasonable mystery. It is mystery logically attained from an acceptance of known facts. It is a mountain too high for us to climb; but a mountain that is not reared by filching away the lowlands about which we ordinarily disport. It is a monument of the limitation of our being and knowledge, and yet a voucher that something we know, and something we are. It is the solution of the riddle of life. It indicates whence we came, and whither we are to go. It lays a yoke upon our necks, and converts the same into a collar of free service. It wounds our pride unto death, and heals our loneliness. An enemy—I call nothing human by that name—has hung a cloud over this Delectable Mountain, and in the same cloud he has wrapped the commonest assurances of our nature. He has drawn this pernicious curtain by the agency of a mistaken metaphysician, whom he has deceived. I have put forward a hand to tear the curtain down; if I have been rude or preposterous, I pray God and man forgive my violence, and teach me, not better intentions, but better grace and skill.

ART. VII.—THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIXTUS
THE FIFTH.

The Life and Times of Sixtus the Fifth. By Baron HÜBNER. Translated from the Original French by HUBERT E. H. JERNINGHAM. 2 vols. London: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1872.

WE offer Mr. Jerningham our sincere congratulations. Translation is always, even to the most accomplished, a tedious and trying task. The book which Mr. Jerningham undertook to translate offered (as he himself remarks in his brief and modest preface) peculiar difficulties to the translator. But all his difficulties, both those which are common to translation in general and those which were proper to his own special work, Mr. Jerningham has overcome. We would, however, wish to say that, while the phrase "the sun never set *upon* the Spanish king's dominions" is defensible, the similar phrase which Mr. Jerningham employs (vol. i. p. 6), "the sun never set *within the boundaries* of the Spanish king's dominions," is nonsense. In vol. i. p. 82, it is said that "Michael Angelo . . . would never have *painted* either his 'Last Judgment' or his 'Moses.'" Michael Angelo's "Moses" is a piece of sculpture, and not a piece of painting. Mr. Jerningham might have learned as much from vol. ii. p. 81, where he himself writes, "later only, the painter of the 'Last Judgment,' the sculptor of 'Moses,' appeared in Rome as an architect." Occasionally, too, his sentences lack the requisite unity, by reason of his loose employment of the relative pronoun or copulative conjunction. For instance, in the very first page of the first volume we have the following sentence:—"The work of Gregorio Leti does not reflect either wit or style, and was published for the first time at Lausanne," which reminds us very much of the young gentleman who wrote in his Theme that "Lord Byron was the greatest poet of modern times, and was very much attached to whisky and water." These mistakes, we are aware, are as much the mistakes of Baron Hübner as of Mr. Jerningham. But, while Mr. Jerningham has a perfect right to claim indulgence for "the literal rendering of many phrases which have no equivalent in English," he can have no apology for sanctioning the propagation of loose, ungrammatical writing. Still we must say he is not a habitual sinner. Of offences such as those we have referred to the two volumes do not contain half a dozen more; and we have referred to

these solely because we wish to see the second edition of the book immaculate. As a translation it is, except in a few trifles, really excellent. The direct, steady, balanced style of the original are all preserved. Nor does the courtly, diplomatic humour of Baron Hübner ever suffer in the words of Mr. Jerningham.

But we owe Mr. Jerningham very much more than congratulations. The historical department of our ecclesiastical literature is so thinly supplied, that any honest addition to it deserves commendation; but to enrich it with such a work as this of Baron Hübner's deserves the highest praise. For Baron Hübner's is a work which, while it will have the deepest interest for English readers, English readers might expect in vain from any one of their own countrymen in this generation. The subject of it is a splendid subject for a biography. Sixtus the Fifth is one of the few men of all times whose life contains the elements out of which the highest genius might draw its inspiration, and upon which the most unwearied industry might be profitably employed. Baron Hübner found the evidence concerning the pontiff in that state of chaos which gives chances to the men who can bring order and light. It was his own good fortune to live in a time when the light was procurable, and to be in a position which peculiarly fitted him for procuring and using it. He made the most of his great advantages. Of a splendid man he has written a splendid biography.

The life of Sixtus Quintus had often been written before—his character had often been estimated in the writings even of those who had not undertaken to give his history; but previous accounts of him generally laboured under these two disadvantages, that they were written, most of them by partisans, and all of them with small authentic evidence to guide the writers. Baron Hübner had before him evidence of the largest and most reliable kind; and this evidence he used simply as a judge and not as a pleader. "It is with the help," he says (vol. i. p. 19), "of the diplomatic correspondence of those times that we have undertaken to write the history of Sixtus V. These documents are the reports drawn up by the nuncios, by the ambassadors of the Emperor, of Spain, of France, of Tuscany, and of Venice—the instructions received from their governments—the autograph letters of the Pope, of Philip II., of Henry III., of the cardinals, envoys to the great powers, and of the agents of the League. These official documents, which are almost unknown as yet, are perfectly authentic, for they have been copied under our superintendence from the originals in the state archives of the Vatican, of Vienna, of Paris, Simancas, Venice, and Florence." And, in p. 22, he writes:—"It is by gathering

our information from authentic sources and principally from diplomatic reports perfectly trustworthy as to facts, as well as by attaching great importance to the judgments of contemporary writers, that we have gone on with this study, which is the fruit of a long research, having for its sole aim to arrive at the truth as regards Sixtus V., and to proclaim it. Free from all thought of the present, we will bestow our whole attention on the past; for it is an historical work and not a casual story that we intend to publish." This is a time when historicists generally do not profess to be much more than casual stories, and when those which profess more do so to impart to fiction the interest of reality. But Baron Hübner has given the world what he proposed to give it—a work which will be at once acknowledged as a genuine addition to true and permanent historic literature.

The plan of the work is as it should be, very comprehensive. We do not admire that method of writing biography lately pretty much in vogue, which appears to start with the supposition that in order to know any man's history as it should be known, we must know the history of all the world beside. Neither do we approve of the meagre method that satisfied our fathers. There is a golden mean; and that mean appears to be determined by the principle that no man's history can be properly written unless it be clearly shown, in the first place, what work he had to do, in order that it may be shown, in the second place, to what extent and with what perfection, and unto what end he did it. Baron Hübner does this for Sixtus, and he does no more. But he does this with an originality of information that makes it invaluable to the scholar, and with a piquant beauty of style which makes it enjoyable by even that fastidious mortal, "the general reader." We recommend, as especially useful and interesting, the chapter on "The Causes and Results of the Renaissance," in volume the first, and the chapter on "The Society of Jesus," in volume the second.

The popular view of Sixtus Quintus,—and Baron Hübner shows how that view became popular,—has not been favourable to that pontiff. He has been looked upon by people generally as a kind of cross between Nero, who fiddled while Rome was burning, and Xerxes, who was ambitious to chain the sea. He was cruel, crafty, hypocritical, avaricious, unscrupulous, thirsting for universal dominion. The worst qualities of the swineherd, the meanest vices of the monk, and the most impudent ambition of the Pope, found their ideal perfection in Sixtus the Fifth. Some good things were said about him, just as some good things are still said about Oliver Cromwell. His morals were irreproachable, his strength of will inflexible, his courage

unfaltering, his power of work preternatural. But these things were said with a grudge: the one thing insisted upon was that he was a very large blot upon the Papal escutcheon; and as such he was a great convenience. If a man wished to put Catholicity into a corner by a compendious reference to the fruits she had borne, he had only to point to Sixtus the Fifth.

Baron Hübner, we have no doubt, set about the investigation of Sixtus' history with his own share of the general prejudice. He was not disposed, and even in his book does not appear disposed, to treat the rude old Pontiff gently. He goes out of his way occasionally to give Sixtus a touch of his humour. "He despised," he says (vol. i. p. 217), "this world's riches as long as he had not any"; and the sincerity of the Holy Father's grief for the death of Francis, Duke of Tuscany, is proved from the fact that Francis (vol. ii. p. 61), "showed him endless attention; sent him the early fruits from his garden, *and never asked him for money.*" He does not conceal or palliate the faults of the Pontiff—his merciless severity; his rudeness to his court; his terrible fits of anger; his unfairness towards the Jesuits; his shiftiness with Philip of Spain; his bitter references to Gregory XIII. But the Baron is, like Sixtus himself, if severe and merciless, also just. He has the truth, and he tells it. He has the light, and he lets it in upon that "darkness visible" that lay over the Pontiff's history. He shows Sixtus as he really was: a fierce man in a fierce time; a judge who showed no mercy, because to show it would have been to encourage crime; a king who, neither from his own subjects nor from foreign potentates, would tolerate the smallest infringement of his rights; a true Dalmatian, with much of St. Jerome's genius and all St. Jerome's fire; a great Pope, if ever there was one; fit imitator of the great Hildebrand; fit model for other Popes that have yet to reign.

It is a very trite remark, though they who know it to be but a truism do not always act as if they believed it true, that a man's acts can be judged fairly only in the light of the man's circumstances. It is not hard to be virtuous if you have neither passion nor temptation; it is but natural that your face be a pleasant one when all your affairs prosper and all your future salutes you with smiles. But when all around you is confusion, and when all the world is plotting to carry the evils of your present into your future? Sixtus the Fifth was Pope at a juncture when an easy Pontiff would have been the ruin of Europe, and (humanly speaking) the ruin of the Church. The Reformation had laid hold on Germany, England, Denmark, France. It was threatening even Italy and Spain. Among professing Catholics something worse perhaps than Protestantism, — a

liberalism like the liberalism of our own time,—was doing such fearful damage, that a confessor's first question to his penitent was a question as to whether he was not a secret infidel. "Society was therefore placed," says our author (vol. i. p. 58), between Protestantism on the one hand, which was "ready to cross the Alps, and a weakened faith and corrupted morals, the inheritance left by humanism, the effects of which they were only beginning justly to appreciate." France was torn and trampled, covered with blood and dirt, even worse than she is at present. Philip of Spain was looking for the establishment of a monarchy which would make him the master of Europe. The huge German Empire, unhappily in the hands of Hapsburg impotence, was slowly falling to pieces; while from the East were heard the first muffled movements of that great Mussulman advance which, later on, was stayed only under the walls of Vienna. In such terrible times when the whole world, religious and political, was passing through one of those great periodic convulsions which, in the moral as in the physical world, are destined to introduce a fairer order and a more perfect life, Sixtus the Fifth was called to take that position which is alike the loftiest and the most difficult to hold.

Nor in his own City and States had the new Pope much cause for comfort. Italy swarmed with robbers. During the reign of the preceding Pontiff they numbered as many as 27,000. One of their leaders was in the pay of Protestant princes; and, in league with them, was planning the destruction, perhaps, of the Papacy itself, but certainly of the Pope's temporal power. There was such a good understanding between the bandits and the Italian nobles, that the former were always sure of asylum even in the palaces of the Pope's own city. Nay, "in Rome, during the reign of his (Sixtus') predecessor, neither man nor woman was in safety in their own houses even in the middle of the day." (Vol. i. p. 263.) And the banditti were not the only cause of the new Pope's trouble at Rome. Both the city itself and its inhabitants were in a deplorable state. Everything was tending to stagnation. St. Peter's was incomplete, and people said it would never be completed. Nero's Obelisk was still prone in the mud, and even Michael Angelo had pronounced that there it would lie for ever. The Springs of Adrian were still leaping in the Latin Hills, but the aqueducts were all broken, and Rome had to live on muddy water. There was no security for life or property, and, consequently, there was little industry, and less enterprise. Even in ecclesiastical matters there was a lack of business efficiency at Rome. The old system of conducting Church affairs through a single Consistory was still in great part followed. But it was

daily discovering its unfitness for the Church in the new and difficult relations with European States upon which she had entered since the Reformation. The Consistory was not, and could not be expected to be, equal to the task of transacting the immense amount of business which now fell to its share. And, besides, a great portion of that business was, from its being of a partially political character, totally unsuited to a Court which, though composed of the highest ecclesiastical dignitaries, yet always inevitably represented various rival nationalities.

In the reign of Sixtus the Fifth, short and troubled though it unhappily was, all this was changed. The banditti were either captured and brought to justice, or driven, terror-stricken, out of Italy. Law became so potent that, "to quell a street-row, it was enough to whisper that Sixtus the Fifth was Pope." St. Peter's was completed. The Obelisk of Nero was raised up once more, and fixed in the great piazza of the great Cathedral of the world. The waters of the Latin Hills again came down to the Eternal City. "Monuments, streets, piazzas, fountains, aqueducts, obelisks, and other wonders, all the work of Sixtus V., have almost made me fail to recognize Rome," writes a contemporary of the Pontiff. (Vol. ii. p. 135.) "If I were a poet, I would say * * * that, thanks to the power of that fervent and exuberant spirit, a new Rome has arisen from its ashes." The great Roman congregations came to transact the business of the Church with that masterly ease which comes of method and divided labour. And all this was substantially the Pope's own work. What he did not formally do he did virtually by that wonderful energy which was not merely an example but an inspiration to all around him. Into his short reign of five years he compressed the work of fifty. It looks as if what Baron Hübner says (Vol. i. p. 227) were literally true, that "Sixtus, foreseeing death, wished to replace time by the extent of his will, and called upon hours to give him what years seldom grant to ordinary mortals." And that his almost superhuman activity was always guided by the very highest principle which should rule one in his position, even his bitterest enemy, Olivarez, King Philip's ambassador, has to admit in confidence to his master. "Appeal specially," writes Olivarez, in a secret letter to Philip (Vol. ii. p. 154), "appeal specially to the religious sentiments of His Holiness, for he is full of zeal for all that concerns the faith." All this Baron Hübner narrates with a clearness of arrangement and fulness of detail that leave nothing to be desired.

But naturally it is to Sixtus's political relations with the various European powers, and especially to his relations with

France and Spain, that the author pays most attention. It is this portion of the Pope's history which has been supposed to be peculiarly damning, and it is on this portion that Baron Hübner was specially enabled to throw light. The popular impression about the Pope's Franco-Spanish policy has been that he was, at the same time, most selfish and most suicidal, most crafty and most absurd. He wished to destroy heresy by a general coalition of the Catholic Powers; he wished to destroy the Catholic Powers by submitting them entirely to himself; and he wished to destroy himself by thus constituting himself, not the Common Father, but the common tyrant of all. To attain these ends, he used all manner of means unscrupulously. He hoarded up money to fit out armies and fleets. He instigated Philip to sail against England. He tried to instigate Venice to sail against Turkey. One day he favoured the League, and the next he advised Henry the Third to murder the Guises. Now he planned with Philip the dismemberment of France, and presently he abandoned Philip when he feared that the plan would fail. At first he called down on Henry of Navarre the curses of heaven; he shortly after gave him his secret support; and, had he lived long enough, would have probably commissioned him to cross the Pyrenees and ruin Spain. Baron Hübner, of course, had heard all these accusations. He had, however, too slight a turn for controversy, perhaps too high a sense of a historian's dignity, to honour them with formal notice. But he gives them their answer. And the answer is taken, not from hearsay or from partizans of the Pope, but from the extant correspondence of the Pope's enemies, who would hardly tell a lie in his favour, and of the foreign ambassadors, whose very existence in office depended on their narrating events to their Courts with the most perfect precision. And what is the answer? It not only exculpates the Pope, but forces the admission that (Vol. ii. p. 372) "Sixtus the Fifth saved France from incalculable miseries, and has deserved well of the Church and of humanity." Were it only for this one portion of it, the book of Baron Hübner would be of the highest value. The case is made out so perfectly, the grand old Pontiff comes out so triumphantly, that the question may be considered as put to rest for ever. We must be very brief; but we shall try to give, in the author's own words when we find it possible, the Baron's conclusions regarding the Franco-Spanish policy of Sixtus the Fifth. They will be found explained and defended in the chapter with which the Baron's book concludes.

In presence of the events of which France was the theatre, Sixtus aimed at two things: the preservation of the Catholic

religion, which was seriously compromised, and the maintenance of France in the rank of the first power of Europe. He was convinced that if the new creed should be enthroned in France it was all over for some time, nay perhaps for generations, with the Catholic religion in Europe. He was equally convinced that even though France remained Catholic, still if she lost her position as a leading power, the Catholic Church in Europe, even "the centre and focus of the faith," Rome itself, would lose its independence, and the Catholic religion, thus mortally struck, must then have slowly but inevitably perished. Here then are the conclusions at which those had arrived who were interested in the maintenance of the Catholic religion, and naturally no one was more interested in it than the Head of the Church. Religion and France must both be saved; if this cannot be done, then France must be sacrificed to save religion.

Now the future of France was hardly more important for the Pope himself than it was for Philip of Spain. The vast kingdom to which Philip had succeeded was made up of many disconnected and dissatisfied provinces. In the centre of the great European movement—so hostile to Spanish interests—lay the Spanish tributaries of Flanders, Franche Comté, Milanese, and the kingdom of Naples. To hold these in proper subjection the road to them from the Iberian Peninsula should lie open, and that road lay through France. In India and America were Spanish provinces of immense wealth and importance, but separated from Spain by many leagues of sea. To maintain a power over her European provinces, and not to lose, sooner or later, her transatlantic possessions, two things were necessary for Spain, the possession of France, and the dominion of the seas. No one understood this better than Philip himself. "I must have the power," he said, "which God has given me; to possess that power I must have France and the sea." And hence, all through the negotiations with Sixtus, Philip insisted on the dismemberment, which meant the destruction, of France. Sixtus wanted to save the Church, Philip wanted to save Spain. Both the Church and Spain were to be saved through the medium of France. But the Church was to be saved through France Catholic and independent; Spain was to be saved by making France, Catholic if you will, but a Catholic province under the dominion of Philip II.

The policy just ascribed to Sixtus was the policy which throughout the struggle he constantly and consistently pursued. His changes of conduct were all simple necessities of his pursuing that policy. When he was made Pope, France was really divided into only two camps, the Calvinists and

Catholics. It was the policy of the Pope to prevent the success of the former, and hence does Sixtus issue his 'privatory' bull against the King of Navarre. But after awhile he clearly perceived that the Catholic camp was really divided into two irreconcilable factions, and that over either of these, or over both of them, the King of Navarre would be sure to triumph. Then came the murder of the Guises, to widen still more the breach in the Catholic party. And, lastly, came the murder of the king and the abandonment of the League by many of its firmest adherents, apparently insuring the success of Navarre. But the success of Navarre meant the Calvinizing of France. To save France from being Calvinist, Navarre must be beaten, and there was no one to beat him but Philip of Spain. Accordingly the Pope proposed at Madrid, that he and Philip should in concert attack the King of Navarre. That exposed France to dismemberment, but, in the eyes of Sixtus, national dismemberment is better than national apostasy. Philip, who had long resolved to have France, with or without papal permission, jumped at the offer. To give France one chance more, Sixtus determined that in the projected war he should have the whip-hand of Philip. The papal troops were to be in a majority, and the commander of the entire army was to be the nominee of the Pope's.

But another change took place. It soon became certain, not only that France would not resign her Catholicity, but that, if Henry of Navarre wished to be her king, he must be a Catholic. The Catholic spirit of the country showed itself with such force that the conversion of the future sovereign was no longer a useful means of success, but an actual condition of his accession to the throne. Even in his army the parts were changed. The Huguenots were in a minority, and were fast dwindling down to the rank of mere auxiliaries. All this the Pope was perpetually hearing, and with it came constant assurances that the king, possibly from conviction, possibly from expediency, was about to recant. There was just one way in which the Sixtus policy of saving both France and the Church might still be successful. That way Sixtus saw. He followed it. He got rid of his engagements with Spain, certain, as he now was, that France would issue from the crisis both Catholic in religion and independent as a nation. Was he wrong in so doing? We have stated the facts almost entirely in Baron Hübner's own words, and we leave the reader to form his own conclusion. But Baron Hübner's conclusion is expressed in the words quoted already—"Sixtus the Fifth saved France from incalculable miseries, and has deserved well of the Church and of humanity." And in the justness of that conclusion we fully concur.

We cannot conclude this article without making a remark which this book of Baron Hübner's has very pointedly suggested. We all believe that the more we hear of the truth the more the Church will profit by it. But that belief does not always haunt us when we think of the Church's rulers. We are shy of speaking about such men as Sixtus the Fifth and Alexander the Sixth. Yet the book which we have just been reading shows cause for glorying in the memory of the one, and hints a suspicion that if the history of the other were properly known, he too would come out triumphantly as, if not a splendid figure among Popes, certainly a splendid figure among Kings. The Baron's book does more than hint it. At p. 50 of the first volume, the Baron writes:—"Even Alexander the Sixth himself was looked upon by his contemporaries as a great Pope, unfortunate though his memory is to us. The history of his reign, *which has still to be written*, must have come down to us in a very altered form, or the moral sense of his generation must have been strangely perverted since Ariosto, in his poem published under Leo the Tenth, and while Lucrezia Borgia was still alive, could sing the praises of the latter without offending the public conscience." The history of Alexander has indeed to be written. And when it shall have been written by a man with the honesty, ability, and opportunities of Baron Hübner, we dare prophesy a vindication of Roderick Borgia, not less splendid than our author's vindication of Felix Peretti.

ART. VIII.—CATHOLIC PRIMARY EDUCATION IN ENGLAND.

Education to be Real must be Denominational. By FREDERICK CANON OAKELEY, M.A. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

Three Letters to the "Tablet," of May 4, May 18, and June 1, 1872. By FREDERICK CANON OAKELEY.

CANON OAKELEY has published a criticism of the remarks which we made in April, on the educational position of English Catholics under Mr. Forster's Act. It will be more satisfactory, if we begin by reprinting his three letters in extenso:—

SIR,—The writer of the article on Education in the new number of the DUBLIN REVIEW has done me some unintentional injustice, in supposing

my late pamphlet to be directed primarily or principally against the Government system, as at present enforced in English Catholic schools under inspection. Thus, he speaks of agreeing in my principles but dissenting from my "application" of those principles; and meets particular objections which I bring against the actual operation of the undenominational system, by a defence of what he believes to be the practical working of the new Act in Government-aided schools. I venture to think that he is here somewhat mistaken as to his facts, and I shall presently give my reasons for this impression. But even were I fully to admit them, my argument would remain intact; since, whatever may be the case in our English schools under Government, it is certain that in the Irish National Schools, and in schools conducted on the principles of the League, and in the projected Board schools, the statements which I have made, for example as to indirect religious teaching and sectarian history, are strictly correct.

In fact, the main object of my pamphlet, as denoted by its title, and explained both in the preface and opening sentences of the pamphlet itself, is to defend the denominational or dogmatic system of education against that which is now gaining ground in this and other countries; and to argue against what the writer of the article agrees with me in regarding as the false theory, not especially on Catholic or even religious grounds, but on such as are recognized even by our opponents. This is what I mean to sum up, in the words "education to be real must be denominational." I deal, or at least intend to deal, throughout my pamphlet with the question *in the abstract*; although of course in doing so I am led to illustrate my principle by facts, or supposed facts, tending to show the practical operation of the false theory. Certainly in these exemplifications I include the effects or tendencies of that false theory, in the department in which they come most directly home to me as the manager of a Government-aided school. But I think that I have seldom if ever named the Government, except in conjunction with the School Board, and this for the very reason that I was anxious to divest my remarks of all appearance of especial hostility to the Government system as carried out in England; while in some cases, as, for example, where I speak of the Fenian proclivities of certain schoolmasters trained under the Irish National system, I plainly imply the breadth and extended scope of my argument. I entirely agree with my reviewer, in appreciating the remnants of denominationalism which are still preserved to us in this country; and I agree with him that the action of the Government upon our Catholic schools is as yet less injurious than it might have been expected to be, or may conceivably become: nor do I think that anything I have said in my pamphlet is inconsistent with this admission. Still I do see, even in the present Government regulations, the germ of probable, as well as the reality of actual mischief, and I think that the best mode of arresting the downward course of things is to expose the real, however modified, evils of the actual system, while at the same time doing full justice to the good which is preserved in it. Although, therefore, it is not necessary to my argument to deny what the reviewer has said respecting the advantages of the present Government system, I

will yet give my reasons for considering, that his view of these advantages, and not mine of their counterbalancing defects, is liable to the charge of exaggeration.

1. No devotional act is allowed during school hours. When the Angelus bell of the church sounds, the children who used to act upon its invitation must now be mute. Which, to say the least, is a necessity not helping towards edification. In schools taught by nuns it was formerly the practice for the children to note the striking of the clock by some momentary devotional act. This too must be discontinued. 2. No religious hymn is allowed during school time; although singing is now encouraged as a part of education, and in infant schools is a necessary part of it. 3. Bible instruction is interdicted. 4. Indirect as well as direct *doctrinal* teaching is forbidden. The reviewer throws doubt upon this statement, but I will give my reason for making it. At the recent inspection of my own Poor Schools, her Majesty's Inspector (being, according to the present rule, a Protestant, and in this case a clergyman) lighted upon a book of historical sketches, in which a pious Austrian nobleman is described as having met a procession of the Blessed Sacrament, and got off his horse to do honour to Our Lord therein present. The Inspector forbade the use of the passage, and impounded the book. 5. And now as to what are called sectarian views of history. The reviewer sees no reason why a book of history, in which the Reformation is condemned, may not be used in a Catholic school, or one in which it is eulogized, in a Protestant school. But he forgets that, since the conscience clause does not prevail* during school hours, Protestant children may conceivably be present during those hours in a Catholic school, or Catholics in a Protestant one; and I greatly doubt whether the Government inspector would allow the ears of the possible minority to be offended by language adapted to the opinion of the majority. At least, if no interdict on this subject as yet exists, I have reason to believe that it is threatened. A distinguished Protestant Government Inspector, to whom I sent my pamphlet, and who pronounces its argument unanswerable from our point of view, adds, in reference to my remarks on history: "As to history, you have hit on one of our great difficulties; which, I think, will have to be got over by including that subject in the religious department, and so bringing it under the operation of the conscience clause." 6. It is perfectly true, as the reviewer insists, and no doubt very important, that a certain time is allowed twice in the day for exclusive religious instruction. But then he has forgotten to add, that the times fixed are singularly inconvenient for the purpose; the one being so early that it is very difficult to muster the children, and the other coming in at the end of their school work, when they are tired and impatient. It must also be borne in mind, that the period allowed in the morning comprehends the time for preparatory devotion; and that confession has occasionally to be included in the hour set apart for religious instruction. Moreover, should my correspondent's anticipation be realized, and other subjects besides those directly religious relegated to the religious hour, a still further deduction will be made from the present

* "Prevails" ?—ED. D. R.

allowance for catechetical instruction. At best, however, I cannot consent to regard mere religious *instruction* as anything like an adequate substitute of religious *education*; which I understand to imply the free power of introducing religion as a *permeating* element in the teaching of children. It is thus only that religion can be made interesting to children, and in this respect it is that we are so painfully crippled. Here I will take occasion to observe, that there is one remark of the reviewer which positively amazes me, and which I cannot but fear may be interpreted in a sense very wide of his intention. He says (p. 120), "an atheist might imbue a child's mind with reading, writing, and arithmetic as well as the devoutest Catholic." Will not persons be found to infer that, since these subjects form the staple of popular education, and since the religious department belongs, of course, not to the ordinary teacher, but to the clergy, it is immaterial whether such ordinary teacher be an atheist or a Christian? I well know that this is not what the reviewer means, but I neither like the remark, nor agree with it. Surely reading at all events is not perfectly open ground; to say nothing of the fact, that children sometimes ask questions of their teacher, and are, moreover, very quick in discerning his characteristics. To wind up my catalogue of *gravamina*, I will ask those who are better read in the Act of 1870 than myself, whether it be not one of the provisions of that Act, that whereas the Protestant inspector may enter the Catholic school at any time, the Bishop or priest can enter it only once a year? I ask this question hesitatingly, and do not wish to make more of the prohibition than it deserves. But, if real, it is certainly significant of an animus, and something little short of an insult.

In one respect, I think that the reviewer has been unfair to the Government. He regrets that for the future no building grants will be made to Catholic schools out of the public funds. This is true. But then it must be remembered that numerous and liberal grants have been and are being made, in answer to thousands of applications sent in on or before December 31st, 1870. It is also not so certain that the difficulty of obtaining such grants rests entirely on the side of the Government. Our own Bishops are far from regarding them as desirable; and I know of one instance in which a priest who had made application for a Government building grant, and was on the point of receiving it, was required by his diocesan to withdraw his claim, on the very reasonable ground that it is perilous to risk further Government complications.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

April 26th.

FREDERICK OAKELEY.

SIR,—As the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW has kindly promised to notice my letter to you of a fortnight ago, I feel it right to add to that letter some words of modification, explanation, and enlargement, in order that my reviewer may have the full case before him, and understand precisely the issue between us. I have reason to believe on enquiry that the different conclusions at which he and I have arrived, as to the practical operation of the new Act in our Government-aided schools, are owing in

great part to the different interpretations put upon that Act by different Government inspectors. I am recording the results of one experience, and my reviewer probably of another; and thus it is possible that we may at once differ, and yet both of us be in the right. It is true that I have not formed my conclusions simply upon my actual experience of our own inspector's words or actions, and I will go on to state on what other grounds I have formed them. But it is certain that the several Protestant inspectors, with whom the clergy of London have to deal, do differ materially in the interpretation of the Act, or at least in their mode of carrying it into effect; and thus that books or practices which are allowed by some, are discountenanced by others. A good deal seems to depend on the personal opinions of the inspectors themselves. Thus I have heard within the last few days of one of them, who is an ultra-ritualist, having allowed and even commended the use of books in which Catholic doctrine is indirectly taught, and having listened without protest or objection to the recitation of the Angelus at the appointed hour, with other such practices of periodical devotion. I am also informed that the same inspector offered no objection to the singing of our religious hymns. But in our district we have an inspector of different views; who not only objected to the use of books elsewhere allowed, but told me expressly that although the Government is disposed to treat us very leniently, and not to interfere without necessity, yet that such is the pressure employed by the secularist party, that, if we should attempt to take advantage of their good will by straining the Act in our own favour, we must expect to draw down upon us a new code of regulations, in which practices heretofore tolerated would be absolutely forbidden.

Two courses appear to be open to us. The one of them is, to load the hours of secular teaching with as much religion as we can get into them according to the laxest possible interpretation of the Act, and thus to go on till we are stopped. The other is, to regard our compact with the Government as one which obliges us in honour, not certainly to interpret the Act in too stringent a sense, but on the other hand not to strain it beyond its legitimate meaning and the obvious end to which it is directed. For myself the latter of these modes of action seems to be at once the more honest and the more politic; but if the former be sanctioned by our authorities, and practically admitted by the Government, I shall be only too happy to adopt it. But as I read the Act, and as I believe the Government intends me to read it, the case stands thus. There is a time appointed for exclusively religious, and there is another time appointed for strictly secular instruction. The former, as all admit, is inconvenient; but it no doubt gives the opportunity for a certain amount of doctrinal teaching, though in a dry and technical way. From this instruction, all those children whose parents object to it are at liberty to withdraw. But from the secular instruction they are not at liberty to withdraw, if actually in attendance at the school. It seems to me obvious that the Act cannot intend any doctrinal instruction whatever, either direct or indirect, whether as conveyed by history or otherwise, or any specially Catholic practice, to be introduced during the time at which the Conscience Clause

does not operate*; and that, inasmuch as this Conscience Clause is our protection in Protestant schools, as well as our hindrance in our own, we have a certain interest in upholding the principle upon which it is founded. For if by any chance one of our Catholic children were to find its way into a Protestant school, the evil of such a mis-location would be greatly increased, by as lax an interpretation of the Act on the other side as we are tempted to apply to it on ours. I had intended to supplement this letter by some valuable observations on the whole subject, which I have received from an excellent Catholic friend, who cordially sympathizes with the general principles of the DUBLIN REVIEW. But my letter has run out so unexpectedly, that I cannot further trespass on your kindness, and will venture to ask for a renewal of it in your impression of next week.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

May 15.

FREDERICK OAKELEY.

SIR,—I can assure my critic in the DUBLIN REVIEW with the greatest sincerity, that unlike most arguers I desire to find myself in the wrong in the little amicable controversy towards which I trust that the present letter will form my final contribution. My natural love of peace and quietness, the respect I feel for the intentions, and the allowance we must all be disposed to make for the difficulties of those who are chiefly responsible for the new Education Act, and above all my interest as a priest and school-manager in the maintenance of our connection with the Government, all incline me to hope that my misgivings as to our educational condition and prospects are groundless or exaggerated; and dispose me to receive with gratitude and sympathy the suggestions of those who are at once thoroughly agreed with me in principle, and more hopeful than myself on the subject which causes me anxiety. It was therefore with pleasure that I received and read the able report of the excellent secretary of the Poor School Committee, and that I have since heard of the favourable reception which this report has met at the hands of the authorities who preside over the Education Department. I will say also that, had my own experience as to the practical operation of the new Act corresponded with that of some of my reverend brethren, I should have agreed with my critic in considering that so far, if we had not gained, at all events we had not lost by the changes which the Act has made in the constitution and conduct of our schools. But when I find that, as I stated in my last letter, the construction put upon the Act by various inspectors is materially different, I cannot help coming to the conclusion that the favourable operation of it is a mere accident; and that since it is so vaguely worded as to admit of almost contradictory interpretations, it is not only an occasion of great inconvenience and embarrassment to us at present, but it may become an instrument of serious mischief in the hands of an executive less tolerantly disposed towards us than those who have now the administration of it.

* "Operates" ?—ED. D. R.

For instance my critic tells me, if I remember right (for I have not his words before me) that indirect religious teaching is still permitted during the hours of secular instruction; and that, as to history, I may be entirely satisfied that, in a Catholic school, Catholic views might be inculcated through its medium. But I must remind him that in the first place the Act does not recognize any school as specifically Catholic, or otherwise denominational, but employs the general term "public elementary schools" to describe all institutions designed for primary teaching; and presumes in theory that excepting during the hour of religious instruction, children of any religion may resort to them. Moreover, I have just received practical evidence that indirect religious teaching by means of history is, in the judgment of one inspector at least, forbidden by the Act; though whether or not his objection will be adopted by the Government, I am not as yet in a position to state.

But if the Act in some of its provisions be ambiguous, it is in others only too plain. For example; it provides in the seventh section that "it shall not be required as a condition of any child being admitted into or continuing in the school that he shall *attend or abstain from attending any Sunday school or any place of religious worship, or that he shall attend any religious observance, or any instruction in religious subjects in the school or elsewhere* from which observance or instruction he may be withdrawn by his parent." Now let us observe the effect of this provision, the salient points of which I have italicized. The description is general, "any child, &c.," and consequently any Catholic child who should habitually abstain from Mass or catechism, or whom his parents should choose to withdraw from all Catholic instruction, or send to the Protestant Church, could neither be dismissed from the Catholic school, or punished, or placed under any disadvantage whatever in comparison with the children who might be observant of all their religious duties. He may play outside the church in the face of the people on a Sunday during the time when Mass is being said, or catechetical instruction given, and if bidden to come in, he may defy the priest, even though he be a manager of the school, and take shelter under the Act of Parliament. This, as I know from experience, is no imaginary case. Nothing but unwillingness to trespass on your space prevents my following up this subject more at length. As it is, I will content myself with leaving the exposition of the difficulties under which the new Act places us in the hands of an able and thoughtful correspondent. I do not say that I make his views without exception, my own, but I think that they are, at all events, sufficiently important to deserve a special treatment from the pen of the DUBLIN reviewer.

"The DUBLIN omits one very serious consideration, *i.e.* the schools are not under the control of even the managers. You cannot refuse admission, if you have room, to a heretic, and in small places the heretic boys and girls might outnumber the Catholic. You cannot expel a Catholic boy for neglecting his Easter duties, or even Mass on the holy days of precept. All your school may be outside the church, and you are without redress. . . . I cannot believe that the children, knowing this, will be none the worse for it. If you admit the Bishop into your school (which is at your

option) you must give notice first to all who would like to absent themselves; then the Bishop, when he comes, is your delegate and servant, for he is there by virtue of leave given by you. Then you cannot admit him more than twice in the year. The schools are not under the Bishop at all, for he cannot visit them when he pleases. . . . On the whole, and in theory, we have given up the children to the State, and are acting, not as the Church, but as the servants of the civil power. . . . The indifference that must come out of the new scheme will be very visible in the course of ten years, and in twenty the mischief may be irreparable. If we could have the Pope's sanction we should be safe, even in the furnace; but without it I am afraid, and the more so because of the Fribourg Brief, which distinctly says that schools out of which the authority of the Church has been thrust cannot be frequented. The DUBLIN puts the Brief on one side by calling it an ideal, whereas it is distinctly practical, and was issued to meet a real fact. There is no more of the ideal about it than about a sentence in a court of law." The compensation which the Act gives us for all which it takes from us is the gracious permission to use schools built at the expense of Catholics, and maintained principally by their contributions, for the instruction of the school children, at a stated and very inconvenient time, in the rudiments of their religion. But it neither obliges the teachers to give the instruction nor the children to attend it, nor places either of the parties under any disadvantage for their neglect of duty.

I will now briefly call to mind in conclusion the circumstances out of which this little amicable controversy arose. The operation of the new Act in Government-aided schools upon which, contrary to my desire, the question between the reviewer and myself has turned, was but one of several illustrations, which I gave in my pamphlet of what I there called the undenominational system of education, and by far the least conspicuous of those illustrations. The object of my pamphlet was to show, not specially that this particular illustration of the system, but that the system itself, is shallow and unphilosophical. I waived the question of its religious bearings because I was concerned merely with an argument *ad hominem*. I have been led by the force of circumstances to speak exclusively of that which is decidedly the most harmless of the examples of the sort of education with which this nation is to be flooded. I cannot help thinking, though I am of course a partial judge, that enough has been elicited in the progress of the discussion to prove that the new theory of national education is superficial and something worse.—With sincere thanks for your kind insertion of my letters,

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

FREDERICK OAKELEY.

May 25.

P.S.—The above extract from my correspondent's letter will explain and rectify an impression which I hesitatingly conveyed in my first letter as to the restriction which I had supposed to be placed by the Act upon the visits of the priest or Bishop. My correspondent describes more correctly than I did the nature and extent of this restriction.

We have profound respect and regard for Canon Oakeley ; as has every one who enjoys the pleasure of his acquaintance. Further, we cannot but feel most grateful to him, both for the admirable exposition of (what we hold to be) the one true educational doctrine, which he has given in his pamphlet,—and also for some excellent remarks in the same strain interspersed through these letters. Nevertheless we must begin on this occasion with a friendly remonstrance. The question he has raised is indeed of urgent practical importance ; it is one on which the unanimity of good Catholics is an object especially to be desired ; and one, nevertheless, on which the most loyal and zealous sons of the Church differ from each other (it may almost be said) fundamentally. We heartily feel with him therefore, that excellent service will be done by the most careful and frank criticism of conflicting arguments. But then *in order that* such service may be done, it is necessary that whoever engages in the discussion shall take pains to apprehend rightly, first, the precise position of his opponents, and secondly, the precise drift and bearing of his own words. We cannot but think that in both these respects Canon Oakeley has been somewhat deficient.

We will begin with the *second* of our two complaints. We think that, in one or two particulars, he has not sufficiently apprehended the drift and bearing of his own words. The strongest instance of this appears in his third letter. His anonymous correspondent does not hesitate to declare, that, in the Holy Father's judgment, those English Catholic schools which are now receiving Government help, "cannot be frequented."* Yet it is simply undeniable, that all the Catholic bishops in England, without exception, earnestly exhort the faithful to send their children to Catholic schools, and that the large majority of these schools receive Government help. Canon Oakeley then publishes the opinion of an anonymous friend, that all the English Catholic bishops earnestly exhort the faithful to do that which, in the Holy Father's judgment, may not be done. Canon Oakeley does not even give the weight of his own name, as a guarantee for this allegation ; but, on the contrary, adds, "I do not say that I make his views without exception my own." And he leaves this anonymous statement to produce what effect it may—however injurious to the reputation and due influence of Catholic bishops—on those

* "The Fribourg Brief," he declares, "distinctly says that schools out of which the authority of the Church has been excluded cannot be frequented." And the very purpose of his argument is to show, that the English Catholic schools which now receive Government help are incontestably in this category.

readers of the "Tablet," who may be unguarded enough to credit it. We well know that Canon Oakeley will be quite as much shocked as we could be, at the notion of so acting; and yet (as it seems to us) he *has* so acted. This is the very thing which we so much regret; that he has taken no sufficient pains to understand the drift and bearing of his own words.

We will not conclude our article without carefully considering this Fribourg Brief, and showing how completely Canon Oakeley's friend has misunderstood it. For the present however, we pass to a second instance of that carelessness on Canon Oakeley's part, which we deprecate. In our April article we incidentally made a remark, which is next door to a truism; viz. that "An atheist might imbue Catholic children with their 'three Rs' as effectively as the devoutest Catholic" could do (p. 420). Canon Oakeley has really no more doubt of this proposition, than we have. However grievous he might account the calamity that Catholic children should be instructed by an atheist,—and he could not possibly account it more grievous than we do,—he would never dream of alleging, that such children might not be most effectively imbued with their "three Rs." Such children, he justly thinks, would receive an injury incalculably *graver* than this; but they need not receive this particular injury. Yet, in his first letter, he says that our proposition "positively amazes" him.* He must understand us then as meaning,—so our readers will at once say,—that it is *immaterial*, whether a Catholic or an atheist imparts secular instruction in a Catholic school. But he does *not* understand us so; for he says in so many words, "I well know that this is not what the Reviewer means." What then *is* it which he understands us to mean, against which his arguments are relevant? He does not give the faintest hint, and we cannot form the faintest conjecture.

Perhaps, however, what he intended to say was, that our article, *taken by itself*, would imply a certain opinion, which, *on other grounds*, he was confident we did not hold: that opinion being, that secular instruction could be as beneficially imparted to Catholic children by an atheist, as by the devoutest Catholic. If he really meant this, he does but illustrate our *other* criticism of his letters; viz. that he has not taken sufficient pains to apprehend our various statements.

We reply then firstly, that the very clause he quotes, taken by itself, cannot be fairly understood in the sense he gives it. To teach a child his "three Rs" "effectively," does not

* He does not even take the trouble to quote our words correctly. For the word "effectively" he substitutes the more ambiguous word "well."

mean to teach them "in such a manner as shall conduce to piety and Catholic docility"; but to teach them "so that they shall be really learned and acquired." This is the one legitimate sense of the adverb in such a connection; and it is the sense in which we employed it.

But if our article is looked at *as a whole*, Canon Oakeley's allegation,—if it really *be* his allegation,—is far more surprising. In p. 413 we had said:—"We quite agree with Canon Oakeley, that Catholic children will suffer grievous spiritual evil by learning even the 'three Rs' from non-Catholic teachers, and among non-Catholic companions." In p. 422 we gave an opinion, that "the question of securing thoroughly accomplished Catholic teachers, assumes under existing circumstances quite exceptional importance." In the paragraph immediately preceding that from which Canon Oakeley quotes, we call it "*the most important part of all*," that "*discipline be enforced from first to last on Catholic motives*" (p. 420). Could he understand us as contemplating two different officials in each school, one to teach, and the other to enforce discipline? Or, on the other hand, could he suppose us to think, that an atheist will enforce discipline on Catholic motives?

But now take the paragraph itself, from which Canon Oakeley isolated one single half-sentence:—

Then consider further. The main—the almost exclusive—staple of primary secular instruction must ever be those matters which we have mentioned; reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, and the like. Now the character of these studies should be observed. Of course the *act* of study, like all other human acts, may and ought to be animated by religious motives; but religion is simply irrelevant to *the study itself*. There is no strictly *religious* method, we say, of imbuing a child's mind with his "three Rs"; and an atheist might imbue Catholic children therewith, as effectively as the devoutest Catholic. Doubtless it would be somewhat more conducive to their spiritual well-being, if the two-hour study were occasionally interrupted by some religious act: nevertheless at best this would be *simply* an interruption (p. 420).

If Canon Oakeley will but patiently read through this not very long paragraph, he will find it impossible to mistake our meaning. We drew a distinction between such studies as reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, on the one hand,—and such as history, e.g., on the other. It would be intolerable tyranny, if Catholic teachers were commanded to teach *history*, without reference to the characteristic doctrines of their religion; because, in the judgment of all Catholics, the matter so imparted would be a *perversion* of facts, and not history at

all. But there is no corresponding hardship in reference to the "three Rs"; because, as we expressed it, "religion is simply irrelevant to the study."

As we have been led to say so much on this particular question,—the question of Catholic children receiving secular instruction from non-Catholic teachers,—it will be more convenient to proceed at once with our few remaining remarks on this particular theme. It seems to us then, that several excellent Catholics are by no means sufficiently alive to the disastrous results of such an arrangement. Children in general are very far from being the voluntary or even passive recipients of instruction: on the contrary, in order that they may give requisite attention, it is necessary to ply them with motives of every kind; to visit them with exhortations, threats, promises, punishments, rewards. In our view, there is no one more important part of religious education, than the administering such addresses on sound Catholic principles; while, on the other hand, nothing more injures their Christian growth; than irreligious and capricious discipline. So long as they are under the direction of a well-principled and well-educated Catholic teacher, that blessing is secured to them, which Canon Oakeley so much desiderates; for religion is a "permeating element" of their whole training. On the other hand, it afflicts one with the keenest grief to think that, as time goes on, so large and increasing a number of Catholic children are likely to be placed under the instruction of non-Catholics. We will heartily allow everything which can be alleged, on the importance that the Catholic poor should not fall behind their fellow-countrymen in secular knowledge. Yet such an evil is to our mind hardly more than dust in the balance, when compared with the calamity of their breathing, in the tender years of childhood, a non-Catholic atmosphere for so many hours of every day.

Having spoken on this particular part of our subject, we will now enter on a more general course of remark. Canon Oakeley said in his original pamphlet (p. 12) that "true education" had been "rendered *utterly impracticable* by that which is now required by our Government in all schools receiving support from the State." These were very strong words of his; and they were calculated, in our humble judgment, seriously to mislead Catholic opinion: the more so, because of the very high place which he justly holds in Catholic estimation. It was for this reason that we thought it important to point out, what we considered the exaggeration of his statement. It now appears however, that he himself accepts Government assistance for his schools; and doubtless he

reckoned on this circumstance being so taken into account, that his words would not be understood in a more stringent sense than he intended to give them. But we assure him we had not the remotest suspicion of this circumstance, until we read his letters.

On the other hand, those letters are calculated to convey a very mistaken notion, on the amount of our sympathy with the recent Act. In his third letter indeed, he actually ascribes to us the opinion, that "if we [Catholics] have not gained, at least we have not lost, by the changes which the Act has made." We will therefore briefly remind our readers of what we really did say in April. We gave an opinion (p. 413) that "since that Act has been passed, most earnest and self-sacrificing efforts may be necessary, for the purpose of averting, not only grave violations of principle, but *grave practical calamities*." We did not "*dream* of contending, that the recent Act has not in some considerable degree interfered with the means which a Catholic teacher has at his disposal." (pp. 419-420.) "Catholic children will suffer grievous spiritual evil in non-Catholic schools." (p. 413.) "It is urgent that Catholics shall strain every nerve" against "the evil influences with which they are now threatened." (p. 422.) It is no social progress, but much the reverse, that children of the lower orders be imbued with that degree and kind of secular instruction which is now proposed. (pp. 422-3.) "Seldom has there been a more anxious prospect . . . than at the present time." (p. 427.)

Still we do not wish to understate the divergency which exists, between Canon Oakeley's language on one hand, and our own opinion on the other. We heartily agree with him indeed, that the attendance of Catholic children at Anglican or secularist schools is a grievous calamity; but he has said—so far as his *words* go—that true education is impracticable, even in *Catholic* schools which receive support from the State. If this were so, it would follow that no clear-sighted priest could accept Government help, and that no clear-sighted Bishop could *permit* his priests to accept it. But, as we have said, Canon Oakeley shows by his acts how far his language is from expressing his true mind. And for our own part—lamentable as has been the injury inflicted even on *Catholic* schools by the recent Act,—we think nevertheless (p. 420) that a Catholic teacher "has still full power, through proportionally increased efforts, of making his school thoroughly Catholic in spirit and in tendency." So far as Canon Oakeley dissents from this statement, he mainly defends such dissent by reciting various evils introduced by the new Act, on which

he thinks we have not laid sufficient stress. We think he has done excellent service in drawing attention to those evils; and we hope that, by reprinting his letters, we may have done something towards giving his comment even increased circulation. But to our mind no one of the evils, nor all of them put together,—however seriously some of them may *impede* a Catholic teacher's work—make that work by any means impossible or hopeless. Let our readers judge.

There is one positive mistake indeed, though only one, into which he thinks we have inadvertently fallen. He doubts the truth of our statement, that the Catholic teacher is at liberty to inculcate Catholic views of history during the two two-hour periods of secular instruction. If we could mention however, without impropriety, the source of our information on this head, Canon Oakeley would see that there cannot be more irrefragable authority, as to what was intended by *the framers of the Act*. Then the Report of the Poor School Committee speaks expressly on a matter, whereof that committee must of course possess certain cognizance. "So far as history is taught at all in the secular instruction of the school"—so speaks the Report—the State "does not require that the books used by the school should set forth particular views as to history. To do so would at once destroy its neutrality." And lastly the anecdote, told by Canon Oakeley for the purpose of invalidating our statement, on the contrary confirms it. The "distinguished Protestant Government inspector," to whom he sent his pamphlet, says that it may possibly be necessary *hereafter* to proscribe history during the period of secular instruction: thus implying, by his very form of speech, that no such proscription at present exists.

On the other hand Canon Oakeley mentions a case, in which a book (as we understand him), used as a *reading manual*, was proscribed by the inspector because of its indirect Catholic teaching. If this decision were even final, it seems to us (we confess) a matter of small importance. Our own notion is, that a child's intellectual faculties are so engrossed by the mechanical difficulties of the art he is learning, that no religious lesson of any great moment can be simultaneously imparted by his book. But if Canon Oakeley means that the book in question was actually used as a text-book for historical lessons, we are confident that the prohibition would be reversed on appeal.

In his second letter Canon Oakeley recounts several facts of great importance, which illustrate the different interpretations placed on the new Act by different inspectors. In the same letter he also raises a question of much practical interest, as to

the most suitable course to be adopted under present circumstances by Catholic school managers. Our own feeling is entirely accordant with his; except indeed on that particular detail of which we have just spoken, the study of history.

In his third letter Canon Oakeley says most truly, that great weight should be accorded to the recent Report of the Poor School Committee, which we just now mentioned. That document indeed throws light on the subject in so many different ways, that we are confident our readers will thank us for reprinting that portion of it which relates to our present theme, notwithstanding the many pages of our number which it will occupy. We must explain however, that there are one or two somewhat important particulars, in which, for our own part, we are unable to accept its implied lessons. In the first place, unless we entirely misapprehend its bearing, it is worded throughout on the theory,—against which we protested in April (pp. 422-3),—that what now goes by the name of popular education is a social advance, and not (as we conceive) a social retrogression. In the second place (consistently enough with its assumption of that theory) it does no kind of justice (we think) to the standpoint of those, who gravely doubted, before ecclesiastical authority had given its judgment, whether Catholics would act wisely in uniting their schools on any terms with the State, and promoting in any way that high-pressure secular education of the masses which is now in vogue. But these are at present mere matters of abstract speculation; and in regard to what is immediately practical, our readers will find (we think) that the view we took in April is fully sanctioned by this high authority. Here then shall follow the passage in question; and all who peruse it will be struck with its lucidity and completeness of statement:—

A year ago a wave of the tide, which everywhere in Europe is striking against the Church in Her relation to the School, passed over England. In what position has it left us? It is of importance to consider, in this matter of primary education, exactly where we stand,—whether it is in the same position which we held before, or in another one; and if another, in what the change consists. A review of the past is often the best mode of understanding the present, and therefore of putting it to the best account. It often likewise supplies a warning, and sometimes a preservative, against evils which threaten the future.

The period which elapsed, from the commencement of the union of Catholic primary schools with the inspection of the Privy Council down to the Education Act, may be termed the past. This period commenced for us in December, 1847,—when certain minutes of the Privy Council admitted for the first time Catholic, like other schools, to the public grants

administered by it,—and terminated on the 31st of March, 1871, when the Act began to take effect. The inspection of Catholic schools thus inaugurated was confined to secular instruction only; and the inspectors were not to be appointed without the concurrence of the Catholic Poor School Committee, which was thus acknowledged to represent the Catholic body. What we have especially here to note is, the attitude of the Government in respect to the union of religious with secular instruction. During the whole of this period this union was a condition of all grants; though the mode in which it was carried out differed in the various religious communities with which the Government had to deal. Thus in Anglican schools the inspector was appointed with the concurrence of the Archbishop of Canterbury or of York for their several provinces; and this concurrence was a larger one than that given in the case of Catholic schools, and in virtue of it the inspector exercised supervision over both religious and secular instruction, and both obtained marks for participation in grants. But in Dissenting, as in Catholic schools, though there were no marks for religious instruction, and though the inspection did not deal with it, yet the religious community was credited with having given it. In the Anglican schools, indeed, the Privy Council determined, by the examination of the inspector in the schools, and by the questions given in its papers to teachers who wished to obtain the certificate, how much religious instruction it would require, and what should be its quality. But in Dissenting schools, as in Catholic, it left the religious community to determine both the amount and the quality of the religious instruction. Thus greatly as both amount and quality might differ in the British and Foreign Society schools and in Catholic schools, yet the one and the other received grants at the same time from the Government, on the same condition of supplying what each considered fitting religious instruction. During all this period the Government repudiated practically, by giving it no grants, the notion of what has now come to be called secular education. It said, in fact, by its acts, there is no education without religion; but as you, with whom we have to deal, are at issue as to what religion is, we do not enter into your differences, but require of each of you to educate your child in religion as you understand it. It followed, of course, that the inspection was more thorough in the schools of the Established Church, as it embraced both religious and secular instruction; while in the case of the other two classes of schools just mentioned, the religious community was more free; so much so, indeed, that it could neglect, if it chose, the religious instruction left to its care. But this was not the meaning of the system, nor the intention of the Government. On the contrary, from the beginning to the end it recognised religion as forming part and parcel of education. In the case of the Established Church, it saw by its inspection that this condition was fulfilled. In the other cases, it credited the religious community with the fulfilment of the condition.

What has been just said of the Government in its attitude towards the Church, defines likewise the position of the Church during this period. The Government gave its money grants in return for a certain amount of instruction and efficiency in teaching, of the existence of which it satisfied

itself by its inspection. As to all the rest, the freedom of the Church was complete. There was no interference with the books used ; no limitation as to the times of teaching various subjects ; no time-table relegating religious instruction to one time and secular instruction to another. A great increase in the severity and precision of the inspection took place when the Revised Code was introduced ; and the payments which at first were made to teachers and for pupil-teachers were gradually merged in a capitation grant. But all this did not affect the perfect liberty of religious teaching which existed in the schools of the various religious communities, in virtue of which British and Foreign schools and Catholic schools, which hold principles as to the mode of conveying religious instruction in absolute contradiction to each other, were enabled to share the same grants. The efficiency of each was supervised ; the conscience of each was respected. The yearly inspection was a guarantee to the State, that a certain standard of instruction was reached. If the school fell short of this, it was fined accordingly ; but the State did not say " You shall give so much, and at such hours, to secular instruction." Year after year attention was drawn in the Reports by this Committee to the liberty thus enjoyed, and to the great opportunity left to the Church to leaven the child with its own spirit. Perhaps this liberty and this opportunity will be more deeply appreciated, under the less favourable state of things which has now been introduced.

The advantages derived from this joint action of Church and State may be thus briefly alluded to. And first, when the Privy Council began to administer the public grant in support of primary education, anything like a system of primary education, or a class of qualified teachers in either sex, can hardly be said to have existed. Gradually, and as the result of many tentative efforts, came the recognition that there is such a thing as an art of primary teaching. In the preceding chaotic period it was often seen that men and women, who had succeeded in nothing else, betook themselves to teaching ; and pretended to impart to children what they had either not at all, or very insufficiently, learned themselves. It is more remarkable that managers were reduced to allow teachers of this sort in their schools. We cannot wonder that it soon became apparent to those who then directed the public administration, that it was necessary to create a race of teachers. This was done by the formation of the class of pupil-teachers, and the founding of training-schools to carry on and perfect the work so begun. By and by it was found further, that the training-school involved the necessity of practising-schools in immediate connection with it. All this was the work of years,—a work continually growing, correcting itself, and expanding by the lessons of daily experience. Much of it was already done and in operation, when Catholic schools were admitted into the system ; and there can be no doubt that, as a general rule, our schools needed these improvements as much as any others. The recognition that there is truly an art of primary teaching, and the formation in training-schools of young teachers who have already passed several years in preliminary pupillage, were the necessary bases of all future improvement. Next came the application of the best method of teaching in

inspected schools. To establish this, the regular training of the teacher required to be followed by the maintenance of an uniform system of inspection. The inspector is the living rule, who carries from one school to another the result of the whole experience won by the system which he administers; he can point out, and by pointing out correct, defects in discipline and errors in method, besides noting the good or bad spirit of the school; and it is one of the most valuable arrangements of the Privy Council, that the capacity and rank of the teacher are not gauged simply by a written examination, but by a searching inspection of the school, which is his living work. But, fourthly, the rules of the Privy Council insured in the schools which they inspected buildings proper in dimensions, in arrangements, in salubrity; a supply of books; and the employment of teachers, whose certificates should be some guarantee at least of their suitableness for their work. And, more especially since the application of the Revised Code, their grants have been paid only for actual results ascertained and attested by the inspector after individual examination; and there can be no doubt that this has a great bearing on the efficiency of the school. As administrators of the public money, the Committee on Education would take nothing for granted. Probably one of the first results of their experience was a conviction, that the unconditional payment of money grants has no tendency to improve the teaching and management of a school. Perhaps none but those who have had the opportunity of comparing together the condition of schools which are under a settled system of inspection and of uninspected schools, as to the matters above mentioned,—that is, as to teachers, method of instruction, discipline, supply of books, and suitable buildings,—will have an adequate notion of what has been done for primary education since the establishment of the Minutes of Council. These advantages were common to all schools; but there are two which belong to us specially. The necessity of the teacher being certificated, in order to obtain the grant, induced a great many Religious to apply for it. In this they made a great sacrifice of natural feeling for the good of the school; but thereby was effected the union of an external standard of secular qualification with the piety of the Religious life, and the blessing on teaching thence to be expected. For while a Religious, who is likewise an accomplished teacher, is invaluable,—on the other hand the religious life does not of itself bestow the requisite knowledge and training, and the Rule does not always prescribe teaching, so that there is nothing to ensure that a Religious merely as such must be a good teacher. Wherever it is possible to join the two things together, and especially where the Religious Rule enjoins as much attention to teaching as is imposed on the secular teacher by the contract in which he engages, the gain to the school is great. And we may hope that the attainment of the certificate by so many Religious during the period we are describing has often realised this gain. The other advantage which our past history makes of singular value to us is, that during the whole series of these grants, extending over twenty-three years, a great public department, representing Parliament and the State itself, treated Catholic school-managers and teachers like other citizens of a free Government, and

Catholic poor-schools like poor-schools not Catholic. We had fair play and no favour; and the Privy Council, seeing by the operation of its own rules in a great variety of detail our needs and difficulties, was helping us to do an indispensable work. Hence has followed the removal of many prejudices and misconceptions on both sides. But, to realise how great an advantage this has been, it is requisite to remember that this is the first time for three hundred years that Catholics have been treated with fair-play in the distribution of a public grant; and more particularly the first time they have been helped in the work of education, without any sacrifice of their religion being imposed as a condition of the help.

It is only after considering the six points above enumerated, that we come to the money grants themselves. We hold that the importance of the conditions under which these grants were earned exceeds their money value in itself. If we could have had the same money by yearly unconditional gifts, it would have done us little good in comparison. The prime and chief value of the grants lay in the improvement of education, of which they were the instrument. It lies still in the altered condition of the educating power which they have brought about. It consists in the aggregate of the teachers created, the schools built, the reading-books produced, the inspection submitted to, the standard of instruction set up, the hearty co-operation in a good work of two powers which had been enemies for centuries. Its value for the future will consist in the continuance of these things. The grants thus made to Catholic schools in Great Britain down to the 31st March, 1870 (which are the last published, but do not include the last year of the period under consideration), amounted to £487,799. 4s. 4d. The number of children in average attendance at day-schools in the year ending the 31st August, 1870, amounted to 77,333, and in the night-schools to 10,353. So much, then, for the terms of union, the relative position of the Government and the Church, the system of instruction carried out by means of their co-operation, the moral and material aid secured by it, and the amount of the population which it had reached before the passing of the Education Act. We have now to consider how much of this system is carried on in the new one founded by that Act.

The Act established a new mechanism—the School Board—in order to reach that portion of the population, which the voluntary and denominational schools had not touched. But it likewise recognised all that these schools had done, and proposed to continue to them the Parliamentary grant which for so many years they had been receiving. At the same time in so doing it imposed certain changes in the conditions under which the grant for the future was to be received. The first of these was, that every school receiving such a grant should be a "public elementary school" (Act, Clause 7); whereas before it had been a school of some one denomination, which had voluntarily come into connection with the Privy Council by applying for a grant. In virtue of the character thus imposed on it, no child attending it should be required as a condition "to attend any religious observance, or any instruction in religious subjects in the school or elsewhere, from which he may be withdrawn by his parent."

And to facilitate this it was required, that "any religious observance practised, or instruction in religious subjects given," should be at the beginning or end of the morning or afternoon attendance, or both (Act, Clause 7). So far the school is truly made "a public elementary school;" in the sense that to whatever denomination it may belong, children of parents not belonging to such a denomination may be sent to it, without their being required to attend its religious observances or instruction. But, on the other hand, these religious observances and instruction are left unrestricted at the times not reserved for secular instruction. The liberty thus left is most expressly guarded: for "the school shall be open at all times to the inspection of any of her Majesty's inspectors; so, however, that it shall be no part of the duties of such inspector to inquire into any instruction in religious subjects given at such school, or to examine any scholar therein, in religious knowledge, or in any religious subject or book" (Act, Clause 7). The Act further enjoined, that "the school shall be conducted in accordance with the conditions required to be fulfilled by an elementary school in order to obtain an annual Parliamentary Grant" (Act, Clause 7, 3), "which shall be those contained in the Minutes of the Education Department in force for the time being" (Act, Clause 97). By this it will be seen that all "public elementary schools" stand henceforth under two authorities—one, the fixed text of the Education Act; the other the Code of the Council Minutes "in force for the time being." And the power of this second authority—which is the living interpreter of the Act—was seen at once, when it added to the conditions of the Act in the 7th clause, requiring that religious observance or instruction should only take place at the beginning or end of an attendance or at both, the much more onerous condition that "attendance at a morning or afternoon meeting may not be reckoned for any scholar, who has been under instruction in secular subjects less than two hours" (Code, Art. 23). The Act, that is, relegated the religious instruction to a particular time; but the Code came upon it, and limited the possible extent of that time. It is one inconvenience to be limited to a particular time for religious instruction, which inconvenience is imposed by the Act; it is quite another, when the possible hours of school attendance being limited within a narrow border of excess, four of those hours, two in the morning and two in the afternoon continuously, are required to be given to secular instruction. This second inconvenience was added by the Code to the Act; and makes the joint effect of Code and Act much more stringent than the text of the Act by itself, in the very point wherein the chief change lay.

With these restrictions and conditions, the Education Act continued on the system of Parliamentary annual grants as it existed before. Indeed it confirmed these grants by placing them, after examination, under the safeguard of an Act of Parliament, and that an Act made to inaugurate a system of national primary education; and it likewise increased their amount. The result is, that the Act has placed all "public elementary schools" under the supervision of the Committee of Council entitled "the Education Department." But these schools are of two classes. The one class comprehends all Church of England, Dissenting, Catholic, or other

schools, in which specific religious instruction, over and above the two periods of two continuous hours of secular instruction, may be given under the restriction of times noted above. And these schools receive in return the Parliamentary annual grant. The other class comprehends all Board Schools, in which "no religious catechism or religious formulary which is distinctive of any particular denomination shall be taught" (Act, Clause 14, 2). These schools are subject to the Revised Code, and according to it receive the Parliamentary grant; but are further to be built and maintained by rates, and managed by boards. It would be a complete mistake for any such School Board to suppose itself a Board of Education, for all the first class of schools in any given district does not fall under its jurisdiction at all. The sole Board of Education is the "Education Department," which stands in relation and supervision to every "public elementary school." What, then, is the position of the State represented by the Education Department, with regard to the Church, under the Act and the Code?

The chief change consists in the new attitude taken up by the State as to religious instruction. In the old system, all its grants were made on the condition of religious instruction being given in the school. In the large majority of the schools aided by it, those of the national Church, its inspectors were likewise the Church's inspectors, and examined in religion as well as in secular knowledge. In the other schools aided by it, its inspection stopped short of religion, but supposed it to be taught by the community to which the school belonged according to its several belief. In the new system it is strictly laid down, that any grant of the Education Department "shall not be made in respect of any instruction in religious subjects"; and that the conditions of its Code "shall not require that the school shall be in connection with a religious denomination, or that religious instruction shall be given in the school" (Act, Clause 97). Thus while the idea of the old system was that there is no education without religion, the Act, without saying anything on the speculative truth, withdraws the State's supervision altogether from the subject of religion, and declares that it will make its grant for secular instruction only. We may here note two things. First, that the position thus taken up with regard to the various religious communities is simply neutral. It does not favour one more than another. It is the propagandist of none, the guardian of the freedom of all. For, secondly, with regard to religious instruction, this is put under a certain restriction of time, but under no restriction of quality. As to time, four hours continuously, two in the morning attendance and two in the afternoon, are to be given to secular instruction. This constitutes that for which the State makes its grant; this is the subject-matter, which it narrowly inspects, and pays according to its efficiency. But outside of this time, it permits religious instruction, and does not claim to interfere with its quality, or with the use of the schoolroom. It by no means claims to impose the use of certain books; but only that religious instruction shall not be given during certain hours. And so far as history is taught at all in the secular instruction of the school, it does not require that the books used in the school should set forth particular views as to history.

To do so would at once destroy its neutrality. It remains then, that all which has hitherto been taught in Catholic schools as to specific religious instruction may be taught still outside the margin of the four hours ; and that as to whatever secular instruction is given during the four hours, it remains still in the hands of the teacher and manager to give the tone and spirit of the school. School buildings are still at liberty to inscribe upon their walls such texts as "The Word was made Flesh, and dwelt among us" "He humbled Himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross" ; or to put up a statue of the Virgin Mother with the Child in her arms, and the image of Christ crucified. The change is the greatest in the schools of the Established Church ; for here the State withdraws from the religious supervision which it had previously exercised. In Catholic schools it had no such supervision before, but only stipulated that religious instruction should be given ; now however, with regard to all public elementary schools, it warns its inspectors that it shall be "no part of their duty to inquire into any instruction in religious subjects given in the school" (Act, Clause 7, 3).

And this defines the position of the Church in the new system. It is plain that the perfect freedom which it possessed before is interfered with as to time. No grant may be claimed for any attendance of the child in the day-school, wherein two hours of continuous secular instruction through the whole school is not given. As the school hours, which are limited to six hours a day by the rule which does not require the attendance of pupil-teachers for more (Code, Art. 70, *f.* second schedule), are in practice scarcely ever more than five, out of which is to be deducted the time for marking in the registers, this condition limits considerably the time to be given to specific religious instruction ; while by fixing it at the beginning or end of the school time by a time-table to be rigidly observed, a liberty previously possessed of giving religious instruction at any time to a class in a school is incidentally taken away. Again, the irregular scholars, those who come late, or who leave early to carry dinners, &c., get the smallest share of religious instruction, while they are the class that most need it. The conclusion is, that whereas before the Church was free, she now works in chains, but yet she is allowed to work. Adequate religious instruction can be given, where there is a resolution to do the utmost, and where there is full co-operation on the part of managers and teachers. Her schools are still her own, though it may cost her more effort to pervade them with her spirit. Is it not a fresh call upon the devotion of managers and teachers ? There is more labour and more difficulty in discharging a primary duty than before. But there is no impossibility. This brings us to the question, What advantages do we derive from accepting the co-operation of the State on the new terms ?

We retain the six advantages mentioned above as belonging to the old system. They embrace the possession of qualified teachers, training schools, the best method of instruction, supported by uniform inspection acting on the teachers and the taught, the encouragement of Religious to take the certificate, and equal treatment by the State. The keeping up of all these things by an external power, and the maintenance of an extrinsic

standard of secular instruction, set up by the State and kept up to the mark of gradual progression for the whole country, are a great good to us. The submitting of our pupil-teachers and teachers to an unrestricted competition, the treating of our schools and their results with rigid fairness and no favour, although the original condition of having only Catholic inspectors has been removed without any compensation to us, however hard the discipline, may in the end be serviceable. If there be a present loss, the change may lead to greater exertion, and be succeeded by larger gain. But the very exertion is a good. In what was said above, these things have been considered in themselves ; but connected with them, and in fact, as their motive power, is a large annual Parliamentary grant—say £40,000 a-year at present. If this were withdrawn, if we had to replace and continue on by our unaided exertions the works which it supports, may it not be doubted, considering the nature and extent of our population, whether we should be equal to the task? At this moment we have no inspection of secular instruction save that of the Education Department. The schools which are not under this, as a matter of fact, go without inspection as to the efficiency of their secular instruction. But, moreover, it is a great many years since this Committee urged the universal employment of religious inspection. It is still only partial—it is not uniform ; the several inspectors do not confer together, nor work on any agreed standard. But inspection has been considered by the Education Department from the beginning as the primary condition of efficiency. Does not every one who has given attention to schools, or examined and compared them, agree with this judgment of the Education Department? But inspection is only one of the advantages above named. It must be supported by training-schools and qualified teachers. Could we maintain them all if we had to stand by ourselves?

It is undoubtedly a downward movement for the State itself to retreat from avowing that religious instruction forms an essential part of education. This, as we have seen, it did avow by its condition of making grants up to the Education Act. But to us as Catholics, where the State has not the blessing of possessing the Catholic Faith, its complete severance from any interference with religious instruction has its advantages. Under the Education Act and the Code its self-chosen attitude is that of a policeman, who has his eye always on the school to see that no child is forced to receive religious instruction against the will of his parent. What is true religion, and what is false, is beyond such a policeman's cognisance. He has simply to prevent the exercise of force upon the scholar in the matter of religious instruction. But in her long life of eighteen hundred years the Church has fought with persistent perseverance for the free-will of man. It is a condition which she not only can, but will keep, and exact from others in the freedom of religious instruction. This must be looked upon from two sides : freedom, on the one hand, to teach completely the religion to which the parent belongs, and to which he wishes his child to belong ; freedom, on the other hand, of the parent to object, on behalf of the child, to all teaching of a religion which he does not accept. If we retain full and entire the former freedom, we do not object to the latter.

Indeed, Catholic schools before the passing of the Act were frequented either by Catholic children only, or by such others as the parents sent thither by choice. The concession of their liberty made by Catholic schools, in accepting for the first time a time conscience-clause, is far harder on them than on the schools of the Established Church, because in their case there was no reason to impose such a restriction. In their schools nobody's liberty had been violated, nor any complaint heard from a parent that a child received religious instruction against his will. The jealousy as to the imposition of religious instruction on unwilling scholars has a reason in the case of a national school in country districts, which may be the only one where scholars not belonging to the National Church may be able to attend; but its application to schools intended for Catholics, and frequented by others only at their choice, had no such justification. Still, so long as this is accompanied by the positive freedom for those who value it to make religion the basis of education and to teach it in the school, it can be borne. But an advance beyond this point—any attempt to make the parent receive on behalf of his child secular instruction, from which religious instruction is violently severed by the will of another, is persecution. "Public elementary schools," which receive the Parliamentary grant under the Minutes of Council, are still free, at a certain time, to give religious instruction; but "public elementary schools," which are under a Board, are prohibited from using any distinctive religious catechism or religious formulary. But it is precisely by means of such that the Catholic religion always has been, must be, and will be taught. It follows that our only safety in the present consists in supplying for all our children schools in which full freedom of all religious instruction—as we understand that term—is allowed. And here it is both fair to the Education Act and important to ourselves to note a provision in Clause 76, whereby not only sanction is given, but an arrangement is made, for the inspection of the school "by other than one of her Majesty's inspectors," "as well in respect of religious as of other subjects." As much as two days in the year are allowed for such inspection, and it is stated that "on any such day any religious observance may be practised, and any instruction in religious subjects given at any time during the meeting of the school." By this clause not only is the full freedom of religious instruction in what the Act terms "voluntary" schools recognised by the Act itself, as forming part of the school's course of teaching, but the efficiency of such instruction is cared for by the suggestion of annual inspection in regard to it. And it follows that any "voluntary" school, in which such inspection and examination are not carried out, would sink below the religious level of the Act itself. This last remnant of the conditions of the past, wherein religious instruction was never absent from the idea of education, is most valuable in itself, and yields to us a position in which we may maintain that which we most value, as a right guaranteed by the Act itself.

What condition of things, as to the relation of the State to the Church in the matter of primary education, may be coming in the future, is unknown to all. But in estimating the present, and the value of the

position which it offers us, a considerable element is the view of other possibilities. The golden age is passed ; we stand in the silver ; we may have to encounter the iron. In the golden age, the State would make no educational grant without the condition of religious instruction. And of that instruction, the quality, the amount, and the time were all unrestricted, at the disposal of the Church. Yet many were found who censured connection in primary education with the State on these terms. This Committee advocated such co-operation consistently from the beginning, and to a certain degree it was carried out ; but no one will deny that it might have been carried out with much greater energy and to a much greater extent. In the silver age the work of religious instruction is allowed, but not encouraged ; the four pounds of flesh are rigorously required ; the blood, "in which is the life," is sparingly permitted. Even so, if the Church will exert to the utmost Her power, She can still animate this flesh ; She is allowed not only to teach reading, writing, and arithmetic, but what moral use man is to make of them ; and the State does not compel her, as the price of its co-operation, to treat man as if he were brother of the ape. Shall we stand aloof, or make the most of this concession ? Perhaps it depends on the efficiency with which it is used,—that is, on the fact whether we are able to raise the labouring population out of the ignorance in which they lie,—whether this condition of things be a mere breathing time or a permanent state. But it should not be forgotten that an iron age may come. Such an age would be when the State should prohibit, in schools which it assisted, definite Catholic religious instruction. It is sufficient here to note that on such terms co-operation of the Church with the State would be impossible ; and it would remain for it, at its own expense and risk, to provide its schools and all which should maintain them in efficiency. There is an old myth which still "speaks to the wise." An unknown woman came before the Roman king and offered him nine volumes at a high price. He refused, and she departed and burnt three of her volumes ; and returned with the six, asking the same price. The king refused again, and she went away once more and burnt three others ; but she came a third time, and demanded for the three remaining the same price which she had asked for the whole nine. And then we are told that the king, who refused the nine volumes and the six, paid the whole price for the three. Thus, when the action of the Church was entirely untrammelled, we might have formed such a body of male and female teachers,—by the aid of the State,—that every school should have been supplied with them before an Education Act arose, and no large portion of the population been left outside ; or, again, we might, as some advised, have kept aloof from all co-operation with the State ; in which case do not the facts cited above show at what a terrible disadvantage we should have stood on the appearance of such an Education Act as that of 1870 ? So now we may fold our hands, and leave the waifs,—who appear to be half our number,—to schools which must have a spirit hostile to ours, and in which our belief cannot be taught ; or we may so use the liberty still left us, and the aid still supplied to us, that our schools shall be more thoroughly leavened with Christian education than before. But

should the liberty ever be taken away, which God forbid, what we are now doing, the energy now put forth, and the experience now obtained, will probably determine whether we shall be able to keep those committed to us, or be condemned to lose them.

Such then is the language of the Poor School Committee : the same which we ourselves held in April. The recent Act has inflicted severe injury on Catholic schools which receive Government help ; yet not such fatal injury, but that, by proportionally increased efforts, these may be made to continue thoroughly Catholic in spirit and in tendency. Such also is the Archbishop's judgment, as expressed at the great educational meeting of June 20th. The new arrangements, he said, "place the religious instruction of our schools at a notable and a formidable disadvantage"; and "we must therefore, with a concentration of attention, vigilance, and energy, maintain the religious efficiency of our religious instruction."

We have spoken hitherto exclusively of the *present* ; but we feel, quite as strongly as Canon Oakeley can feel, the alarming prospect which threatens Catholics for the *future*. In fact, these perils of the future were our very reason, for protesting against what seemed to us undue depreciation of the present : "It is not possible," we said (p. 413) "that Catholics should throw themselves heart and soul into the impending contest against irreligious education, if they consider the *existing* system inevitably and hopelessly irreligious." Had it been the case, as Canon Oakeley said, that true education is rendered utterly impracticable by the State's conditions of help, Catholics would have had no resource, but to do the best they could in their own strength ; and, so far as education is concerned, they would have been comparatively indifferent to the political arena. Our own conviction on the contrary is, that they now retain much which is worthy of energetic political struggle ; and that they have means, moreover, of retaining it, for a very considerable time at least. But then we also think that, *in order* to retain it, they must put their shoulders vigorously to the wheel. Let them exert then their united strength, that not one denominational safeguard now existing be removed, and that the compulsoriness of instruction be not advanced one single step beyond its present position. In so much as this, by co-operating heartily with other denominationalists, there is every hope of their succeeding, for at least a very considerable time. And while such is their *political* attitude, let them *domestically* (if we may so express ourselves) strain every nerve,—by building and endowing Catholic schools and training Catholic teachers,—that they may be more and

more prepared to meet the evil day, when at last it comes; and that even in the present they may make more and more provision for those unhappy children, who otherwise, by an unjust and cruel law, are placed under non-Catholic secular instructors.

Doubtless, as we also said in April (p. 422), they should "use their best efforts," if opportunity be offered, "to obtain some amendment of the law in the interests of true religion." But we think there is so little probability of important success in this direction, that they would but waste strength by laying any very great stress on the accomplishment of such a result. In truth, seldom has a political end been pursued under greater difficulties, than those which now cripple the Catholic politician in this matter of education. Bad as are the terms which the Church has obtained under Mr. Forster's Act, we are only surprised that they are not much worse; and we believe that Catholics owe far more than they sometimes suppose, to Mr. Gladstone's influence with his party. They stand between two cross-fires. Speaking broadly and generally, the Catholic conclusion is derived from two premisses, of which the major is denied by liberals, and the minor by conservatives. That the State should exert itself to promote good religious education,—this is the principle which Catholics assume. But liberals deny the principle; while conservatives, admitting the principle, deny that *Catholic* "religious education" is really "good." And so it turned out, that the very same men who supported Mr. Gordon against Mr. Gladstone, would have voted (it was understood) to a man, in favour of Mr. Fawcett's attack on the same Minister. They proceeded on a very intelligible ground: viz. that the Empire's true religious interests are advanced, on the one hand by promoting presbyterianism in Scotland, and on the other hand by repressing "popery" in Ireland.

Then, there is another complication. Catholics of course are directly at issue with most liberals,—while so far agreeing with most conservatives,—on the vital importance of Christian education. But a large number of Protestants advocate Christian education under the particular *shape* of teaching children the Protestant Bible; and, in fact, Mr. Gordon's motion on the Scotch Education Bill went precisely to this point. Here then the remedy is worse even than the disease. That a Catholic child be instructed by an heretical teacher in an heretical translation of Scripture,—is even a *greater* evil in the Catholic eye, than that he should be placed under such a teacher for the acquirement of purely secular knowledge. Certainly it seems to us, that Protestants who advocate religious

education have in general been anything rather than ambitious of Catholic support; and that they would often rather fight alone, than make common cause with a creed which they abhor. Catholics owe it mainly to Mr. Gladstone,—such (we emphatically repeat) is our own strong conviction,—that they have not been visited with far more gross and unmitigated injustice, than has in fact befallen them.

And this leads us to another remark. Canon Oakeley refers, in one or two parts of his letter, to the *insulting* treatment which Catholics have received: in that, e. g., Catholic schools are not even designated by the name “Roman Catholic,” and that Catholic bishops and priests are limited as to their power of entering a Government-aided Catholic school.* Now we hope we shall not be misunderstood when we say, that, to our mind, every *insult* inflicted by Parliament on Catholics, which is not also an *injury*, is a positive and great benefit. There is a vast amount of (what we may familiarly call) anti-Catholic *steam*, latent in public men of both parties, which will inevitably vent itself somehow or other; and, so far as it vents itself in insult, there is less to fear in the way of injury. Hard words, according to the proverb, are indefinitely more tolerable than broken bones. Or to put the thing more worthily and truly, the Church will most gladly endure to be called by every ignominious name, and treated with every contumelious device, so only she can thereby earn greater liberty of training towards heaven those souls, for which her Master died. To suppose there can be any real sympathy between two such bodies as the British Parliament and the Catholic Church, argues surely a strange blindness to the most conspicuous facts of our time.

These are the general observations which we have at this moment to offer, on the state and prospects of Catholic primary education in England: and it will have been seen that our apparent differences with Canon Oakeley arise almost exclusively from misconception of each other's language. But a special theological question has been incidentally raised, which we must not conclude without noticing. Our readers will remember, that an unnamed correspondent of Canon Oakeley's has criticised the view which we put forth in April, concerning

* At the same time what does this limitation amount to? Catholic managers may have any religious observance they like in their schools for any time, and on as many days, as they please, if they merely abstain from marking in the registers on those days, and give liberty to non-Catholic children of going away for the occasion. Nay, and two days in every year, chosen by themselves, may be entirely devoted to religious work, and yet *count* towards the Parliamentary grant.

Pius IX.'s Fribourg Brief. This Brief, he considers, "distinctly says that schools, out of which the authority of the Church has been thrust, cannot be frequented." "The DUBLIN," he adds, "puts the Brief on one side by calling it an ideal, whereas it is distinctly practical, and was issued to meet a real fact. There is no more of the ideal about it than about a sentence in a court of law." We contend for the exact contrary. It is a great pleasure to deal with an opponent who so unreservedly defers to Papal authority; and our controversy with him cannot but be most amicable. Yet we must argue (1) that the Brief says what our critic thinks it does *not* say; and (2) that it does *not* say what he thinks it does say. And we make one little preliminary remark. We pointed out in April (p. 416, note) that the Irish bishops consider the Brief to have been issued *ex cathedrâ*; and we infer, from our critic's whole tone, that he (as well as ourselves) is of the same opinion. We shall word our arguments therefore on this assumption, though those arguments are substantially the same on *either* hypothesis.

Firstly then we are to ask, what is the direct infallible teaching of this Brief. And we have authentic information, as to the principal errors which Pius IX. intended therein to condemn, by referring to the 47th and 48th propositions of the Syllabus; which are the two expressly laid down as censured by the Brief in question. They are as follows:—

Prop. 47. "The best constitution of civil society requires that popular schools, which are open to children of every class,—and that public institutions generally, which are devoted to teaching, literature, and science, and providing for the education of youth,—be exempted from all authority of the Church, from all Her moderating influence and interference, and subjected to the absolute will of the civil and political authority [so as to be conducted] in accordance with the tenets of the civil rulers and the standard of the common opinions of the age."

Prop. 48. "That method of instructing youth can be approved by Catholic men, which is disjoined from the Catholic Faith and the Church's power; and which regards exclusively, or at least principally, knowledge of the natural order alone and the ends of social life on earth."

So far then is it from being true, as our critic thinks, that there is nothing of the ideal about this Brief, that the very opposite is true. The principal errors which it was intended to condemn, were errors establishing a false *ideal* concerning the work of popular education. We may further infer, with some confidence,—though this is irrelevant to the question between our critic and ourselves,—that as on the one hand Pius IX. spoke *ex cathedrâ* in his condemnation of a *false* ideal; so on the other hand he spoke *ex cathedrâ* in his ex-

position of the *true* one. This exposition is contained in the passage, which the Irish bishops quoted, and which we reprinted.

Secondly, our critic considers the Brief to "say distinctly" that certain schools "cannot be frequented." Now there is but one passage in the Brief, on which he can possibly found this opinion; and we will at once place it before our readers.

Certainly indeed, when, in whatever places and regions, a most pernicious plan of this kind were undertaken or accomplished, of expelling from schools the Church's authority, and when youths were miserably exposed to loss concerning the Faith, then the Church not only would be bound (deberet) to attempt everything with intensest effort and never spare any pains that the said youths should receive the necessary Christian instruction and education, but also would be compelled to admonish all the faithful, and declare to them that such schools, being adverse to the Catholic Church, could not in conscience be frequented.

Our critic, it appears then, understands the Pontiff to declare by his Fribourg Brief, that no Catholics in any part of the world may in conscience send their children to any schools, from which the Church's authority is so expelled, as it is in those English Catholic schools which now accept Government aid. Yet he need not have looked beyond the British Islands themselves, to see that he has made a great mistake somewhere. He will not deny that the *Irish National schools* are to the full as much removed from the Church's authority, as are those which he denounces. Now Pius IX. was specially consulted about these schools; and he responded that Catholics may be permitted in conscience, under existing circumstances, to send their children thither. What he had expressly sanctioned in *one* place, he could not intend by this Brief to declare unlawful in *all* places.

Our critic then is certainly in error; and if we look again at the wording of the Brief, we shall see where his error lies. In the first place, one thing will be at once seen: Pius IX. does not, as wielding the Church's authority, declare that certain schools may not be frequented; but expresses an opinion, augury, judgment, that under certain circumstances the Church *would* be compelled to declare this. Moreover, our critic must consider him *mistaken* in this opinion, augury, judgment; for he thinks that the very contingency contemplated by the Pope has now arisen; while it is indubitable that the Church has issued *no* such declaration, as that which the Brief (if so be) teaches us to expect. Our critic's interpretation of the Brief, then, is less respectful to Pius IX. than is our own.

We do not indeed ourselves admit, that the Church's authority is removed from Catholic Government-aided schools: still we do not lay stress on this consideration; because clearly that authority is removed from those *non-Catholic* schools, which Catholic children are unhappily obliged by law in various instances to frequent. We say then, that the Pope's words are to be understood with the obvious and recognized qualification: "Unless circumstances so change, as to affect the balance of spiritual good." This is no subtlety or refinement, but the broadest common sense. Take for illustration an extreme case. In this that or the other country, certain given schools give admirable secular instruction, but are imbued with an anti-Catholic spirit; while a parent has the fullest liberty, so far as the State is concerned, to send thither his children or not to send them. He is strictly obliged in conscience *not* to send them; for he may not obtain for them good secular instruction, at the price of peril to their souls. This is indubitable Catholic doctrine. But now let us suppose circumstances totally to change; let us suppose, e. g., the State to *enforce* attendance at the schools. Would it not be simply childish to infer, from the indubitable Catholic doctrine above mentioned, that under these *new* circumstances a parent is obliged in conscience to resist tooth and nail the policeman, who comes to summon thither his children? and that they again (if they have arrived at the age of reason) are obliged in conscience to refuse entering the schools, until dragged there by main force? We have supposed the extreme case, of State authority *enforcing* non-attendance; but, short of that, Government may, in a great variety of ways, put forth such strong pressure, that much greater spiritual harm than good would result from combined Catholic recalcitration. The doctrine remains intact, that instruction may not be sought at the price of spiritual evil; but it by no means follows from this doctrine, that a less spiritual evil may not laudably be incurred to avoid a greater. And it is absurd to suppose that Pius IX., in his Fribourg Brief, intended to deny by a sidewind this obvious truth.

In fact, if our critic wishes to take this Brief for his guide, he ought surely to arrive at the conclusion directly opposed to his own. Pius IX. considers that if a certain contingency arose, the Church would issue a certain declaration. But she has *not* issued such a declaration; therefore the contemplated contingency has not arisen.

The importance then of the Fribourg Brief consists, not in its laying down any rule which binds under all possible situations, but in its placing before Catholics the true ideal

of popular education. The impossibility under which English Catholics find themselves of practically pursuing this ideal in its integrity, is an evidence of the disastrous circumstances in which they are placed. We do not think they can pass through the present crisis, without undergoing serious spiritual evils. But we think that the best method of *minimizing* those evils is that, which has been indicated (it seems to us) by the bishops, which we sketched in our last number, and which we have now endeavoured more fully to explain and vindicate.

NOTE ON THE SECOND ARTICLE OF THE APRIL NUMBER.

THE following remarks occur in our last number (p. 285):—

A question has quite recently been raised, how far it can be legitimate for a Catholic writer to allege publicly a charge of doctrinal unsoundness against any theory, which certain other Catholics may maintain. Doubts have been expressed, whether it is in accordance with the Church's spirit and principles, to adduce such a charge otherwise than in the way of private appeal to ecclesiastical authority; and whether a different practice, so far as it prevails in England, has not arisen from Catholics living in the midst of a Protestant world. Now as we have ourselves from time to time made accusations of the very kind here censured, we shall not be suspected of undue aggressiveness if we briefly refer to this allegation: for if it could be maintained, it would follow that the view of our duties, on which we have habitually acted, is seriously opposed to ecclesiastical principle. And as our purpose is exclusively to speak in our own defence, we must beg our readers to bear in mind a fact, which we have often mentioned; viz., that whatever we write with any doctrinal bearing, is submitted to censors, who are appointed by the Archbishop of the diocese in which our REVIEW is published.

The writer, to whom we here principally referred, explains, that his remarks had no reference to ourselves, and do not cover our particular case. "Even in principle," he says, "and certainly in practice, there is a wide difference between controversy carried on in a recognised organ of Catholic literature, which has a responsible editor, assisted (though a layman) by censors appointed by authority,—and an anonymous charge in the columns of a newspaper, even the Editor of which is 'not responsible for the opinions expressed by his correspondents,' who have no technical restraint but the law of libel." Nothing can be more straightforward and satisfactory than this statement. The question raised is one of great and constantly recurring practical importance, and one on which it is very desirable that Catholic writers should be united in judgment.

We are in entire accordance with another remark, made by the same writer with some reference to ourselves. We are as far as he can be from desiring "the most unbridled independence of anonymous comment in matters of doctrine." "The press," he adds, "is a valuable weapon for the defence of the Church, but every one knows that it is a weapon peculiarly liable to abuse." We heartily concur.

Notices of Books.

A Scheme of University Education in Ireland. By a PROTESTANT CELT.
London : Stanford.

WE mentioned in our last number, that we defer to a future occasion all detailed criticism of the various plans which have been proposed, for University education in Ireland. We will only say therefore, concerning the one now before us, that it is most ably and carefully wrought out, with a very complete and ample reference to all the various necessities of the case. The general spirit of the pamphlet is truly admirable ; and we can only hope that there are many Irish Protestants, who resemble our author.

There is one fundamental truth, repeatedly forgotten in England, to which he draws attention. We cannot express it better than in his own words :—

“ It not unfrequently happens in controversial affairs, that one who ought to be a suitor in court places himself in the position of a judge. In imagination he sits upon the bench, and he lays the flattering unction to his soul that he has perfect judicial impartiality ; while in reality he carries with him all the one-sidedness of the plaintiff or defendant.

“ The ‘ Secularist ’ or ‘ Non-Dogmaticist ’ (call him by what name you please) does this. He fancies that he is a judge, and he says, ‘ I am just. I am impartial. I am judge, and I treat you various Dogmaticists—Catholic, Anglican, and Presbyterian—all alike, with even-handed justice. I am not as Queen Elizabeth and other sinful persons of that class, one favouring Protestants and persecuting Catholics ; I am a just judge.’

“ To this the Dogmaticists reply, ‘ Who made you a judge over us ? This is no question of Catholic against Protestant. It is a far greater and more important one. It is one of us altogether against you. Come off the bench ; you are only a suitor.’

“ The question of abstract justice which we have at present before us in Ireland then is this. How is the State to deal justly, as between ‘ Dogmaticists ’ and ‘ Non-Dogmaticists ’ ?

“ Is it just for the State to give to the latter sect, and to say no to the former ? ” (pp. 6, 7.)

But not only are these “ Non-Dogmaticists ” a mere sect like any other ; beyond all possible doubt, they are the very smallest sect of all. “ All will agree that the Non-Dogmaticists and their secular allies ”—so far as Ireland is concerned—“ are at present in a hopeless minority ” (p. 8). To legislate for Ireland in the predominant interest of undenominational education, is not merely to legislate in the predominant interest of one single sect,—but it is to

legislate in the predominant interest of the smallest and most insignificant sect existing throughout the whole country.

Our author draws another distinction (pp. 8, 9); viz., between Catholic Irish "Ecclesiasticism" and "Non-Ecclesiasticism," as he respectively calls them. Our impression is, that he is here mistaken in his statement of fact, through his unacquaintance with Catholic doctrine. There are two different classes of important questions, which have to be considered in any scheme of higher education: the former class being those which are connected directly or indirectly with faith and morals, the latter those which have no such connection. Thus it is a question of the *former* class, whether some given philosophical or historical opinion be cognisable on theological grounds as false or objectionable; while it is a question of the *latter* class, whether such opinion (admitted to be theologically unobjectionable) be really in accordance with reason and with facts. Again, it is a question of the *former* class, whether some given arrangement of studies give sufficient prominence to the inculcation of religion and morality; but it is a question of the *latter* class, whether some given arrangement of studies be the best for developing the learner's intellect, imagination, taste. Now all Catholics, who understand the first elements of their religion, will admit that on questions of the *former* class the Church is *de jure* absolutely supreme: whereas, in regard to the *latter* class, there is no specially clerical prerogative; and the most loyal Catholic may earnestly desire, that the laity should have a co-ordinate and influential voice in their decision. Only of course it is always exclusively within the Church's province to decide, what *are* those particular questions over which her supremacy extends.

If our author had duly pondered on this simple distinction, he would have been more accurate, we believe, in his statements of fact. Moreover, he would have been more sparing in his sarcasms on "the Irish Catholic Sinbad" (p. 9); and would thus have avoided what, we think, is the only blot in his very excellent disquisition.

The Life of S. Jane Frances Fremyot de Chantal. By EMILY BOWLES.
London: Burns & Oates.

THIS volume forms the second of the quarterly series, conducted by the managers of the "Month," a series from which very valuable service may be expected for the Church: and Miss Bowles has given us in it a beautiful and touching sketch of the life of the great Mother of the Visitation. We are told by the Editor in his preface, that "the work was originally intended as a sketch of the life and character of the great Saint whose name it bears, chiefly in connection with her own family and children," but that afterwards it was thought a pity not to complete the narration "by some account of Madame de Chantal herself, not only as a mother in the natural order, but also as the Spiritual Mother of numerous generations of

souls so dear to God and so precious to the Church, as the Nuns of the Visitation are well known to have been." We heartily rejoice that this second thought has been acted up to, for the result is one of the most interesting, and in its own way one of the most perfect sketches of the outer life of a great Saint that we have ever had the happiness of reading. The child-life of S. Jane Frances in the rambling old house at Dijon, her married and widowed life at Bourbilly,—beautiful Bourbilly with its grand old trees, and green meadows and sloping vineyards, and in the distance the forest "stretching for miles, and filling with its purple outline all the space to the horizon,"—her more anxious life at Monthelon, where the gloom of the old castle, so different from Bourbilly, must have seemed to her typical of that darker gloom of sin which in some measure hung over the place; her meeting with S. Francis de Sales, who was to be for the whole of her future life as "the good Angel of God, accompanying her, and ordering all things well;" her work among the sick and poor; her final vocation; the history of her dealings with her children and all connected with her; the chosen souls whom God gathered round her to serve as foundation-stones of the Visitation; her life at the Gallery-house at Annecy; the progress of the great work of the Visitation; her intercourse with Angélique Arnauld and S. Vincent de Paul; her last journey and illness, and the last night of her life on earth,—all these scenes stand out before us as so many vivid pictures of the life of the valiant woman, whose "strength and beauty are her clothing, and who shall laugh at the latter day."

We have said above that the work before us is a sketch of the *outer* life of the Saint, and as nothing more seems to have been intended either by the authoress or the editor, we have no right to complain that we have not received more solid information as to her *inner* life, by what might be called a more "hagiological" and definite treatment of her practice of heroic virtue. We would not, indeed, have our readers to suppose from these remarks that we are not permitted to have glimpses of her inner life, for we are favoured with many such glimpses, but then they are glimpses only. We are not allowed *steadily* to gaze deep down into those depths of heroic sanctity, where lie the *roots* of that Divine life whose fruits are unto everlasting. This life of S. Jane Frances is not a life which we can take up and find our attention at once concentrated on the Saint's heroic struggle after some particular virtue, which we ourselves are endeavouring by God's grace to cultivate, and which we may perhaps wish to compare with the exercise of the same virtue in the lives of other Saints. This is not a life in which the heroic virtues of the Saint are all set down each in its proper place, along with facts, gifts, and miracles; so that without difficulty we may apply the lessons to be learnt from them to our own daily spiritual life; in other words, this is not a life for *spiritual reading*. In our last number, while fully admitting that biographical lives of the Saints are most valuable, and peculiarly suited to the tastes and needs of the present day, we dwelt on the necessity, which we think exists, of *also* having Saints' lives written on such a method and in such a style as may best serve for spiritual purposes. Now, although this life of S. Jane Frances, as we said above, is intended to be merely a biographical sketch, and nothing more, and as such cannot fail to be pro-

ductive of much very important service ; yet, as it illustrates in a very marked manner what we consider to be the disadvantages of the biographical method, we may perhaps be allowed to dwell somewhat at length upon the subject.

No one, we venture to say, who takes up this beautiful book—say, for instance, during his quarter of an hour for spiritual reading—but will find it rather a distraction than a help, in some respects a positive hindrance to his purpose. He has only a few minutes at his disposal, during which he hopes to take in enough of solid spiritual food to sustain his soul during the struggles and weariness of the day. What does he find ? Page after page of beautiful writing and often of minute description, the very charm of which carries his thoughts far away from the Saints' heroic virtue, and even from his own soul, the nourishment of which is the sole object for which he has taken up the book. The style is so attractive that he stops to admire it, perhaps even reads a passage or two aloud, in order that the sweet sound of the melody may fall upon his ears. It is so picturesque, that it is suggestive of many thoughts—all beautiful in themselves, but charming the mind far away from the main object in view. The human interest,—and it is so great that we ourselves confess that we could hardly lay down the book till we had finished it,—prevails to such an extent over the saintly element—although of course this is never altogether absent—that the reader becomes absorbed in the story rather than in the sanctity of the Saint ; and when the time for spiritual reading is over, and he lays down the book, he finds that, after all, however much his mind has been entertained and delighted, his soul has not been fed with the bread of the strong, which he stands so much in need of for the nourishment of his spiritual life. He opens the book, we will say, at chapter xi., and his eyes fall on the following striking passage (p. 96) :—

“It would read more like some fairy story than a record of real life were we to follow the little Baroness de Thorens through the first year of marriage in the old Castle de Sales. It is wonderful that, with all the pictures we possess of possible heroines in poetry and prose, no painter has tried his hand upon the actual beauty of this extraordinary and touching scene. Nothing could be depicted more full of grace and charm than the figures of this young Bernard, bright-faced and golden-haired, with his large, transparent blue eyes, and his girl-baroness, with her richly-coloured young face, sweet with its modest gravity and a kind of peaceful responsibility. We can imagine her sitting at work either in the long galleries or antique chambers of the castle, with their high coved ceilings and deep windows with stained glass, or kneeling in the quaint oratory, roofed with blue and sown with stars ; or again, wandering with her chivalrous husband among the exquisite valleys, gazing with rapt delight upon the mountains bathed in rose-coloured and purple light, or gathering primroses and violets from the rich spring carpet, which at the time of their coming home spread under the hoary oaks and pines.”

Now what will be the ejaculations which this beautiful passage, so full of purely human interest, will call forth from the reader, except such as these : “What a perfect picture !” “How I should like to see it made the subject of a painting !” What will be the practical resolution taken after reading it,

except, perhaps, at once to form the plan of a summer tour, in order to gaze at the mountains bathed in rose-coloured and purple light, and to stand under the hoary oaks and pines rising above the silvery lake of Annecy? Surely it would be a mistake to call the reading of a saint's life, written in this way, "spiritual reading." Nor are we, we think, in any way unfair in quoting the above passage, for the life of S. Jane Frances is literally full of similar picturesque descriptions. To us it seems that for lives of the saints designed for spiritual reading, the advice of S. Francis de Sales with regard to the ecclesiastical music of his holy daughters of the Visitation should be followed, of which we are told (p. 109) that it was his earnest desire that "the natural pleasure (taken in it) should be sweetly, gradually, and without violence checked and pruned, and never be allowed to stifle the growth of grace," and that therefore the office tones should have no beauty to recommend them. We do not, of course, say that the natural pleasure we must all feel in such descriptions as that given above stifles the growth of grace in the soul; but we do say that it distracts the mind from the true object, and deprives the soul of the true fruit of spiritual reading, just as beautiful figured music, although under certain restrictions it has its own work to do in the Church of God, would be both a disturbance and a hindrance to the worship of religious communities who have to sing the Divine Office or the Office of our Lady, much in the same way as spiritual books ought to be read, but of course in a less degree,—*pausatim*, and with reflection.

We may seem to have been pointing a moral at Miss Bowles's expense, for she does not *profess* to have written her work as a provision for spiritual reading. Again, therefore, we will say that such lives as that which she has written are especially valuable at the present time, and we know none more so than the one before us. As helping to correct the corrupt influence of the literature of the day, and as encouraging a pure and healthy taste in the place of so much that is sentimental and enervating, as well as making known this great Saint to many who would never read about her in any other way, it will be of incalculable benefit; in hours of recreation, above all in the refectories of our religious houses, convents, and colleges, it will be most warmly welcomed; nay, it will even importantly assist its readers in knowing those depths of the Saint's soul which cannot *adequately* be exhibited, except in some life framed on a different type. We are most anxious that we should not be thought to be desirous of discouraging biographical lives in their own proper place. It was to prevent this misconception that we repeated, over and over again in our April number, even at the risk of wearying our readers, that such lives were most important. But we contended then, and still contend, that what we have called the Italian or "hagiological" method, should not be allowed to fall into disuse, because of all methods it is the best adapted for the nourishment of the soul, inasmuch as it is founded on the actual results of the Saint's heroic lives, as brought to light and established in the Processes of Canonization,—results for which alone the Church now honours them upon her altars. We freely confess, that apart from spiritual reading, the biographical method has many advantages which might render it preferable to any other method; but if the Lives of

the Saints are to form, as they ought to form, a most important part of spiritual reading, the place of which no other spiritual works, even those of Rodriguez or Scaramelli, can supply ; if, according to F. Faber, *all masters of the spiritual life tell us* that the Lives of the Saints should be read slowly, *pausatim*, and a little at a time, then surely the style of the Processes is more suitable than the biographical method, which from its human interest is almost incompatible with spiritual reading in its strict sense.

We dwell at length upon this point, because we fear, notwithstanding all our efforts in our April article to prevent misunderstanding, a much valued contemporary, from whom we always differ with pain, and whose opinion on such points we should always wish to treat with the greatest respect, has in his last number, while noticing the very work before us, somewhat misunderstood the arguments on which the advocates of the Italian method would wish to rest their position. Far be it from us to run down any style of life which can do good to souls. The boundaries of the Church of God are wide, the wants of men's souls are many, and our mother's heart is large. All styles of Saints' lives are good, all are useful. Writing in April we said : "By all means let us have Lives of the Saints of as great literary merit as possible, written from different points of view,—biographical, historical, psychological, intellectual,—all these are good and useful." Surely, then, we could not be understood as running down the biographical method when we added : "But if we have at heart the growth of our people in holiness, do not let us lightly set aside or undervalue a method consecrated by the wisdom of past generations, which the foresight of our first Cardinal Archbishop inaugurated in the midst of us, and for which F. Faber so earnestly contended." Who could say, for example, that the intellectual life of S. Thomas of Aquin, as written by F. Vaughan, was not greatly needed in England ; yet if we should contend that a life in which the heroic sanctity of the Saint should be more definitely brought forward still remains to be written in English, could we be said in any way to be running down F. Vaughan's admirable life ? If not, then in contending for the necessity of "hagiological" as well as biographical lives, we can in no way be said to be running down the latter. To us it seems that in England, at the present moment, there is greater danger of the former being altogether superseded.

Our contemporary has also taken exception to the use of the term "hagiological" in reference to the Italian method. For our own part, we have made use of the term partly for the sake of convenience, as opposed to "biographical,"—the inner life of the Saint being more prominently set forward in the one case, the outer life in the other,—but much more because, as canonization has to do with the results of heroism, and not with historical or biographical interest, or with natural character ; so the method which treats of those results seems to us more worthy of having applied to it the term "hagiological," than that which deals more prominently with characteristics of the Saints, that had nothing to do with placing them on the altars of the Church. Hagiology, of course, may be taken in a wide sense ; but in the common language of the Church it bears, as we take it, a distinct and definite meaning, namely, the science of holiness as studied in the lives of the Saints and servants of God.

There is yet one other remark of our contemporary upon which we can hardly refrain from saying a word. F. Faber, it is said, the great advocate for the Italian method, was also the author of "All for Jesus," and of those other spiritual works by which his name will hereafter be chiefly known. "These books," it is further remarked, "were meant, we suppose, for spiritual reading, as well as for other purposes, and we can hardly help smiling when we compare their attractiveness, their popular character, their absence of technical arrangements, their general brilliancy and discursiveness, with the series of Lives which he seems almost to have rejoiced in making comparatively stiff and ungainly." Now we suppose F. Faber would have been the very last to wish his own spiritual writings to supersede the more methodical spiritual works which have treated of the science of holiness. He wrote to popularize dogma and spirituality, and to make men read about the doctrine of the Church, and the spiritual life, with which they would never become acquainted in any other way. We feel sure he believed—and his own attractiveness as a writer adds weight to his belief—that a far higher kind of spiritual benefit would be derived from reading, under due circumstances such Saints' lives as those which he edited, than could be obtained by the most constant study of such religious books as those which he wrote. The latter in his judgment, we are confident, would have achieved one of their very highest ends, so far as they might stimulate their readers to make due use of the former.

We can assure our readers that we write in no narrow spirit, with no wish to exclude any kind of life, with no desire to cripple the efforts of others who are trying to work for God's glory in the way which seems to them best, but simply and solely from a deep conviction of the immense importance of Saints' lives written upon the method which we have been advocating. Far then from running down biographical lives, to which we wish all success, we are but pleading for that other, and as we believe higher, method which has given so much spiritual nourishment to so many souls, that it may not be altogether set aside or forgotten. To us it seems, that "the life of a Saint on paper is the most perfect for all spiritual uses, when it represents, as far as may be, in its effect and influence on others," not so much "the life of the same Saint as it influenced those who saw and knew most of him while upon the earth," as the life which influenced the Church of God in declaring him to have reached the level of heroic sanctity, and therefore to be worthy of a place upon the altars of her Lord.

We have only to add that the materials for the biography of S. Jane F. de Chantal are stated to have been chiefly taken from two French works, *Les deux Filles de Ste. Chantal*, and the Abbé Bougaud's *Histoire de Ste. Chantal, et des Origines de la Visitation*.

English Church Defence Tracts, Nos. 1, 2, 3. London: Rivingtons.

NOT the least benefit, accruing from the Vatican Definition, has been the cessation of that frivolous and shallow talk about corporate reunion with Rome, which at one time was in fashion with Dr. Pusey's friends. This talk produced a very undesirable result with certain excellently-intentioned but not clear-sighted Catholics, by inducing them to labour, in the supposed interests of charity, to pare down and minimize the Church's doctrines. We have ourselves always thought—and have often expressed our *reasons* for thinking—that one minimizing Catholic may easily inflict greater injury on the Church, than a hundred men of equal ability could do who assail her from without; according to the proverbial contrast, between open enemies and traitors (however *unintentionally* traitors) in the camp. Now, thank God, all this coquetting with heresy is necessarily at an end; and we are glad to see that the Tracts before us assume towards Catholics the one reasonable attitude of Anglicans, uncompromising hostility. At the same time this position of public hostility (if we may so call it) affords no defence for the personal imputations, which here meet us at every turn; and which culminate in the denunciation of S. Alphonsus and "Jesuit casuistry," wherewith the first tract concludes. One learns to be surprised at nothing: otherwise one would be transfixed with amazement that an admirer of Dr. Pusey—with the notorious "Eirenicon" fresh in his memory—should twit his *opponents* with being "unscrupulous in assertion" and "culpably careless as to the grounds of their statements."

Again we have read with much pleasure some remarks in the third Tract. It is of great importance, we quite agree, that inquirers should fully understand, how wide and how profound is the intellectual submission required from every Catholic. Doubtless there are two or three overstatements on this head: to talk e.g. about "the pitiless energy of a Spanish inquisitor" is very misplaced rhetoric (p. 7); and to call the "*Cum ex Apostolatus officio*" a dogmatic definition, is to trifle with a serious subject. But then on the other side there are actually passages, which might be more vividly coloured. We cannot admit (p. 10) that no utterance is *ex cathedra* which is not, *in point of form*, "addressed to all Christians"; nor can we admit the implication of the first Tract (p. 8) that S. Leo's Dogmatic Letter was not, on Vatican principles, an *ex cathedra* Act. As to the remarks on Pope Honorius (tr. 3, p. 10), and on what is ridiculously called the "qualifying clause" of Florence (tr. 1, p. 9)—these show that their writer has not even given himself the trouble to *look* at recent controversial literature.

Perhaps the most singular circumstance connected with these "English Church Defence Tracts" is, that they do not contain one syllable of "defence" of the "English Church." The second, indeed, upholds the validity of Anglican ordinations; but supposing its whole argument were conceded, it would only follow that the English Establishment possesses one charac-

teristic, which every Anglican admits to be possessed by various bodies which he himself denounces as heretical. Yet even as regards this small matter, one most curious circumstance meets us in the Tract. There is no controversialist whose objections have a more peremptory claim on the attention of Anglicans, than F. Newman; because he writes with special reference to Anglicanism, and against a theory which he himself held for many years of his life. No one would have thought it possible beforehand, that his arguments have been as simply ignored as though he had never written, and that his very name is passed over in silence. A greater compliment could not be paid to the irrefragable solidity of his reasoning.

Now for the first and third Tracts. There are two different classes of men, who may derive much theological light from ecclesiastical history. They who possess learned leisure, are able thoroughly to investigate the various facts and citations on which controversy turns; and the greater the number of those who do so, the better for Catholic interests. But there are many educated men, quite incompetent for this, who may nevertheless form a trustworthy judgment for themselves on the general bearing of ecclesiastical history. It is to this latter class that these Tracts purport to be addressed; "readers who may not have time for deeper investigation": and yet the Tracts do not touch the general features of ecclesiastical history, but are confined to those isolated passages which are only for men of learned research. How unscrupulously they handle these passages, F. Addis abundantly shows in the pamphlet to which we devote our next notice.

Suppose then such a reader as is professedly addressed in these Tracts, gave his mind to the issue involved: it is obvious what his first question would be. He would ask, What are the *theses* maintained by the respective combatants? *what* is that divinely-given constitution of the Church, which either party maintains to be testified by Tradition? The Roman Catholic answer is most intelligible. "The Church by divine appointment possesses corporate unity; and the means given her by God for preserving that unity, is the precept of strict union with the Holy See, imposed by Him on every baptized person." Our inquirer next turns to the Anglican controversialists. "What then is *your* statement, gentlemen, as to that divinely-given constitution of the Church, which you allege to be testified by Tradition?" But not one word of reply could he obtain. Take e.g. the fundamental attribute of *corporate unity*. If they say that corporate unity is involved in the Church's divinely-given constitution, they ipso facto exclude themselves from the Church. If they say that corporate unity is *not* therein involved, they are brought into shameless contradiction with the unanimous and most express testimony of Antiquity. Let any educated man read through those impressive patristic passages on ecclesiastical unity, which Mr. Allies has brought together in his volume on "Dr. Pusey and the Ancient Church" (pp. 90-115). He begins with S. Clement, who was Pope before S. John's death, and carries the series uninterruptedly down to the time of S. Augustine. No one doctrine, so he plainly shows, more absolutely possessed the mind of the *Fathers*—not even the doctrine of our Lord's Incarnation and Resurrection—than the doctrine, that visible and indefectible unity is an essential attribute of the

Church. S. Cyprian is as urgent and clear on this point as any modern Roman Catholic can possibly be. And their *actions* are even *more* irrefragable proofs of their true mind, than their *words*. If any one proved to demonstration that the modern Roman Catholic doctrine on Papal prerogatives is false, he would thereby show,—not at all that the Anglican communion is part of the Catholic Church,—but, on the contrary, that the Catholic Church has ceased to exist.

We have been not a little surprised by the absence of *novelty* in these Tracts; not a point being attempted in them, which has not been long ago substantially met by Catholic controversialists. We have been more grieved than we can say, that Canon Liddon, who has elsewhere so powerfully defended a vital portion of the Faith, and for whom we desire to entertain unmixed respect, prefixes his initials to these truly discreditable productions.

Anglican Misrepresentations: a Reply to "Roman Misquotations."

By E. W. ADDIS, of the Oratory. London: Burns & Oates.

THIS is (we think) the first publication of a writer, from whom we expect signal services to the Church. He is no merely old-fashioned theologian; but, on the contrary, while standing of course on the solidity of the ancient Rock, he labours to be thoroughly acquainted with the phenomena, and equipped with the weapons, of the present. We only wish he had begun with a worthier antagonist; for it is poor work indeed, to deal with such wretched performances as these "English Church Defence Tracts." We may add however, that he does his best under this disadvantage, by refusing to content himself with what might suffice as an answer to his feeble opponent, and by grappling thoroughly with the various questions he treats.

We cannot reprint the whole pamphlet, and we have some difficulty in making a selection out of its excellent materials. "By far the most important subject of which his opponent treats," as F. Addis himself remarks (p. 4), is S. Irenæus's well-known passage on the "*potentior principalitas*." We are not acquainted with any other controversialist whomsoever, to whom we would refer for so fair, complete, and lucid an exposition of this passage as F. Addis's (pp. 4-12). Then he has treated admirably (pp. 14-16) the recognition of Roman supremacy by the Council of Sardica. Again, in pressing the unanswerable arguments derived by Catholics from the phenomena of Nestorianism, he has added (what we have not otherwise seen adduced) the singularly strong language of Pope Sixtus III., on John of Antioch's submission (p. 29).

In pp. 30, 31 he says: "Though the infallibility follows as a logical consequence from the constant teaching of the Fathers it is not necessary to maintain that this consequence was in all ages of the Church

as clearly apprehended by every one as it is at present." We are disposed to wish he had pressed this a little further. We cannot ourselves see reason for confidence, that S. Cyprian (p. 14) or even S. Augustin (pp. 26-28) held explicitly and reflexly the full doctrine of Papal infallibility. We expressed more fully what we here intend, in July, 1867, pp. 29-33.

We shall look with keen interest for F. Addis's next publication.

Discussions and Arguments on various Subjects. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN.
London: Pickering.

Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England. By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

WE have to commemorate two new volumes of this new issue of F. Newman's works.

The first-named volume is composed of papers, some written before and others after his conversion. We confess we should have somewhat preferred an arrangement, under which the two classes had been kept apart, and the former accompanied throughout by corrective Catholic notes. But this is a comparatively small matter; whereas it is no small matter at all, that posterity shall have ready access to such masterly productions, as the lectures on Antichrist and on the relations of Scripture to Catholic dogma.

The second volume we have named shows, by a certain lightness and one might almost say jauntiness of tone, its author's then fresh delight in his escape from the heavy shackles of Anglicanism; from those services which made him "shiver," and those formularies which made him "shudder." We believe that the volume has produced a most powerful effect on English public opinion, in removing a thousand misconceptions of Catholic doctrine and practice, among multitudes even of those who are never likely to become Catholics. To mention one only of its many excellences, we have always thought that his treatment (Lecture IV.) of Mr. Blanco White's testimony on the state of religion in Spain, is among the most complete and exhaustive pieces of criticism anywhere to be found.

A Sermon Preached at the Requiem Mass for Miss Catherine Boys. By AMBROSE ST. JOHN, M.A., of the Oratory of S. Philip Neri, Edgbaston.
London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

WE cannot express our full feeling on the beauty of Miss Boys's character as depicted in this sermon, or on the touching simplicity of the sermon itself, lest we might be accused of exaggeration. Miss Boys was

a pious "evangelical" in the Church of England, when she first came across Mr. Henry Wilberforce and Mr. Ambrose St. John, as her Anglican incumbent and curate. Mr. St. John soon became a Catholic; and after heart-rending conflicts and perplexities, not without quasi-miraculous help from the Mother of God, Miss Boys followed his example. She deliberately resolved on a single life; for twenty years she devoted herself to deeds of charity; she was (it may be said) sole foundress of the Deal Mission; she constantly supported sixteen persons, having no more means on which to reckon than an income varying from £80 to £100 a year. She was so venerated by her Protestant and Catholic neighbours alike, that on the day of her funeral, as F. St. John expresses it (p. 1): "The windows of the shops are closed, blinds drawn down, work at a standstill, as if for the funeral of some member of the Royal Family." May she pray for those of both communions whom she has left behind, that they be brought into union of mind and heart with each other, by union with the full truth!

We wish F. St. John had not introduced debateable matter into his otherwise so exquisite sermon. But we cannot agree with his implied opinion (p. 18), that Englishmen excel inhabitants of other countries in their hatred of hypocrisy and their love of truth; nor do we see that any advantage results from "comparisons," which are proverbially "odious." Indeed, F. St. John has worded his last paragraph strangely enough: "*Though* a most fervent Catholic and ardent lover of the Holy See and of every Catholic devotion, she was English to her heart's core . . . especially in her hatreds and her loves. She hated dirt, she hated hypocrisy, and was, above all things, an intense lover of truth." Such words run as though there were a certain *antithesis*, between loyalty to the Holy See or the practices of Catholic devotion on one hand, and hatred of hypocrisy or love of truth on the other. That Miss Catherine Boys possessed these last qualities in truly noble fashion, we have no doubt whatever; and she obtained every assistance towards this—not at all by being English—but by being "a most fervent Catholic, and ardent lover of the Holy See and of every Catholic devotion."

The Creed of St. Athanasius. Charlemagne and Mr. Ffoulkes. By the Rev. J. JONES, S.J., Professor of Theology at St. Beuno's College. London: Burns & Oates. 1872.

THIS admirable pamphlet of the learned Father Jones is a most welcome publication in its present form. Our readers probably know it already in substance, for it appeared before in the "Month" for March and April of this year. It has been recast; and if we had not been entirely satisfied with it in its previous form, we should say that the remodelling has added to its clearness and force. It is a thorough sifting of a theory rashly hazarded, and in a short compass contains all that has been said against the authority of the "*Quicumque vult*," and at the same time most lucidly shows how utterly

baseless is that reasoning which would deprive us of that most marvellous compendium of Christian belief.

Mr. Ffoulkes is a prolific writer, who has been for some years busy with the traditions of the Church, with the faith we profess, and the discipline under which we live ; nor need we now repeat what we set forth a few years ago on his utter incompetency for such topics as he loves to handle. He has now openly deserted the communion of saints : he has entered the army of the adversary, in the midst of which he is fighting, apparently unaware, to his great loss, that they who fight against God will never want an enemy, and that God has never yet foregone the challenge. "*Cui deest gratia ecclesiæ,*" said John of Salisbury ; "*tota creatrix Trinitas adversatur.*"

It is well known that since the revolution of 1688 the "*Quicumque vult,*" or, as it is commonly called, the Athanasian Creed, has been regarded with disfavour among the Anglicans. Laymen denounced it, and the ministers of the established religion faintly defended it. Some of the latter never took any notice of it, and never read it from one year's end to the other. Of late this dislike has become strong, and the public sees, with a grim satisfaction, the men it has called learned and pious cry out for the suppression of a formula which very few believe, and which is not defended by those who think they believe it. This being the state of what is called the public mind, Mr. Ffoulkes very naturally took advantage of it, and, in another form, repeated a previous attack on the doctrine of the Most Blessed Trinity, which he had delivered in the book called "*Christendom's Divisions,*" and again in an "*Occasional Paper of the Eastern Church Association, No. VII.*" The immediate object of attack then was the "*Filioque*"; but the assailant of the "*Filioque*" is, of necessity, an assailant of the whole Catholic faith. In some places, no doubt, Mr. Ffoulkes seemed to attack only the insertion of the "*Filioque*" in the creed. Yet in other places he assailed by implication the doctrine itself.

Besides, Mr. Ffoulkes is in favour, or was at one time, of union with the Greeks, who not only will not admit "*Filioque*" into the creed, but deny the doctrine. He was of opinion that the words in the creed "*perpetuate the miserable schism.*" Now, if the public use of them perpetuates a schism, so most assuredly will the belief in them ; for it is impossible to preserve the unity of the church without preserving also the unity of the faith.

Let us now return to the pamphlet of the learned Jesuit professor. Mr. Ffoulkes had undertaken to show that the Athanasian Creed is a dishonest forgery of Charlemagne and his friends,—a forgery, according to him, made for the purpose of changing the doctrine of the church. The Emperor has been for some time a bugbear to Mr. Ffoulkes, and we ought not to be surprised at any villany attributed to him. In this particular villainy of forging a symbol of orthodox doctrine he was aided, it seems, by good men, to say nothing more of them ; and yet good men in general abstain from forgery. But as the proofs are convincing to Mr. Ffoulkes, the character of Alcuin and others may not stand in his way, when he has made up his mind to bring so terrible a charge against them. Father Jones discusses this part of the case with admirable clearness and force, and even takes the trouble to show very grave reasons why it was very unlikely that Charlemagne should

have given way to the criminal folly involved in forging a new creed. Though he does not make Charlemagne a perfect Christian, he does a good service by bringing out the excellences of his character, and the real nobleness of mind which he undoubtedly possessed : his sagacious rule and iron will, but at the same time his filial reverence for the Holy See.

It is not necessary to justify all the acts of Charlemagne, nor would it be necessary to lay aside the Athanasian symbol, even if it could be proved that it was a composition of the Emperor alone. There are many things in use in the church the authorship of which cannot be settled, or at least has not been settled up to this day. We should not be disposed to give up the "*Veni sancte Spiritus*," if it could be proved to have been the work of King Robert : we recite it because it comes to us on another ground, not that of authorship or of beauty. So in the same way the symbol of St. Athanasius, even if it were the work of Charlemagne, will retain its place in the divine office in spite of its supposed origin. But, then, that origin cannot be proved. At present, however, there is no reason shown why we should change even its name. We and our fathers have received it as the "*Symbolum S. Athanasii*," and the designation is a thousand years old, by the confession of its adversaries. It is not very reasonable to suppose that so important a summary of Christian doctrine should have been accepted in ignorance, and its name supplied by hazard or by fraud. Nor can we imagine any state of circumstances which could have helped it into the divine office, if its origin be, what Mr. Ffoulkes would have us believe, a fraudulent forgery.

"As long, therefore, as this creed cannot be shown to be of later date, or of another source, as long as it cannot be shown that there is in it or its history that which forbids us to cling to the time-honoured tradition that he, if not the author, gave it at least his sanction, I will not deem it a duty to call it by any other name ; but if the interest the present question has excited should be the occasion of revealing to us anything more of its obscure origin, I shall have no difficulty in accepting whatever may be in store for us" (p. 65).

These observations of Father Jones are most just ; for what right has anybody to suggest the abandonment of the creed, on the ground that he thinks it a forgery of somebody ? Let us have some proof of the assertion, for most assuredly we ought to have something better to rest on than the guesses of men who do not believe the doctrine it contains, and who, for that very reason, perhaps, are too ready to discredit a writing which is inconvenient for them, and at variance with the opinions which they think they hold.

It seems to be admitted that the word or words, "*Filioque*" in the Nicene Creed had not received the sanction of the Pope for some time after that creed had been so "*interpolated*," to use the words of Mr. Ffoulkes. But how, where, and when the change was made is a matter not quite so clear. We know that the chaplains of Charlemagne used the creed in its new form, and that it had been so used also in Spain for some 200 years before Charlemagne. Beyond this, the words "*Filioque*" in the Creed have not been traced ; nevertheless, it would be rash to say that the insertion was made for the first time in Spain, because there is no appearance of novelty about that insertion, and, for all we know, the Spanish bishops may have used the creed in its present form all their lives.

We know that Spanish bishops, when they recited the Nicene Creed, did so for the express purpose of disowning the Arian heresy ; but Mr. Ffoulkes, in his many writings, tells us that Charlemagne's intentions were of another kind. His object was to place a barrier between the East and the West, and to make the division between the Latins and the Greeks the more distinct. But we need not believe in this malignity of the Emperor, for it is not proved, and Mr. Ffoulkes does not say that there is any evidence of it beyond this,—that on his hypothesis it accounts for facts he does not apparently understand himself. The notion gravely put forth by him is this, that Charlemagne forged the Athanasian Creed for the purpose of defending the insertion of the “Filioque” in the Nicene Creed. These are his words as quoted by Father Jones :—

“This effect” [the creed or its use] “was deliberately planned by Charlemagne, and planned for a twofold purpose. First, to justify the interpolated creed to the Pope, and convict the Greeks of error in rejecting it ; and, secondly, to substitute ‘the Catholic faith of Athanasius’ in the West as a standard of orthodoxy for that of Nicæa.” P. 17.

This most singular notion is dissected by Father Jones, and we shall leave it in his hands, for nothing can be added to his exposure of its absurdity. Mr. Ffoulkes, we believe, belongs to the school of culture and historical research, and we poor Catholics, who hold the Creed as our fathers held it before us, are generally objects of pitiless scorn to that school. But still, we think that we have never yet shown so many signs of intellectual weakness as our censors have shown, for if we do cling to beliefs which they reject, there is nothing contemptible in that ; we are so far the more respectable ; for it is assuredly more respectable to hold what we have been taught than to give way to all the new discoveries which men think they make, the great bulk of which, in the course of time, is invariably found to be new mistakes, or old mistakes clumsily revived.

This is the notion put before us by Mr. Ffoulkes to account for the existence of the Athanasian Creed. The Emperor Charlemagne wished to remove out of sight, or out of memory, the Nicene Creed, which is said or sung so frequently in the Mass, and to which the people had become used. To accomplish his purpose he forges, or procures the forgery, of another creed ; but he does not get rid of the old creed, nor replace it by the new ; and Mr. Ffoulkes has not shown that any attempt whatever was made to change the Liturgy. Then, again, the Athanasian Creed which the Emperor wished to substitute for the Nicene Creed, was never used in the Mass anywhere ; whether it was used at all in the public offices of the Church in the time of Charlemagne is a matter about which men have doubted. Then, again, it is very difficult for ordinary people to see what Charlemagne could possibly gain by the use of the Athanasian Creed when he had interpolated the Nicene Creed for his purposes. It would most assuredly have been easier for him to do his work, whatever it was, by means of the “interpolated” Creed, with which the people were familiar, and among whom the “interpolation” excited no trouble and, so far as we know, no surprise.

The discussion about the origin of the Athanasian Creed is, in one sense, a dishonest one ; for it is carried on chiefly by men who wish to get rid

of the doctrine as well as of the form. Mr. Ffoulkes, in his "Christendom's Divisions," Part II. p. 551, says that Charlemagne, by his "interpolation" had "well nigh succeeded, as Photius has well shown, in committing the Church to a formal denial of the first article of the Christian faith." A little further on he asks this question, and by that question he plainly shows that he does not hold the Catholic doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Ghost, or that he does not know what that doctrine is.

"As it is," he asks, "who can deny that the *original* procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father has been imperilled by including it in the same proposition with His *derivative* procession, however eternal from the Son?"

The words printed in italics are so printed by Mr. Ffoulkes. He certainly does not hold the Catholic doctrine that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one source. This dislike to the doctrine is a fact which is more or less hidden from view; but it is a fact, and people must not be surprised if they are told that this dislike is the true fount from which the river of their disputations runs.

Mr. Ffoulkes has admitted that the Athanasian Creed did not take the world quite by surprise, and that there is a "resemblance between it and the known formularies of the age of Charlemagne." That is quite true, and Father Jones has taken the pains to show that there were many formulæ of the kind. He has pointed out that as early as A.D. 676 or 677, a synod held in Autun speaks of the "*Symbolum S. Athanasii*;" but he, we think too generously, yields that synod to the objections made by Mr. Ffoulkes, though he says that, "from the time of the Brothers Ballerini the genuineness of this canon and its date have been looked on as settled." Father Jones will allow us to quarrel with him on this point, and, we trust, the more readily, because he admits that he cannot "see anything in Mr. Ffoulkes's observations to suggest a single serious difficulty with regard to it."

Difficulties have been made about the origin of the Apostles' Creed, but we cannot give it up because learned men cannot agree about its origin. And no good reason has yet been shown why we should be careless about the Athanasian. The latter is a summary of doctrine unsurpassed for its terseness and clearness. It is true, and it is of very little importance, that we do not know who wrote it, or when. Even if it could be shown to have been written some centuries after the death of St. Athanasius, it can make no difference whatever, for it is quite certain that the use of it in the Church is not grounded on the fact of authorship, but on its reception; and if Mr. Ffoulkes could show that the reception of it was brought about by forgery, fraud, or violence, he could do nothing towards getting rid of it, until he first gets people to disbelieve the doctrine which is set forth in it.

"There can be no doubt," says Father Jones, "that the Creed was put forward in the early part of the ninth century as the work of Athanasius, Bishop of Alexandria; that it was put forward as an approved and familiar exposition of the Catholic faith, and that authority was claimed for it on this ground. That it was put forward as having come down from former generations, and that those who so used it did not anticipate, nor did its use excite surprise, comment, or opposition. That it was put forward in the most public manner, by the most learned and respected doctors and prelates, in

synod and in controversial works, for use in the Divine Office, and in the instruction of the faithful. There is no need to prove this point by quotations, for they are found in almost every treatise on this subject, and are not questioned by any. I conclude, therefore, that it is neither probable nor credible that it was then an entirely new or unknown document, or that there was no reason of any kind for attributing it to St. Athanasius."—P. 31.

This is a most just and sensible summing up of the whole controversy ; it describes a condition of things which nobody can reasonably question, and to the argument derived from it, Mr. Ffoulkes and his friends ought to furnish an answer if they can find one.

The learned men of the ninth century—if they were the first who did so—must have had some reasons for accepting the words "*symbolum Sancti Athanasii*," in addition to the formula about which they did not dispute because they held the doctrines thereof. Is it likely that an order of the Emperor could carry conviction to the minds of all priests and bishops, and that they should have accepted a formula already in their hands as the work of St. Athanasius if they had not always thought so ?

But Mr. Ffoulkes assumes that the creed was forged in the year 800 : by that he probably means that it was reduced into its present form at that time. Now, there were bishops and priests living in those days of all ages, from twenty-four years of age to seventy or eighty, and Mr. Ffoulkes asks us to believe that they all accepted the imperial decision without a murmur or a doubt. Priests in those days were like priests in these days ; let the experiment be made now.

We find from Father Jones that the forgery was made in the year 800, according to Mr. Ffoulkes ; that is, the forgery of the creed itself, not of the name only. It is something to have a fixed time, and we are glad it is so in this case ; we also gather further from the answer of Father Jones that Mr. Ffoulkes could not assign an earlier date to the forgery, because the proofs on which he relies compel him to assume that the forgery could not have been completed before the year A.D. 800.

To this we reply, that if the forgery was made in the Court of Charlemagne in the year 800, the creed could not be known two years before, in 798, in Worcester and Canterbury. But it was known, not only then, but a long time before, in this country—perhaps ever since its conversion by St. Augustine. In the year 798 Denebert was elected Bishop of Worcester ; and, as usual, had to make a profession of obedience to the Archbishop of Canterbury, Ethelard, and his successors, on his consecration. In that profession—printed by Hearne in the "*Textus Roffensis*," p. 252, and by Messrs. Haddan & Stubbs, "*Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents*," vol. iii. p. 526—are to be found the following words :—

Insuper et orthodoxam Catholicam Apostolicamque fidem, sicut didici,
paucis exponam verbis, quia scriptum est.

1. Quicumque vult salvus esse, ante omnia opus est illi ut teneat Catholicam fidem.
2. Fides autem Catholica hæc est, ut unum Deum in Trinitate et Trinitatem in Unitate veneremur.
3. Neque confundentes Personas, neque substantiam separantes.
4. Alia enim est Persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti.

5. Sed Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, una est Divinitas, æqualis gloria, co-æterna Majestas.

6. Pater a nullo est factus, nec creatus, nec genitus.

7. Filius a Patre solo est, non factus, nec creatus, sed genitus.

8. Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio; non factus, nec creatus, nec genitus, sed procedens.

9. In hac Trinitate nihil prius aut posterius, nihil majus aut minus, sed totæ tres Personæ co-æternæ sibi sunt et co-æquales.

10. Ita ut per omnia, sicut jam supra dictum est, et Trinitas in Unitate Unitas in Trinitate veneranda sit.

Suscipio etiam decreta Pontificum et sex synodos Catholicas, &c.

Here are ten clauses of the Athanasian Creed, not successive, it is true, but taken out of it by the bishop for the purpose of expressing his orthodoxy, and it is remarkable how little change has been wrought in the formula in the course of a thousand years and more. In the first clause—we have numbered them ourselves for convenience-sake—"illi" is no longer retained. In the fourth clause we have a different arrangement of the words from that in use: "enim" and "est" have changed places. In the sixth clause, Mr. Stubbs, differing from Hearne, has printed, "Pater a nullo factus est," probably on the authority of the MS. in the British Museum, which he quotes. In the tenth clause there is another change: the bishop said, "the Trinity in Unity, and the Unity in Trinity is to be worshipped," but now we say, "the Unity in Trinity and the Trinity in Unity," a variety probably owing to the scribe, or, perhaps, the bishop may have trusted to his memory too much.

From this passage out of the Profession of the Bishop of Worcester in 798, we do not think that anybody can withstand the inevitable conclusion that the Athanasian Creed was at that time what it is now. That is not all, the bishop is not expressing his belief in words chosen by himself, he is repeating a well-known formula, a formula not invented by himself, but one that he had been taught "*sicut didici*." For our own part, we believe that the bishop was repeating a portion of the Divine Office well known to him and to all ecclesiastics, and that the Athanasian Creed in its present form had been known to him from his earliest years. We do not say that it was known to the first converts from heathenism made by St. Augustine, because we do not know; but we do say that we know of no reason why it should not have been taught in England by the first missionaries of St. Gregory the Great. Certainly, if we find the symbol in this form in the year 798, and can trace portions of it in the decrees of councils, and in professions of faith for centuries previously, we see no great difficulty in holding that it might have been in use two hundred years earlier in England, when St. Augustine, in 597, was consecrated Archbishop of Canterbury.

The Vicar of Christ ; or, Lectures upon the Office and Prerogatives of our Holy Father the Pope. By Rev. THOMAS S. PRESTON, Pastor of S. Ann's Church, New York, and Chancellor of the Diocese. New York : Robert Coddington. 1871.

THE solemn definitions of the Church's leading doctrines leave their mark, not only on the age which witnesses them, but on all after ages. They react upon the spiritual life of her children,—upon the devotions of the people,—upon the current of theological, philosophical, and general thought throughout all her after-history. It is impossible, therefore, to exaggerate the effect of such grand definitions as those which have distinguished the Pontificate of our present Holy Father. The definitions of the Immaculate Conception of our Blessed Lady, and of the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, when speaking *ex cathedra* on faith and morals, will leave luminous traces behind them which will never be effaced. Even in the next world they will be worn by the Church triumphant amongst the brightest of her jewels, when “the marriage of the Lamb shall have come, and His Bride shall have made herself ready.” Amongst the many effects of these definitions at the present time, hardly any is more remarkable than the renewal of vigour and strength which they have brought to the spiritual prerogatives of the Vicar of Christ. The peculiar circumstances under which each definition took place ; the absence of all opposition to the one which, like the whole system of Marian doctrine itself, grew silently out of the deep mind of the Church ; the strong, and, in some respects, unlooked-for opposition to the other, although its roots, like those of some ancient and giant oak, had long been visible to the eye, clasping the solid earth with a tenacity which no tempests, however violent, had been able to weaken,—these alike, each in its own way, have but served to bring the Vicar of Christ and the Holy See still more prominently before the eyes of all Catholics as their supreme teacher and guide. Even as the temporal influence of the Holy See has been gradually declining, owing to the perversity of the world, which, as our Lord foretold, has rejected the Church, as, long before, it had rejected Him, so the spiritual influence of the Pope has been gradually growing, until, never in the history of the Church, has it been so clearly recognized by her children that Peter is indeed the foundation of Christ's kingdom, in whom and by whom, and through whom, and for whose sake the gates of hell shall never prevail against it.

We cannot wonder, then, that the office and the prerogatives of our Holy Father the Pope are made more frequently than ever before the subjects of sermons and lectures. It becomes necessary to point out, both to those within the fold and those without, how all-important this office and these prerogatives are, and that as these are admitted or rejected, so the whole religion of Christ and His Divinity must stand or fall. Our Lord's promises to Peter are too clear to allow of any doubt. The Church which He founded is so dependent upon these promises, that without them

she has no existence. There is only one Church that has ever dared to lay claim to the fulfilment of these promises in herself; nay, as we have more than once pointed out in this Review, the very daring to make such a claim must be either the Voice of Christ speaking through the Church that makes it, or open blasphemy. It follows, therefore, that if the promises of Christ are not fulfilled in the Holy Roman See—and where else can they be fulfilled?—where else has the claim to their fulfilment ever been put forward?—not only Christ has not founded a Church upon earth, but He Himself is not the Son whom the Father sent to be the Saviour of the world. On the other hand, if the Holy Father is the successor to Peter's prerogatives, then the whole scheme of Redemption, as divinely established by our Blessed Lord, is carried out, the promises made to Peter are fulfilled, Christ's last prayer has been heard, and He Himself is clearly proved to be Very God of Very God, one with the Father, and the Father one with Him, even as His Church is one. So, too, it follows that the Holy Father can never teach error, when speaking authoritatively on faith or morals, otherwise the gates of hell would prevail against the Church; and that to Him as supreme teacher, kings as well as peoples must be subject, while as Vicar of the King of Kings he is himself a king.

Our readers will find these thoughts well developed in the four lectures which form the subject of the present notice. The first is upon the Supremacy of the Pope; the second, on his Infallibility; the third, on his Temporal Power; while the fourth, on the Pontificate of Pius IX., forms, as it were, both a striking summary and a telling illustration of the other three. Thus, in the first lecture, the Chancellor of the Diocese of New York shows very clearly that unless the Holy Father is the supreme pastor of the Church, there is no such thing as Christianity:—

"As we have seen," he says, "Jesus Christ staked His veracity and divine character on the Church which He established, and with which He promised to abide. Let us suppose for a moment that Peter and his successors are not the supreme pastors of the Church, and what are the direct logical consequences?"

"First. There is now no church whatever on earth, no visible body of Christ, no representative of the Incarnate Word who spake the language of grace and truth. Different sects, agreeing in no doctrine, separated from each other's communion, and contending against each other, are surely not one flock under one shepherd. The world can never hear, if it would, a voice of truth from lips whose names are legion, and whose tones are discord. The Church has failed. The fragments of the wreck float around, but the bark that was launched on Galilee has gone to pieces. What, then, has become of the promise of Christ, 'Behold, I am with you all days, even unto the consummation of the world'? That promise has never been fulfilled. The Son of God has not kept His truth.

"Secondly. The Christian Church was built upon Peter as its head and immovable foundation. 'Thou art Peter,' &c. The Church of Christ is founded on Peter, and any Church which rests not upon him is no Church of Christ, by whatever name it may be called. The word of the Lord must be kept with Peter, or we can trust Him in nothing. . . . If this plain promise has been broken, and there is no house of God resting on Peter, and no flock which he feeds, then is Jesus Christ neither true prophet nor

divine teacher. The whole of His blessed life turns out to be a cunningly-devised fable." (pp. 74—76.)

Again it is argued :—

"Christianity is not a pious feeling towards our Lord, nor self-complacency at the thought of His love ; it is the complex of truths which He taught, which are one perfect whole that can never be divided. We do not accept the Gospel and its verities because they commend themselves to our taste, but because they are taught us by God. They all rest upon a divine authority, and stand or fall in their completeness. If there is no visible Church speaking in its living unity, or, which is the same, no supreme visible part, who shall tell what and where Christianity is? . . . We would expect to see the Church which Peter guides go down to her Gethsemani or ascend to her Calvary ; but to see her broken to fragments till no trace of her form remains, and in her place rise up a thousand conflicting forms, as if she had bred reptiles of her own body, the fruits of her dissolution, this cannot be reconciled with the divinity of her founder. For an utter rout like this, are we asked to believe that God became man, and lived and died on earth? Even false prophets have done works more wonderful than these, and the votaries of lies have not so signally failed. Heathen mythologies have not yet died out ; the Jewish theocracy lived its long day ; and Christianity, planted by a Divine hand, and watered by the tears and blood of the Son of God, has become a Babel of confusion, and an enigma of contradictions." (pp. 76—78.)

While, however, we fully admit the logical sequence of these remarks, we must also add that we cannot follow the lecturer when he presses the argument still further, and maintains that "the rejection of the pastorship of S. Peter" is also "the rejection of natural religion and the light of reason." (p. 71.) The author shows throughout the whole work so firm a grasp of Catholic doctrine, that we cannot indeed believe that he would maintain this assertion absolutely. Much rather would we suppose that we ourselves have failed to arrive at his exact meaning. Still, the arguments brought forward in the first lecture, by which the author endeavours to prove this assertion, seem to us somewhat wanting in logical precision and accurate wording. No doubt it may often happen that a man who wilfully rejects the pastorship of S. Peter may end in utter unbelief. The man who has ceased to believe in revealed religion may also cease to believe in natural religion. Still, there is no necessary connection between the rejection of the one and the rejection of the other. The evidence for the one is distinct from that of the other. When belief in revealed religion is overthrown, the light of reason still remains strong enough to prove the existence of God. It may be distorted, but it is not extinguished. The Church has always guarded the rights of reason within reason's own province. She has constantly rejected the doctrine that there is no certitude except that which leans upon faith ; that without grace and revelation man can know nothing about God. She has no less constantly taught that the use of reason precedes faith, and that reason can prove the existence of God with certitude, and this even in those who have not yet received the faith. Now this doctrine of the Church hardly seems sufficiently kept in view in the following remarks :—

"Yet when the spirit of dissent has run its logical course, and the

founder of our religion is counted an impostor, *where shall shine the light of nature, or in what region shall reason hold up her torch?* If the miracles of the new law be rejected, and revelation falls, where shall man repose his trust *when his God has so skilfully deceived him?* No prophet can come to him with the light from the infinite for which his soul yearns. No sun shall arise to chase away the gloom from the land of the shadow of death. . . . If one rise from the dead, he cannot believe the testimony of his senses. It is only another deception of which he may be victim, and he will cry out within himself, 'Is there a God of love and truth unbounded that can thus sport with my misery, or am I myself a lie, the central figure in a scene of delusion?'

" . . . Such are the steps which descend unflinching, by a logic that cannot be withstood, to the dark chambers of infidelity, *where even the sunshine of reason is put out.* Christianity stands or falls as Jesus Christ formed it. If it fails us, everything falls with it. We cannot go back to the days of pure reason, for the light within us is distorted, *and we have lost our confidence in the God who made us.*"

Of course, if the author only means that one whose reason has become so distorted as to reject the truth of revealed religion, may also be unable to see the truth of natural religion, we fully admit that this may well be; but the words which we have placed in italics seem to us to show that he means more than this, and that he regards the rejection of Christianity as leading by strict logical consequence to the rejection of Theism. The same confusion of thought appears to us to run through the whole of the fourth division of this lecture, with the exception of the arguments which we have first quoted, and which are perfectly logical. No doubt, as the author remarks in the Preface (p. vi.), "the rejection of any part of revelation is logically the rejection of the whole"; but it is not always necessarily the rejection of natural religion or of the light of reason.

The other lectures we have found most instructive, and in some places eloquently written. The one on the "Infallibility of the Pope" seems to us especially valuable. We extract the following excellent remarks upon Gallicanism:—

"That narrow and transient school of theologians has received far too much notice, and beyond the Catholic communion, far too much credit. Evil, indeed, was wrought by it, for error is always deadly, and far reaching in its consequences; but it was never allowed to influence the body of the faithful. Arising in France under the royal favour, it sprang up without warrant or antecedent, was affirmed by only a few of the bishops, while it was rejected by the great majority of them, and condemned by three popes in succession. In other countries than France it has never prevailed, and has only been used in argument by those whose minds were already out of sympathy with the current of Catholic thought and feeling."

We must add the value of the work is greatly enhanced by an Appendix, which contains the dogmatic decrees of the Council of the Vatican on Catholic Faith and on the Church of Christ, in Latin and English, several Encyclical and Apostolic letters of the Holy Father, and a chronological table of the Roman Pontiffs.

The Sacred Heart of Jesus offered to the Piety of the Young engaged in Study.
By A. DEHAM, S.J. London: R. Washbourne.

FATHER DEHAM, of the College of S. Servais, Liège, has given us a little treatise in which devotion to the Sacred Heart of our Blessed Lord is held out to young scholars as the best of all pledges of their future success in life. In it the boy at college, or the young girl in her convent school, will not only find explained the origin, object, and end of this devotion, the tender love and kindness of the Sacred Heart, the favour promised to those who honour It, but also will be made acquainted with many useful practices, indulgenced prayers, acts of contrition and reparation, and invocations, by means of which the Sacred Heart may be daily honoured. We are glad to see that our Lady of the Sacred Heart is not forgotten. The more these two devotions can be kept together in practice the better. Devotion to God's mother is the golden key which unlocks the Sacred Heart of her Son, and of all our Lady's glories surely her empire over that Heart is the greatest.

We may add that the Bishop of Liège has given his warmest approbation to this little work, which "he recommends both to masters and to scholars."

The Life of Our Lord commemorated in the Mass: a Method of Assisting at the Holy Sacrifice. By EDWARD G. BAGSHAW, Priest of the Oratory of S. Philip Neri. London: R. Washbourne.

THIS method of hearing Mass will be a great help to those who are in the habit of joining with the priest in reciting the Missal prayers. Each mystery has been carefully suited to the words of the prayer which it accompanies, while the intervals after Communion are filled up with appropriate texts. It appears to us admirably calculated to bring home to the soul, in the most life-like way, the mysteries of the Holy Mass, and to make the Mass itself a summary of the Life of our Blessed Lord. The little book is so small and thin, though printed in large and clear type, that it may easily be slipped into the Missal.

De Annis Christi Tractatus: sive Chronologiæ Sacræ et Profanæ inter se et cum Vaticanis S. Scripturæ Concordia Plena. In lucem prodiiit opere et cura Rev. HENRICI FORMBY, Tertii Ordinis Sancti Dominici. Veneunt apud Bibliopolas, Londini, Burns et Oates, Socios; Romæ, J. Spithöver, &c. &c.

FATHER FORMBY is really unwearied in his labours of love,—labours for our children, that they may become better acquainted with Sacred and Church History, and the Parables of our Lord and the

Seven Sacraments; labours for ourselves in the spirit of a true son of S. Dominic, that we may grow in the knowledge of the mysteries of the Holy Rosary; labours, and by no means the least of all, that a taste for truly Christian art may be encouraged amongst us. And now he comes before us again, offering to the learned a Latin treatise about the years of Christ—a labour of love by which he hopes to do further good service to his Master, and to reconcile sacred and profane chronology both with one another and with the prophecies of Scripture, by proving that He lived, not as is more commonly supposed, three-and-thirty, but forty years with the sons of men,—“*Quadraginta annis proximus fui generationi hinc.*” We need hardly say that this is not a question which touches the faith; there have been at different periods different opinions on the subject; indeed, so many difficulties have gathered round it, that Natalis Alexander has said that so far as tradition is concerned, the question cannot be determined with certainty. Moreover, F. Formby’s treatise comes to us with the *nihil obstat* of F. Stanton of the Oratory, and the *imprimatur* of His Grace the Archbishop, so that even the most timid may feel assured that the author has not exceeded the limits of legitimate inquiry. We must add that F. Formby, although very confident of his own position, in no way wishes to impose it upon others, or to arrogate to himself any public authority. He believes, however, that by reconciling sacred and profane chronology in this particular way, he knocks away the ground from under the feet of those who hold that the Gospel history is a myth.

The treatise is divided into two parts. The first is chronological, having to do with historical evidence, and is from the pen of the late Mr. W. H. Scott, translated into Latin by F. Formby; the second is theological, dealing with the prophecies and the interpretation of Scripture, and is by F. Formby himself.

The conclusion of the first part may be thus briefly summed up. From historical evidence, which he finds irresistible, the writer (Mr. Scott) believes that the birth of our Lord cannot reasonably be assigned to any year after 25th December, A.V.C. 746, A.C. 8; nor can the Crucifixion be in any way placed before the 3rd April, A.V.C. 786, A.D. 33; so that counting from the Incarnation, that is, from the end of March, and nine months before the Nativity, to the Crucifixion, there is the full space of forty years. This conclusion, he thinks, harmonizes perfectly with all the chief events and dates of sacred and profane chronology, with, however, one important exception, namely, the passage in which S. Luke is commonly supposed to say that our Lord, at the *time of his baptism*, “was beginning to be about thirty years old.” (Luke iii. 23.) That our Lord lived forty years on earth is also confirmed by the authority of S. Irenæus.

In the second part F. Formby appeals to the prophecies and types and figures of Holy Scripture in support of the forty years of our Lord’s life on earth, on the supposition that they are historically proved; and here he is perhaps the most successful. He also brings forward arguments of congruity, laying great stress on the number 40 being, in a certain way, as S. Augustine tells us, the number of perfection. He then proceeds to

examine the one only real difficulty to be found in Luke iii. 23, and offers a new interpretation of that text, by which he hopes to remove it. Here, however, we think, with great deference to F. Formby, and we hope to be able to show, that he signally fails. After having observed that, as according to Mr. Scott, the mistake of the Vulgar Dionysian Era has arisen from a false interpretation, either of that passage of S. Luke (iii. 1) in which mention is made of "the fifteenth year of the empire of Tiberius Cæsar," or of that other passage of the same Gospel to which we have just alluded (Luke iii. 23), and that, as Mr. Scott has shown, the words in the former passage must be taken in their natural sense, he comes to the conclusion that the common interpretation of the latter passage must be abandoned, and that it is to this interpretation that the mistake of the Vulgar Era is due. He next offers the following interpretation in its stead:—"S. Luke," he says, "must be supposed to speak in this passage *not in any way of the age of Christ at the time of His baptism*, but of His age at the time when He first bade farewell to the private life which He had led as a poor and unknown man of Nazareth, and began that work for which He came into the world, and of which He declared with a loud voice, when dying on the Cross, 'It is finished.'" (p. 48.) Although most unwilling to introduce any novelty into what is commonly believed of our Lord, he thinks that if the common interpretation of this passage be retained, the Vulgar Era must also be thought to be correct, which he holds can in no way be admitted. Further on, in noticing an objection that the Evangelist speaks of our Lord's beginning (to be) about the age of thirty years, immediately after relating the fact of His baptism, he says:—"It is easy to see that the Evangelist, after having finished his account of the baptism, throws into his narrative something entirely new; that is to say, a new episode about the genealogy of Christ, at the beginning of which he relates in passing (*obiter narrat*) that Christ, when He began His work for which He had come into the world, was about thirty years old." The word 'beginning,' therefore, refers, not to our Lord's age, but to His work. F. Formby confirms this by the reading of the Vatican Codex, *καὶ αὐτὸς ἦν ἰησοῦς ἀρχόμενος ὥσει ἐτῶν τριάκοντα ὄν*, which may be thus translated: "Now Jesus was beginning (that is, His work as Saviour of the world) when He was about thirty years old." Our readers will perceive that by this interpretation it is possible to add a few more years to our Lord's public ministry, so as to make Him live forty years in all; but of these years thus added to His life the Evangelists are entirely silent.

Now we cannot within the narrow limits of a notice enter into a discussion about the Vulgar Era; we cannot bring forward several weighty objections to Father Formby's interpretation of this passage of S. Luke's Gospel; we cannot even refer to all his arguments; but one thing at least we can do. We can try to show, and, as we believe, shall show, that the narrative itself of S. Luke's Gospel necessarily excludes F. Formby's interpretation; and if so, then that the reconciliation of sacred and profane chronology must be looked for in some other direction. We shall show that the words "And Jesus was beginning (to be) about the age of thirty years," are not merely "*obiter dicta*" at the beginning of the genealogy,

but an integral part of the narrative, and that S. Luke in making use of these words refers to our Lord's age at the time of His baptism, and to nothing else; at the time namely when the word of the Lord was made to John in the desert, and he came into all the country round the Jordan, preaching the baptism of penance; in other words, in the year which the Evangelist calls "the fifteenth" of the reign of Tiberius Cæsar, no matter how this "fifteenth" year is to be interpreted. We must ask F. Formby kindly to read from Luke iii. 21, to iv. 1, and he will see, we cannot doubt, that the Evangelist does not begin a new subject at ver. 23 of ch. iii., but although introducing the genealogy by way of parenthesis, still continues the narrative of the baptism. This surely is evident from ch. iv. 1: "And Jesus being full of the Holy Ghost,"—that is, of the Holy Ghost who had just descended upon Him (iii. 22),—"returned from the Jordan, and was led by the Spirit into the desert." Leave out the parenthesis—and it is a parenthesis, even F. Formby calls it an episode—and the whole passage will read as follows:—"Now it came to pass when all the people were baptised, that Jesus also being baptised and praying, heaven was opened and the Holy Ghost descended in a bodily shape, as a dove upon Him, and a voice came from heaven: Thou art my Beloved Son in whom I am well pleased. And Jesus Himself was beginning (to be) about the age of thirty years: being as was supposed the Son of Joseph, &c. And Jesus being full of the Holy Ghost returned from the Jordan, and was led by the Spirit into the desert." To refer the words *Et Jesus erat incipiens* (however they are to be interpreted) to something distinct from the baptism, seems to us arbitrarily to distort them from their true position, and utterly to confuse the whole passage; nor can we understand how F. Formby can have passed over ch. iv. 1.

We do not think we need say anything more; for, although we should much like to enter more fully into the subject, if F. Formby's interpretation of Luke iii. 23, is untenable, all his other arguments fall to the ground together with it, and indeed we have already far exceeded our space. We do not however mean to say that F. Formby may not be able in some way or other, to us as yet unknown, to make good his case—many will hope that he may; for the forty years of our Lord's life on earth seem at first sight more in harmony with the prophecies, types, and figures of the Old Testament, than the thirty-three years usually assigned to it. On the other hand, it may be argued that to give ten years to our Lord's public ministry is to destroy the force of Daniel's "time and times and half a time" (vii. 25) as well as of the three years and a half during which Elias closed the heavens (3 Kings xvii. 1; S. James v. 17), both of which passages are usually interpreted as prophetic or typical of Antichrist's counterfeit of the three years and a half of our Lord's public ministry. But, for the present, our verdict must be "*not proven.*"

The Spoken Word; or, the Art of Extempore Preaching: its Utility, its Danger, and its True Idea. By the Rev. THOMAS J. POTTER, Professor of Sacred Eloquence in the Missionary College of All-Hallows. Dublin: M^cGlashan & Gill.

THIS is a most valuable work, and to priests especially cannot fail to be welcome. We cannot too strongly recommend it. It treats upon a subject the importance of which is daily becoming more felt, while it has the immense advantage of having been written by one who has made sacred eloquence the study of many years, and has also already had the happiness of seeing his own teaching bear much fruit. We have not even yet exhausted the good points of this book, for we must add that, like all Father Potter's other works, it not only contains a great deal of useful information, but is also interestingly and agreeably written. Even after a hard day's work, spent in attending to sick-calls and in visiting his schools, the missionary priest may take up this work, and while meeting with many a valuable hint which may serve to render his preaching more beneficial to souls, may also find amusement and relaxation.

Father Potter is especially good in showing what extempore preaching is *not*, namely, preaching without preparation, as is too often taken for granted, and that "extemporization regards only the words and not the matter of the discourse."

"An extemporary preacher is one," he says, "who, having previously and carefully studied and arranged the substance of his sermon, trusts to the inspiration of the moment to supply him with the spoken words in which to give expression to ideas which are the fruit of much earnest study, and of much patient and thoughtful labour." (ch. i. p. 10.)

Father Potter points out certain qualifications which are indispensable to success in the extemporary preacher, treats of the selection of the subject and the conception of the subject, and notices especially how unity of thought and conception is doubly necessary in this kind of preaching, and that therefore every discourse should be the development of one great leading idea. He enforces upon the reader that want of thought is a great deficiency of modern sermons, and shows how the subject should be meditated, how the matter of the discourse should be arranged, how the subject itself should be presented, how all-important it is to seize the audience; in other words, how to teach and to move, how to appeal to the intellect, and to touch the heart. The use and abuse of word-painting are also considered. The whole work is illustrated by the opinions and examples of great saints and great preachers, as well as, from time to time, by amusing anecdotes. We extract the following striking passage from Chapter XV., "How to Seize the Audience." Father Potter is speaking of those preachers who fail in this respect:—

"By their most brilliant phrases and their most ingenious figures of speech, they never succeed in disguising the innate and repulsive deformity of the dead body which they labour to clothe in these gaudy garments.

They never succeed in making these dry bones live ; probably they never even succeed in galvanizing and imparting to them a momentary semblance of life and utility. They never succeed in breathing the breath of life into that lifeless frame. Spite of their ill-directed efforts to animate and give it being, it remains cold and dead to the end. These are the men of whom it has been bitterly written, that they have nothing to say, and they say it. And what, perhaps, is most painful of all is, that many men who were destined by God and nature to become true orators—men who begin well, and whose after-career promises to be great and glorious,—end in this miserable way, simply because, when they have once acquired that gift, which is too often fatal to its possessor,—a great facility of speech,—they give up the habit of study,—the habit of careful and studious reading, without which no man, how great soever his talents or his natural gifts may be, will ever continue to be really and truly eloquent, will ever be able to speak with force and effect to a body of intelligent, educated, and thoughtful men."

One of the great difficulties of extempore preaching, and indeed of all extempore speaking, seems to be to know when to end. We must all of us remember more than one good sermon or speech utterly spoilt, because the preacher or speaker did not know how to stop. Very often, as Father Potter remarks, after having neglected to conclude at the favourable moment, when the crisis of his discourse has been secured, "the preacher flounders along for a little while longer, heaping word upon word, and phrase upon phrase, till in the end, with the recklessness of despair, he winds up with the well-used text, 'Come, ye blessed of My Father' (or with that perhaps still more familiar one, 'Well done, thou good and faithful servant: enter thou into the joy of thy Lord'), and descends crowned, if not with laurels, at least with the gratitude of his audience, for having seen fit to conclude at last." (ch. xvii. p. 242.)

Father Potter points out very clearly the way in which to guard against this unpleasant result, namely, by marking out distinctly in the plan of the discourse the leading ideas which are to be dwelt upon in the conclusion, the manner in which they are to be developed, and to some extent the very words in which they are to be expressed. We consider this advice most judicious, and we believe that in practice it will be found that those extempore sermons are the most telling whose concluding words have been carefully prepared beforehand. One of the great advantages of extempore preaching—that is, of course, of extempore preaching as understood by Father Potter, for none other is worthy of the name,—over sermons written and committed to memory, is, that it allows the preacher to keep his mind open to those inspirations of God's Holy Spirit which can surely never be wanting to any of His servants when engaged in preaching His Word. But the crisis of the sermon once reached, the object of the discourse once gained, the same reason no longer exists, and a conclusion carefully prepared beforehand will strike home at once to the hearts of the hearers, and prevent the full current of thought already presented to them from losing itself in mere deserts of sand. "Nor will this be sufficient," says Father Potter. The preacher must also foresee how his conclusion is to be arranged "with that lucid brevity, that vigorous point, that warmth, earnest and real just in proportion as it is brief,

which alone render the conclusion of a discourse all that it ought to be, the most telling and effective portion of it." The reader will also find examples of perorations employed by such well-known preachers as S. Alfonso Liguori, Massillon, Father Segneri, who to our mind is one of the most vigorous of Italian preachers, his Grace the Archbishop of Westminster, and Dr. Newman. Of the two last-mentioned Father Potter, quoting the author of "Lamps, Pitchers, and Trumpets," observes that "their writings contain fountains for many sermons for years of consolation and light."

We should have been glad to make a few remarks upon the two great methods of presenting the subject of a discourse by "plan" and by "view," and to express our hearty concurrence with the Abbé Bautain and the Abbé Mullois, quoted by Father Potter, when they say that the fault of sermons at the present day "lies in the absence or deficiency of all method." "The composition of the ordinary man," says Father Potter—for, we repeat, we do not lay down rules for a Lacordaire or a Felix—"who proposes to himself 'to take views,' is almost certain to lack that strict and logical sequence of ideas, of proofs, of arguments, without which, resting upon the authority of S. Augustine (1 Ep. xviii.), we have no hesitation in saying that a sermon is essentially faulty. Such a preacher is as likely as not to say at the commencement of his discourse that which he should have reserved for the conclusion." (ch. viii. p. 82.) But we must refer our readers for further information to the work itself.

We will only, in conclusion, repeat that we cannot doubt that this book will be warmly received by the clergy, most of whom in the midst of their missionary labour find it quite impossible to prepare the *words* of their sermons, and who, therefore, cannot fail to feel grateful for so many useful hints, how to make their extempore preaching really fruitful. We trust also that Father Potter's work will be in the hands of all ecclesiastical students, for whose information we may add that at pages 20, 21, 97, they will find how this accomplished and experienced professor of sacred eloquence himself trains the students of All-Hallows College to prepare for extempore preaching. The continual practice of writing sermons during their college course, and of making a careful and accurate synopsis of every sermon thus composed, forms the chief feature of this training. There can be nothing better. The work has been excellently brought out by Messrs. McGlashan & Gill, of Dublin, whose many beautiful publications clearly show that in excellence of typography and finish of binding the Irish capital can more than hold her place with any rival.

The Russian Clergy. Translated from the French of Father GAGARIN, S. J., by CH. DU GARD MAKEPEACE, M.A. London: Burns & Oates. 1872.

THE state of the schismatical clergy of Russia seems, if we may judge of it by the number of books even recently published, to be exciting very considerable interest in the minds of men who have little in common with that fallen body. Father Gagarin, however, had a natural attraction to the

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subject, besides the supernatural desire to see his countrymen recover their lost inheritance. It is also the more satisfactory to read what he writes because of his perfect knowledge of the subject, and because of the illumination of faith which enables him to see things in their true light as they really are.

The work before us is admirably done, and we have seldom or never read any book our interest in which was so unflagging. The translator, too, deserves all praise for the skill with which he has rendered the French original into clear and easy English, and our sole regret is that he is still a stranger to the household of the faith.

"Inasmuch as the author," says the translator, "whose work I have translated is a living Catholic Father, as well as an historical writer of repute, I, a Protestant, felt bound, especially after being favoured with the author's consent to the translation, to allow him, by a very faithful rendering of the original, to speak not only as an historian, but also as a Catholic."

It is but justice to the translator to make known this his explanation, and that done we proceed with our task.

In the first place, the reader of the book must be struck not simply with the ineffectiveness of the Russian clergy, but with the spiritual degradation and intellectual darkness into which it has sunk. Schism and servility to the civil power seem to go together, and to be according to circumstances sometimes causes, and sometimes effects each of the other, at least in principle; for in some countries, by the great mercy of God, abject servility before the temporal power has not always resulted in schism, though it has always threatened to do so. We know what came of it in England, we have heard of the dangers it created in France long before the First Revolution, and we see now what it is doing in Bavaria, though we hope the great evil may not be wrought out in full, and our hope is well grounded, for the bishops are faithful there.

In Russia the civil power met with scarcely any resistance, because there was no one to make it. The bishops had begun by revolting against their superiors, and were therefore without strength. It is true that the superiors, whose authority, such as it was, they cast aside, had no lawful claim on their obedience; but that did not mend their case, because they did not return to their true Superior and Father the Supreme Pontiff. Bishops and priests in schism can offer no resistance to the secular aggressions, and the strength of bishops not in schism is always lessened in proportion to their disloyalty to Rome.

Besides, the civil power hardly ever fights with the whole episcopate within its reach at once. It beats the prelates by dividing them among themselves, protesting all the time that it means no mischief, whereby some are generally won over either to befriend the State or to observe a benevolent neutrality. If, then, the State can do so much evil when it has to do with bishops not tainted with heresy, and in the communion of the Holy See, its powers are immeasurably greater when it has to do with bishops who have built their palaces on the sand, as the bishops of Russia had certainly done long before they fell an easy prey to the Czar Peter the Great.

As heresy begets schism, so schism begets heresy; the Russian bishops

have not escaped, and it appears from Father Gagarin's book that they hardly wish to escape, the unavoidable lot of schismatics. They have either taught heresy themselves, or suffered it to be taught by others ; they are at best but dumb dogs that cannot bark, and the wolf is never disturbed by their cries of danger.

In Russia the secular clergy has become a caste ; and the cause of that is that they are all of them, before their ordination, married men. The old law of the Church is still in force, but with this difference, that the secular clergy is composed of men who were compelled to marry their wives. Thus, orders in Russia are given only on two conditions, monastic vows and marriage. Father Gagarin knows of but one ordination there the subject of which was an unmarried man living in the world :—

“In Russia alone has the custom prevailed of requiring the marriage of all who are to be ordained among the secular clergy. But even in Russia this custom, how general soever, has not the force of law. A recent fact proves this. Mgr. Filaret ordained as priest a M. Gorski, a celibate but not a monk. The legality of this act is not to be doubted : but so strongly rooted is the contrary custom, that in the whole Russian Church not a single bishop would be found to follow Mgr. Filaret's example. We have not heard that this prelate has himself followed his own lead, and made a second ordination in the same circumstances.” (p. 29.)

The discipline in force in the Eastern Church always allowed the ordination of married men, but in Russia marriage has become compulsory previous to the ordination. The result is that the secular clergy are immersed in worldly cares, struggling with the unavoidable poverty, except in towns, of a small benefice and a large family. They have no time to study, and the higher dignities of the church are withheld from them, because of the law that requires the bishop to be an unmarried man. Their children are driven by the State into the ecclesiastical seminaries, and in a certain sense compelled to become priests or monks, whether they have vocations or not. “The son of a priest or deacon is destined by his birth to enter the clerical ranks : it is an obligation from which he is not permitted to withdraw himself” (p. 16.) On the other hand, though the children of nobles, tradesmen, or peasants are not absolutely forbidden to enter the ecclesiastical state, yet if they wished to enter it they “would meet with insurmountable obstacles,” unless they proposed to become religious also.

Education in Russia is a function of the State, and it educates not the layman only but also the priest. There is nothing in this beyond the necessary and lawful result of the principle : and we are not surprised to read in Father Gagarin's book the following astounding statement. The italics are his, not ours :—

“The ignorance of the clergy being complained of, a decree was issued for the founding of ecclesiastical schools. These remained deserted : the clergy were then *ordered* to send their children there ; and as these did not go by any means willingly, they were taken there by force—sometimes even *loaded with chains*. Here we see an application of the principle of *gratuitous and compulsory instruction*.”

“The ukases of Alexander I., published in 1808 and 1814, declare that all

the children of clerks from the age of six years to eight, are at the disposition of the ecclesiastical school department."

"When once the Synod or the State had been at the expense of the children's education, it seemed just that they should wish to be indemnified for it. The seminarists had no other prospect than that of entering the ecclesiastical state. In order to pursue any other career, they needed a special permission, which was very difficult to obtain, and almost always refused." (pp. 17, 18.)

The priesthood of Russia has thus become a caste; and what should be a special vocation from God is supplied by a profession, hereditary in certain families. Russia has converted the priesthood into a function of State, and "in order to put the children of the clergy in safety from an unpleasant competition, obstacles were multiplied to other classes of society gaining access to the sanctuary." (p. 18.)

This is not all: not only are men doomed to become priests whether they have a vocation or not, but they are further bound to marry, and even in marriage they are not free. The seminarist is in the grip of the State and the Synod,—the Synod is only the State in another form,—and he must do what he is bid. He cannot choose even a wife out of the caste. "Priests and deacons have daughters for whom settlements must be found: hence arose a prohibition against marrying out of the caste. There are some bishops who even do not tolerate their clergy marrying out of their diocesan clergy." (p. 19.)

This utter degradation of men who at the same time possess the awful grace of holy orders is enough to make stones cry out; but it is not felt in the Russian Church: those who feel it take refuge either in Nihilism or in dissent.

"There is in Russia a sect called Nihilists, who deny everything and believe nothing. The existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the future state, the fundamental bases of society, marriage, property,—they reject everything. Nihilism is rapidly spreading in the universities; but if we may believe the *'Moscow Gazette,'* it has committed still greater ravages in the seminaries." (p. 20.)

The Dissenters in Russia are numerous, and are governed by their own laws in ecclesiastical matters. They sturdily refuse all communion with the so-called orthodox Church, and they have very prudently established their chief bishop or patriarch in a place outside the Russian dominion: in order to secure their own independence of the State, and the freedom which they think they ought to possess.

In Russia the religious houses are not even honestly filled. It is true that the State does not force people to become monks; yet it is difficult to say that the State has no influence in determining that which out of Russia would be a divine vocation.

"A priest or deacon who has rendered himself guilty of grave offences, and can no longer exercise his functions, is condemned to the convent, as civilians are elsewhere to the galleys." (p. 88.)

It is true that the monks have one inducement before them, for it is out of their body that the bishops are taken. In the absence of vocations, the

prospect of preferment might lead a certain number of ambitious men to take vows ; but as it is not considered decent to promote ignorant men to the episcopal sees, a certain necessity is acknowledged that young men of good abilities and becoming learning should be persuaded to enter the monastic houses ; but if persuasion fails, other means are resorted to ; and Father Gagarin tells the following story of the celebrated Pbatō, Metropolitan of Moscow, at the beginning of this century. The story is told by him on the authority of a Russian parish priest, and he does not suggest a doubt of its truth :—

“ When all methods of persuasion had failed, the recalcitrant student was invited to pass the evening with one of the monks. There he was made to drink until he became intoxicated, when the ceremony constituting religious profession was performed,—i.e., the taking the habit and receiving the tonsure. On awaking the next morning, the unfortunate youth saw beside his bed, instead of the lay garments worn the night before, a monastic habit.” (pp. 84, 85.)

It was to no purpose that the miserable youth complained of the trick ; the act was done ; his deceivers secured their prey, and he was constrained to yield, and ratify in his more sober senses what had been done while he was too drunk to offer any resistance to the tonsure, which was effected by force and fraud.

Another principle of destruction in the Russian Church is the use in the seminaries of pure Protestant books on theology, and the wasting of much time on physical science and merely secular learning. It is not to be wondered at that the young men in these seminaries should indulge in unbelief ; their training necessarily leads thereunto. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the State, it matters not much whether the priest believes in God or not. Sermons are infrequent, and the clergy have generally persuaded themselves that all their duties are fulfilled when they have publicly chanted the Divine Office :—

“ As to making Jesus Christ known and loved, or pointing out to souls the way to tread in His steps, it [the clergy] does not even dream of such a thing. The salvation of souls redeemed by Jesus Christ at the price of His own blood concerns it not ; its thought goes not beyond a few formalities understood after a Jewish fashion.” (p. 48.)

This is the fruit of the Royal supremacy. The work has been done differently in England ; but it has been done, and we also have come to the Nihilism of the Russians.

The bishops are not better than the priests. It would be a miracle if they were. Brought up in the same schools, and trained in the same system, they resemble each other. But the bishops have to bear the yoke first, for they are immediately under the Synod, which is simply an office of the secular government, and are absolutely at its disposal. They are, of course, appointed for life, but the Synod can translate them to other sees without asking their consent, and if they do not give satisfaction in their new place, they can be, and are allowed to rest themselves—that means that they are really deposed,

and deprived of their functions. This is what Father Gagarin says of them :—

“If we pass to the moral authority, to the influence of the bishops, we shall not be wrong in affirming that it is almost *nil*. As to pastoral letters, they are never heard of. The discourses they pronounce on solemn occasions no one cares about.” (p. 194.)

It is the most natural condition of things, for if men, whose work is to represent God, forego their primary and only duty and become the representatives and agents of man, they forfeit their claims to be heard, and fall into contempt as they deserve to fall.

But, unfortunately, this servility of the Russian bishops does mischief in more ways than one. The State having found them pliable, and having obtained from them, or taken from them without resistance on their part, all it wanted for the purpose of controlling the so-called orthodox Church, cannot now, or will not, believe that Catholic bishops are of another mint. The Emperor of Russia is persuaded, and his ministers never attempt to undeceive him, that he has a lawful right to direct the religious life of his subjects. He is in one sense tolerant, for he does not forbid sects, and is willing to allow his people to become Catholic. But that done, he follows them into whatever sect they go, and he follows them also into the Church. The Raskolnicks—the Russian Dissenters—seem to defy him on the whole, but then they are never safe. He would allow the Catholics all the liberties they ought to have according to his notion, but not all that the Pope claims. He thinks himself the supreme judge, and is for ever interfering in the internal affairs of the Catholic Church. It is simply an anti-christian system of government, and the Dissenters refuse to communicate with the established Russian Church on this very ground: it is to them Antichrist claiming their obedience, and they refuse it. The civil government is so tolerant that it meddles with every religion.

“Hence,” says Father Gagarin, “the insurmountable difficulties in the construction, and above all in the enforcement, of Concordats with the Holy See. From the point of view of the Russian Government, the supreme authority over the Catholic Church in Russia substantially resides in the Emperor. He is quite willing that the Mass be said in Latin, that the *Filioque* be inserted in the symbol, that unleavened bread be used, that the Communion be in one kind only: but, these concessions made, he sincerely believes he has the right to rule the Catholic Church in his States, the Protestant and the Arminian just as the National Church. He applies the same principles to Jews, Mussulmans, and Buddhists; and this equality of all religions before Imperial supremacy constitutes what is in Russia called toleration. As is witnessed, a perpetual misunderstanding and radical opposition exists between the Catholic Church and Russian autocracy.” (pp. 258, 259.)

Thus it is evident that the Russian Government is founded on “Liberalism,” and is, strictly speaking, the most liberal government in the world, for it has developed the principle further than any other government, and is consistent with itself. The State is everything: all rights flow from it, and all rights are measured by its convenience; for being a law to itself, the sole measure

of right tolerated in it must be its own wellbeing or ease for the moment. Nations and Government are happily inconsistent, and in many countries people are not yet thrown into the dungeons of liberalism, though the State may have accepted the principle. The Emperor of Russia is consistent; and woe to the people when the consistency in evil has become a law. The State in Russia is religious, for it has chaplains, churches, magnificent ceremonials, and a traditional usage. But the spirit has escaped. The State is really sceptical, for it tolerates, and the people who are sent to school have begun to learn their lesson. It is a question of time probably in Russia, and the day may not be far distant when the priest and his deacon will find themselves alone in the parish church.

Monastic Legends. A Paper. By EDWARD GEORGE KIRWAN BROWNE,
Author of the "Annals of the Tractarian Movement," etc. London:
R. Washbourne.

IN this paper Mr. Browne touches upon some interesting monastic legends and more especially upon that beautiful one which still clings to the ruined choir of Tintern, as a pledge to us of happier days for England, when,—

"Such a harvest shall be reap'd,
Beyond the World's belief,
As shall console the Church of God
For centuries of grief."

Mr. Browne, however, somewhat anticipates that happy time—at least, he gives us some information for which we were quite unprepared. The sons of S. Bruno are apparently already amongst us in their "Chartreuse" at Kensington. "If we would wish to recall the life of S. Bruno," he says, "or desire to visit in spirit that glorious but self-subdued hermit of La Chartreuse, we have but to pay a visit to their house at Kensington, and the realities of their austerities practised by those glorious martyrs, F. Houghton and F. Newdigate, are before us." We should indeed be glad to know that the sons of S. Bruno had returned to us after three centuries of absence, bringing with them that old silent life of theirs, which is the salt of the earth; it will be a happy day for England when they come, although it will not be Kensington, we imagine, that they will fix upon for their "Chartreuse." But meanwhile we can only suppose Mr. Browne has confused between the Carmelites and the Carthusians. We should not however have pointed out this mistake, had not Mr. Browne told us that he means this paper as an introduction to his "*Monasticon Britannicum*;" or, a Sketch of the Religious Houses and Charities of England and Wales, and the Channel Islands; also the alien Priories in Normandy and Brittany, with three Indexes of Founders, a Description of the Seals (when possible), and also the Names of the Grantees." For such a work the utmost accuracy is required. If mistakes are made about the green tree, what shall be done with the dry?

Henri Perreyve. By A. GRATRY, Prêtre de l'Oratoire et Membre de l'Académie Française. Translated, by special permission, by the Author of "A Dominican Artist," "Life of S. Francis de Sales," &c. &c. London, Oxford, and Cambridge: Rivingtons.

THIS exquisite translation of what we should also call—were we not obliged in some important points to differ from it—an exquisite work, will meet with many readers not only for the sake of the beautiful life enshrined within it, but even more perhaps for the sake of its author. The heat of that fiery trial which two years ago tested so many Catholics of what metal they were made, when the definition of the great doctrine that had been set for the rising and falling of not a few in Israel was under discussion, and which for a moment seemed to hide Père Gratry from us in its thick smoke, has died away, and he himself, true and faithful, is resting now, "where beyond these voices there is peace." He whose constant prayer on earth was that he might have grace to remember the blessed promise that "Whosoever liveth and believeth in Me shall never die," has passed beyond the veil, but this work is almost as much a revelation of his own soul as of that of the friend about whom it is written. We see in this book how almost impossible it would have been for Père Gratry to have ended as some have ended whom we will not mention here. We see in these pages how truly deep was the current of that inner life hidden with Christ in God, which no obstacle, however great and strong—although the very depths of the waters may have made the fierceness of the struggle more apparent,—could hinder from pouring itself out at last into the ocean of God's love. Indeed we have always regarded Père Gratry as one of the few mystics of our age, one of the very few in these days of ceaseless hurry who have not only believed but have acted upon the belief that spiritual progress, as he himself says, "*consists in intensifying the inward life.*" Everything therefore that opens up to us the thoughts of such a man upon the inner life must be of intense interest and of real value. For ourselves we have only had one regret, that Père Gratry had not more thoroughly cast his mysticism in the mould of the great saintly mystics of the Church. We speak with great diffidence, for these are high matters; but to us it has always seemed that in Père Gratry we meet with the philosophical mysticism of Malebranche rather than the mystical theology of S. Bonaventure, or S. John of the Cross or S. Teresa. We wish that it had been otherwise, for then, we think, he would have been better able to have read the signs of the times. He would not then surely have "*interpreted Revolution by the light of the Gospel in wisdom, in peace, in fraternity*" (p. 138), but would rather have looked at it in the light of the judgments of the Holy See, and condemned it as the spirit of the *City of Evil*. To us Père Gratry seems always to forget that there is such a thing in the world as the City of Evil as well as evil itself, a fact which true mysticism never forgets. Nor can we agree with his view either of the present or the future. Still Père Gratry was in his measure a true mystic, and that surely is something in

these days of ours, when the forces of men's souls are spread abroad over many things, and dissipated in restless activity, and when recollection is almost unknown. See how beautifully and vigorously he speaks of what he calls the "surface movement" of the present day — by which we whirl about more, but advance less,"—movement being "multiplied in every shape, moral, intellectual," and physical, while "the central impetus is slackening." We quote from chapter vi. on Imperfection.

"It is a universal blot; every living thing finds the difficulty of self-recollection, of gathering itself together, and abiding steadfast at the heart's core. It is an evil incident alike to the flowers by the wayside, to all living bodies, to all hearts and minds. It is the *degenerare tamen* of Virgil, which, passing on from the grain of wheat, he applies to all nature. It is that which S. Bernard, with his deep insight, has called the '*evisceratio mentis*' the 'disembowelling of the soul.' S. Augustine alludes to the same under the same metaphor, '*viscera quædam animæ*,' when he says that man throws the inner depths of his soul into his outer life, '*proiecit intima sua in via sua*.' Life hurries on, spreads itself far and wide, but the source of life dries up. What avails it to conquer the world, if that conquest exhausts the life within us? Yet this is the universal weakness of all creation; it is the road which leads to death. Let us consider the present time and the tendency of minds in this day to rush forward. If we are to believe one of the latest and ablest psychological authors, that mental and spiritual progress consists in intensifying the inward life (*à remonter les degrés d'intériorité*) in passing (as mystic writers have well said) from that which is without to that which is within, and thence to that which is highest,— '*ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab interioribus ad superiora*,'—if this, I say, be true, surely at no time has the human mind and soul been so utterly dispersed, plunged amid that which is external, which may perchance prove to be 'the outer darkness' of which we read in the Gospel. There is a mighty central life within the vast sphere of a man's soul, which seems to be forgotten, unheeded by all; a neglected sanctuary, a lost fountain-head! And owing to this, those who have wandered farthest would fain assure us that no such invisible world has ever existed. These men tell us that our very soul's existence and that of God, and that science which teaches their union, the interior life, theology, metaphysics, are mere illusion. They end by denying the existence of the very source which gave them life.

"In days of old there were monks whose whole life was absorbed in this great centre, and who found peace, light, and happiness therein. To them it furnished the motive power, the life of all things. But in these days, where shall we find such calm, deep minds, dwelling in the invisible, wrapt in heavenly things, ever facing eastward amid the whirl of life? Who now believes in recollection, retirement, and prayer?

"I have seen a discourse which, forty years ago, a learned magistrate ventured to produce, on the advantage of retirement for lawyers; but, now-a-days, who would venture to proffer such an idea?—who would give a moment's heed to it? Let it go! Enough if we may presume to speak of the need for retirement in the priest's case! Yet a life of retirement and recollection, an interior life, a life of prayer, *de interna Christi conversatione*, of hidden communion with God; these are, undoubtedly, the greatest of all realities—realities which cannot pass away, an imperative need to the soul."

Our extract has been long, but we do not think our readers will regret its length. There is not one amongst us who may not profit by such teaching. It was the want of self-recollection which was the one imper-

fection of Henri Perreyve's otherwise almost faultless life, and which cost him the life of his body. Not indeed that he ever wasted his soul in spreading it abroad over unworthy objects, but that out of much love to God and his neighbour he failed to concentrate his love by intensifying his inner life, and so to "possess his soul" and save it for even greater good. And who is there amongst us who may not learn from this solemn warning how to make his own works of charity more vigorous and enduring? In saying however that Henri Perreyve's life was not altogether perfect, our readers must not think that he was unable to form to himself an ideal of the perfect life. In the chapter immediately preceding the one on Imperfection, Père Gratry places before us the ideal which he had formed of what a priest's life should be. It is contained in four Meditations written during his retreat at S. Eusebio, Rome, 1857, on Chastity, the Priest's Death, Persecution, and Son of Man, of which the last three are given, and from which the reader will be able to gather glimpses at least of the nobleness of his soul. With the exception of the one imperfection alluded to, the whole work bears witness how well he lived up to his ideal, and not only lived up to it, but died true to it. As we might have expected from Père Gratry, it is rather a mystical treatment of his life, than a biography; and yet we do not hesitate to say that the seven chapters headed "Education," "Vocation," "Organization of Life," "Ministry," "An Ideal," "Imperfection," "Death," contain a far truer and more vivid idea of the servant of God, and even of the living man, than any mere biography could give. We have lately had occasion to point out how, for spiritual purposes, the Lives of the Saints, composed upon the "hagiological" method, are to be preferred to those written in the biographical form; and, *mutatis mutandis*, we think that in the sketch of such a life as that of Henri Perreyve, the method of treatment adopted by Père Gratry gives us far more real knowledge of the life itself than could be derived from the more human interest of a biographical sketch. The last chapter contains a touching account of Henri's last days by the Abbé Bernard. Henri Perreyve is himself well known as an author, having written the "Journée des Malades," biographical essays on Lacordaire, Rosa Ferrucci, Hermann de Jouffroy, Alfred Tonnelé, and Mgr. Baudry, and the "Station à la Sorbonne," the last sermons he ever preached. Had God spared him a little longer, our young men would also have been indebted to him for a work on "Religious and Social Life." "Nor must it be forgotten," says the translator, "that we owe that matchless volume of Lacordaire's familiar intercourse with the younger generation he loved so well, *Lettres à des Jeunes Gens*," to the Abbé Perreyve, to whom many of those exquisitely beautiful letters were addressed." We are glad to be able to add that a collection of Henri Perreyve's own letters is in course of preparation.

We must say one word upon the translation. It is as nearly perfect as we can conceive a translation can ever be. The translator is, we believe, still an Anglican; but there has been no tampering with Père Gratry's work, which has been given in its original form. That it will do much good amongst Anglicans by showing them what the true priestly spirit is capable of effecting we have no doubt; and few Catholics, we feel sure,

who read the book, will fail to offer an earnest prayer to God, that not only the translator, but all who, although strangers to the household of faith, take delight in its pages, may discover, before long, that the perfection of the Christian spirit and life for which they are thirsting is not to be found in the unrealities of Anglicanism, but in that Church alone at the altars of which Henri Perreyve offered in sacrifice, not only his own life, but the Bread of Life itself. Still, we have one fault to find, and it is a grave one. In Henri Perreyve's Second Meditation, p. 161, after having spoken of persecution as an evil that leaves wounds in the breast of a nation which take more centuries to heal than they took days to inflict, he goes on to say that, "in England the Church was smitten with such wounds, that her present life is more like a miraculous waking from death than any mere healing." In the translation the passage is thus rendered:—"The Church of England was thus smitten," &c. Now we have not the original by us, but if in the original the sentence begins with the words, "*L'Eglise d'Angleterre*," these words in a French priest's mouth, or coming from a French priest's pen, mean something very different from what is conveyed by the expression, "the Church of England." It is of the Church of the living God in communion with the Holy See that Henri Perreyve is speaking; whereas we suppose there will be few Anglicans who read this passage who will not wrap themselves round in the happy thought that the writer is referring to signs of renewed life in their own Establishment. We should be the last to deny that the finger of God is now stretched over the Establishment, but it is stretched over it only to point out the way into the true Church of God; and we should consider ourselves wanting in true charity were we not to try and tear away every one of the deceitful coverings by which Anglicans seek to hide from their own eyes the nakedness of what they call their Church. Even supposing that the translator thought that the words "the Church of England" were an honest rendering of the original, a note of explanation ought at least to have been added. At the same time, we do not wish to speak harshly, but to bear in mind the beautiful words spoken by our Holy Father to Henry Perreyve, and quoted by him at the beginning of his Meditation on the Son of Man:—"Strike boldly at error, but let your hearts be tender as a mother's towards men." (p. 162.)

Louise Lateau: her Life, Stigmata, and Ecstasies. By DR. LEBFEVRE.
Translated from the French by J. S. SHEPHARD. Second Edition
London: R. Washbourne. Dublin: W. B. Kelly.

WE are delighted to find that Mr. Shephard's translation of Dr. Lebevre's really scientific treatise has reached a second edition, and that thus, while God's marvellous work in the poor peasant-girl of Bois d'Haine is made better known, a work of charity so dear to the Sacred Heart as the Northampton Diocesan Orphanage must surely be, is

also benefited. There can be no danger in circulating a work like the present far and wide, for it is written by one who is as remarkable for his scientific acquirements as for his loyalty to the Church. We trust that the extraordinary manifestations which are at present attracting so much attention at Baden and Alsace will also be examined in the same spirit as that in which Dr. Lebfevre has conducted his inquiry in the present instance, in order that if they stand the test, the Catholic world may not be deprived of a great consolation. We are glad to find that Dr. Imbert Gourbeyre, Professor of the Clermont-Ferrand School of Medicine, whose evidence as to the development of Louise Lateau's ecstasy under certain circumstances is quoted by Dr. Lebfevre, and whose letter in answer to some strictures of the "*Siècle*" appears at the end of this work, has already paid a visit to Alsace for the purpose of investigation, and has written to the "*Univers*" on the subject. However, the case of Louise Lateau is now so thoroughly well established, that no Catholic need scruple to bring it forward as a proof that God is still near to this generation, notwithstanding all its shortcomings. Such a paper as the "*Lancet*" may still continue to maintain, as we pointed out when noticing the first edition of this work, that her state is so far from extraordinary, that the real difficulty is to prevent people falling into it, or such publications as the "*British Medical Journal*" may still believe that her ecstatic visions and bleeding skin are in no way opposed to or above the ordinary laws of nature; but unprejudiced Protestants will not thoughtlessly reject the evidence, and will be led on to further inquiry, while Catholics will thank God for having visited His people.

As we have already called the attention of the public to this important work, we need only now again recommend it most earnestly to their notice, for the sake both of the edification to be derived from its perusal, and of the admirable institution for whose profit it is sold. We may perhaps, however, be allowed to make a remark before we conclude. There is one important fact connected with Louise Lateau's ecstasy which seems common to other similar manifestations. Certainly the same fact is related both of Maria Mörl and Maria Dominica Lazzari, the *Addolorata* and *Ecstatica* of the Tyrol. We allude to that wonderful and instantaneous obedience shown, even in the midst of ecstasy, to those who have *spiritual jurisdiction* over the soul. So far as we can gather, this obedience is not confined to the confessor alone, but is paid to all legitimate superiors. Surely, if there be any lesson which more than another these ecstatic maidens teach us, it is this: "*Hear the Church.*" This is a lesson by which all men may profit; Catholics by learning still more to value their high privilege of being children of the Church; Protestants and other non-Catholics by perceiving that God, even when speaking Himself to the soul, is obedient to the voice of the Church, which is His Body. We understand that before long Dr. Imbert Gourbeyre will publish the result of his investigations into the case of the *Ecstatica* of Oria.

The Works of Aurelius Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. A new Translation. Edited by the Rev. MARCUS DODS, M.A. Vol. III. *Writings in Connection with the Donatist Controversy.* Translated by Rev. J. R. KING, M.A. Vol. IV. *The Anti-Pelagian Works.* (Vol. I.) Translated by PETER HOLMES, D.D.

Origen contra Celsum. Being Vol. XXIII. of the *Ante-Nicene Christian Library.* Translated by Rev. FREDERICK CROMBIE, D.D.

Early Liturgies and other Documents. Vol. XXIV. of the same Series. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1872.

WE here notice four volumes of Patristic translations, published by Messrs. Clark, of Edinburgh, two of them being a continuation of the edition of S. Augustine noticed in our number for last October, and the other two forming the concluding volumes of the *Ante-Nicene Series*, to which we have had occasion to draw attention before.

In beginning their post-Nicene series with S. Augustine, and in promising S. Chrysostom to follow, the publishers have no doubt chosen the names out of the whole range of Patrology which are secure of the greatest amount of attention. The "City of God," which was the first of S. Augustine's works issued, though it had been translated several times before, was fairly sure of being received with interest. But the volumes now before us are of a very different kind. There are chapters and paragraphs in S. Augustine's controversial writings which are as eloquent and grand as any he has written, and there are not wanting attractive passages of history, and striking personal allusions. Moreover, S. Augustine being the great authority he is, the continual allusion to Holy Scripture, and the incessant direct and indirect commentary on Scripture passages, will always bring the student back to his pages. But still the controversial writings, of which we have samples in these two volumes on the Donatist and Pelagian heresies, must be called dry to the ordinary reader. The extreme minuteness with which the Saint answers objections, the repetitions, and the want of liveliness inherent in a buried, or rather fossilized, dispute, are apt to turn away all but professional students from a study of the answer to Petilianus, the books on Baptism, or the "case of Pelagius." It does not follow from this that these translations should not have been undertaken. On the contrary, it is a sign that the ranks of the students of S. Augustine are enlarging. Such an undertaking as this is rarely begun without some kind of demand; and the demand will be indefinitely increased by the supply. We may hope that good will come of this presenting the Fathers to the English public in an English dress. Any one who knows something of the dense ignorance which possesses not only the ordinary British church or chapel-goer, not only the ladies who distribute tracts and read novels, but the masters of thousands of parsonages throughout the land, will be glad that there is a prospect of Messrs. Clark's translations finding their way to drawing-room tables, and taking their place on the desk or the

shelves of the rector's "study." Very few of the men, not to say the women, who watch over the theological concerns of the land, have any but the mistiest notion, we do not say of modern "Roman" practices, but even of that fragmentary Christianity which is presented to them by their own prayer-book, or which is common to the Roman Church and to those which have thrown off her obedience. The glances into S. Augustine, in English, which may now be expected, will astonish a good many well-meaning Protestants. They will take up the book with varying notions about the great African doctor. Most will think him a sound Protestant, from having heard him quoted by Evangelicals on many platforms and in divers pamphlets. Some will go further and expect to find Calvinism well developed in the anti-Pelagian treatises. Such persons will be somewhat astonished to find S. Augustine talking about the Primacy of Peter, in a strain such as they might hear in a Catholic Church in England. He first quotes the well-known passage of S. Cyprian in the Epistle to Quintus, beginning, "For neither did Peter, whom the Lord chose first" (it should be translated "as the first") "and on whom our Lord built his Church," &c. He then goes on to speak himself of the Apostle Peter, "in whom the Primacy of the Apostles shines with such exceeding grace" ("shines" is not a good word; the original is *tam excellenti gratiâ præeminet*). (Vol. iii. p. 32.) This will be an interesting experience to the controversial parson (or his lady); and it would be a profitable exercise for them to try if they could bring themselves to speak as S. Augustine speaks. They would also find Purgatory in S. Augustine. At page 370 of Dr. Holmes's translation of the anti-Pelagian writings, they would come upon a distinction between sinners who are to be punished everlastingly, and sinners "of whom the Apostle declares that 'they shall be saved, yet so as by fire after their (evil) work has been burnt up.'" Ritualists would find much profit in a careful reading of the treatise *De Baptismo* against the Donatists. It is impossible for a candid High Churchman to doubt that the man who wrote that work, with its fervent appeals against breaking off from unity, and its continued reference to the "orbis terrarum," would address words of the same import to him and his party, if he were writing at this moment. Other Christians would be surprised to find S. Augustine advocating the use of force on the part of the civil power against heretics. Mr. King, the translator of the Donatist treatises, is himself astonished at this. Speaking of the letter to Count Bonifacius, which is the concluding treatise in this volume, he says that S. Augustine "enunciates principles of coercion which, though in him they were subdued and rendered practically of little moment by the spirit of love which formed so large an element in his character, yet found their natural development in the despotic intolerance of the Papacy, and the horrors of the Inquisition." (*Preface*, xiii.) Mr. King is one of those men who need to be reminded that the theoretic intolerance of the Catholic Church—a kind of intolerance which every one must have who believes there is such a thing as God's true revelation—never becomes practical except when the overwhelming majority of a national community are Catholics; and that the "horrors of the Inquisition" are partly imaginary, and at the worst no more "horrible" than the other non-religious portion of the criminal law of the times in which the Inquisition existed. Of

course it is really the principle of religious compulsion that is objected to ; but, if so, writers should not colour their protests by "horrors" and hard words. If religious compulsion is wrong in itself, then punishments for heresy will be "horrible;" if it is right, such punishment will be only legitimate severity. S. Augustine, in the passage alluded to, lays down so clearly the principles on which the mediæval Church acted that it is worth while to quote his words.

"As to the argument of those men who are unwilling that their (the Donatists') impious deeds should be checked by the enactment of righteous laws, when they say that the Apostles never sought such measures from the kings of the earth, they do not consider the different character of that age, and that everything comes in its own season. For what emperor had as yet believed in Christ, so as to serve Him in the cause of piety by enacting laws against impiety? For a man serves God in one way in that he is a man, in another way in that he is also king. In that he is a man he serves Him by living faithfully ; but in that he is also king, he serves Him by enforcing with suitable rigour such laws as ordain what is righteous, and punish what is the reverse."

After bringing forward, as instances of the righteous severity of rulers, the edicts of Ezechias, of Josias, of Darius, and of Nebuchodonosor against idolatry, impiety and blasphemy, he continues :—

"But so soon as the fulfilment began of what is written: 'All kings shall fall down before Him, all nations shall serve Him,' what sober-minded man could say to kings, 'Let not any thought trouble you within your kingdoms as to who restrains or attacks the Church of your Lord ; deem it not a matter in which you should be concerned, which of your subjects may choose to be religious or sacrilegious,' seeing that you cannot say to them, 'Deem it no concern of yours which of your subjects may choose to be chaste or which unchaste.' For why, when freewill is given to God by man, should adulteries be punished by the laws, and sacrilege allowed? Or if these faults, which are committed not in contempt but in ignorance of religious truth, are to be visited with lighter punishment, are they therefore to be neglected altogether? It is indeed better (as no one ever could deny) that men should be led to worship God by teachers, than that they should be driven to it by fear of punishment or pain ; but it does not follow that because the former course produces the better men, therefore those who do not yield to it should be neglected. . . . Wherefore, if the power which the Church has received by Divine appointment in its due season, through the religious character and the faith of kings, be the instrument by which those who are found in the highways and hedges—that is, in heresies and schisms—are compelled to come in, then let them not find fault with being compelled, but consider whither they are compelled." (Vol. iii. pp. 495-500.)

(Mr. King has "whether they be so compelled," which is probably a misprint, the Latin being "*quo cogantur attendant*"). If the word "kings" in the foregoing passages be changed into "Governments," we have principles that apply to every age of the world.

The Five Treatises of S. Augustine against the Pelagian heresy, translated by Dr. Holmes in the second of the volumes named above, are not the first in interest of the fifteen which he has actually left, but only the first in order of time. In looking through the volume, it is curious to speculate as to the

reception its contents will receive at the present day. Omitting the question of the probable sale of the series and its profit to the publishers, it seems difficult to suppose that much attention will be paid to S. Augustine's stiff writing on the intricacies of infant baptism, or his exposition of Pelagius's quibbles, except by those who attended to such things before this translation appeared—students of Catholic theology, chiefly, a few Evangelicals, inheritors of the spirit of Beza or Arminius, and omnivorous German historians. The great and fundamental question raised by the Pelagian heresy is as vital in our days as it was in the days of S. Augustine. But in the fifth century the discussion was whether Pelagius could belong to the Church—to the body of Christ, which was regulated by the Holy Scriptures and the bishops; whereas, in our times, it is very certain that a man who denies grace cannot be a Christian in any real sense of the word, and the dispute is whether it is necessary to believe as a Christian or not. The Pelagian heresy meant the cause of Naturalism against Redeeming Grace. Those who wish to see how Pelagianism is Naturalism—how it contradicts the Scriptures on the Fall of Man, on man's will, on man's passions, on regeneration and merit through Christ, will find all they can wish for in the writings of S. Augustine.

Dr. Holmes has some good remarks in his Preface on this subject:—

"The key to this wonderful influence is Augustine's knowledge of Holy Scripture, and its profound suitability to the facts and experience of our entire nature. Perhaps to no one, not excepting S. Paul himself, has it been ever given so wholly and so deeply to suffer the manifold experiences of the human heart, whether of sorrow and anguish from the tyranny of sin, or of spiritual joy from the precious consolations of the Grace of God. Augustine speaks with authority here; he has traversed all the ground of inspired writ, and shown us how true is its portraiture of man's life." (p. 18.)

The translation of these two new volumes of S. Augustine seems to be exceedingly well executed. There has been no attempt to re-write the original in a more modern dialect of thought, and therefore the English reads a little stiff and complicated at times, and requires some attention to catch its full meaning. But faithfulness more than makes up for whatever is wanting in ease and transparency. We will mention a few of the mistakes which we think we have detected. At the very commencement of the Anti-Pelagian volume it is a little unfortunate to render S. Augustine's humble phrase, "*nostrorum peccatorum*," by the words "the sin which is *inherent in us all*;" he merely means his own (actual) sins. At p. 166, the translator renders "*se sibi ad vivendum caput facit*" by "makes himself the chief aim of his life;" whereas it should be "makes himself the source of his own works." A little lower down on the same page the intrusion of the word "alone" makes S. Augustine talk unsound doctrine by seeming to say that all that can be done by a sinner is a sin. There is a curious mistranslation at p. 236. S. Augustine tells his correspondents that he has carefully read through the book which they had sent, interrupting, to some extent, what he was actually busy with (*intermissis paululum quæ in manibus erant*). What can have possessed Dr. Holmes that he should have rendered this clause, "omitting only the few points which are plain enough to everybody!" In the "Donatist" volume, at p. 32, Mr. King translates the epithet "*postea*

riore," applied to S. Paul, by "later"; whereas it is evident that in both the passages where it occurs, S. Augustine means "inferior" or lower, the context showing that he is praising S. Peter, the "primus," for yielding on one occasion to his subordinate. In addition to these slight slips, which we merely give as specimens, we had marked some dozen others which have fallen under our notice; but perhaps it is not worth while to mention them. We gladly bear witness to the evident desire and aim of the translators to be liberal and impartial, and to present S. Augustine to the English reader as he is, divested of all glosses that may have been put upon him either by heterodoxy or by orthodoxy. We think, of course, that it would be a much more profitable thing for theology if the present edition had been edited and translated by men who were both able to understand S. Augustine, and possessed of the Faith which alone can read him aright. The edition is colourless. There is hardly a note, the language is of Quaker coolness and neutrality, the prefaces are gentlemanly and unexciting, or if eloquent, eloquent on everything except the Church, the grace of Christ, and the sin of heresy. Still, we may well be thankful for what we have. S. Augustine, even though he be as dried up as a "specimen," cannot fail to make himself felt. When allowance has been made for all that is local or temporary, tedious or minute, in his immortal pages, there will still remain enough of the mighty thought of a great mind,—enough of that living power of enunciating undying principle, which has left him without a superior, and with only one or two rivals among the doctors of the Church.

Dr. Crombie's translation of "Origen against Celsus" seems to be faithful and intelligible. It is disappointing, as we read it, to feel how different the English idiom is from the original, and how tamely the sentences succeed each other in a work which, in the Greek, frequently reminds one of the sonorous rhythm of the "*Histoire Universelle*." But to reproduce the spirit of a work in a modern language is quite another thing from writing a readable translation for purposes of historical and theological study.

The small concluding volume of the "Ante-Nicene Series" presents us with a translation of the "Early Liturgies," and of several early liturgical fragments. The Liturgy of S. James, the Liturgy of S. Mark, and the Liturgy of the Holy Apostles are the only ones which the authors give at length. As to the Roman Liturgy, the editors say in their introductory notice:—"Some have attributed the authorship of the Roman Liturgy to Leo the Great, who was made Bishop of Rome in A.D. 451; some to Gelasius, who was made Bishop of Rome in A.D. 492; and some to Gregory the First, who was made Bishop of Rome in A.D. 590. Such being the opinions of those who have given most study to the subject, we have not deemed it necessary to translate it." (p. 5.) We never heard of any one who said that S. Gregory the Great was the author of the Roman Liturgy. What is certain is, as we are told by his contemporary biographer, that he reformed the Gelasian sacramentary by shortening it considerably, making a few changes, and some additions. And the Gelasian sacramentary itself was modelled on a yet older use. It would, therefore, have been well if the Roman Liturgy had not been omitted in this volume, if only to show its agreement in all essentials with the others. We have a pretty minute history of the Roman

Liturgy, extending far back to the times of the persecutions, and as we never find mentioned the institution of any of the important and essential parts, we may justly conclude that in all essentials it is Apostolic. Among the essential points which the editors admit to be common to all the ancient liturgies, without exception, is Prayer for the Dead. If ocular demonstration were of any use in controversy, we should hope that now, by degrees, the assertion that Prayer for the Dead is a Roman corruption will disappear from the *répertoire* of the Protestant platform.

Scripture Truth in Oriental Dress. By the Rev. J. LONG.
Calcutta : Thacker & Co.

THE author of this book, who has sent it to us from India for notice, is or was (for we hear that he has just retired), one of the most distinguished Protestant missionaries in India,—distinguished not so much for missionary work proper, though we believe that he was in no way behind-hand in this, but for the great influence he had acquired among the natives, by genuine interest manifested in their welfare; whence it arose that, being equally in the confidence of the Government, he not unfrequently acted as the interpreter of the wishes and opinions of the governed to their governors. Having travelled for some time in Russia, he had to a certain extent familiarized himself with the genius and habits of that people, the natural link between the European and the Asiatic; and of this knowledge he freely availed himself in dealing with the people of India. It is, we understand, to the interest with which he read certain articles which appeared in our pages for 1869 and 1870, on the subject of the new sect of Indian Theists, that we owe the transmission to us of the present volume for notice.

The principle of the book is to popularize the teaching of Scripture, by illustrations drawn from those Oriental proverbs and proverbial sayings which appeal at once to the sympathy of the common people. As the preface says, "Emblems, parables, pictures, proverbs are even in Europe regarded as of great value in instructing the masses; how much more ought they to be used in Eastern lands, where it is so important, in announcing new dogma, to fix them [*sic in orig.*] in the mind by illustrations which excite interest and arrest attention." Accordingly, some 250 of the principal texts in the Old and New Testament are selected, and accompanied with comments more or less full, showing how, in the opinion of the author, the truth inculcated by the text can be best brought home to an Oriental audience by illustrations and proverbs with which they are familiar. These skeleton sermons are followed by a collection of proverbs in use among various Oriental natives and tribes, with references to passages in Scripture which more or less closely correspond. The book appears to be entirely free from any anti-Catholic tendency, and in fact, in many cases the illustrations which, in simply following out his text, the

author gives, afford a very strong argument in favour of some characteristic Catholic principle. Thus, on the text Rev. i. 18, where our Lord, appearing to S. John, says that He has the keys of death and of hell, Mr. Long comments thus :—"Silence was represented by the Greeks as a golden key on the tongue. Christ said to Peter, I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven ; Mat. xvi. 19. As stewards of a great family, especially of the royal household, bore a key, probably a golden one, in token of their office, the phrase of giving a person a key naturally grew into an expression of raising him to great power. Is. xxii. 22 ; Rev. iii. 7. This was, with peculiar propriety, applicable to ministers, the stewards of the mysteries of God. 1 Cor. iv. 1. Peter's opening the kingdom of heaven, as being the first that preached it both to the Jews and the Gentiles, may be considered as an illustration of this promise ; as also the power given of binding and loosing ; authority to explain the law and the prophets was given among the Jews by the delivery of a key." And again, "In the East the carrying of a key on any great occasion was a mark of a person holding some office of rank and power."

Hence a Catholic missionary might use Mr. Long as his authority for laying the distinctive foundation of the Catholic religion by showing, from this expression alone, that our Saviour raised S. Peter to great power in His Church,—we might add *unique* power, since it cannot be contended that He ever made the faintest sign of conferring the possession of "the keys" on any one else. He might also prove that, to the nation to which S. Peter and the bystanders belonged, this commission implied in a special manner "authority to explain the Law and the Prophets," the germ, we need hardly point out, of the dogma of infallibility.

In other texts it is no less evident that, by omitting the Catholic sense of a text, the whole point of a simile is destroyed in Mr. Long's comments. Thus in one of the texts which compare the Church to the moon, under that very heading, he writes : "The moon receives her brightness from the sun ; she is dark herself and reflects his light. . . . Such is the *Christian* : he is dark himself, but reflects the light of his Lord. For the graces of Christ beheld by faith produce like graces in the soul. Christians are like the moon,—(1) Receive light from the sun. Christ is the Sun of righteousness—Mat. iv. 2. (2) Dispense what they receive—Mat. v. 14, &c. &c."

Now, properly considered from the Catholic point of view, no comparison could be more happy (if we may use the expression without any appearance of disrespect to the place where it is found) than that of the Church to the moon. While the sun is removed from our view, the moon acts as a medium for transmitting its light to us. We cannot obtain the light of revelation from the sun direct, as it is below the horizon ; but this light, not the full flood of light, such as we shall see it hereafter, when, as S. Paul says, we shall no longer see as in a glass darkly but face to face, but such light as Heaven vouchsafes for a guide to us, is all conveyed to us by the moon, and in such manner that while it appears to come to us from the moon, it in fact emanates from the sun, and is only reflected to us in a pure and undivided stream from the orb of the moon. So it is with the Catholic Church. Christ having ascended into heaven, has left us His Church, and set

it on high, above the world, that from it, a single whole and undivided teacher, we may obtain the light of His revelation. Yet this light, seeming as it does to come from the Church, is only the reflection of the light infused into it by the Author of light. Look to the moon, and you are at once placed in communication with the sun and receive its light; look anywhere else, and it is all darkness.

When, however, instead of the united body of the Church, the individuals who compose it are supposed, as is done by Mr. Long, to be signified by the moon, instantly the whole comparison fails; instead of one moon, you have thousands; instead of one vehicle for reflecting to us the divine light of revelation, you have a mob of dispensers, innumerable as the sand of the seashore, emitting sparks in every direction, which cross and conflict with one another, and bewilder the eyesight of those who try to walk by the light which they give out.

We need hardly mention that Mr. Long's system of teaching by emblems, pictures, and proverbs is most thoroughly Catholic; in fact, though adopted largely by Protestants in the present age, it is more than doubtful whether, in the last analysis, it is consistent with the fundamental principle of the Bible, and the Bible only, without note or comment. The work before us is one which will be found useful as a storehouse of illustration to the Catholic as well as the Protestant missionary.

A Guide to the Members of the Spiritual Union, established by the Ven. Domenico Gesu and Maria, General of the Discalced Carmelites. Translated from the Italian. By A. M. R. BENNETT. London: Burns & Oates.

A THOROUGHLY solid guide, based upon the work of the Rev. F. Dominic of Jesus and Mary, the object of which is to prepare the reader step by step to understand the advantages of spiritual union in prayer and good works. Thus the excellency of merit, the possibility of continually meriting, the renewal of our intention; how one single action may have several merits, and what is required in order to acquire several merits by one single action; the proportion between acts and intentions, desires, the extension of desires, and the deceptions which there may be in them; the union between our works and those of our Lord; the value of good works,—all these subjects are first placed before the reader, so that having mastered them he may be the better able to see in what the special form of spiritual union consists which is advocated in this work. In chapter xxi. will be found the articles of F. Dominic of Jesus and Mary, in which are contained the intentions which all men ought to have who are members of this union. The following extract will sufficiently explain its nature:—

“It is a pious society to which may be applied the words of S. Ambrose, *Dum singuli orant pro omnibus, etiam omnes orant pro singulis*. In this

devout alliance whilst one prays for all, all pray for him, and whilst I in the language of my prayer and my good works say, 'Lord, save me and all those of this sacred union'; all the other members of the union, with the same language, are begging of the same grace for me."—(Ch. xvi.)

It is not however necessary in order to enter into this union, either to inscribe one's name, or to perform any other outward ceremony. All that is required is the determination to join, as well as to conform to all the intentions of the venerable founder, who himself expressly intended to receive into this society all who shall be aggregated to it by any one member, although the names of such persons may remain unknown to the other members of the society.

We have no doubt that this little work, which is well translated, will do much good. We cannot too often remember that "one more degree of grace acquires a right to a proportionate degree of glory in Paradise, and that one degree more of glory in Paradise signifies nothing less than one Paradise more. Therefore S. Thomas asserts that one more degree only of grace is worth more than the whole heap of all temporal goods contained in the entire universe. *Bonum gratiæ unius majus est quam bonum naturæ totius universi.*"—(1. 2. q. 115. Art. ix. 2.)—(Ch. 1. p. 7.)

Education. A paper read by the Rev. GEORGE PYE, P.P., Glenavy and Killead, before the Academia, Belfast.

WE have read this paper with great interest. It is especially valuable as setting in a very clear light the extraordinary attitude of the Presbyterian body in the North of Ireland at the present moment in relation to education. Mr. Pye mentions two facts which have occurred within the memory of many of the present generation, and which may be taken as fair tests of the sincerity of the Presbyterian body in advocating State Education, of which they have lately shown themselves so greatly enamoured. We will leave Mr. Pye to tell his story, as far as our space will allow, in his own words:—

"I shall consider," he says, "the Presbyterian body as to its two great components—the Non-subscribing Presbyterians, and those who follow the Westminster Confession of Faith. The former cannot readily forget the agitation which was raised against them in the year 1844, when they were threatened with the confiscation of their manse and meeting-houses. . . . All the Catholics on that occasion felt that they were called upon to come to the relief of their Unitarian friends. The Catholics of Belfast and of the province of Ulster took a leading part in defence of the threatened rights of this small, but then undefended body. Sir R. Peel stated that the Catholic petition from Belfast had turned the scale in favour of the Unitarians. Now, I ask them to consider whether they admire more the action of the State, which was well-nigh depriving them of their just property, or the religious teaching and patriotism of the Catholics of Ireland, who saw that the State was about to pass a measure against a portion of

their fellow-subjects, in which they could not in conscience acquiesce. How can they declare, after this, that they will be content with nothing but State education? No doubt it is well understood that their religious code comprises very few points of a distinctive dogmatic character, which may be the motive that brings them at once more into harmony with education unaccompanied by religion. I know that if educational grants were given in strict proportion to the number of members who form the different religious communities throughout Ireland, their quota would look miserably small on paper. But surely they must be guided, in their opposition to Catholic claims, by a higher principle than this, even though gratitude towards their best friends did not provide a different course. While the Catholics of Ireland acted thus towards the Non-Subscribing Presbyterians, it was not from a spirit of hostility to those who hold the Westminster Confusion of Faith; for this latter body will remember that during the passing of the Marriages Bill, Parliament dubbed their ministers unordained teachers, and their children the offspring of bastardy. I know they will pardon this *parrhesia* of mine, for I only mean to recall the independent and generous action of the Catholics of this kingdom at that time, who did not suffer this foul brand to become the heritage of the children of Presbyterian marriages. Can they ever forget the contrast that was presented between the Catholics and Protestants of Ireland on that trying occasion? In and out of Parliament the voice of the Catholic nation was raised against the injustice and insult which threatened the entire Presbyterian body. And will they, after that, still clamour for State control in matters of education,—a control under which they might have been deprived of the privileges and honours of social life? If they must kiss the rod that was raised to strike, let them not turn upon those who saved them from its infliction." (pp. 11—13.)

This is well put, and is only another proof how much more truly liberal (we use the word, of course, in its proper sense) Catholics are than members of any other so-called religious body; but we fear that there is something in the North of Ireland stronger than gratitude, and that is hatred of God's Church,—hatred which not only blots out of the memory of the Presbyterians the acts of kindness done to them by Catholics in the past, but forces them, regardless of all inconsistency, to sacrifice even their own interests, in order that the Catholic Church may be deprived of her rights. There are no words more frequently on the lips of Irish Presbyterians than "No priestly dictation! No clerical control!" "No clerical control, indeed!" writes Mr. Pye. "Why, it is as rampant amongst the Protestants of Ulster as in any other part of Ireland. Take the Queen's College in Belfast, and you will find to the number of deans and professors proportionately as many ministers as you can name priests in the Catholic University of Dublin." (p. 6.)

We cannot conclude these remarks without adding a few words from a recent speech of the Bishop of Elphin, as quoted by Mr. Pye:—"There are 20,000 Protestant children of all denominations in Belfast, and such is the zeal of their parents and pastors for a practically denominational system, that *not one single* Protestant child is permitted to attend a National School in which literary instruction is imparted by a Catholic." Yet the Presbyterians are advocates of the mixed system. How is this? There is only one answer. The mixed system which they advocate is that under which, while they will not allow Protestant children to be taught

by Catholic teachers, Catholic children shall attend Protestant schools, and be taught by Protestant masters! The whole paper is vigorously written, and we recommend it to the notice of all who take an interest in the present crisis of Catholic education in Ireland.

Graduale de Tempore et de Sanctis, juxta Rítum Sacro-Sanctæ Romanæ Ecclesiæ, cum Cantu Pauli V., Pont. Max., jussu reformato. Cui addita sunt Officia postea approbata, sub auspiciis Sanctissimi Domini nostri Pii P.P. IX., curante Sac. Rituum Congregatione. Cum privilegio. Ratisbonæ, Neo-Eboraci, et Cincinnati sumptibus, chartis, et typis FRIDERICI PUSTET, S. Sedis Apost. et Sac. Rituum Congregationis Typographi. 1872.

WE wish to call immediate attention to the above, which is the first of a set of Gregorian choir books which are coming out under the special supervision of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, hoping later on to give a more detailed account of what promises to exert a powerful influence on the choral part of the offices of the Church. And we do so for two reasons—1st, because of the high authority *intrinsically* which this edition possesses; and, 2nd, because of the *extrinsic* authority with which it is accompanied. We say *intrinsic* because it is not an adaptation of the Roman, nor a reprint of any local Gregorian chant for the liturgy, but because it is a faithful re-issue of the great “*Editio Medicea*,” printed in Rome under Paul V., in 1614, which has continued to be the standard there ever since. We say *extrinsic* because it is not only “under the auspices of His Holiness Pius IX.,” but also is brought out “under the supervision of the Sacred Congregation of Rites”; while the decree, which we give in full, accompanying its publication, “specially recommends it to the ordinaries, that by their adopting it in their dioceses, the wished-for uniformity in the sacred liturgy may be obtained, even in the chant.”

RATISBONEN.

Perillustris D. Eques Fridericus Pustet, a Sanctissimo Domino nostro Pio Papa IX. titulo Typographi Sanctæ Sedis ac etiam Sacrorum Rituum Congregationis pro editione tantum Gradualis, Antiphonarii et aliorum Librorum Gregoriani Cantus condecoratus, pulcherrimâ et magnificâ Editione jam ad exitum perduxit primum volumen Gradualis ad instar Editionis Mediceæ. Et licet eadem Editio expensis et laboribus supradicti Typographi lucem aspexerit, tamen quoniam directâ fuit singulari diligentia a Commissione peculiari ab eadem Sacra Rituum Congregatione deputatâ, et continet Cantum Gregorianum, quem semper Ecclesia Romana retinuit, proindeque ex traditione conformior haberi potest illi, quem in Sacram Liturgiam Summus Pontifex S. Gregorius Magnus invexerat, ideo eadem Sacra Rituum Congregatio Reverendissimis Ordinariis præfatam Editionem summo opere

commendat ut eam adoptantes in suis Diocesisibus exoptata uniformitas in Sacra Liturgiâ etiam in cantu obtineri valeat.

Die 14 Augusti, 1871.

The history of the undertaking is this :—The well-known Ratisbon publisher Pustet, hearing that the question of bringing out a new edition of the Roman Gregorian Chant for the various offices was before the S. Congregation of Rites, offered himself to execute any plan they might determine upon. The Congregation, after duly weighing the proposal, determined to give him an exclusive privilege for thirty years, on condition that he should do two things—1st, reproduce the recognized standard Roman edition in the same form, and at least as magnificently as the original ; and, 2nd, complete the same by adding the chant to all the new offices granted since 1614, while not a single sheet was to pass to press until it received the approval of the Committee of the S. Congregation. The publisher accepted this, engaging to bear the whole expense. The war between France and Germany retarded the execution of the great folio edition, and he applied to the Congregation for leave to bring out the same in 8vo. form, in order to meet the heavy expense of the original attempt, which has since been realized in the issue of the 1st vol. of the folio Gradual this year. The work in both forms can be seen, and (we need not add) also had, at Messrs. Burns & Oates, Portman-street ; and the folio edition especially is worth a visit merely to see. We believe that though this century has, especially in France, seen several editions of the Gradual appear, not one can compare with the present one in style and execution ; indeed, we do not think that a single one is printed in red and black, a thing that not only gives such beauty to the old choir books, but very considerably assists the eye in following the music, especially when the singers are grouped round a lectern, reading from one large book.

We have spoken of a set of the officially recognized choir books in course of publication, under the same direction and by the same Editor. They are as follows :

1. *Graduale de Tempore et de Sanctis, &c.*, as above. Folio and 8vo., red and black.

N.B.—The “*Ordinarium Missæ*,” containing all the invariable portions of the Mass, e. g. *Kyrie, Gloria, Credo, &c.*, for the different classes of Feasts, for the Sundays, Ferias, and the “*Missa pro Defunctis*,” is published separately in both sizes. In the folio it costs about 10s.

2. *Directorium Chori*, which is in the press, in 8vo., red and black, taken from a MS. officially approved of by the S. Congregation of Rites.

3. *Vesperale Romanum*.

4. *Hebdomada Sancta*.

5. *Antiphonarium Romanum*, which will complete the set.

The organ accompaniment for the *Ordinarium Missæ* is already complete. It is the intention of the publisher to set the whole of the Gradual to music for accompanying. Another fact will interest. This splendid edition in folio is printed on three different sorts of paper : the two first we have before us ; we have written for the third. The first is on machine-made paper, and costs £5. The second, on paper made by hand, very superior in

appearance and in strength, a thing to be considered in large choral books, costs £7. 10s. The third, of which a very limited number of copies is promised, costs £10.

Our sympathies cannot but be with everything emanating from the Apostolic See; and here we have the highest authority in the Sacred Rites of the Church expressing at least a strong wish ("summopere commendat") that the adoption of this, not local, but general, edition of the Gradual, may perfect the work which has been at last all but universally achieved ("*uniformitas* in Sacra Liturgia"), by producing also uniformity in the musical rendering of the one great Liturgy of the West. This is at least an appeal to the *adhesion* of all Catholics: we do not venture to say *adoption*.

Another suggestion we would make:—There is a general feeling that our music, especially for the Holy Mass, is very incongruous, and that a change must be made, and in an ecclesiastical direction. And supposing that the decree of the Provincial Synod of Westminster in 1852 were enforced, a gap would at once be made by one of its provisions, viz., the exclusion of female voices ("ut *fœminarum*, maxime *pretio conductarum*, in choro *concentus*, ab *Ecclesiis* *excludantur*") being carried into effect; the singing of the indubitable music of the Church, which the "*Cantus Gregorianus*" certainly is, would tell upon the boys' school of any mission ("*Pueri etiam musicen in scholis edoceantur*"); and thus the necessity created for male singers would produce a healthier tone in the male portion of our congregations, and to sing in the choir would become a proper aspiration among the boys.

Indulgences, Sacramental Absolutions, and the Tax Tables of the Roman Chancery and Penitentiary considered, in Reply to the Charge of Venality. By the Rev. T. L. GREEN, D.D. London: Longmans. 1872.

THE present generation, whatever its merits may be, is most certainly not without its troubles. It may have clear lights about commerce, and sound views of political economy, but it nurtures a good many people in whom common sense has little sway. A good many people think it highly scientific, and far more learned than its predecessors; and there is a general consent that it is far more highly gifted than any other, and that knowledge was never more universal or more certain. In spite of all this, it is labouring under one delusion, and that is, that it understands the Catholic religion better than those who believe it and try to practise it. Everywhere throughout the world we find men—and unfortunately they are too often men with power in their hands—who, absolute strangers to the Faith, tell us that they know what the Church teaches, and what she ought not, or cannot, teach. The Prince Von Bismarck in this respect differs not from the most obscure dissenting preacher in the most obscure corner of the earth.

It may be painful, but it cannot be astonishing, to learn that in Wolverhampton, in the diocese of Birmingham, a man was found—it will excite no surprise to be told that he was “an influential member of the Town Council,”—about five years ago maintaining that it was possible to purchase indulgences and absolutions for money, and that they were even cheap, some as low as two shillings; he added also the very useful information, probably inaccessible to anybody lower in dignity than a town councillor, that a man or woman who had judiciously traded in the market might, in virtue of indulgences purchased, “commit any sin, from reading the Bible to murder, with impunity.” Well, certainly, in that case, we should expect the “impunity” as a matter of course; for we see no advantage whatever in spending our money in the purchase of an indulgence, when intent on murder, if “impunity” could not be guaranteed; the money without it would be thrown away.

This admirable Town Councillor—we regret that Dr. Green has not given us his name, for he deserves to be handed over to posterity—does not tell us whether reading the Bible be a very great offence or only a small one; and we also are left in the dark as to the number and nature of the offences and their names which fill the gap between it and murder; that is probably a knowledge that will never be vouchsafed to us.

A great many people, like the illustrious Town Councillor, have maintained that an indulgence is leave to commit sin or sins, and a great many people also have been asked to prove that assertion. Hitherto we say, not with any special satisfaction—for we see none in it—the proof has been kept back. Dr. Green was very nearly being rewarded for his researches, for Mr. Collette offered to enlighten his ignorance, or, as Mr. Collette might naturally believe, his pretended ignorance, seeing that Dr. Green must have been by that time a prosperous trader in indulgences and absolutions.

Mr. Collette was very confident; he had by laborious study and immense learning discovered a very common book, in fact, a dictionary, nothing else but the “*Prompta Bibliotheca*” of Ferraris. It is, of course, a book kept very secret among us; for it has gone through many editions, and we believe has been twice reprinted within the last twenty years, notwithstanding its bulk. Mr. Collette’s sagacity was too much for our secrecy, and he was also able to use the book, having apparently discovered that the key to its contents was a knowledge of the order in which the letters of the alphabet are arranged in Latin. Having got the book and mastered the principle on which it is methodized, Mr. Collette discovered the word “*Indulgentia*” in its proper place, and in large type; but he was well aware that the discovery was not an easy one, and so he told the world that the long-desired proof was to be found in a certain volume of the work in question, and on a certain page. That is the history of the great discovery.

Now for the fact. Mr. Collette quotes a passage from the Dictionary of Ferraris, and to his mind it is a conclusive proof that Indulgences are, or were, sold, and that Indulgences are also permissions to commit sin. He is quite satisfied that he has found us out. “I maintain,” he said, “if I hold a plenary indulgence, that it operates for the past and present, with a

clean sheet to commence again ; but if I hold a present indulgence of the above form, 'to be valid for all future times,' I need not get the license renewed, for it operates as a forgiveness of all future punishments for future sins to be hereafter committed." (Intro., p. viii.)

Nothing can be plainer than this. Mr. Collette explains the effect of the "form," and is quite satisfied with his conclusions. Indeed, he has no doubts whatever, for he gives the form, and what is more to the purpose—at least to his purpose—he translates it into English as follows : of course, it is the latter portion of a Papal Brief :—

"We mercifully grant in the Lord a plenary Indulgence and remission of all their sins, by these presents, to be valid for all future times, with a power of applying the same plenary Indulgence to the souls in purgatory." (Intro., p. vii.)

That is highly satisfactory for the living sinner, but we do not see the use of it for the souls in purgatory, seeing that they cannot sin. That has probably escaped the researches of Mr. Collette, so we leave it.

There can be no doubt that Mr. Collette was sincere, and that he believed all this, for he quoted his document in Latin. The translation was for the service of his friends, to whom the knowledge of the Latin tongue is a science beyond their reach. Here are the words in Latin :—

"Plenariam omnium peccatorum suorum Indulgentiam et remissionem misericorditer in Domino concedimus, presentibus, perpetuis, futuris, temporibus valituris, cum facultate etiam eandem plenariam indulgentiam applicandi animabus in purgatorio."

It is a great pity that this document was not accepted at once, and in the sense of Mr. Collette. Dr. Green thought otherwise ; and he has in the most ruthless manner pointed out that the translation itself requires every possible indulgence, because it sins, as the saying is, against a rule of grammar which admits of no dispensation. It is true Mr. Collette might have revived an Oxford doctrine current there before the end of the thirteenth century, by which his translation might be supported ; for the learned disputants in grammar there maintained that *ego currit* was perfectly good Latin when Kilwardby and Peckham were Archbishops of Canterbury. Dr. Green spoils the whole affair, and observes that Mr. Collette "has applied the term *valituris*—a participle in the ablative case—to the terms *indulgentiam et remissionem*,—substantives in the accusative,—an essential rule of grammar is against him." (p. x.) This is the mischief : grammar is against the discovery.

It does not appear that Mr. Collette has ever expressed an opinion on the interpretation which Dr. Green gives, and we are therefore unable to say whether he thinks it necessary to respect the rules of grammar in his exposition of Papal Letters.

But Dr. Green's book is not to be judged of by this discovery of Mr. Collette, and the further discovery of its worthlessness. The book is really a learned, calm, and clear discussion of the doctrine of Indulgences, written in a most sober style—exhibiting in every line the most careful conscientiousness. It is clearly a work done with great pains, and nobody

can read it without either learning something new, or having his learning already in possession made more his own by the singular minuteness with which the learned doctor has entered into his subject. He has exposed the blunders of Mr. Collette and men of that mint, that is true; but he has also done much more than that: for he has explained many points about which, ordinarily, men's knowledge is wont to be hazy. He has put forth most clearly, and yet most concisely, the doctrine of Indulgences, and explained it so that children might understand it. He has further taken pains to tell us what the *Taxæ Cancellariæ*, &c., really mean, so that even the most obstinate heretic is left without excuse, if he were to maintain that there is in Rome a tariff of sins. He has done a good service also by exposing the dishonest dealings of heretics with the book in question, which being nothing else but the table of fees to be paid for the parchments and the writing therein, was interpolated and altered for evil ends. It would be as true to say that the English judges sell justice, as it would be to say that the Pope does so; and nobody dreams of throwing dirt on the ermine, as men say. Well, the papers and writs necessary for a lawsuit in England have to be paid for, not to the lawyers only whom a client employs, but to the officers of the court also. But we pay more in England than they do in Rome, and there are in Rome many papers of great importance which can be had for nothing, for no payment whatever; and we have never heard that an English court of justice issues out any papers whatever without payment, unless it be blank forms, which in that state can be of no great service to anybody.

In one thing we are not able to agree with Dr. Green; he has not been just to Tetzel in our opinion.

"The principal delinquents, however, were the eleemosynary questors: and their offences were of various kinds. . . . One of the most notorious of their number was a Dominican friar, named Tetzel." (p. 124.)

In another place (p. 127) he speaks of the "*puffs* of Tetzel." For our own part we disbelieve the stories told of Tetzel; they are on the face of them utterly incredible, and they come to us from a drunken friar and his friends. Of course if there be untainted testimony against him, let him be given him up to the censures he deserves; but if not, we should be inclined to believe, and we do believe, that he was a holy and learned friar, probably a man of great repute in his order, and most certainly of blameless life. Heretics and revolutionists do not usually attack bad men: they respect them and leave them alone, if it be dangerous to use them. It is against good men, against the servants of God, that they hurl their arrows. To us it seems certain that Tetzel would never have been spoken against as he has been if he had not been a much better man, more holy and more learned, than his adversaries, who were neither the one nor the other.

On this subject we beg our readers to read again what was written in this REVIEW for July, 1867; or, what is more to the purpose, the work of Dr. Gröne, on what the observations then made were grounded.

Thoughts on some Passages of Holy Scripture, by a Layman. Translated from the French. Edited by JOHN EDWARD BOWDEN, Priest of the Oratory of S. Philip Neri. London: Burns & Oates. 1872.

THIS little book contains in the most unpretending form twenty-four reflections on various passages or events in the Old and New Testaments. They are not exactly either sermons, or meditations, or commentaries, but partake of the character of all three. The author's preface informs us that they are the private notes of a father of a family, never intended to be published. This accounts for the fact that he has followed no fixed order or system. We are glad that he was prevailed on to publish them. He has not aimed at anything very deep or very original, but he has expressed in a fresh and simple style the reflections of a devout and thoughtful Catholic reader of Holy Scripture.

His little book is a useful contribution towards a kind of spiritual reading much needed for devout people in the world, and we could have wished there were more of it.

Shall France perish? A Sermon delivered by His Lordship the BISHOP OF POITIERS, in the Cathedral Church of Tours, at the opening of the Solemn Triduum in honour of B. Jeanne Marie de Maillé, on Sunday, April 7, 1872. Translated from the French, with the permission of the Author, by a SECULAR PRIEST. Together with a Sketch of the Life of the Servant of God. London, Dublin, and Derby: Richardson & Son.

THE Holy See has few more vigorous supporters, the Church of France few more eloquent Bishops than Mgr. Pie. We trust therefore that this striking sermon of his will obtain both for the Holy See and for France many heartfelt prayers from English and Irish readers. The mediæval Saint whose *cultus* has recently been approved of by the Holy Father, gives the Bishop occasion in this sermon to contrast mediæval and modern times, and to point out that the great superiority of the former over the latter consists in this, that notwithstanding many undoubted evils, the Christian principle was then in a marked manner the principle of all, and on the foundation of this principle it was always possible for order when disturbed, to be re-established. In those days men kept their baptism; in other words, the principle of faith. We may add that the Bishop of Poitiers seems to us to form a far truer estimate of modern times than Père Gratry, in the work which we have already noticed. There are many eloquent passages in this sermon. Prefixed to it is a Sketch of the Life of B. J. M. de Maillé, whose name deserves to be held in reverence by all nations for the great services she rendered to the Church and the Holy See in the fourteenth century.

Those who are acquainted with the other publications of the "Secular Priest," will know how thoroughly they may trust the faithfulness of this translation, and at the same time how spirited and vernacular they will find its English.

Catholic Progress: The Journal of the Young Men's Catholic Association.
London: Burns & Oates.

IN April we expressed a hope, that we might give in our present number a detailed account of the first six issues of this spirited Journal. In order to do this however, it would be necessary to consider its May and June articles on the higher education of English Catholics; for this is a subject, which no other can exceed in importance. But it seems to us, that under existing circumstances we cannot with propriety comment on those articles; and we reserve therefore further notice of the periodical to some future occasion.

The Damnatory Clauses of the Athanasian Creed rationally Explained in a Letter to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P. By the Rev. MALCOLM MACCOLL, M.A., Rector of St. George, Botolph-lane, with St. Botolph-by-Billinggate. Rivingtons: London, Oxford, and Cambridge.

MR. MACCOLL has contributed what seems on the whole a forcibly-argued and eloquently-written volume to the agitation now rising in the Church of England for the abolition of the Athanasian Creed, in the form of a letter to the Prime Minister. The subject is one with which we hope to deal at greater length in our next number; but meantime such of our readers as take an interest in the controversy, will doubtless acquaint themselves with Mr. MacColl's work, written as it is in defence of those diminishing Catholic verities which the Church of England still respects. A great part of the book was revised while in proof by Dr. Newman; and we observe in a note that Mr. MacColl also consulted Dr. Murray, of Maynooth, as to the exact authority attributed to the Athanasian Creed in the Church of Rome.

It is so rare to find such pains taken to be accurate in the representation of Roman Catholic doctrine by writers who are not Roman Catholics, that we cannot but be touched by the love of truth and the good feeling which it shows. There is one eminently amusing episode in the discussion, in which the writer deals with Mr. Ffoulkes's characteristically obtuse and grotesque supposition that the Athanasian Creed was a joint forgery of Charlemagne, Alcuin, and Paulinus. We elsewhere notice F. Jones's comment on this theory; and Mr. MacColl, with great wit and equal point, shows its ludicrous absurdity. We have not had time to master the volume as a whole; but we hope to do it more ample justice when we are able to consider the question in general.

The House of Yorke. By M. A. T. New York : The Catholic Publishing Society. London : Burns, Oates, & Co.

THIS is a work of fiction, into which are introduced the leading scenes in the persecution of a Jesuit Father and his people in the State of Maine, during the Know-Nothing Movement of 1854. We are told by the author in the Preface that every temptation to embellish the true story has been resisted, and that even striking incidents have been left out, because they chiefly concerned persons who prefer that God alone should know what they have suffered for the faith. We are also told that the roots of the Know-Nothing Movement have not been destroyed, and that they are even now preparing to start forth again in a more vigorous growth. That this may very well be the case we can easily believe from the description of American thought and feeling given in this interesting work ; but if so, it will not be with the same result, for we are informed that American Catholics will not again submit to such a persecution. Of course, it would not be fair to criticize a work like the present according to the standard of ordinary fiction ; but even as a work of fiction, we can safely say that the unity and the interest are well sustained throughout. The interest certainly never flags, while the descriptions of character are life-like and real. For ourselves, we can bear witness that the work now before us has enabled us to understand American society, and the relation in which the Church stands to it, better than any other work we remember to have read. The author has not only a thoroughly Catholic, but also a thoroughly artistic mind,—advantages not always to be found combined in American writers of fiction. At the same time, religion is never thrust forward awkwardly, nor are we treated to dissertations upon art. The author shows us how things really are in America, yet we feel all the while that the story is being told us by one who is endowed both with a religious and richly-cultivated mind. Here is a specimen of the author's artistic taste, combined with a love of nature :—

“He affected not to notice her emotion. ‘All I have done in this house has been a labour of love and delight,’ he said, and led her to a picture which bore the mark of his own exquisite brush, the only picture on the walls. ‘This is to remember Carl by,’ he said. ‘It is painted partly from nature, partly from a description of the scene. It is a glimpse into what was called Kentucky Barrens.’ An opening in a forest of luxuriant beech, ash, and oak-trees showed a level of rich green, profusely flower-sprinkled. The morning sky was of a pure blue, with thin flocks of white cloud, and everything was thickly laden with dew. The fringe of the picture glittered with light, but all the centre was overshadowed by a vast slanting canopy of messenger-pigeons, settling towards the earth. The sunlight on their glossy backs glanced off in brilliant azure reflections, looking as though a cataract of sapphires were flowing down the sky. Here and there a ray of sunshine broke through the screen of their countless wings, and lit up a flower or a bit of green. An oriole was perched on a twig in the foreground, and from the hanging-nest close by

his mate pushed a pretty head and throat. Startled by the soft thunder of that winged host, they gazed out at it from the safe covert of their leafy home."

Or again the following, where religious feeling enters in as well :—

"He looked out thoughtfully, and she sat looking at him. At length he said, with a faint smile, 'I wrote you last year of a visit I paid to the island and cave of Capri. That scene is like my past life. That cave was an enchanted place, so fair, so blue, so unreal. All ordinary critical sense deserted me as I gazed. I could easily have believed that the walls and ceilings were of jewels, and the watery floor some magical blue wine. As I sat in the boat and looked back, I saw a white star in the distance. Everything but that, and a long white ray from it was blue. I rowed toward that star, I looked at it as my goal, just as I made you my goal. But when I came near, I found it was no star. It was only the low entrance to the cave, or rather to me it was the passage to sunshine and the heavens. And that you have been to me, Edith,' he said, turning toward her. 'Thank God that your influence with me has always been for good, and that in leaving you, I progress rather than change. You inspired me, and kept me from what was low when I had no religion to help me. I can see it all now. The very excess and enthusiasm of my affection for you was necessary in order to govern me and keep me from harm. Besides, it is my nature to do with my might what my hands find to do. I was not then capable of resolving to do right for the sake of right; but when I was strong enough, then you drew aside, and left me face to face with God.'"

The description of the Know-Nothing Movement at Seaton, where Father Rasle is tarred and feathered, and where Edith crosses the river on the logs and boom in order to try and save him, is well written, and free from exaggeration; but it is too long for us to do more than allude to it. Not the least charm about the book is the quiet humour which pervades it; as, for example, in the chapter where the Hardshell Baptist and the Universalist Ministers break down in the coach; and while the former emerges from the mud, covered with a complete domino of clay and water, and with his ankle sprained, the latter, stepping out on a blanket and cushion, reaches the roadside in safety, and sets out in the neatest of boots to the town where they were both expected to preach. Through some mistake the Universalist is directed to the Baptist Chapel, and astonishes the Hardshells with a text from the Koran, and quotations from S. John of the Cross and Ecce Homo.

Or take the following lines :—

"Poor Sally Patten was not nearly so cruel as she appeared. In truth, she had never laid the weight of her hand upon her husband. *But then, he was always afraid she would.*" (p. 63.)